



# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



19 May – 31 May 2011

**DTRA**

## **BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)**

### **S. Korean, U.S. forces Discuss Joint Drill against Bioterrorism**

*Yonhap News Agency, 26 May 2011, [english.yonhapnews.co.kr](http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr)*

Military officers from South Korea and the United States were in discussions to hold their first joint exercise aimed at testing their ability to cope with bioterrorism activities, officials said Thursday. (163 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## **CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)**

### **ANCDF Completes Ton Container Operations**

*U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 19 May 2011, [www.cma.army.mil](http://www.cma.army.mil)*

Disposal operations for the 108 bulk containers filled with mustard agent concluded today when the last “ton container” exited the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) Metal Parts Furnace. (405 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Blue Grass X-ray Assessment 41 Percent Complete**

*U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 23 May 2011, [www.cma.army.mil](http://www.cma.army.mil)*

Blue Grass Chemical Activity (BGCA) crews report 41 percent of the total X-ray assessment operation is complete as of Wednesday, May 18. (197 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Director-General Addresses Conferences in Switzerland**

*Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 25 May 2011, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org)*

The Director-General of the OPCW, H.E. Mr. Ahmet Üzümcü, visited Switzerland from May 23-24, 2011 where he spoke at several conferences and events in Geneva and Interlaken. (290 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **First Building Operational at Richmond's Chemical Agent Destruction Plant**

*The Kentucky Herald, 31 May 2011, [www.kentucky.com](http://www.kentucky.com)*

The fire water pump house at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant was declared operational Thursday at Blue Grass Army Depot. (318 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Russia Eliminates 50 Percent of Chemical Arsenal**

*Global Security Newswire, 31 May 2011; [www.globalsecuritynewswire.org](http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org)*

Russia has eliminated more than 50 percent of its original stockpile of approximately 40,000 metric tons of chemical warfare materials... (153 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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## IAEA SAFEGUARDS

### **NSG Should Lead by Example on Sensitive Technology Transfers**

*States News Service, 31 May 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

When the participating governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) convene in June under the chairmanship of the Netherlands, they will face an especially difficult and thorny agenda. (1,426 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## NEW START TREATY (NST)

### **Russia Cuts Nuclear Arsenal Faster than Required**

*Reuters, 01 June 2011, <http://in.reuters.com/>*

Russia has already cut its nuclear arsenal below the level required in an arms control treaty [New START] signed with the United States last year, according to figures released by the U.S. State Department on Wednesday. (349 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center**

*U.S. Department of State, 01 June 2011, [www.state.gov/t/avc/nrrc](http://www.state.gov/t/avc/nrrc)*

An interagency team led by the Director of the Department of State's Nuclear Risk Reduction Center [NRRRC] has returned from consultations held in Moscow, Russia, between the Center and its counterpart in the Russian Federation. (119 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## OPEN SKIES TREATY (OS)

### **Tu-214 Open Skies Performs its Maiden Flight**

*Russian Aviation, 02 June 2011, [www.ruaviation.com](http://www.ruaviation.com)*

The duration of Tu-214OS's first flight was 1 hour 22 minutes. (255 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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## PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT DISPOSITION AGREEMENT (PMDA)

### **State Duma Ratifies Russian-U.S. Plutonium Disposition Agreement**

*Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 23 May 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

The State Duma on Friday ratified the Russian-U.S. Plutonium Disposition Agreement and two protocols to it. (313 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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*Yonhap News Agency, 26 May 2011, [english.yonhapnews.co.kr](http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr)*

Military officers from South Korea and the United States were in discussions to hold their first joint exercise aimed at testing their ability to cope with bioterrorism activities, officials said Thursday.

The allies hold a series of military drills against a possible North Korean invasion every year but have never conducted a joint exercise solely for the purpose of dealing with bioterrorism threats.

Called "Able Response 2011", the three-day discussions that started Wednesday involve senior defense officials from the two nations, including Andrew Weber, U.S. assistant to the secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, officials said.

"In the wake of this week's discussions, South Korea and the United States plan to develop ways to hold a joint exercise against bioterrorism," said Yang Young-mo, a senior official at Seoul's defense ministry.

South Korea and the United States agreed to hold the discussions last year. The move doesn't indicate, however, that bioterrorism threats from North Korea are growing, Yang said. [...]

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## ANCDF Completes Ton Container Operations

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 19 May 2011, [www.cma.army.mil](http://www.cma.army.mil)

Disposal operations for the 108 bulk containers filled with mustard agent concluded today when the last “ton container” exited the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) Metal Parts Furnace.

The disposal campaign took 63 days. A ton container is almost seven feet long. It has a diameter of 30 and one-half inches. Each ton container can hold approximately 170 gallons of mustard agent, a chemical that causes severe burns and blisters on exposed skin.

Though few in number, the 108 ton containers accounted for more than 18,300 gallons of agent. Considering the next demilitarization campaign at the ANCDF involves 105mm projectiles, Anniston ton container operations were the equivalent of processing more than 37,400 of the 15.7-inch long artillery shells.

Timothy K. Garrett, government site project manager, said, “Our on-going safe disposal operations in general, and our ton container campaign in particular, continue to demonstrate to our community and to all who have oversight responsibilities of our project that we are a professional, well-trained team committed to the safe conclusion of our mission.”

The facility will continue to routinely process agent contamination waste as ton container operations conclude. Also, a maintenance day has been scheduled for early next week to support work by Alabama Power Company as the utility company interrupts power for less than one day. ANCDF design and engineering features include battery and generator backup capabilities to ensure the site maintains required safety and security systems.

Kenneth R. Ankrom, URS (Westinghouse Anniston) plant manager, said “Even though the ton container campaign was relatively brief, we put the same planning, preparations, and attention to detail as with any previous campaign. Safety and environmental compliance remain our top priority regardless of the campaign duration.”

ANCDF’s demilitarization of 105mm projectiles will start in a few days.

Anniston Chemical Activity (ANCA) employees have the responsibility of safely storing the Anniston chemical munitions stockpile. They are also responsible for safely moving the munitions from storage igloos to the ANCDF. To date, they have safely moved more than 642,250 munitions and containers.

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Since disposal operations began in August 2003, ANCDF operators have processed 638,225 nerve agent and mustard agent-filled munitions and containers. That accounts for almost 97 percent of the entire Anniston chemical munitions stockpile.

Referencing just the mustard-filled munitions, ANCDF operators have processed 276,423 of those munitions and containers. So far, 92.2 percent of Anniston's mustard stockpile has been demilitarized.

All disposal operations are expected to conclude later this year.

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*U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 23 May 2011, [www.cma.army.mil](http://www.cma.army.mil)*

Blue Grass Chemical Activity (BGCA) crews report 41 percent of the total X-ray assessment operation is complete as of Wednesday, May 18.

BGCA began X-ray assessment operations of 155mm mustard agent-filled munitions within the Chemical Limited Area on May 9. A total of 176 rounds were selected to be assessed.

The X-ray operation is a joint effort between BGCA, the U.S. Army 20<sup>th</sup> Support Command Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive Analytical and Remediation Activity [CARA], and the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project.

The operation is being conducted at the request of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) and the U.S. Army Element, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA), the program responsible for the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile stored at the Blue Grass Army Depot, to help identify what portion of the stockpiled mustard munitions contain a “heel” of solidified agent, and may provide insight related to difficulties in removing bursters from the projectiles.

The data collected from the operation will be given to CMA and ACWA to determine the path forward for safely and efficiently destroying these munitions. The X-ray operation is on schedule to be complete by the end of June.

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## Director-General Addresses Conferences in Switzerland

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 25 May 2011, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org)

The Director-General of the OPCW, H.E. Mr. Ahmet Üzümcü, visited Switzerland from May 23-24, 2011 where he spoke at several conferences and events in Geneva and Interlaken.

Ambassador Üzümcü gave a keynote speech at the 14<sup>th</sup> Annual Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference, held at Interlaken. The conference brought together chemical disarmament professionals from around the world as well as diplomats dealing with the OPCW.

“Since entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention more than 65 percent of the 71,000 metric tonnes of chemical warfare agents declared to the OPCW have been destroyed under international verification by the OPCW – including the entire stockpiles of three States Parties,” the Director-General said in his statement, which he called “an unprecedented achievement in the history of disarmament.”

In Geneva the Director-General was invited to address the Conference on Disarmament (CD) by the CD President, Ambassador Wang Qun of China, and its former President, Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada. In his address Ambassador Üzümcü referred to the Chemical Weapons Convention as the CD’s last major success story in terms of negotiations.

“The Chemical Weapons Convention resulted from a common vision of a world forever free from chemical weapons” he said. “It was concluded successfully because all negotiating parties were prepared to make compromises for the sake of consensus.”

During his visit the Director-General met with the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, H.E. Mr. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. He also gave presentations at both the Geneva Center for Security Policy, and at the Geneva School of Diplomacy where he holds an honorary doctorate.

Before taking up his duties with the OPCW, Director-General Üzümcü was the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations Organizations in Geneva and in 2008 held the CD Presidency.

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## First Building Operational at Richmond's Chemical Agent Destruction Plant

*The Kentucky Herald*, 31 May 2011, [www.kentucky.com](http://www.kentucky.com)

A chemical weapons stockpile of about 520 tons being stored in Kentucky is one step closer to destruction. The fire water pump house at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant was declared operational Thursday at Blue Grass Army Depot.

Site project manager Jeff Brubaker said Richmond's plant is one of nine similar chemical agent destruction projects – four have been completed, three are in the process of destroying chemical agents and one other facility, in Pueblo, Colorado, also is in the construction phase. The agents have been stored at the Richmond depot since the 1960s, Brubaker said, and over time degrade and pose a greater chance of leaking, thus creating a need to destroy them.

The completed pump house will provide process water for the chemical destruction and water for fire suppression should the need ever arise, Brubaker said. The structure consists of two 250,000-gallon tanks filled with water and the pump house itself.

Public affairs specialist Stephanie Parrett said the plant's construction is set to be completed in 2016, and destruction of the stockpile will begin in 2018 and finish in 2021. The weapons will be destroyed using a neutralization process that eventually, through a process called supercritical water oxidation, breaks down the agents into carbon dioxide, water and salts. The pump house is also a move toward safety during the plant's operations.

"We always are working on safety," said Tom McKinney, project manager with Bechtel Parsons Blue Grass, the group constructing and running the facility. "We take safety very seriously here."

The destruction process will take place in a structure built with 26-inch thick concrete walls, designed to contain effects of a detonation.

"We don't expect there would be a detonation," Brubaker said.

Special self-consolidating concrete was used in construction to prevent any voids, McKinney said. "We are doing things here that have gained national attention," he said. "In that case, it's a very important project."

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## Russia Eliminates 50 Percent of Chemical Arsenal

*Global Security Newswire, 31 May 2011; [www.globalsecuritynewswire.org](http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org)*

Russia has eliminated more than 50 percent of its original stockpile of approximately 40,000 metric tons of chemical warfare materials, Interfax reported on Monday.

"Over 20,000 [metric] tons of Category 1 chemical weapons were destroyed as of May 30, 2011, which is over 50 percent of the earlier announced amount (39,966)" metric tons, Russian Federal Department for Safe Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons head Valery Kapashin said.

"The fulfillment of the fourth and the last stage is a strategic task, and all efforts during the fulfillment of this task will focus on the operation of the available objects and the creation and operation of the last chemical weapons destruction facility in the village of Kizner, Udmurtia Republic," Kapashin said.

Moscow has acknowledged it would be unable meet the Chemical Weapon Convention's April 2012 deadline for the complete destruction of all Russian chemical warfare materials. Work is expected to be completed by 2015.

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## NSG Should Lead by Example on Sensitive Technology Transfers

*States News Service, 31 May 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

The following information was released by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

When the participating governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) convene in June under the chairmanship of the Netherlands, they will face an especially difficult and thorny agenda. The primary task will be to reach consensus on new Guidelines for transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology, the negotiation of which has dragged on since 2007.

But several other issues loom on the horizon, including identifying ways and means to possibly accept non-NPT states as members of the group;<sup>1</sup> deciding whether China should pursue an NSG waiver before building two additional nuclear power reactors in Pakistan, or at least seek the NSG's agreement on the validity of grandfathering the new contract; and considering possible NSG responses to enrichment and reprocessing technology transfers by non-NSG members to states that do not meet the Guidelines.

All of these issues will require careful discussions, but given the stresses on the nonproliferation regime this is no time to compromise existing principles. Particularly on transfers of sensitive technology, NSG members need to lead by example.

There are two major concerns the NSG needs to consider regarding proposed changes to its Guidelines governing trade in enrichment and reprocessing technology. First, it is vital to ensure that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities do not lapse if a State withdraws from the NPT. And second, it is essential to make clear that a regional arrangement such as ABACC<sup>2</sup> can in no way meet the objective of the Additional Protocol (AP)<sup>3</sup> and cannot be considered as a substitute for the latter.

In addressing these two issues, NSG participating governments should demonstrate that they have no intention to seek commercial advantages at the expense of nonproliferation requirements.

### *Continuity of IAEA Safeguards on Sensitive Fuel Cycle Facilities*

The NSG Guidelines require a recipient of nuclear technology to have brought into force a comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement that covers all nuclear material. Should that safeguard agreement be terminated, the recipient:

"Will bring into force an agreement with the IAEA based on existing IAEA model safeguards agreements requiring the application of safeguards on all trigger list items

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or related technology transferred by the supplier or processed, or produced or used in connection with such transfers (emphasis added).<sup>4</sup>

This requirement is akin to attempting to bridle a horse as it bolts from the barn. If a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) withdraws from the NPT, its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA will lapse and it is exceedingly unlikely it would agree thereafter to bring into force an agreement with the IAEA as required by the NSG.<sup>5</sup> From a practical point of view, it would make far more sense for the NSG to require the recipient NNWS to have in force, before any transfer of relevant items, a facility-specific INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement, which would be subsumed to its CSA. This could be easily accomplished without any additional cost to the state or the IAEA.

In fact, UN Security Council Resolution 1887 (September 24, 2009) urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment.<sup>6</sup>

Continuity of safeguards in case of NPT withdrawal is an important principle that should be strengthened, in particular for sensitive fuel cycle technology transfers. The NSG Guidelines should stipulate that, in addition to the present conditions, suppliers should transfer items listed in INFCIRC/254/Parts 1 and 2 (especially if they are related to sensitive fuel cycle facilities) only if they are used in a facility subjected to an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement, with the IAEA as a back-up, in the event that the recipient state withdraws from the NPT. Such an agreement would be subsumed to the CSA and come into operation only in case the CSA is terminated.

As a matter of policy and in order to lead by example, all NNWS members of the NSG presently operating enrichment and reprocessing facilities (in particular Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Brazil and Argentina) should conclude with the IAEA such 66-type safeguards agreements.

## *The Additional Protocol (AP) as a Criterion for Sensitive Technology Transfers*

NSG deliberations are conducted behind closed doors. However, a November 2008 draft of proposed changes to the Guidelines that became public contains some language that is cause for concern. This draft proposes criteria for Special Controls on Sensitive Exports which, among others, require that the recipient:

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"Has signed, ratified and is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and has in force an Additional Protocol or has signed, ratified and is implementing a regional arrangement approved by the IAEA which operates to achieve the same objective by providing confidence in the peaceful nature of civilian nuclear programs (emphasis added)"<sup>7</sup>

The purpose of the AP is to give the IAEA the tools necessary to draw a credible conclusion that a state's declarations to the IAEA are correct and complete and that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities in that state. John Carlson, an Australian safeguards expert, recently published an analysis on the Additional Protocol in which he argues:

"Refusal to accept the most effective form of safeguards, of which the AP is an essential component, erodes confidence in the peaceful intent of the states involved. The IAEA Board, representing the organization's membership, has determined that the procedures under the AP are essential for the IAEA to meet its responsibilities under the NPT to ensure that all nuclear material in NNWS remains in non-explosive use, but for those states without an AP it cannot. This situation does not meet the terms of the NPT. It would be an affront to the great majority of states who have accepted the AP for this situation to continue indefinitely."<sup>8</sup>

A regional arrangement in this context would have to provide the IAEA with the same access and tools provided under the AP in order to meet the same objective. This ambiguous language is likely intended to satisfy Argentina and Brazil, but without an AP in force in either state, notwithstanding the existence of ABACC (and the Quadripartite Agreement),<sup>9</sup> the IAEA will not be able to draw the above-mentioned conclusion and therefore the NSG's stated objective would not be met.

NSG participating governments should endeavor to lead efforts to comply with the recommendations contained in UN Security Council 1887, in which the Security Council calls upon all states to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system.<sup>10</sup>

The wish of the large majority of NSG members is to reach a consensus that no enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and thus corresponding equipment and technology, should be transferred to a recipient state which doesn't have an Additional Protocol in force. Negotiations to reach that goal should continue. Members of the NSG could consider supporting the suggestion recently made by Dr. G. Gonzalez (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chile)<sup>11</sup> to encourage

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states from Latin America that have already signed and ratified the AP to invite those states of the region without an AP to meet and discuss, with the support of the IAEA, the benefits of the AP. It is worth recalling that an AP is in force in Chile, Columbia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, and has been signed by Costa Rica, Honduras and Mexico.

In the meantime, members of the NSG should delete any ambiguous language from the draft Guidelines that could be interpreted as unduly equating a regional arrangement approved by the IAEA (such as the ABACC Quadripartite Agreement) with an Additional Protocol. It is important not to create a precedent that would further diminish the credibility of the NSG and the global nonproliferation regime, which has been severely undermined by the adoption of the so-called special case of India. It is therefore important to reject any attempt to create other special cases, despite the impatience of many NSG participating governments to reach consensus.

While trying to persuade the few NSG members still resisting the adoption of the Additional Protocol as an export condition for enrichment and reprocessing technology, the other members should formally commit to adopt it under their national law, thereby demonstrating that they have no intention to weaken nonproliferation requirements in order to possibly gain some commercial advantage.

<sup>1</sup>See Pierre Goldschmidt, NSG Membership: A Criteria-based Approach for Non-NPT States, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=viewandid=44147>.

<sup>2</sup>ABACC is the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. The Quadripartite Agreement (signed in 1991 and entered into force in 1994) between the two Governments, ABACC, and the International Atomic Energy Agency gives the IAEA the responsibility of applying full safeguards in both countries.

<sup>3</sup>IAEA INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

<sup>4</sup>INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part.1, November 2007 (paragraph 4.a).

<sup>5</sup>Under Article 26 of CSA (INFCIRC/153 corrected) the agreement remains in force only as long as the State is party to the NPT.

<sup>6</sup><http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/523/74/PDF/N0952374.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>7</sup>See page 61 at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MTA-NSG-report-color.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup>John Carlson, Is the Additional Protocol Optional? Trust and Verify (January-March 2011) Issue No. 132, <http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/TV/TV132.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup>IAEA INFCIRC/435.

<sup>10</sup>UNSCR 1887 Op. Cit.

<sup>11</sup>IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards; Vienna, 1-5 November 2010.

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



19 May – 31 May 2011

DTRA

## Russia Cuts Nuclear Arsenal Faster than Required

Reuters, 01 June 2011, <http://in.reuters.com/>

Russia has already cut its nuclear arsenal below the level required in an arms control treaty [New START] signed with the United States last year, according to figures released by the U.S. State Department on Wednesday.

Russia has 1,537 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, just under the 1,550 ceiling it is obliged to reach by 2018 under the New START nuclear arms reduction pact, while the United States has 1,800, according to a State Department fact sheet [released June 1, 2011].

The figures are accurate as of Feb. 5, 2011 and drawn from an exchange of data required under the treaty, which was signed on April 8, 2010 and entered into force on March 22, 2011.

Under the treaty, each side agreed to reduce its deployed nuclear warheads to no more than 1,550 within seven years of the treaty's entry into force.

Each also agreed to limit its intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers to no more than 800, whether deployed or not. The United States has 1,124 of these and Russia 865, according to the State Department figures.

Finally, each committed to deploy no more than 700 intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine ballistic missiles or heavy bombers. As of Feb. 5, the United States had 882 of these and Russia 521.

Tom Collina, research director of the nonpartisan Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan Washington-based group that seeks to promote arms control, welcomed Russia's cuts and said the United States should speed up its reductions.

"New Start is working," he wrote in a blog post, saying Russia was previously estimated to have 2,000 deployed warheads. "Russia has already deactivated hundreds of nuclear weapons that otherwise could have been aimed at the United States, and the United States is using on-site inspections to verify these reductions," he said. "This is good news for U.S. security."

"If Russia can accelerate its reductions, so can the United States," he added. "There is no need for the Pentagon to wait until 2018 to get to New START levels. As a confidence-building measure, the United States should speed up its reductions."

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19 May – 31 May 2011

**DTRA**

## U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center

U.S. Department of State, 01 June 2011, [www.state.gov/t/avc/nrrc](http://www.state.gov/t/avc/nrrc)

An interagency team led by the Director of the Department of State's Nuclear Risk Reduction Center [NRRC] has returned from consultations held in Moscow, Russia, between the Center and its counterpart in the Russian Federation.

During the consultations in Moscow, the delegations discussed technical issues related to information exchanges and other operational issues.

The Centers are responsible for transmitting and receiving time-sensitive communications required by arms control treaties and security agreements, including the New START Treaty, the OSCE Vienna Document and, other bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Since 1987, watch officers have staffed the Centers around the clock, receiving, translating, and disseminating those communications.

NRRC consultations are a regular feature of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation.

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



19 May – 31 May 2011

**DTRA**

## Tu-214 Open Skies Performs its Maiden Flight

Russian Aviation, 02 June 2011, [www.ruaviation.com](http://www.ruaviation.com)

The duration of the Tu-214OS's first flight was 1 hour 22 minutes. The first test flight has been performed by the pilots of Tupolev's Zhukovsky flight-test and development center, the press-service of Kazan Aviation Production Association [KAPA] reports.

Production of the Tu-214OS is being carried out by the Kazan Aviation Production Association, named after S. P. Gorbunov, in accordance with the order of the "radio [engineering] concern Vega." This modification of the Tu-214 was designed by the Tupolev design bureau.

Tu-214OS is intended for executing inspection flights in the network of the "Open Skies" treaty. This airplane is outfitted with aerophotographic equipment which allows [Russia to check] the military infrastructure of other countries and [track] the changes for [peacekeeping] purposes.

The "Open Skies" treaty was accepted on March 24, 1992 by 27 [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] OSCE countries in Helsinki. In May 2001, this agreement was ratified in Russia. Now, there are 34 member-countries in this treaty.

The Tu-214OS aircraft will replace the Tu-154 and An-30 planes which [currently carry out] important government missions by executing [Open Skies] inspection flights.

The flight development and certification tests still lie ahead for the Tu-214OS. The on-board aerial reconnaissance complex will also be tested in the near future. After passing all factory tests, the aircraft will be handed over for state testing.

Delivery of the aircraft is planned for late 2011.

In addition, KAPA is assembling another Tu-214ON aircraft which will be used for the governmental needs within the framework of the "Open Skies" agreement.

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19 May – 31 May 2011

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## State Duma Ratifies Russian-U.S. Plutonium Disposition Agreement

*Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 23 May 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

The State Duma on Friday ratified the Russian-U.S. Plutonium Disposition Agreement [PMDA] and two protocols to it. A total of 312 deputies voted for the document and 92 voted against it.

The Russian-U.S. Plutonium Disposition Agreement was signed by the United States and Russia in mid 2000. Under this agreement, each party assumed an obligation to decommission 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium not needed for military programs.

The agreement also prohibits the export of the decommissioned plutonium to third countries, with the exception of cases when there is a written agreement between the parties on the matter. The document governs issues related to monitoring and inspecting of plutonium disposition in Russia and the U.S. on a symmetrical basis.

The agreement also envisions control over this process by the [International Atomic Energy Agency] IAEA.

"Despite the fact that the agreement was signed back in 2000, its ratification was suspended due to the fact that some major issues relating to the implementation of this document were unresolved," the State Duma committee on international affairs said in a statement.

To clarify these issues, the parties signed a protocol in September 2009 that amended the intergovernmental agreement, the statement says. These changes affected "issues relating to civil liability for any losses and damage done as a result of activities associated with the implementation of the agreement."

In 2007, the Russian government decided to make changes to the Russian plutonium disposition program to allow the use of BN-800 fast neutron reactors instead of VVER-1000 reactors.

The United States agreed with Russia's proposal. The agreements were set forth in the second protocol to the bilateral agreement, which was signed in April 2010. Thus, the three documents (the agreement and the two protocols) were ratified by the State Duma on Friday.

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