



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

Biological Weapons Conference Ends with Goal to Boost Readiness

Bloomberg News, 23 December 2011; www.bloomberg.com

The United States and partner nations have agreed to increase their ability to deal with biological weapons attacks and mass outbreaks of disease. (152 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Successful Conclusion of the 7th BWC Review Conference

The White House, 23 December 2011; www.whitehouse.gov

States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) ended the meeting of the treaty's Seventh Review Conference (RevCon) on a high note by endorsing a multinational work program for the next five years. (697 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Edgewood Receives Patent for Mobile Lab

BioPrepWatch, 14 December 2011; www.bioprepwatch.com

The U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center's [ECBC] Mobile Labs and Kits Team was recently awarded a patent for developing a mobile laboratory. (212 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Researchers Learn How to Trace Chemical Agent Residue

BioPrepWatch, 15 December 2011; www.bioprepwatch.com

A recently released report details how researchers have developed a technique for tracing the residue left by components of nerve gas and other chemical agents back to their sources. (229 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Anniston: Lessons in CW Destruction Shared with CDCAB

The Richmond Register (KY), 16 December 2011; www.kentucky.com

The destruction of Alabama's chemical weapons stockpile was completed in September, and project manager Timothy Garrett shared lessons learned Tuesday during the monthly meeting of the CDCAB (Chemical Destruction Community Advisory Board Meeting). (532 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) (CONT.)

Deseret Begins Final Agent Campaign

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 19 December 2011, www.cma.army.mil

December 19 marked a significant milestone as workers at Deseret Chemical Depot's (DCD) Area 10 Liquid Incinerator (ATLIC) began the last agent campaign – destruction of DCD's small stockpile of lewisite blister agent, the only such stockpile in the United States. (344 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

Umatilla Depot Declared Free of Chemical Weapons

Global Security Newswire, 21 December 2011; www.globalsecuritynewswire.org

[The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)] has formally determined that all chemical weapons stored at a military depot in Oregon have been eliminated, the U.S. Army announced on Tuesday. (390 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) PROGRAM

Celebrating 20 Years of Nunn-Lugar, with Questions about the Future

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 December 2011, www.carnegieendowment.org

December 12 marks the twentieth anniversary of one of the most innovative and important nonproliferation initiatives of the post-Cold War period: the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. (621 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Nunn-Lugar Secures Nuclear, Chemical Weapons

Press Release of Senator Lugar, 21 December 2011, lugar.senate.gov

U.S. Senator Dick Lugar announced the following progress in the Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperative Threat Reduction Program during October 2011. (390 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT)

Progress on Commencing Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Negotiations

U.S. Department of State, 13 December 2011, <http://www.state.gov/>

[A]n FMCT has long been one of the key goals of multilateral arms control... [it] will provide a solid foundation for future disarmament efforts, and help to consolidate the arms control gains. (1,606 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Russia, U.S. Ink Uranium Enrichment Pact for 2013-2022

Ria Novosti, 21 December 2011, <http://en.beta.rian.ru/>

Russia and the United States signed an intergovernmental agreement on Tuesday enabling the contract for uranium enrichment services in 2013-2022 to come into force, (248 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

A “New START” for Arms Control

The Hill Congress Blog, 22 December 2011, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog>

By Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at the Department of State and the chief negotiator of the New START Treaty.

The New START Treaty data exchanges are providing us with a more detailed picture of Russian strategic forces than we were able to obtain from earlier exchanges, and the inspections give us crucial opportunities to confirm the validity of that data. (549 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

Bulava Missile Ready to Deploy

RIA Novosti, 27 December 2011, <http://en.ria.ru/>

The flight tests of the Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] have been completed and it will now be adopted for service with the Russian Navy, President Dmitry Medvedev said on Tuesday. (224 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

FULL TEXT OF BI-WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011



Biological Weapons Conference Ends with Goal to Boost Readiness

Bloomberg News, 23 December 2011; www.bloomberg.com

The United States and partner nations have agreed to increase their ability to deal with biological weapons attacks and mass outbreaks of disease.

The decision, made at the close of the seventh Review Conference of Biological and Toxin Weapons in Geneva, was part of a larger program that the 165 member nations agreed to pursue until their next meeting in five years, said Thomas Countryman, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation.

Countries also committed to strengthening implementation of the convention. Now, only about half of the signatory countries submit an annual report on their biological activities, as the agreement calls for, Countryman said in a telephone briefing.

Two U.S. aims – to increase the three-person staff that administers the convention and to allow the conference to make decisions in the five years between formal meetings – failed due to objections from some members. The conference is governed by consensus.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Successful Conclusion of the 7th BWC Review Conference

The White House, 23 December 2011; www.whitehouse.gov

“We will continue to face new and emerging biological threats that will require the coordinated and connected efforts of a broad range of domestic and international partners. As we take action to counter these threats, we will work together to advance our own health security and provide for the improved condition of all humanity.”

–President Obama’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, November 23, 2009

On December 22nd in Geneva, the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) ended the meeting of the treaty’s Seventh Review Conference (RevCon) on a high note by endorsing a multinational work program for the next five years that promises to revitalize global efforts to reduce biological threats and advance objectives set forth in the President’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.

States Parties announced their agreement to focus on three broad areas proposed by the United States:

- strengthening national implementation of the BWC;
- reviewing science and technology developments relevant to the treaty; and
- increasing cooperation and providing assistance to build global capacities for preventing and controlling disease outbreaks, whatever their origin.

The RevCon Final Document provides a critical framework to bring together international security, health, law enforcement, and science communities to raise awareness of evolving biological risks and how to best manage them. As Secretary of State Clinton noted in the U.S. opening statement, shoring up our domestic and international defenses against intentional attacks will make it easier to detect and respond to naturally occurring outbreaks, providing benefits for every country in every region.

Advancing the National Strategy

The ambitious work program adopted by the Review Conference is an important step toward reinvigorating the BWC as a premier venue for multinational collaboration on concrete activities to help counter biological proliferation and bioterrorism. States Parties agreed that efforts on the three priority standing issues would continue from one year to the next – an approach the United States had advocated as key to enabling real progress at the international level.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

- To strengthen national implementation of the BWC, States Parties agreed to begin annual discussions of topics such as enforcement of national legislation, coordination among law enforcement institutions, and best practices for enhancing implementation.
- States Parties concluded that there is a need for regular and systematic review of scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, and they emphasized the importance of education and efforts to raise awareness of dual-use concerns among those working in the biological sciences. States Parties took the additional step of identifying topics for the working group on Science and Technology to consider each year, starting in 2012, with advances in enabling technologies, such as those for sequencing, synthesizing, and analyzing DNA.
- States Parties also agreed on the need to build capacity to deal with disease outbreaks, including those potentially due to use of biological weapons. During the next five years experts will address, inter alia, capacity-building in biosafety and biosecurity, preparedness, response, and crisis management; States Parties also decided that a database system to facilitate requests and offers for assistance among States Parties will be created.

Building Confidence in Compliance

The States Parties acknowledged the need to enhance participation in voluntary confidence-building measures (CBMs) submissions. As a first step, States Parties undertook a review to improve the treaty's annual CBM reporting system – the first time since 1991 that such a review had been done – and they committed to continuing the effort during the next five years. The United States asked States Parties to further focus on developing constructive approaches to strengthening BWC implementation and to building confidence that all Parties were living up to their obligations. Because the dual-use nature of biological work makes it impossible to verify compliance through traditional arms control means, the United States urged that countries create their own openness and transparency measures to demonstrate confidence in compliance.

Leading by example, Secretary Clinton announced a new Bio-Transparency and Openness Initiative, featuring a U.S.-hosted International Forum on Health and Security in mid-2012 to share views on biological threats and discuss the evolution of U.S. bioresearch programs, as well as continued tours of U.S. biodefense facilities and exchanges among American scientists and their counterparts from other countries.

[back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Edgewood Chemical Biological Center Receives Patent for Mobile Lab

BioPrepWatch, 14 December 2011; www.bioprepwatch.com

The U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center's [ECBC] Mobile Labs and Kits Team was recently awarded a patent for developing a mobile laboratory. The All Hazards Receipt Facility [AHRF] includes containment areas that meet BioSafety level 2 and BioSafety level 3 standards and was funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS].

The Mobile Labs and Kits Team fully designed, developed and built the facility. "These mobile laboratories are the key to ensuring the safety of lab personnel by taking in an unknown sample directly into a controlled environment. It makes safety the number one priority when triaging the sample for identification," George Noya, the ECBC Mobile Labs and Kits Team leader, said.

The BSL-3 containment area of the facility is connected to a bleaching and decontamination station that has an airlock attached so that unknown samples can be processed while remaining under complete control. The facility's air-handling system maintains air conditioning, filtration, exhaust, and supports the proper BSL-2 and BSL-3 pressure differentials.

Noya said that the AHRF is designed to address the concerns of public health laboratories in the United States that have been inundated with potentially harmful specimens since the 2001 anthrax attacks. In 2007, DHS built two prototypes of the facility, both of which are still being used.

[back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Researchers Learn How to Trace Chemical Agent Residue

BioPrepWatch, 15 December 2011; www.bioprepwatch.com

A recently released report details how researchers have developed a technique for tracing the residue left by components of nerve gas and other chemical agents back to their sources. The technique could provide a major boost to law enforcement agencies, which could use the technique to track down the perpetrators of a terrorist attack. Although traces of the agent would remain as evidence after such an attack, there has been no practical means of finding the source of the ingredients used, according to www.PhysOrg.com.

A team of scientists led by Carlos Fraga call their method impurity profiling. In the case of the nerve gas GB, also known as sarin, Fraga and his team were able to identify impurities in a sample of the agent and match them to known impurities from its source. The method is similar to matching fingerprints found at a crimes scene. The team found that up to 88 percent of the impurities found in the source chemicals used to make GB could also be found in the finished product. The impurities, like a fingerprint, are unique to each agent.

Using standard laboratory instruments, the scientists performed the impurity profiling method on two batches of GB and correctly identified their components. "This remarkable outcome may one day become a basis for using impurity profiling to help find and prosecute perpetrators of chemical attacks," the researchers said.

[back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Anniston: Lessons in CW Destruction Shared with CDCAB

The Richmond Register (KY), 16 December 2011; www.kentucky.com

The destruction of Alabama's chemical weapons stockpile was completed in September, and project manager Timothy Garrett shared lessons learned Tuesday during the monthly meeting of the CDCAB (Chemical Destruction Community Advisory Board Meeting).

The chemical agent disposal facility located at the Anniston Army Depot was responsible for safely storing 7 percent of America's original stockpile of chemical munitions. The Anniston facility used incineration and explosive destruction technology (EDT) to destroy the stockpile containing 661,529 nerve- and mustard-agent munitions and 2,254 tons of chemical agent. Destruction operations at the depot began in 2003.

The team in Anniston operated by a "crawl, walk, run" philosophy, Garrett said. The Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal facility decided to pursue other methods to process problematic munitions by attempting to reduce manual interaction with the projectiles. The Anniston team used a static detonation chamber, which is a key component in the EDT process. The weapons are detonated inside a safety chamber during this process.

A static detonation chamber is a heated, armored, double-shell retort which operates up to 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can process both conventional and chemical-agent-filled munitions. EDT is one of three options being considered for the Blue Grass Chemical Agency Destruction Pilot Plant in Richmond, and the pros and cons of the process were outlined during Tuesday's meeting by site project manager Jeff Brubaker.

The mustard agent-filled projectiles can be processed by the current design plan, which requires manual intervention, the plant design can be modified or the EDT process can be used. Modifying the design would make it difficult to incorporate the changes after construction and some manual intervention still would be required, Brubaker said. However, if the EDT process is used, worker safety improves, but a new building permit and a new facility is required, he said. A working group has been formed to discuss the matter of building a facility for the EDT process at the depot's pilot destruction plant.

"The potential use of EDT would be a good step," said Craig Williams, director of the Berea-based Chemical Weapons Working Group. At the moment, the pilot plant will be using Super-Critical Water Oxidation (SCWO) followed by neutralization. This process extracts the nerve agent by "cooking" the projectile at a high temperature, then neutralizing the toxic waste.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Some of the weapons stored at the depot have been labeled as problematic, and an X-ray process was completed to locate the difficult rounds. The X-ray process was finished in September. It examined random samples of the 15,400 mustard-agent projectiles at the depot. The X-rays were conducted on 96 projectiles to determine if their components had fused or if their liquids had solidified, as was the case with similar rounds stored at the depot in Colorado. This solidification is also known as “heel.”

The problematic rounds could get stuck in the automated destruction plant, requiring manual personnel intervention. During the process, it was found that all 96 weapons X-rayed contained heel, and more than half of most weapons already had solidified. According to Brubaker’s presentation, approximately 6,100 munitions are estimated to have more than 59-percent heel.

The CDCAB is looking for the public’s input and is requesting a recommendation from the EDT working group by January 2012.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Deseret Begins Final Agent Campaign

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 19 December 2011, www.cma.army.mil

December 19 marked a significant milestone as workers at Deseret Chemical Depot's (DCD) Area 10 Liquid Incinerator (ATLIC) began the last agent campaign – destruction of DCD's small stockpile of lewisite blister agent, the only such stockpile in the United States.

"This is a major accomplishment," said Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) Site Project Manager Ted Ryba. "With the startup of the lewisite campaign, we are starting the last scheduled new agent campaign for all baseline sites"

The first lewisite bulk containers were delivered to the ATLIC and placed inside specially designed glove boxes, which were sealed tight. Using the protective gloves secured to the glove box enclosures, workers safely drained the agent from the containers.

Unlike the GA nerve agent, which was fed directly to the liquid incinerator, the lewisite agent is first sent to a holding tank where it can be properly sampled prior to being fed to the liquid incinerator. This added step is required because lewisite is known to contain heavy metals.

Because the lewisite containers will contain metals in the residual heel, nitric acid will be used to adequately clean the interior of the empty bulk containers and destroy any remaining lewisite. A water rinse process is then applied to the containers; the rinse is repeated three or more times to ensure the containers meet the decontamination standards set by the facility's operating permit.

The empty, decontaminated containers are then returned to a storage igloo until they are processed through the TOCDF's Metal Parts Furnace and ultimately sent to a permitted, off-site treatment facility for final disposition.

ATLIC lewisite agent operations will gradually ramp up in preparation for emissions testing, which is required by the facility's operating permit. Results from the emissions testing will be provided to both the Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste and Department of Air Quality for final approval.

The ATLIC is now neck to neck with the TOCDF as both facilities are in the home stretch to completing destruction operations. Both facilities are expected to wrap up operations in late January 2012.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011



Umatilla Depot Declared Free of Chemical Weapons

Global Security Newswire, 21 December 2011; www.globalsecuritynewswire.org

[The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)] has formally determined that all chemical weapons stored at a military depot in Oregon have been eliminated, the U.S. Army announced on Tuesday. The Umatilla Chemical Depot [UMCD] in October concluded a seven-year project to destroy 220,604 containers and weapons filled with 3,717 tons of blister and nerve agents that had been in storage for decades.

The site on December 5 and 6 underwent an inspection by the [OPCW], the Hague, Netherlands-based organization that monitors compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Convention prohibits the United States and all other member nations from developing, producing, stockpiling and using toxic warfare materials such as mustard gas and the nerve agents VX and sarin.

The OPCW team verified that there were no longer any chemical weapons held at the site, officially ending its tenure as a stockpile and disposal facility under the Convention, the Army Chemical Materials Agency [CMA] said in a press release. "This is another significant milestone achieved assuring the safety of future generations," Lt. Col. Kris Perkins, Army commander at the depot, said in provided comments.

The [OPCW] has monitored the depot's incineration plant since disposal operations were initiated in May 2004. "The Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility [UMCDF] has hosted hundreds of OPCW inspectors representing the 188 member nations since on-site destruction verification activities began in May 2004," Gary Anderson, UMCDF site project manager, said in the press release. "It is an honor to have been able to assist these individuals in their mission to verify the global reduction of chemical weapons."

The Chemical Materials Agency expects in January to complete chemical demilitarization activities at its last disposal plant, at the Desert Chemical Depot in Utah. In total, the Army branch is responsible for destroying 90 percent of the declared U.S. chemical stockpile. Another service office, the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA] program, is building facilities in Colorado and Kentucky that would finish off the final 10 percent. It expects to complete work by 2021.

The Chemical Weapons Convention requires member nations to complete disposal operations by April 29, 2012. Member nations recently determined that states expected to miss that deadline – Libya, Russia and the United States – would not be penalized. Instead, they are being placed under a program of heightened reporting and transparency.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011



Celebrating 20 Years of Nunn-Lugar, with Questions about the Future

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 December 2011, www.carnegieendowment.org

December 12 marks the twentieth anniversary of one of the most innovative and important nonproliferation initiatives of the post-Cold War period: the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The disintegration of the former Soviet nuclear security apparatus did not result in a major nuclear catastrophe as many experts worried, and CTR is clearly due a significant share of the credit. It has been one of the most successful “whole-of-government” responses to a potentially cataclysmic threat. It remains an important tool today for international cooperation to reduce nuclear dangers, but some tough questions about the continued viability of the model loom.

The CTR program suffered a rough start both in the United States and Russia. In Washington, legislators agreed that the threat of nuclear collapse in the disintegrating Soviet Union was real, but they questioned the imminence of the threat. Many Nunn-Lugar critics in Congress argued that channeling nonproliferation assistance to Russia would simply free up Russian resources for modernizing its nuclear forces. Meanwhile, lawmakers in Moscow also had suspicions about the motives behind CTR and understandably worried about letting the United States anywhere near their nuclear arsenal. And skeptical bureaucrats on both sides, still recovering from their Cold War modus operandi, had trouble accepting an innovative initiative such as CTR. The initial obstacles and subsequent implementation problems rooted in bureaucratic politics and lack of trust made CTR’s eventual achievements even more impressive.

The most important CTR contribution to international security is the non-nuclear status of three post-Soviet republics – Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. When the Soviet Union collapsed, all three states had nuclear weapons on their territories, and the fate of these weapons was far from certain. While CTR was not the sole or even the primary factor to lead all three republics toward denuclearization, it was a critical tool for making it happen. CTR paid for removal and dismantlement of nuclear weapons and all weapons-related infrastructure in all three states.

CTR also significantly reduced proliferation threats stemming from Russia and other post-Soviet states. It assisted Russia with meeting its obligations under START by providing equipment for dismantlement of submarines, bombers, and missiles. CTR programs secured thousands of tons of vulnerable nuclear material, strengthened physical security of scores of nuclear facilities, and enhanced detection capabilities at borders to prevent nuclear material smuggling. Several CTR offshoot programs also engaged thousands of former weapons scientists in civilian projects aimed at preventing “brain-drain” of Soviet scientists to states looking to develop nuclear weapons.

[back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Despite these successes and the acceptance of CTR by Russia and other former Soviet states, the program has suffered growing pains. In part, it has never managed to escape questions from skeptical members of Congress that it is anything more than foreign aid in fancy clothes. In order to demonstrate success, U.S. agencies were pushed to develop metrics for some programs that confused outputs and outcomes. Now, amid the deficit/debt crises in the United States and Europe, funding will diminish and these programs will inevitably contract.

As the mission has evolved beyond destroying delivery vehicles, securing fissile material, and redirecting weapons scientists, some CTR elements appear to be solutions in search of problems. Agencies now look for new countries or new threats against which to apply existing capabilities. Such countries or threats may exist, but current programs as designed for the former Soviet states may not suit them well. Just as Tolstoy observed that each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way, countries with nuclear weapons have unique pathologies. Efforts to mitigate nuclear or other WMD threats effectively in these countries therefore must be customized to each case.

Celebrating twenty years of Nunn-Lugar success is appropriate, but serious thought will be required to guide CTR past major conceptual hurdles going forward.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Nunn-Lugar Secures Nuclear, Chemical Weapons

Press Release of Senator Lugar, 21 December 2011, lugar.senate.gov

U.S. Senator Dick Lugar announced the following progress in the Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperative Threat Reduction Program during October 2011.

- 4 nuclear weapons train transport shipments secured, and
- 121.66 metric tons of chemical weapons nerve agent destroyed.

On Veteran's Day 2011, Lugar delivered a speech at Indiana University in which he called for increased efforts to stop threats of weapons of mass destruction before they reach our shores. He heralded the future of Nunn-Lugar Global "to protect Americans at home and our service personnel overseas."

"Achieving this mission requires constant vigilance. I will continue my efforts to bolster Nunn-Lugar activities that eliminate threats to U.S. security before they reach our shores," Lugar said.

The Nunn-Lugar scorecard now totals:

- 7,601 strategic nuclear warheads deactivated,
- 792 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) destroyed,
- 498 ICBM silos eliminated,
- 182 ICBM mobile launchers destroyed,
- 155 bombers eliminated,
- 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) destroyed,
- 492 SLBM launchers eliminated,
- 674 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) eliminated,
- 33 nuclear submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles destroyed,
- 194 nuclear test tunnels eliminated,
- 194 nuclear test tunnels/holes sealed,
- destroyed 2486.9 metric tons of Russian and Albanian chemical weapons agent,
- 551 nuclear weapons transport train shipments secured,
- upgraded security at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites, and
- built and equipped 34 biological threat monitoring stations.

Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program. Those countries were the third, fourth and eighth largest nuclear weapons powers in the world.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Lugar makes annual oversight missions to Nunn-Lugar Global sites around the world. During his most recent mission, Lugar led a mission to East Africa to expand efforts to secure deadly biological threats.

In November 1991, Lugar (R-IN) and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) authored the Nunn-Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. This program has provided U.S. support and expertise to help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle its enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, related materials, and delivery systems. In 2003, Congress adopted Senator Lugar's Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which authorized operators outside the former Soviet Union to address proliferation threats. In 2004, Nunn-Lugar funds were committed for the first time outside of the former Soviet Union to destroy chemical weapons in Albania, under a Lugar-led expansion of the program.

The Nunn-Lugar program: <http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar/>

The Nunn-Lugar scorecard: <http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar/scorecard.html>

[back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011



Progress on Commencing Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Negotiations

U.S. Department of State, 13 December 2011, <http://www.state.gov/>

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance delivered at the Wilton Park Conference: *Challenges of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*. Thank you for having me here today. It is always a pleasure to be at Wilton Park, particularly during this festive time of year.

I am also glad to be here talking about the development of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). As you all know, an FMCT has long been one of the key goals of multilateral arms control. A cutoff will provide a solid foundation for future disarmament efforts, and help to consolidate the arms control gains made since the end of the Cold War. An FMCT's verifiable controls on fissile material production will play an important role by strengthening confidence among the relevant states and help to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. The United States is firmly committed to making this treaty a reality.

Though we believe that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the best-suited international body for negotiating a multilateral arms control agreement, we've made no secret of our frustration with the CD's current impasse with FMCT – a frustration shared by many countries. Secretary Clinton told the CD our patience is not unlimited and I will reiterate that sentiment here. We are in a race against time and these obtrusive delays put our collective security at risk. However, the United States is encouraged that the P5 is renewing joint efforts to move the CD closer to FMCT negotiations.

To CD or Not to CD?

Of course, for any negotiation to be substantive and worthwhile, the key states most directly affected by an FMCT should be involved. When it comes down to what is in the best interest of international security, the negotiating venue for the FMCT is of less importance than the participants.

That being said, there is no current consensus among these key states to negotiate an FMCT outside the CD. We believe that it is unlikely that any – much less all – of the non-NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] states would participate in efforts such as technical expert talks in Vienna, which is one idea that has been circulated. It is not even clear that all P5 [permanent five nuclear weapon] states [recognized by the NPT] would participate in such outside efforts.

Technical discussions that lack key participants are also unlikely to be fruitful. Indeed, they could actually serve to undermine the sense within the international community that [an] FMCT

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

is ripe for negotiation. We should be wary of unworkable technical proposals that create unrealistic expectations and move us further from the needed consensus. This is a risk we should not take as we seek to create and sustain momentum for an FMCT. The fact is that the key obstacles to FMCT negotiations are political, not technical.

There are also those who propose moving FMCT negotiations to the United Nations General Assembly [UNGA]. The UNGA, as a rule, operates by majority vote, although there have been exceptions, such as with the Arms Trade Treaty. Again, it is doubtful that the key states would participate in such a process, particularly if it does not operate by consensus. Simply put, negotiations will have to be consensus-based to get key states involved, similar to the process in the consensus-based CD. It is hard to see how a non-consensus-based strategy outside of the CD would be more effective in getting meaningful negotiations underway than striving to break the impasse at the CD.

With the goal of approaching this issue with the involvement of all key players, at last June's Paris Conference, the P5 committed to renewed efforts with other relevant parties to promote FMCT negotiations in the CD. The P5 continued their discussion in Geneva in August and met again in October in New York on the margins of the United Nations First Committee. This multilateral effort is already producing positive effects.

We were pleased that India, a key FMCT stakeholder, joined the P5 at the October meeting. The P5 is continuing to discuss this issue with Pakistan and Israel individually. We hope we will be able to also include additional countries as these consultations continue to go forward.

It seems that for now, our best hope is in the efforts of the P5 Plus consultative process. It is true that this process will need time to develop further and that resolving the issues that have created gridlock in the CD will be difficult. Still, we believe this course of action has the best potential to move the CD to action on the FMCT in 2012.

Amending the Consensus Rule?

There is some talk of amending the consensus rule at the CD, in order to break the current logjam. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission made this argument in their 2006 Final Report. The United States does not share the view that the impasse in the CD is the result of its procedural rules. On the contrary, the consensus rule has served CD members well by providing assurance that individual member states' national security concerns can be met. This is a point that the United States continues to make to Pakistan.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

There may be a case for some modifications to how decisions are taken on small procedural items at the CD – such as agreement on meeting schedules and similar, administrative issues – but those issues are not at the heart of the impasse. The road will not be clear until all members of the CD are convinced that commencing negotiations is in their national interest, or at least, not harmful to those interests. The United States is working hard to make the case to Pakistan – and all countries with reservations about the FMCT – that the commencement of negotiations is not something to fear.

Scope

Once FMCT negotiations have begun, CD members will face many complex and contentious issues, perhaps none so contentious as the issue of scope. We are well aware that CD members are divided on this issue. Indeed, it has always been so. Ambassador Shannon's Report to the CD, from which the Shannon Mandate is derived, highlighted these disagreements. His report of his consultations made it abundantly clear that members could not agree on this key issue, nor on many others. What members did agree on is embodied in a key line in that report following a listing of those contentious issues. That crucial line said: "...it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the ad hoc Committee any of the above noted issues."

The U.S. position is clear: FMCT obligations, including verification obligations, should cover only new production of fissile material. The United States has taken a step-by-step approach to reducing our nuclear arsenal in negotiations with the Soviet Union and now Russia. A step-by-step approach would serve us well with an FMCT. One essential step in the process should be codifying a legal ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

We are fully aware that many CD members have a different view and this issue will be the subject of vigorous debate. That is what negotiations are for, and the United States looks forward to that debate. What is not helpful is an effort to "pre-negotiate" the outcome of negotiations by an explicit reference to existing stocks in a negotiating mandate. We would not be alone in seeing this as a thinly-veiled effort to prevent negotiations from getting underway.

Verification

Another potential challenge in the negotiating process will be the creation of a verification regime. The United States supports an effectively verifiable FMCT and believes that sufficient

[back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

measures can be taken to ensure that a militarily significant diversion of newly-produced fissile material can be detected in a timely manner.

The [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] already has the requisite tools and experience to monitor declared facilities. Safeguards on enrichment and reprocessing plants have been well developed, and improvements to these techniques continue to be made. While FMCT verification will have different goals than those of traditional IAEA safeguards, many of these proven techniques will be of direct relevance.

Procedures will, of course, need to be developed for non-routine inspections to detect undeclared production facilities in states with a long history of fissile material production outside of safeguards. Drawing on established regimes, such inspections should include managed access or other procedures (e.g., confidence-building measures) to balance the inspectorate's right of access against the need to protect information that is sensitive for proliferation, proprietary, or other reasons. This will be a challenge as it is in all verification efforts, but it is a challenge we believe can be met.

Conclusion

We will continue to make it clear that all nations will have an equal opportunity to defend their interests in the CD. No country need fear the outcome of FMCT negotiations. More importantly, no country should fear the mere beginning of negotiations. And no country should feel it necessary to abuse the consensus principle and frustrate everyone else's desire to begin negotiations on serious disarmament efforts.

We believe that efforts by the P5 and others to get the FMCT back on track in the CD will yield good results. The sooner, the better, since the longer the CD remains paralyzed, the louder and more persistent the calls to abandon it will become.

We are under no illusions that negotiating an FMCT will be easy, given the difficulties of even starting the process. But a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material is in the interest of every man, woman and child on this planet. That is why it is worth the effort.

Thank you for your attention and I look forward to your questions.

[back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Russia, U.S. Ink Uranium Enrichment Pact for 2013-2022

Ria Novosti, 21 December 2011, <http://en.beta.rian.ru/>

Russia and the United States signed an intergovernmental agreement on Tuesday enabling the contract for uranium enrichment services in 2013-2022 to come into force, General Director of Russian state-controlled nuclear equipment exporter Techsnabexport (Tenex) Alexey Grigoriev said.

Sergey Kiriyyenko, the head of Russian state-run civil nuclear corporation Rosatom, and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman signed the agreement. “Just yesterday the head of the industry Sergey Kiriyyenko and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman signed, virtually, during a videoconference, the administrative arrangements for the intergovernmental U.S.-Russian agreement on cooperation on peaceful use of atomic energy,” Grigoriev said.

Grigoriev noted that the new arrangements replace the HEU agreement that was signed in 1993 and expires in 2013. “The contract between Tenex and USEC, which we signed on March, 23, 2011 for the supply of low-enriched uranium, entered into force with the signing of the [new] agreements,” Grigoriev said.

Tenex, wholly owned by Rosatom, signed a \$2.8 billion 10-year deal with the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to supply low-enriched uranium. Under the deal, Russia will supply USEC with 21 million separate work units over a period of 10 years starting from 2013.

The long-stalled U.S.-Russian Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, also known as the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement, signed for 30 years, came into force on January 11, 2011. It lays the legal framework for cooperation in nuclear research, production and trade, and both sides see it as contribution to non-proliferation regime.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

A “New START” for Arms Control

The Hill Congress Blog, 22 December 2011, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog>

By Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at the Department of State and the chief negotiator of the New START Treaty.

One year ago today, I watched from the Senate Gallery as Senators from both sides of the aisle gave their advice and consent to the New START Treaty. This great bipartisan effort is paying big dividends now in strengthening U.S. national security.

The New START Treaty entered into force on February 5th of this year and immediately entered implementation. It is going very well. The process has been pragmatic, business-like, and productive – a continuation of the working relationship we established with our Russian colleagues during the negotiations in Geneva.

We have had boots back on the ground conducting inspections for almost a year now. The United States has conducted 16 inspections in Russia and the Russians have conducted 17 inspections here in the United States – we have been keeping pace with each other. Every year, we each have the right to conduct 18 inspections on the other’s territory.

Negotiators worked hard to find innovative new mechanisms to aid in the verification of the treaty and the results of that work are now evident. For the first time, we are receiving data about re-entry vehicle (warhead) loadings on Russia’s missiles – and Russia, of course, receives the same data from us. The on-site inspection procedures under New START allow the United States to confirm the actual number of warheads on randomly selected Russian missiles. These verification tasks and inspection rights did not exist under the previous START Treaty.

Last March, the United States conducted exhibitions of its B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers and the Russian Federation conducted an exhibition of its RS-24 ICBM and associated mobile launcher. That was the first time we had a chance to see at first hand the RS-24, the new Russian mobile missile with multiple warheads.

We are constantly in communication with the Russians, exchanging over 1,700 notifications under the New START Treaty so far. These notifications help to track movement and changes in the status of weapon systems. For example, a notification is sent every time a heavy bomber is moved out of its home country for more than 24 hours.

In addition, every six months we exchange a comprehensive database. This gives us a full accounting of exactly where weapons systems are located, whether they are out of their deployment or operational bases and gone to maintenance, or have been retired. These semi-

 back to top

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

annual exchanges, along with the mandatory treaty notifications that continuously update the information that each side receives, create a “living document” that provides a comprehensive look into each other’s strategic nuclear forces.

The New START Treaty data exchanges are providing us with a more detailed picture of Russian strategic forces than we were able to obtain from earlier exchanges, and the inspections give us crucial opportunities to confirm the validity of that data. Of course, the verification regime is backed up by our own National Technical Means – satellites and other monitoring capabilities that we alone control.

Our experience so far demonstrates that the New START Treaty is enhancing our national security by building predictability and stability between the United States and Russia, still the world’s two largest nuclear powers. We are also setting the stage for the future, since new nuclear reductions will build on the success of New START and the innovations we are putting in place as we implement it.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



13 December – 27 December 2011

DTRA

Bulava Missile Ready to Deploy

RIA Novosti, 27 December 2011, <http://en.ria.ru/>

The flight tests of the Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] have been completed and it will now be adopted for service with the Russian Navy, President Dmitry Medvedev said on Tuesday. “We have made a very important step – we have completed the cycle of flight tests... of the Bulava missile,” he said. “Now it will be put into service.”

Russia successfully test launched two Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles on Friday. The missiles were launched from the Borey-class Yury Dolgoruky nuclear-powered submarine in the White Sea and hit designated targets at the Kura test range on Kamchatka, some 6,000 kilometers to the east.

They were the 18th and 19th test launches of the troubled Bulava. Only 11 launches have been officially declared successful. But some analysts suggest that in reality the number of failures is considerably larger. Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer said that of the Bulava's first 12 test launches, only one was entirely successful.

Despite several previous failures, officially blamed on manufacturing faults, the Russian military has insisted that there is no alternative to the Bulava. The Bulava (SS-NX-30) SLBM, developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (since 1998), carries up to 10 [multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV)] warheads and has a range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). The three-stage ballistic missile is designed for deployment on Borey-class nuclear submarines.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.