DEFENSE TREATY INSPECTION READINESS PROGRAM · READINESS THROUGH AWARENESS

BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW

15 November 2011 – 28 November 2011

DTRA

ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES CONVENTION (APLC)

Anti-Landmines Movement Grows Stronger upon Returning to Its Birthplace

AP Mine Ban Convention ISU, 28 November 2011, www.apminebanconvention.org

The Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties (11MSP) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention [APLC], or Ottawa Convention, officially opened this morning with signs that the anti-landmines movement is growing stronger. *(531 words)* **Click here for full text.**

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

U.S. Ambassador to OPCW Visits Kentucky

The Richmond Register, 14 November 2011, richmondregister.com

Dozens of people from central Kentucky were present at Arlington House in Richmond to dine with and hear from the ambassador who represents the United States to the [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)]. *(480 words)* **Click here for full text.**

Chemical Weapons Convention and U.S. Implementation

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 22 November 2011, www.cma.army.mil

Since entry-into-force of the CWC, the United States has destroyed more than 1.9 million munitions and more than 15,000 metric tons of chemical agent, representing more than 55 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile. *(702 words)* **Click here for full text.**

New Initiatives Announced at 13th Meeting of CWC National Authorities

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 28 November 2011, www.opcw.org

The annual meeting was held at the OPCW Technical Secretariat from November 25-27, 2011, on the threshold of the Conference of the States Parties. *(350 words)* **Click here for full text.**

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

The CTBTO at the Disarmament Conference in Jehu, Korea

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 14 November 2011, www.ctbto.org

The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, Tibor Tóth, attended the Tenth UN-ROK Joint Conference on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Issues in Jeju, Republic of Korea, as a keynote speaker. *(289 words)* **Click here for full text.**

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT) (CONT.)

Exercising the CTBTO's On-Site Inspectors

VERTIC Blog, 25 November 2011, www.vertic.org

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBTO) recently announced the approval of a budget for the next on-site inspection (OSI) exercise. *(1,241 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW)

U.S. Position on the CCW Negotiations on Cluster Munitions Protocol [EXCERPT]

U.S. Department of State, 16 November 2011, www.state.gov

Special Briefing with Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State, and Bill Lietzau, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Via Teleconference

The question here is whether we should support a sixth protocol, which is under discussion, about cluster munitions. And our position is that we should, based on the chair's text that's currently before the conference. *(1,800 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

Talks on Cluster Bomb Restrictions Collapse

The New York Times, 25 November 2011, www.nytimes.com

Despite last-minute attempts to broker a compromise, American-led efforts to conclude an international treaty restricting use of cluster munitions collapsed on Friday in the face of opposition from countries that said it did not address their humanitarian concerns and would undermine existing international law. *(629 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

U.S. Department of State, 22 November 2011, www.state.gov

Today the United States announced in Vienna, Austria, that it would cease carrying out certain obligations under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty with regard to Russia. *(201 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

Nunn-Lugar Destroys Nuclear Warheads, Deadly Chemical Weapons

U.S. Senate, 15 November 2011, http://lugar.senate.gov/

U.S. Sen. Dick Lugar announced the following progress in the Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperative Threat Reduction Program during September 2011. *(396 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

Russia to Test Launch Bulava Missile on Monday

RIA Novosti, 28 November 2011, en.rian.ru

On Monday Russia will carry out the last test of the Bulava ballistic missile this year – a salvo launch from the Yuri Dolgoruky strategic submarine, a high-ranking Navy source said.
(172 words) ***Click here for full text.***

FULL TEXT OF BI-WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

Anti-Landmines Movement Grows Stronger upon Returning to Its Birthplace

AP Mine Ban Convention ISU, 28 November 2011, www.apminebanconvention.org

The Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties (11MSP) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention [APLC], or Ottawa Convention, officially opened this morning with signs that the anti-landmines movement is growing stronger. The opening session of the largest ever multilateral meeting in Cambodia was highlighted by Tuvalu and South Sudan taking their seats as the Convention's newest adherents and Finland's Minister of International Development announcing that Finland is on the verge of becoming the 159th to join the Convention.

"The Parliament of Finland approved accession three days ago and the Government of Finland is now in the process of finalizing the decision," said Finland's Minister of International Development, Heidi Hautala. "This means that we will deposit our instrument of accession with the UN Secretary-General in coming weeks."

Also during the opening session, the Convention's parties formally elected H.E. PRAK Sokhonn, Minister Attached to the Prime Minister and Vice President of the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), as President of the 11MSP. H.E. PRAK Sokhonn will proceed in chairing the 11MSP over the next five days.

"I am pleased that several states not parties to the Convention, including China, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Singapore and the United States of America, are attending the 11MSP as observers," said H.E. PRAK Sokhonn. "This is a sign that there is strong interest in our movement, even by those that have not yet joined the Convention."

The opening of the 11MSP was also marked by a powerful message from His Majesty Norodom Sihamoni, King of Cambodia, who recalled Cambodia's role in the emergence of the anti-landmines movement. "It is an honor and privilege for Cambodia and her people to welcome the world to the birthplace of the Convention and to host and preside over the meeting," said His Majesty.

At the 11MSP, delegates will consider the Phnom Penh Progress Report, a detailed document measuring progress in the past year and highlighting priority areas of work to be acted upon for the year to come. On November 30, the 11MSP will feature a special session marking two decades since the anti-landmines movement emerged from countries such as Cambodia. The 11MSP will also take decisions on requests for extensions of ten year mine clearance deadlines which have been submitted by Algeria, Chile, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Eritrea. In addition, throughout the week, over 30 side events will take place with several showcasing Cambodia's efforts to clear mined areas and to assist survivors.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention was adopted in Oslo in 1997, opened for signature in Ottawa the same year and entered into force in 1999. To date 158 states have joined the Convention with 153 of these reporting that they no longer hold stocks of anti-personnel mines. Over 44.5 million stockpiled mines have been destroyed by the States Parties. Thirty-four of the 50 states that at one time manufactured anti-personnel mines are now bound by the Convention's ban on production. Most other parties have put in place moratoria on production and/or transfers of mines. Demining has resulted in millions of square meters of once dangerous land being released for normal human activity.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

U.S. Ambassador to OPCW Visits Kentucky

The Richmond Register, 14 November 2011, richmondregister.com

Dozens of people from central Kentucky were present at Arlington House in Richmond to dine with and hear from the ambassador who represents the United States to the international organization [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)] charged with the elimination of chemical weapons.

Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, who earlier in the day toured the construction site of the chemical weapons disposal facility at the Blue Grass Army Depot, explained how the Kentucky effort to destroy the stockpile of warfare agents here plays an important role in the nation's obligation to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans chemical weapons.

"Having toured the site and met with elected officials and citizens groups, I can return to The Hague (in The Netherlands) with the utmost confidence regarding the U.S. effort to destroy all the nation's chemical weapons," Mikulak said. "My job is to ensure that the national security of America is protected while working with the 188 other countries that are signatories to the treaty," he said.

The Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG), which co-hosted the dinner with Madison County Judge Executive Kent Clark and former state Rep. Harry Moberly, D-Richmond, arranged the ambassador's visit. "It was an honor to have the ambassador visit us, and we appreciate his first-hand interest in our project here in Kentucky," Clark said. "We have clearly shown how unified we are on the technology being used and the support the project receives from the community and the region."

Mikulak spoke about the situation in Libya, telling guests that only part of that nation's chemical weapons were destroyed under auspices of the OPCW before the revolt overthrew the Gaddafi regime. Since then, OPCW inspectors have been able to return, and two additional, previously unknown caches of chemical weapons were discovered. "This is why the verification element of the treaty is so important," the ambassador said. "The prevention of terrorists from getting these weapons is a critical part of our mission."

Craig Williams, CWWG director, said he was delighted with all aspects of the evening. "Arlington provided a perfect venue to host the ambassador," he said. "The atmosphere was elegant, the service and food outstanding and the hospitality tremendous."

The ambassador noted that in 2013, a number of high-level officials from the OPCW will visit central Kentucky. And, after his own visit, he is upbeat about what they will find. "I think it's clear

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

to anyone that the disposal project (in Kentucky) is well on its way towards achieving its objective of safely disposing of its stocks of weapons," Mikulak said.

Williams added, "Having worked closely now for years with the government and contractors responsible for the project, I can say that my confidence is very high that safety is a top priority (of the project). In addition, the transparency and cooperation exhibited in coordination with the Citizen's Advisory Board is a recipe for success."

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

Chemical Weapons Convention and U.S. Implementation

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 22 November 2011, www.cma.army.mil

On April 29, 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), entered into force. At that time, the United States and 86 other nations became the first countries to sign and ratify the CWC. In doing so, the States Parties agreed to destroy all their chemical weapons and former chemical weapons production facilities and to abide by prohibitions from development, use, production and acquisition of chemical weapons. Today, more than 180 nations have ratified the CWC.

Since entry-into-force of the CWC, the United States has destroyed more than 1.9 million munitions and more than 15,000 metric tons of chemical agent, representing more than 55 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile. Other major CWC milestone accomplishments include the total destruction of the U.S. unfilled munitions and binary projectile inventory, the complete destruction of the nation's former chemical weapons production facilities and the elimination of all binary chemical weapon materiel.

The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) has responsibility for safely storing and ultimately destroying the majority of the remaining U.S. aging chemical weapons and related materials. Additional responsibility for destroying U.S. chemical weapons stored at Army installations in Kentucky and Colorado falls under the U.S. Army Element, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program [ACWA].

Achievements

In December 2000, CMA destroyed the last of the chemical weapons stored on Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean using the world's first full-scale chemical weapons disposal facility. In March 2006, CMA completed destruction of the mustard stockpile stored at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. CMA also completed destruction of the VX nerve agent stockpile at Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana, in September 2008. The blister and nerve agent stockpile at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, was destroyed in November 2010. Stockpiles at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama and Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon were destroyed in September 2011 and October 2011 respectively.

CMA continues to operate the disposal facility at Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah. CMA also maintains responsibility for the destruction of non-stockpile related chemical warfare materiel.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

CWC treaty officials confirmed the complete destruction of declared miscellaneous materiel in 2002, the absolute destruction of the nation's former chemical warfare production facilities in December 2006, the destruction of the binary chemical weapon inventory in November 2007 and the destruction of the final declared non-stockpile chemical munitions in April 2010. All milestones were accomplished safely and ahead of CWC schedule deadlines.

CMA continues to meet CWC requirements in responding to unplanned recovered chemical warfare materiel – treating items on site using proven disposal technologies and notifying treaty officials of chemical warfare disposal efforts.

Challenges

The CWC required participating countries to destroy 100 percent of their chemical weapons stockpiles within 10 years, or by April 29, 2007, for original signatories. The CWC also set intermediate stockpile destruction deadlines, including one percent to be destroyed by April 2000 and 20 percent by April 2002. The United States was granted an extension of the 45 percent milestone, extending it from April 2004 to December 2007. The nation then succeeded in meeting all three intermediate deadlines with an impressive safety and environmental record.

In April 2006, the United States was granted a five-year extension to the original 2007 deadline by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization overseeing CWC compliance for 100 percent stockpile destruction. However, in its extension request letter, the United States notified the OPCW that it does not currently forecast 100 percent destruction by the new deadline, but remains firmly committed to the accord and will complete its stockpile destruction under international observation as quickly as possible.

Several factors contributed to the extension request:

- delays in obtaining environmental permits for disposal facilities
- lower than estimated destruction processing rates
- work stoppages to investigate and resolve problems
- development of protocols to improve operational safety
- deteriorating munitions requiring special handling
- conduct of maintenance activities requiring more down time than originally projected
- facility start-up delays caused by additional community emergency preparedness requirements

The United States continues to destroy chemical weapons safely, expeditiously and in full compliance with the treaty.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

New Initiatives Announced at 13th Meeting of CWC National Authorities

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 28 November 2011, www.opcw.org

The annual meeting was held at the [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons] OPCW Technical Secretariat from November 25-27, 2011, on the threshold of the Conference of the States Parties. It is traditionally the largest gathering of [Chemical Weapons Convention] CWC National Authorities organized by the OPCW, with this year's event attracting 160 representatives from 110 States Parties.

National Authorities are a cornerstone of the Chemical Weapons Convention, responsible for coordinating the comprehensive implementation of its provisions at national level across all relevant government bodies. The annual meeting is an opportunity for National Authorities to update their knowledge of implementation best practices, share experiences with each other, and consult bilaterally with Technical Secretariat staff on specific issues of interest.

In his opening remarks to the meeting, OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü commended the National Authorities for their assistance and goodwill in enabling the OPCW to pass a major milestone this year by conducting its 2,000th inspection of industrial facilities under Article VI since the Convention's entry into force in 1997, aimed at preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. He added as other key achievements that 186 of the 188 States Parties have now established National Authorities, and that 70 percent of them have adopted domestic legislation that prohibits the development of chemical weapons and penalizes violations of the prohibition.

Director-General Üzümcü also used the occasion to announce two new initiatives undertaken by the Technical Secretariat to improve its ability to provide effective capacity-building assistance to National Authorities.

One is the production of electronic learning tools on the history and content of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which will be launched in the first quarter of 2012 and made available to National Authorities via the OPCW Internet website.

Another is the development of a Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, which is now accessible to all States Parties via the OPCW External Server. The Director-General said the database makes it possible for the Technical Secretariat and States Parties to share information and details about activities they have undertaken in the past to implement the Convention, or intend to carry out in the future.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

The CTBTO at the Disarmament Conference in Jeju, Korea

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 14 November 2011, www.ctbto.org

The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Tibor Tóth, attended the Tenth UN-ROK Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues in Jeju, Republic of Korea, from November 7-8, 2011 as a keynote speaker.

The conference, which gathered experts from governments, international organizations, academic and research institutions and civil society, was hosted jointly by the Republic of Korea and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. A number of issues were addressed including the future of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, and the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The conference has been held annually since 2001.

During his visit, Tóth met with Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan and other senior government officials. Topics discussed included the prospects of negotiations with the DPRK on its nuclear program and the importance of preventing further nuclear testing as well as ways to further enhance the already strong cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the CTBTO. Tóth also met with the Chairman of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, Kang Chang-soon, and gave a lecture at the Seoul National University and an interview with Yonhap News.

The Republic of Korea hosts a seismic monitoring station in Wonju, not far from its border with the DPRK. This monitoring station was among those that detected the 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK.

Asia is of particular importance for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as five of the nine countries that have yet to sign and ratify before the CTBT can enter into force are from the region: China, the DPRK, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. The other four are Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United States.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

Exercising the CTBTO's On-Site Inspectors

VERTIC Blog, 25 November 2011, www.vertic.org

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBTO) recently announced the approval of a budget for the next on-site inspection (OSI) exercise. With a budget of $10.3 million, this exercise will be a significant step towards strengthening the organization's OSI capabilities. The first such exercise, held in September 2008, revealed a number of important issues that will have to be resolved before the CTBTO's OSI capabilities reach full strength.

What is the aim of OSI exercises, and why are they important for the overall development of the CTBTO's verification capabilities?

According to the CTBTO, the second Integrated Field Exercise (IFE) will take place in 2014, and will test and train its OSI capabilities "in an all-encompassing way". Although OSIs can only be invoked once the treaty has entered into force, these exercises will ensure that if they are invoked, these inspections will be highly effective.

OSI: Bringing verification closer to home

The CTBTO has been working diligently to develop the verification regime of the CTBT, which will prohibit all nuclear test explosions in all environments. Although the treaty has yet to enter into force, the development of verification techniques has been underway for more than a decade. Since the mid-1990s, the CTBTO has been developing its verification capabilities, which include seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide monitoring systems. These techniques can detect suspicious explosions using data collected from monitoring stations located all over the world.

As noted in a previous VERTIC blog post, North Korea's underground nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 revealed both the strengths and limits of the CTBTO's remote monitoring systems. The verification system detected both explosions and concluded with reasonable certainty that they were caused by nuclear weapons. However, it was unable to find radioactive material originating from nuclear weapons, which could have definitively proven the nuclear nature of the explosions. If the CTBT had been in force, and had North Korea been a State Party, OSIs could have gone some way towards dispelling such uncertainty.

Essentially, an OSI enables the CTBTO to collect evidence on the ground of a possible treaty violation to ascertain the true nature of a suspicious explosion. Where remote monitoring cannot reach, the CTBTO can turn to on-site inspectors to ultimately verify adherence to the treaty. During an OSI, inspectors may conduct a fly-over of an area of concern to narrow down

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

locations for further examination on the ground. They may also employ various verification measures including radiation surveys, drilling and seismological monitoring of aftershocks. Thus, an OSI is, in the words of the CTBTO, “the final verification measure” of the nuclear test ban.

IFE 2008: The first lesson in on-site test inspection

Practice is an essential part of preparation because it enables us to identify strengths and weaknesses. IFE 2008 in Kazakhstan was valuable in this respect because it allowed the CTBT to confirm its verification capacity while identifying flaws that the organization would need to overcome. Moreover, with the success of the field exercise, the CTBTO demonstrated its technical competence to the outside world.

IFE 2008 was based on a fictional scenario in which the CTBTO’s monitoring system detected seismic signals resembling those of an underground nuclear test. The signals came from Arcania, a fictitious country which had a history of previous nuclear tests. However, Arcania rejected claims that they had violated the CTBT, and argued that the seismic indications were the result of an earthquake. Fiducia, a fictitious neighbor of Arcania, remained unconvinced and demanded an OSI in accordance with the CTBT’s procedures.

The exercise was held in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, 430 kilometers away from the country’s capital Astana. Such a remote location seemed appropriate for a covert nuclear test, which would most likely be conducted in a highly isolated area. Indeed, the former Soviet Union conducted over 300 underground tests in Semipalatinsk while Kazakhstan was part of the Soviet Union. As such, the exercise scenario included the real possibility of radiological contamination.

The CTBTO explains that the IFE 2008 was divided into two phases. The first phase incorporated techniques such as visual observation, radiation monitoring, environmental sampling and seismic aftershock monitoring. The second phase of the OSI exercise then utilized more intrusive techniques. This included ground penetrating radar for examining the shallow subsurface layers, and magnetometry to measure the Earth’s magnetic field and detect anomalies.

In essence, all the OSI components employed in the IFE 2008 successfully performed their designated functions, though to varying degrees of effectiveness and reliability. It is important to draw lessons from the IFE 2008 in order for the CTBTO’s provisional OSI operational manual to develop. This manual is still in development, but when it is completed it is intended to become the authoritative resource for implementing OSIs.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

One of the lessons is to consider the demanding logistical requirements of covering large test areas in a thorough manner. While the CTBT out tight timelines for OSIs, it also allows inspections to cover an area of up to 1,000 square kilometers. In the case of IFE 2008, inspectors were allowed to spend only six hours on-site for safety reasons, further limiting the time available for investigation. This forces inspectors to deal with an inevitable conflict between speed and accuracy. Finding a happy medium between the two can only come from practice.

The harsh weather in Kazakhstan also caused some delays to the inspection. As the CTBTO prepares for the next IFE, they must bare this issue in mind. The CTBT will prohibit nuclear test explosions in all environments. On-site inspectors must be capable of identifying tell-tale signs of test explosions despite whatever conditions these environments can produce. Nuclear-weapon states have tested nuclear weapons in a number of environments, not just on the plains of Kazakhstan.

IFE 2008 also revealed financial challenges. As mentioned above, the CTBTO received contribution in kind from various states for the exercise. The announced budget of $10.3 million for the next exercise is no small sum of money. It is worth considering whether the costs of an actual OSI will reflect this sum, and how such verification activities will be supported once the treaty is in force. In this respect, two recent voluntary contributions from the United States, totaling over $33 million, can only be welcomed.

Further, as the CTBTO does not have a standing inspection team, it would need to choose qualified inspectors when an OSI is demanded. As VERTIC Executive Director Andreas Persbo has argued, the CTBTO needs a roster of qualified inspectors, an agreed equipment list and contracts with carriers capable of handling such equipment. All of this must be ready at short notice.

The previous IFE in Semipalatinsk, while indicating that the OSI component was nearing completion, also identified some specific areas that could be improved. With a focus on these areas, a second on-site inspection exercise could be a leap forward in the development of the OSI operational manual. With a diligent eye on previous experiences, attention to detail and careful planning, exercises such as this can have many benefits.

The last few creases in the OSI procedures can be ironed-out, while simultaneously building confidence in the verification capabilities of the CTBTO. If the second IFE proves to be as useful as the first, member states may feel confident enough to put their full support behind the CTBT. If this proves to be the case, a step towards effectively detecting covert nuclear tests may also become a step towards deterring them.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

U.S. Position on the CCW Negotiations on Cluster Munitions Protocol [EXCERPT]

U.S. Department of State, 16 November 2011, www.state.gov
Special Briefing with Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State, and Bill Lietzau, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Via Teleconference

MR. VENTRELL: Good morning, everyone. This is Patrick from the Press Office. Today, we have Department of State Legal Advisor Harold Koh and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Bill Lietzau to discuss the U.S. position on the Convention on Conventional Weapons [CCW] negotiations on a [proposed new] protocol on cluster munitions. […]

MR. KOH: Harold Koh here, the legal advisor. The United States has been a high-contracting party to the [CCW] for a number of years. This is the first time in a review conference in which we're a party both to the convention and all five of the existing protocols. The question here is whether we should support a sixth protocol, under discussion, about cluster munitions. Our position is that we should, based on the chair's text that's currently before the conference.

We want to dispel, at the outset, the notion that in some way we are trying to detract from the **Oslo Convention** [**or APLC**], which is a separate treaty outside the framework of the CCW, which also addresses cluster munitions. We see the two as complementary, not as competitive. Nothing that we are saying or supporting would diminish or detract from the Oslo Convention, and we think that the protocol that's under consideration here takes a significant step toward a goal that everybody shares, which is to address comprehensively the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions.

Just to make this concrete, many countries in the world are not parties to Oslo and are unlikely to become so, and that they represent 85 to 90 percent of the world's cluster munition stockpiles. So a question then becomes: How do you regulate that 85 to 90 percent of holders if they're never going to join the Oslo Convention? And the obvious answer is to try to bring regulation into the CCW, where they do participate.

Under discussion right now is a ban on cluster munitions that are produced before 1980. If that were adopted as part of this protocol, upon ratification and entry into force it would immediately prohibit over 2 million cluster munitions or more than 100 million submunitions, which is about one-third of the entire U.S. stockpile of cluster munitions. To put it directly, if this rule is adopted, it would prohibit more cluster munitions for the United States alone, than the Oslo Convention has prohibited for all of its member states combined.

We think that this is a very significant humanitarian impact and should be supported. It's true for other countries as well. For example, Ukraine announced that if this rule were adopted, it would prohibit more than a third of their existing stocks, almost 700,000 tons. Millions of the Russians'

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

munitions would be banned as well. So, we think that this protocol would have an immediate and tangible humanitarian effect.

The two other advantages of adopting this protocol are that it would create a detailed set of rules about clusters, including obligations with regard to transparency, cooperation, clearance, assistance to victims, and technological assistance. And a third advantage is that the draft protocol is designed to evolve and grow stronger. There are a very detailed set of technical annexes that would adapt to technical developments that might occur with regard to these kinds of munitions, and as well as commitments to review the annexes and to get more comprehensive provisions over time.

So, we think that it is clearly complementary to the norms that are out there. The United States is deeply committed to conventional weapons destruction. We've provided more than $1.9 billion toward that goal since 1993 in some 81 countries, and we think that this is a step in the same direction. We obviously want to address humanitarian considerations while also addressing military concerns, which Bill Lietzau here is from the Department of Defense and can address. But that is the posture in which we are approaching this conference which is going on now in Geneva.

MR. LIETZAU: I have nothing to add. I think Harold said it all. The Department of Defense completely supports the protocol negotiation going on right now in the CCW, and we completely support the CCW as an appropriate and prudent way to limit and to appropriately balance the humanitarian interests and military necessity that come into play when we deal with weapons systems like this. […]

QUESTION: Could you explain in detail what the difference between the Oslo process and this would be in terms of what would and wouldn't be allowed? You said that they're not in conflict, but rather, complementing each other. But what is the distinction between the two that leads you to prefer the process in Geneva rather than Oslo?

MR. KOH: Well, first, we don't prefer it. We think it's complementary. So we think that if you are a supporter of one, it doesn't mean you should be opposed to the other. The major difference is that the Oslo convention was adopted outside as a sort of standalone framework. And a significant number of countries entered and there was a set of norms adopted. We don't challenge that those are the operative norms in this area.

The question is the [CCW] has existed for many years and has addressed a huge range of issues. Its major focus is on adopting protocols that lead to humanitarian impact by immediate effects on stocks. I think the key is that Oslo has a high standard, but many countries have not

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

joined, including many countries that are in the CCW, and that therefore, while the norms of Oslo have been important and, we think, continue to announce a standard which is the one that many look to in this area, its impact in terms of actual destruction of clusters has been less than those in Oslo might have hoped. The adoption of this protocol would immediately eliminate over 2 million clusters for the United States, which is more than Oslo has already prohibited for all the member states combined.

So I think the question is: How can these two things be made to work together rather than competitively? Another way to look at it is that there are three groups within the CCW process. There are the Oslo members, there are those who are working toward this humanitarian goal, and then there are others who are unlikely to participate in Oslo ever. And the question is: How can those who are interested in promoting the humanitarian impacts achieve an outcome that affects everybody who's part of the CCW process?

MR. LIETZAU: I'll just add I completely agree. I think that Harold Koh captured the primary difference, being that it's being negotiated in the CCW, which we think is exactly the right place for this kind of negotiation. Substantively, just to help you identify [what] the […] most interesting technical differences are, […] if you go to Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Oslo Convention, you'll see that certain munitions are excluded from the definition of cluster munition, and the treaty then proceeds to bar all cluster munitions, but with the exclusion of […] these munitions that have certain particular parameters that are based on weight, numbers of submunitions and things like that.

What this complementary agreement [the new CCW protocol] would do is it would also permit those items to be excluded, but then it would provide another mechanism for excluding from use munitions […] having no more than a one percent unexploded ordinance rate across the range of intended operational environments. We believe that that criteria is a specific, objective, measurable criteria that actually is, in many ways, more targeted to the humanitarian concerns that we have than even some of the other criteria. So that's how it's complementary. It would not permit any weapons other than those that fit either the Oslo criteria or this even more rigorous criteria. […]

QUESTION: One of the criticisms from the NGO community is that the current draft, the chair's draft protocol, would allow large classes of cluster munitions to still be used until 2018.

MR. LIETZAU: Yeah. So, you're asking about the deferral period, and […] is it or is it not problematic. […] I would argue, having been in a number of negotiations like this one, not in this one, but when you see that countries have pushed for a deferral period, then you know you've

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

got a serious convention on your hands. Because what you're talking about is someone who is absolutely committed to implementing the provisions of the protocol, but as a practical matter, they have to change their operations; they have to make changes in the way they do business in order to get to compliance.

So […] that would be the case for the United States, and I know it would be the case for many other countries as well. These are very high standards that the protocol would require, and getting our munitions to comply with those standards and our operations to comply is something that you can't just do with a switch. It's something that you have to do with careful planning. It costs money and it takes some time.

So I think that what you have there is an indicator that this would be a serious convention with practical effect, as Harold mentioned in his beginning remarks. Here, we're targeting the 85 to 90 percent of the cluster munitions out there, the producers and users of those cluster munitions, and we're doing it in a way that would – bringing them aboard is not that easy. It's something that would take some time for them to be able to achieve.

QUESTION: And Harold, are you satisfied?

MR. KOH: Well, obviously, the step one […] is to get the protocol. Step two is to submit it, and there are steps along the way for advice and consent. You know that it's a challenge under our constitutional system to get 67 votes [in the U.S. Senate]. There would have to be a hearing process, et cetera. But I think that we would be delighted to be in that position.

I think the main point is at the moment, there are cluster users and producers who are unregulated. They are not part of the Oslo process and they will never be part of the Oslo process. This protocol would have impact on everybody who is part of the CCW process. And for that reason, it would have an immediate impact in terms of how people would have to prepare their stocks and what they might have to do to start moving toward the process of destruction and regulation. Nobody thinks that this is the last step, but it's a very important step to bringing this into a regime of regulation. […]

*[Full text of this transcript can be found at: **http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/177280.htm**]*

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

Talks on Cluster Bomb Restrictions Collapse

The New York Times, 25 November 2011, www.nytimes.com

Despite last-minute attempts to broker a compromise, American-led efforts to conclude an international treaty* restricting use of cluster munitions collapsed on Friday in the face of opposition from countries that said it did not address their humanitarian concerns and would undermine existing international law.

Diplomats from 114 countries spent two weeks in Geneva trying to conclude a treaty that would have banned older, less sophisticated cluster munitions – bombs and rockets that scatter a large number of smaller bomblets over a wide area. Some bomblets fail to explode upon hitting the ground and can remain a deadly hazard long after the fighting is over.

The draft treaty was vigorously promoted by the United States and had the backing of other major users and producers, including China, India, Israel and Russia. It reflected the increasing stigmatization of a weapon recognized as causing unacceptable harm to civilians and seen as having lasting effects on development for decades after conflicts have ended.

The effort was rejected by a group of 50 countries from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, including many nations that had signed on to the 2008 Oslo Convention. The Oslo agreement imposed a comprehensive ban on the use, production, stockpiling and sale of cluster munitions.

The United States argued that the draft treaty, which would have banned the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980, presented an opportunity to regulate the major users and producers of the weapons that hold an estimated 85 percent of global stockpiles but had not joined the Oslo Convention, including the United States.

Under the draft treaty, the United States said it alone would have to give up the use of 2 million cluster bombs and about 100 million submunitions or smaller bomblets, many more than those given up by all 111 countries that have signed the Oslo Convention combined.

But countries and disarmament groups opposing the draft treaty said the humanitarian impact of the proposed protocol would be minimal and would legitimize continued use of other cluster munitions that are recognized to cause unacceptable harm.

These countries, together with the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations agencies dealing with development and human rights, also argued that the adoption of a legal instrument that was weaker than the Oslo agreement would set a dangerous precedent.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

The United States, in a statement released by its mission in Geneva, said it was “deeply disappointed” by the failure to reach an agreement, but would continue with its own plans to prohibit by 2018 the use of cluster munitions that have a rate of more than 1 percent in unexploded ordnance. “We encourage other countries to take similar steps,” it added.

Phillip Spector, who led the American delegation, said amendments he proposed in the dying minutes of the conference would have made the draft treaty “walk in lock step” with the Oslo agreement. But diplomats from the group of 50 opposing countries said the amendments did not alter the substance of a draft that had been drawn up to reflect the interests of a small group of major users and producers of cluster munitions.

“There were fundamental differences over how the issue of cluster munitions should be addressed,” said Alexander Kmentt, director of disarmament in Austria’s Foreign Ministry. “Unfortunately it was always one position that was adopted, and the voices of many countries were never taken into account.”

Diplomats also concluded that the failure to reach an agreement in Geneva after four years of negotiations and a decade of discussions in the United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons may have exhausted interest in pursuing negotiations on a cluster-munitions treaty for the immediate future and had dealt a blow to the credibility of the United Nations’ body as a forum for developing international law on disarmament issues.

**In this article, references to the “treaty” refer to a new protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).*

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

U.S. Department of State, 22 November 2011, www.state.gov

Today the United States announced in Vienna, Austria, that it would cease carrying out certain obligations under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty with regard to Russia.

This announcement in the CFE treaty's implementation group comes after the United States and NATO allies have tried over the past four years to find a diplomatic solution following Russia's decision in 2007 to cease implementation with respect to all other 29 CFE States Parties. Since then, Russia has refused to accept inspections and ceased to provide information to other CFE treaty parties on its military forces as required by the treaty.

The United States will continue to implement the treaty and carry out all obligations with all States Parties other than Russia, including not exceeding the numerical limits on conventional armaments and equipment established by the treaty. We will resume full treaty implementation regarding Russia if Russia resumes implementation of its treaty obligations.

The United States remains firmly committed to revitalizing conventional arms control in Europe. In order to increase transparency and consistent with our longstanding effort to promote stability and build confidence in Europe, the United States will voluntarily inform Russia of any significant change in our force posture in Europe.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

Nunn-Lugar Destroys Nuclear Warheads, Deadly Chemical Weapons

U.S. Senate, 15 November 2011, http://lugar.senate.gov/

U.S. Senator Dick Lugar announced the following progress in the Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperative Threat Reduction Program during September 2011:

- 1 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) destroyed,
- 4 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) eliminated,
- 6 nuclear weapons train transport shipments secured, and
- 121.1 metric tons of chemical weapons nerve agent destroyed.

On Veteran's Day, Lugar delivered a speech at Indiana University in which he called for increased efforts to stop threats of weapons of mass destruction before they reach our shores. He heralded the future of Nunn-Lugar Global "to protect Americans at home and our service personnel overseas. Achieving this mission requires constant vigilance. I will continue my efforts to bolster Nunn-Lugar activities that eliminate threats to U.S. security before they reach our shores," Lugar said.

The Nunn-Lugar scorecard now totals

- 7,601 strategic nuclear warheads deactivated,
- 792 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) destroyed,
- 498 ICBM silos eliminated,
- 182 ICBM mobile launchers destroyed,
- 155 bombers eliminated,
- 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) destroyed,
- 492 SLBM launchers eliminated, 674 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) eliminated,
- 33 nuclear submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles destroyed,
- 194 nuclear test tunnels eliminated,
- 194 nuclear test tunnels/holes sealed,
- destroyed 2381.822 metric tons of Russian and Albanian chemical weapons agent,
- 547 nuclear weapons transport train shipments secured,
- upgraded security at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites,
- built and equipped 34 biological threat monitoring stations.

Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program. Those countries were the third, fourth and eighth largest nuclear weapons powers in the world.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

Lugar makes annual oversight missions to Nunn-Lugar Global sites around the world. During his most recent mission, Lugar led a mission to East Africa to expand efforts to secure deadly biological threats.

In November 1991, Lugar (R-India) and Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) authored the Nunn-Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. This program has provided U.S. support and expertise to help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle its enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, related materials, and delivery systems.

In 2003, Congress adopted Senator Lugar's Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which authorized operators outside the former Soviet Union to address proliferation threats. In 2004, Nunn-Lugar funds were committed for the first time outside of the former Soviet Union to destroy chemical weapons in Albania, under a Lugar-led expansion of the program.

[For more information, see: ***The Nunn-Lugar Scorecard***]

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.

Russia to Test Launch Bulava Missile on Monday

RIA Novosti, 28 November 2011, en.rian.ru

On Monday Russia will carry out the last test of the Bulava ballistic missile this year – a salvo launch from the Yuri Dolgoruky strategic submarine, a high-ranking Navy source said.

"The test was initially scheduled for November 25, but was delayed due to weather conditions, and the salvo launch of two missiles will take place on November 28," the source said.

The planned test is the fourth this year and the 18th overall. Despite several previous failures, officially blamed on manufacturing faults, the Russian military has insisted that the Bulava will be the main armament of the next generation of strategic submarines.

The Bulava (SS-NX-30) submarine-launched ballistic missile carries up to 10 MIRV warheads and has a range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). The three-stage missile is designed for deployment on Borey-class nuclear submarines.

Russia's first Borey class submarine, Yuri Dolgoruky, which has recently completed sea trials in the White Sea, is expected to enter service with the Russian Navy in the near future, pending the outcome of the Bulava testing.

back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.