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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW

13 July – 26 July 2010

DTRA

GENERAL ARMS CONTROL

UN Chief to Try to Revive Disarmament Negotiations

Associated Press, 21 July 2010, http://www.npr.org/

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has invited ministers from the 192 UN member states to a meeting in September to revitalize UN disarmament negotiations which have been deadlocked for more than a dozen years, UN officials said Wednesday. *(455 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

First Steps toward Arms Trade Treaty

Associated Press, 23 July 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

The world's nations took the first steps at a conference that ended Friday toward a legally binding treaty that would try to regulate the multibillion dollar arms trade and prevent the transfer of weapons to armed groups fueling conflicts, terrorists and human rights violators. *(758 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Disposal Operations Resume at UMCDF

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 14 July 2010, http://www.cma.army.mil/

Disposal of mustard ton containers resumed shortly before midnight Tuesday at the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) after an annual maintenance outage of the facility's Metal Parts Furnace (MPF). *(378 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

Pueblo, Blue Grass Funds Pass Senate Committee

Global Security Newswire, 21 July 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/

The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee last week approved federal funding for chemical weapons disarmament efforts at the last two sites in the United States scheduled to finish destroying their stockpiles. *(191 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

Nunn-Lugar Program Disarms Six more Nuclear Warheads

Global Security Newswire, 26 July 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/

The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program in June disarmed six strategic nuclear warheads from the former Soviet Union, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) announced Friday. *(203 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

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NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

Lugar Calls for Passage of "New START"

National Journal, 19 July 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/

"Dear Mr. President: You will face severe foreign-policy challenges during the next four years." So wrote Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) in the opening to his 1988 book, "Letters to the Next President." *(2,113 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

Congressional Testimony of NNSA Administrator Thomas P. D'Agostino

NNSA, 20 July 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/

Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, New START Treaty Hearing

First and foremost, I want to make clear that the New START Treaty will not affect [National Nuclear Security Administration] NNSA's ability to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. *(808 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

New START Verification [EXCERPT]

Department of State, 26 July 2010, http://www.state.gov/

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation at the United States Institute of Peace

New START's verification regime was designed to be effective while at the same time reducing the implementation costs and the disruption to operations at facilities subject to the Treaty compared to those experienced under the original START Treaty. *(1,084 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)

ROK to Lead First PSI Marine Drill in October

Seoul Dong-A Ilbo Online, 17 July 2010, accessed via Open Source Center

A regional marine deterrence drill in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative against weapons of mass destruction will be conducted near Busan for two days from October 13. *(357 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

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TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

Further U.S.-Russian Nuclear Talks might Hinge on Armor Cuts, Analyst Says

Global Security Newswire, 21 July 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/

A new phase of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control negotiations might hinge in part on whether the former Cold War rivals can agree on conventional force reductions in Europe, according to one nonproliferation expert. *(839 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

TREATY ON OPEN SKIES

Russian Plane to Check Military Buildings in Czech Republic

Prague CTK, 23 July 2010, accessed via Open Source Center

A Russian mission will monitor military objects on the territory of the Czech Republic under the Open Skies Treaty next week, Jan Pejsek, from the Defense Ministry press and information service, has told CTK. *(176 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

FULL TEXT OF WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:

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UN Chief to Try to Revive Disarmament Negotiations

Associated Press, 21 July 2010, http://www.npr.org/

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has invited ministers from the 192 UN member states to a meeting in September to revitalize UN disarmament negotiations which have been deadlocked for more than a dozen years, UN officials said Wednesday [July 21].

The UN chief has been frustrated by the inaction of the Conference on Disarmament, which is supposed to be the UN's main disarmament negotiating body. It has been stalemated since it wrote the nuclear test-ban treaty in 1996 because its actions require agreement of all 65 nations that are members.

With many ministers expected for this year's high-level General Assembly session, Ban decided to hold a meeting on the sidelines on September 24 to discuss ways to try to break the disarmament logjam, the UN officials and a Western diplomat said, speaking on condition of anonymity because no public announcement has been made.

The Secretary-General said in his opening speech to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] review conference in May that he wanted the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations immediately on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials – highly enriched uranium and plutonium needed to produce nuclear weapons.

Ban said "it may need stronger impetus from a higher political level" and suggested a possible ministerial meeting on the margins of the General Assembly in September.

In its final document on May 29, the 189 nations that are parties to the NPT called for the Conference on Disarmament to begin work on a fissile material cutoff treaty and on "effective international arrangements" to assure non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapons won't be used against them.

"The review conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament," the document said.

What the September 24 meeting will agree to – or lead to – is uncertain, but the UN officials and Western diplomat said the Conference on Disarmament needs reform. Any reform would also affect the 192-member UN Commission on Disarmament, where disarmament issues are supposed to be discussed, they said.

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One possibility is that the meeting could decide to appoint experts to propose reforms that would be incorporated into a General Assembly resolution, the diplomat said.

Because of the "consensus" requirement, any member country can block action in the Conference on Disarmament, as Pakistan has done on the fissile material treaty, the UN officials said. Ban has warned that because of this requirement the Conference on Disarmament is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Recent treaties on land mines and cluster munitions, for example, were negotiated outside the Geneva-based conference to bypass the bottleneck.

The Western diplomat said the conference's inaction is also costly – about $500,000 a year for a dozen years of producing nothing.

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First Steps toward Arms Trade Treaty

Associated Press, 23 July 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

The world's nations took the first steps at a conference that ended Friday toward a legally binding treaty that would try to regulate the multibillion dollar arms trade and prevent the transfer of weapons to armed groups fueling conflicts, terrorists and human rights violators. When the conference began two weeks ago in the 192-member General Assembly, many delegates were uncertain whether there would be wide support for a treaty regulating a trade which French Ambassador Eric Danon said has been veiled in secrecy for 2,000 years because arms trading is a matter of sovereignty and the weapons are "the symbol of life and death."

The main achievement of the conference, Danon said Friday, is that "the principle of an Arms Trade Treaty is now agreed by all the countries, even if some countries make reservations on some aspects." The United States, Britain and the European Union also praised the outcome of the conference and even Pakistan, which was singled out by many diplomats as being most vocal in questioning the need for a treaty, appeared to sign on.

"We do not question the validity of the objective," Pakistani diplomat Reza Bashir Tarar said, but achieving consensus on a treaty – which will be required at the United States' insistence – "will not be easy. […] When we do, documents that emerge will have lasting value," he said at Friday's closing session.

The General Assembly first voted in December 2006 to work toward a treaty regulating the growing arms trade, with the U.S. casting a "no" vote. Last October, the Obama administration reversed the Bush administration's position and supported an assembly resolution to hold a four-week UN conference in 2012 to draft an arms trade treaty with four preparatory conferences – the first of which just ended.

Danon called the U.S. reversal "very important" not only in launching negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty but in supporting other arms control and disarmament efforts.

U.S. Ambassador Don Mahley said the United States is "pleased" with discussions so far on Arms Trade Treaty and "we hope the negotiations will continue to develop in a positive direction." "The U.S. made clear last October our desire to see a negotiation that would produce an effective Arms Trade Treaty as a means of addressing many of the enduring global challenges caused by unregulated arms," he said in a statement.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, world military expenditure in 2009 was estimated at $1.53 trillion. The top exporters were the United States, Russia,

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Germany, France, Britain and Spain and the top importers were India, Singapore, Malaysia, Greece, South Korea and Pakistan.

There was no final document agreed by all delegates but Argentina's UN Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan, chairman of the preparatory process, issued a "Chairman's Draft Paper" which spells out possible elements, principles, goals and objectives of a treaty. The 14 elements include common standards, implementation, transparency, compliance, international cooperation and final provisions including reservations.

A key principle would recognize that "the absence of commonly agreed international standards for the transfer of conventional arms and their diversion to the illicit market are contributory factors to armed conflict, serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, the displacement of people, transnational organized crime, terrorism and the illicit trade in narcotics..."

The goals would have a treaty "establish the highest possible common international standards for the import, export and transfer of convention arms" and "prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit transfer, production, and brokering of conventional arms." Other key goals would promote transparency and accountability in the arms trade and prevent international transfers of arms that contribute to human suffering, serious human rights violations, armed conflict, UN sanctions violations, organized crime and terrorist acts.

Annalisa Giannella, the European Union's representative on nonproliferation, called the meeting a success and said it "brings the international community closer to agreeing" on a treaty. British Ambassador John Duncan said the meeting made "more progress than we expected," adding that "those who remained unmoved by the urgent humanitarian need" for a treaty are beginning to see the economic case – that unregulated trade "harms our ability to maintain stable markets."

France's Danon said organizing the trade in weapons will take time, and at the beginning a treaty "will not be very constraining" and exports will be "a matter of national sovereignty." "But we are going to organize common rules and standards of this national sovereignty, and I think that this is a new symbol of the globalization, and part of the global governance of the world," he said.

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Disposal Operations Resume at UMCDF

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 14 July 2010, http://www.cma.army.mil/

Disposal of mustard ton containers resumed shortly before midnight Tuesday at the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) after an annual maintenance outage of the facility's Metal Parts Furnace (MPF). In accordance with the facility's Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) permit, the facility will operate at 50 percent of the permitted Agent Trial Burn rate while officials from the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) analyze data from the test burns. The RCRA permit allows for increased rates once the Agent Trial Burn (ATB) data has been analyzed and an increase is authorized by the DEQ. UMCDF will work closely with DEQ to increase the operations rate as permitted.

The ATB was completed on June 27 and the MPF outage began June 28. Prior to the maintenance outage, 374 mustard ton containers had been destroyed or 14.2 percent of UMCD's mustard agent stockpile.

"UMCDF is committed to safely restarting mustard agent destruction operations and to working closely with DEQ to ensure environmental compliance is achieved," said Gary Anderson, UMCDF Site Project Manager. "The UMCDF personnel have worked extremely hard to set the stage for success. My thanks to each and every individual for their professionalism and dedication to this critical national project."

The Army is working to dispose of the mustard ton containers safely and compliantly to meet the Chemical Weapons Treaty Convention deadline of April 2012. "We will do all we can to comply with the international treaty, but safety guides the schedule," said Steve Warren, project general manager for URS, the company that built and operates UMCDF for the Army. "A successful trial burn was a great step towards reaching that goal."

"UMCD government employees and contractors have worked hard on completing a successful trial burn. I am very pleased with their progress and look forward to continuing operations to safely and compliantly destroy the remaining chemical stockpile," said Lt. Col. Kris Perkins, depot commander.

This is the 13th and final chemical weapons disposal campaign undertaken by the UMCDF since the start of chemical disposal operations in September 2004. The last of the nerve agent destroyed at the depot occurred on November 5, 2008, with disposal of the last VX munitions. The total number of munitions destroyed to date since the start of operations is 218,223.

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Pueblo, Blue Grass Funds Pass Senate Committee

Global Security Newswire, 21 July 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/

The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee last week approved federal funding for chemical weapons disarmament efforts at the last two sites in the United States scheduled to finish destroying their stockpiles.

The fiscal 2011 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill contains $65.6 million for building a chemical agent neutralization facility at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado. The site holds 2,611 tons of mustard blister agent, which is scheduled to be eliminated by 2017. […]

Construction continues on the neutralization plant along with a facility that would be used to treat hydrolysate waste produced in neutralizing the blister agent.

The Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky would receive $59.4 million in the appropriations bill for construction of a disarmament facility that would destroy the site's stockpile of 523 tons of mustard agent and VX and sarin nerve agents. Chemical disarmament operations at the installation are slated to end in 2021.

The appropriations bill now must be approved by the full Senate.

The Defense Department agency that is preparing for chemical demilitarization operations at Blue Grass and Pueblo could receive a total of $511 million for fiscal 2011, which begins October 1st.

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Nunn-Lugar Program Disarms Six More Nuclear Warheads

Global Security Newswire, 26 July 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/

The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program in June disarmed six strategic nuclear warheads from the former Soviet Union, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) announced Friday.

The Nunn-Lugar initiative's accomplishments last month also included elimination of two ICBMs, six mobile ICBM launchers and 48 metric tons of Russian chemical warfare material. In addition, the program safeguarded four nuclear-weapon train shipments.

Since being established in 1991 to secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction in one-time Soviet states, the program has deactivated 7,551 strategic nuclear warheads and destroyed 785 ICBMs, 498 ICBM silos, 180 mobile ICBM launchers, 651 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 476 SLBM launchers, 32 ballistic missile-capable submarines, 155 strategic bombers, 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles and 194 nuclear test tunnels.

The program has also safeguarded 487 nuclear-weapon train shipments, boosted security at 24 nuclear weapons storage facilities and constructed 20 biological agent monitoring stations. It helped to remove all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, nations that once respectively held the world's third-, fourth- and eighth-largest nuclear arsenals.

The initiative was also instrumental in the destruction of Albania's small arsenal of chemical warfare materials, its first effort outside the former Soviet Union. The program has eliminated 1,444 metric tons of Russian and Albanian chemical-weapon agents.

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Lugar Calls for Passage of "New START"

National Journal (NJ), 19 July 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/

[…] [A]s the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prepares to vote on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, dubbed "New START," with Russia … the ranking Republican on the committee and a respected arms control voice in the Senate, [Senator Richard] Lugar (R-Indiana) is doing his part to help the Obama administration capture the elusive, bipartisan center where the 67 votes needed for passage reside. *National Journal* Staff Correspondent James Kitfield recently spoke with Lugar about New START. Edited excerpts from that interview follow.

NJ: *When former presidential contender Mitt Romney recently wrote an op-ed critical of New START, you called it a "hyperbolic attack" that "repeats discredited objections and appears unaware of arms control history and context." Why such strong words?*

Lugar: Essentially because I believe New START is vitally important in terms of our relationship with the Russians at this point in history. People can say this debate is just another one of these normal arguments that we have every day in Congress, just more grist for the political mill. But I was saying in that statement that New START is important. It's a pretty modest treaty, but the fact is, we are back at the table talking to the Russians again, and the U.S.-Russian relationship has been strengthened as a result in ways that could prove very important to us in the future. So I wasn't willing to sit back while the treaty was deprecated. When someone writes an op-ed under the headline, "Obama's Worst Foreign Policy Mistake," well, I do consider that hyperbolic. Maybe that's a tough word, but nevertheless I felt it was an accurate description of the op-ed.

NJ: *So you support the Obama administration's "reset" of relations with Russia, and the renewed focus on reducing both nations' stockpiles of nuclear weapons?*

Lugar: Yes. Remember, I was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee when we passed the Moscow Treaty in 2002, which I supported even though it was modest and lacked verification protocols. The response I got to those concerns was that we could still rely on the verification protocols in START I, which didn't expire until December 2009. Flash forward to December 2008, and I'm in Russia on normal Nunn-Lugar [Cooperative Threat Reduction] business. As I was coming into Moscow, a Bush administration official who shall remain unnamed was leaving Russia for the last time, and he indicated that there were no prospects of moving ahead on any cooperative initiatives with the Russians whatsoever. This was after the conflict in Georgia, but even well before that the Bush administration had shown less and less interest in engaging with the Russians on arms control. They just had lots of other things on their agenda.

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NJ: *Were the Russians interested in further arms reductions?*

Lugar: When I talked with senior Russian officials on that trip about the fact that START I was set to expire in a year, they were encouraged that someone was even interested in the subject of arms control. On my return from that trip I thus wrote a memo to President-elect Obama and his people that there was an opportunity to engage with the Russians on the issue, but they needed to act fast because the December 5, 2009 expiration of START I was looming. I think President Obama and his team moved about as rapidly as possible on a new START after that, given the slowness of the confirmation process.

NJ: *Why do you think that U.S.-Russian engagement on arms control is so important?*

Lugar: Because through that continuous engagement people get to know each other and form at least some level of trust, and over time that can lead to breakthroughs that are even more dramatic than anything contemplated in a particular treaty. I'll give you an example. At one point I was in Russia on Nunn-Lugar [Cooperative Threat Reduction] business, and I received a request to visit a Russian naval base where I don't believe any American congressman or military official had ever been. At that base I saw a Russian Typhoon-class submarine, which had never really been the subject of any arms control treaty. The Russians had six of these giant Typhoons, which were characterized to such dramatic effect in Tom Clancy's *The Hunt for Red October*. In actual fact, these submarines traveled up and down our Eastern coast for the better part of 20 years with nuclear-tipped missiles, any one of which would have been a chip shot into New York or Philadelphia.

NJ: *Why were the Russians showing you the Typhoons?*

Lugar: Because this was in the 1990s, when the Russians were having financial troubles and the incredible maintenance required to keep them operational was becoming difficult to afford. So the Russians wanted to talk about a program that would lead to the dismantlement of some Typhoons. And to date, we have dismantled three of these deadly instruments of destruction. That came about not directly from arms control talks but rather because I was in Russia and available for a discussion. My point is, the nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship is that if you're sitting around talking, it may not be a good day for arms control discussions; but when an opportunity presents itself later, each side knows who to call. In that way you can sometimes accomplish even more-dramatic things than what you are discussing in treaty negotiations.

NJ: *How do you respond to critics who say, much like with the Typhoons, New START only quantifies nuclear arms reductions that the Russians would undertake anyway to save money?*

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Lugar: Not exactly. Some Russian officials may want to reduce their nuclear arsenal, but they need assurances that the United States will also reduce its arsenal so they are not put at a disadvantage. We have similar interests.

NJ: *Some critics … are philosophically opposed to New START because they see it as a step toward an unrealistic and utopian vision of a "world without nuclear weapons." President Obama has espoused that vision, as have former Senator Sam Nunn, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and Republican former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz. Do you support the so-called race to zero nuclear weapons?*

Lugar: I've talked to Sam Nunn and all the others that you mention about this subject of a world without nuclear weapons. They express the concept as being at the base of a mountain shrouded in clouds and trying to formulate a strategy for getting to the top even though they can't see it. So I don't fault them or President Obama for talking about a world without nuclear weapons, but neither do I think it is a particularly good idea to express the process in that way. Quite frankly, it's been plenty difficult enough just trying to get down to the 1,500-warhead limit in New START.

Talk of "no nukes" also invites opposition from those who see it as a sign of weakness in those who lack the backbone to face the world as it is. I don't think that criticism is fair, but it's out there. So it seems to me that the more practical path is to move incrementally ahead, taking warheads off of missiles one at a time, steadily building trust and transparency into a process that makes misunderstandings less likely.

NJ: *Some critics object to language in the nonbinding preamble of the treaty suggesting that Russia might withdraw from the New START pact in the future if it thinks that a U.S. missile defense system has tipped the strategic balance. How do you answer their concerns that such language might ultimately constrain development of a U.S. missile defense system?*

Lugar: Well, it's simply not true, which has been asserted in about every way possible. The Russians might withdraw from New START, but they didn't withdraw from START I even after we withdrew from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty in 2001. In other words, the United States exercised our option to withdraw from an arms control treaty on that one conspicuous occasion, and the Russians remained committed to START I until it expired on December 5, 2009. Regardless, the Obama administration asserted in all our hearings and testimony that it is not only reserving the right to proceed on building a missile defense system, it is actually building it. The Russians aren't happy about that, and they've been assertive in stating their objections.

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NJ: *As someone who has dealt with verification issues for decades, are you confident that the verification protocols in the new START are sufficient?*

Lugar: Yes I am. I believe it will provide more transparency than START I, rather than less. The numbering system for warheads and delivery systems is much more transparent than before. START I verification was really about making sure that neither side was cheating, and avoiding a breakthrough that could have changed the strategic balance. The new START reflects the fact that the Russians are now really looking for stability, and they want to avoid a race to greater numbers of nuclear weapons. Before one of President Obama's early meetings with [Russian President Dmitry] Medvedev, he invited [Senator John] Kerry and me over to the White House situation room, where we met with [Defense Secretary Robert] Gates, [National Security Adviser Jim] Jones and others. The president asked us what essential elements the treaty had to include to win bipartisan support. We told him it had to get verification and missile defense right. And I think the administration team did a good job in achieving that goal. President Obama knew he would have to counter the objections of some lawmakers who would launch a frontal assault on the treaty.

NJ: *Another objection the critics have raised is that the new START does not address the Russians' large advantage in tactical nuclear weapons.*

Lugar: Leaving aside the question over whether a next round of talks should address tactical nuclear weapons, Russia's tactical weapons are not a direct threat to the United States or our NATO allies. Because previous treaties have taken down intermediate-range missiles, we're talking about tactical missiles with very short ranges. And all of our NATO allies who might logically be worried about being in harm's way of such weapons have endorsed the new treaty, without exception. They are very hopeful we will stay at the negotiating table with the Russians after START is approved to talk about further reductions in tactical weapons, and a whole lot of other issues. The fact is, a large percentage of Russia's short-range tactical weapons are actually deployed along its border with China. So they are not designed with the United States or NATO in mind, but rather China.

NJ: *Do you believe that the New START pact will win the two-thirds majority needed for passage in the Senate?*

Lugar: I think its prospects are good. The Foreign Relations Committee is likely to have the last of the New START hearings soon, and all of the relevant intelligence information is now available to senators and their staffs. Senator John Kerry has indicated he hopes to move the treaty out of committee in this four-week session, and then it's up to [Majority Leader Harry]

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Reid (D-Nevada) to schedule a floor vote in the post-Labor Day period. That's not a slam dunk, however, because there will be a lot of pressure on Senator Reid to wind things up so members can go home to defend their seats in the November elections. So it will depend on his priorities.

***NJ**: Do you worry that New START will be caught up in the partisan currents of an election season?*

Lugar: Well, I have some concerns. I'm about to go to a Republican lunch where I fully expect to hear for an hour and a half how everything the administration proposes might be blocked. If you're a Republican leader, that makes this a difficult task. There are some in our caucus who just don't trust the Russians, and others who believe that every day that goes by before the election with nothing happening is a victory, but I'm not one of them. Even though these are partisan times, there are also a good many Republicans who really don't want to pick a fight on this treaty.

***NJ:** So you predict passage?*

Lugar: Yes, I think it will pass. I go back to my basic theme. I admire the Obama administration for taking this complex issue on, and it has offered a modest treaty that sets the stage for an ongoing relationship with the Russians that will allow us to work together on issues of common interest. That may prove especially important as we move forward in confronting the issue of Iran's suspected nuclear program.

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Congressional Testimony of NNSA Administrator Thomas P. D'Agostino

NNSA, 20 July 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/

Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, New START Treaty Hearing

First and foremost, I want to make clear that the New START Treaty will not affect [National Nuclear Security Administration] NNSA's ability to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA sites – to include our production, testing, and National Laboratory facilities – will not be subject to inspection, and none of our operations will be subject to limitation.

Our plans for investment in and modernization of the Nuclear Security Enterprise – the collection of NNSA laboratories, production sites and experimental facilities that support our stockpile stewardship program, our nuclear nonproliferation agenda, our Naval nuclear propulsion programs, and a host of other nuclear security missions – are essential irrespective of whether or not New START is ratified.

Treaty implementation will not affect our plans. Warheads removed from deployed delivery vehicles to meet New START limits will continue to remain available to support maintenance and surveillance activities. They may also be retained as inactive reserve weapons, available to support nuclear component reuse if needed as part of future warhead life extension program (LEP) activities. […]

Warhead Life Extension Activities and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)

With respect to life extension options, while the NPR is clear that the United States will give preference to nuclear component refurbishment or reuse, it is equally clear that the full range of options will be considered for each warhead LEP, to include replacement of nuclear components.

The report on the "New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans," submitted to Congress in response to Section 1251 of the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, further explains that "[w]hile the NPR expresses a policy preference for refurbishment and reuse in decisions to proceed from study to engineering development, the Laboratory Directors will be expected to provide findings associated with the full range of LEP approaches, and to make a set of recommendations based solely on their best technical assessments of the ability of each LEP approach to meet critical stockpile management goals (weapon system safety, security, and effectiveness)." […]

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Maintaining Warhead Reliability

U.S. nuclear warhead reliability has always been held to the highest standards – and these standards for warhead reliability will remain exacting and extremely high, regardless of stockpile size. Over the course of the past twenty years, the stockpile has been reduced from over 21,000 warheads to approximately 5,100 at the end of fiscal year 2009 within the context of science-based stockpile stewardship and the continuing moratorium on nuclear testing.

During this time, the National Laboratories have assessed our weapon systems on an annual basis and the Secretaries of Defense and Energy have annually certified to the President the safety, security and reliability of our stockpile. However, as the size of the stockpile continues to decrease, our deterrent must rely even more on a strong capabilities-based infrastructure that can respond rapidly to technical and geopolitical challenges – and this is what we will achieve through the programs and plans described in the SSMP. To ensure this infrastructure is in place when we need it, sustained national-level support over the next decade is essential. […]

NNSA Support to Treaty Verification

The United States relies on NNSA and the National Laboratories for the development, evaluation and utilization of technologies for a number of treaty verification and nonproliferation initiatives. […] For strategic arms control purposes, we leverage the expertise of our physicists and engineers to develop advanced radiation detection equipment, as well as analyze the impact of the use of this equipment on or near U.S. assets.

With regard to New START, U.S. inspectors will use equipment developed by the NNSA National Laboratories to confirm that objects on deployed delivery vehicles that are declared to be non-nuclear are, in fact, non-nuclear. This equipment, which was originally developed for verification under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty, was also used by U.S. inspectors for verification under the 1991 START treaty. Should new radiation detection equipment be required, specialists from throughout the Nuclear Security Enterprise will play an essential role in the development and evaluation process.

Conclusion

The New START Treaty, if ratified and entered into force, commits the United States and Russian Federation to further reduce our deployed strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent and verifiable manner, thereby increasing stability between our countries, while demonstrating in a concrete manner the U.S. and Russian commitment to our obligations under the Nuclear

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Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. This, I believe, will provide positive momentum for future U.S.-Russian collaboration, and will provide further credibility for maintaining a strong leadership role for the United States in international nonproliferation initiatives.

Most importantly, the New START Treaty accomplishes these objectives without jeopardizing U.S. national security, and specifically it will not jeopardize the ability of the United States to maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of its nuclear weapons stockpile. For these reasons, I urge this body to favorably consider the New START Treaty.

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New START Verification [EXCERPT]

Department of State, 26 July 2010, http://www.state.gov/
Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation at the United States Institute of Peace

Since May 13th, when the White House transmitted the New START Treaty to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the leadership of Senator John Kerry and Senator Richard Lugar, have held an intensive series of hearings ensuring a timely and thorough review of the Treaty […]

Numerous administration officials, former government and military leaders, and representatives of non-governmental organizations have testified about the Treaty. In addition to the testimony provided during hearings, Senators have been briefed extensively and the Administration continues to respond to any and all questions posed by Senators about the Treaty. […]

Verification Measures

New START's verification measures are designed to ensure that each Party is able to verify the other's compliance with the requirements in the Treaty […]

The obligations and prohibitions of the New START Treaty are different from those in START, reflecting both the improved U.S.-Russia relationship and the lessons learned from 15 years of implementing the START Treaty. The differences also reflect the spirit of the Moscow Treaty, by permitting each Party the flexibility to determine for itself the configuration of its strategic forces at the reduced levels of delivery vehicles and warheads established in this Treaty.

Like START, however, the New START Treaty promotes strategic stability by ensuring transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces and confidence that the Russian Federation does not exceed the Treaty's limits throughout its ten-year term.

New START's verification regime was designed to be effective while at the same time reducing the implementation costs and the disruption to operations at facilities subject to the Treaty compared to those experienced under the original START Treaty.

The verification regime is based on an extensive set of data exchanges and timely notifications regarding all strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, two types of on-site inspections, exhibitions, restrictions on where specified items may be located, and additional transparency measures.

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The regime includes some significant innovations over the START regime, such as the provision of unique identifiers for all ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. In addition, New START includes reentry vehicle onsite inspections that are designed to monitor the exact number of reentry vehicles emplaced on individual missiles selected for inspection. That is a first.

Under the expired START Treaty, provisions allowed for confirmation that a certain type of missile was not carrying more than the maximum number of warheads attributed to that type of missile. During inspections, we will have the opportunity to confirm that the actual number of warheads emplaced on a designated missile matches the declared figure at the pre-inspection briefing. Verification of the actual number of re-entry vehicles deployed on an ICBM or SLBM was not required by the START Treaty.

The new Treaty provides for an annual quota of 18 on-site inspections a year. While this is less than the number permitted under START (28), the number of Russian facilities that are eligible for inspection will be 35, which is half the 70 total former Soviet facilities that were subject to inspection under START. And, of course, the number of inspections without the New START Treaty is and will be zero.

In addition, what we refer to as Type One inspections under New START, combine elements of two different types of inspections conducted under START. This means that a New START Treaty inspection will provide us with the opportunity to acquire more information than we were able to do under a single START Treaty inspection.

Telemetry

I would like to briefly note the role of telemetry, and compare the START and New START approaches. The New START Treaty's telemetry provisions promote transparency and predictability. Unlike START, telemetric information is not needed to verify a Party's compliance with the New START Treaty. For example, the New START Treaty has different criteria for determining what constitutes a new type of missile for purposes of the Treaty so there is no requirement to determine certain technical characteristics of new missiles such as their launch weight or throw-weight in order to distinguish them from existing types of missiles. Therefore, the telemetry provisions in New START are different than those in START.

The Parties agreed to allow for the exchange of telemetric information on an agreed equal number (up to five annually) of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, with the testing Party determining the launches for which it will exchange information. The specifics of the annual telemetry exchanges will be worked out in the Treaty's implementation body, the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

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We believe that exchanging telemetric information will prove valuable to both sides. Although such information is not required to verify the specific provisions of the new Treaty, it is helpful in providing additional information about both currently deployed missiles and new missiles under development in Russia.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the New START Treaty is a continuation of the international arms control and nonproliferation framework that the United States has worked hard to foster and strengthen for the last 50 years. It will provide ongoing transparency and predictability regarding the world's two largest nuclear arsenals, while preserving our ability to maintain the strong nuclear deterrent that remains an essential element of U.S. national security and the security of our partners and allies.

Its comprehensive verification regime will provide predictability, but it recognizes that we are no longer in a Cold War relationship. Thus, it allows each Party to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms and how reductions will be made.

With the New START Treaty we are setting the stage for further arms reductions. As we say in the Preamble to the Treaty, we see it as providing new impetus to the step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms, with a view to expanding this process in the future to a multilateral approach. We also will seek to include non-strategic and non-deployed weapons in future reductions. For those who are concerned about addressing Russia's stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, ratification of the New START Treaty will be a key step to engaging Russia on those types of weapons. Absent ratification, it is difficult to imagine Russia showing any willingness to address tactical nuclear weapons. […]

The New START Treaty contains the mechanisms that will enable us to monitor and inspect Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Our knowledge of Russian nuclear forces would substantially erode over time without ratification of the Treaty, increasing the risks of misunderstandings, mistrust, and worst-case analysis and policymaking.

The New START Treaty is in the best national security interests of the United States and I believe there is every reason for the Senate to provide its consent to ratification.

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ROK to Lead First PSI Marine Drill in October

Seoul Dong-A Ilbo Online, 17 July 2010, accessed via Open Source Center

A regional marine deterrence drill in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative against weapons of mass destruction will be conducted near Busan for two days from October 13. PSI is a concept that encompasses joint operations and information sharing aimed at preventing the proliferation of WMDs, including nuclear weapons and missiles. Ninety-four countries have signed the PSI agreement.

South Korea for the first time will lead the drill, which will entail the mobilization of three to five ships including anti-submarine and support vessels, maritime patrol aircraft (P-3C) and helicopters, and elite units of the Korean Navy and Coast Guard.

A ranking official at the South Korean Defense Ministry told a media briefing Thursday, “The ‘2+2 meeting’,” or the Republic of Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting of their foreign and defense ministers, will tackle the conduct of the PSI drill as a major agenda item when it convenes in Seoul Wednesday," adding, "Preparation is proceeding well for the October drill according to schedule."

"The drill will not be a bilateral exercise between South Korea and the U.S., and many countries having interest among those that joined PSI will take part."

Japan, Australia and Singapore reportedly expressed interest in participation.

On the delayed transfer of wartime operational command to Seoul, the official said, "We'll have the opportunity to check and evaluate a new plan to transfer the wartime operational command." "Discussions will be held on how South Korea and the U.S. will implement their responsibilities and building up the bilateral alliance."

On the 2+2 meeting, the official said, "The meeting will be based on the two nations' desire to expand and deepen relationship at the regional and global levels, as well as on the Korean Peninsula in line with the spirit of the bilateral alliance." A decision has yet to be made, however, on if the meeting will be held regularly.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will attend an event marking the 60th anniversary of the Korean War at the Korean War Memorial in Seoul during their visit to Korea next week and bring flowers for the victims of the Ch'o'nan [Cheonan] sinking.

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Further U.S.-Russian Nuclear Talks might Hinge on Armor Cuts, Analyst Says

Global Security Newswire, 21 July 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/

A new phase of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control negotiations might hinge in part on whether the former … rivals can agree on conventional force reductions in Europe, according to one nonproliferation expert.

Washington is eager to follow up ratification of the "New START" agreement – signed by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in April – with a new pact under which Moscow would reduce or eliminate its estimated stockpile of roughly 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons. However, Moscow continues to press its interest in curbing U.S. and allied conventional superiority in the region. […]

Hurdles to surmount before the two sides can return to the nuclear arms control negotiating table, though, include a number of issues, such as Moscow's interest in limiting U.S. missile defenses, according to issue experts.

Obama administration officials have indicated interest in addressing the idea of tactical nuclear limits during the next phase of talks, but Russian concerns about Washington's conventional military prowess could pose a daunting challenge to making progress, experts say. The Russian military – notably the nation's navy – has been particularly reticent to reduce tactical nuclear warheads when U.S. fighter aircraft, armor and warships maintain a clear technological edge.

Tactical nuclear weapons are typically short-range arms, such as land-based missiles with ranges of less than 300 miles and air- and sea-launched weapons with ranges of less than 400 miles.

At the height of the Cold War, Washington maintained more than 7,300 such weapons in Europe. Moscow had approximately 15,000 of the weapons fielded in the region in the early 1990s, according to a 2008 estimate by nuclear arms experts Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen.

Over the years, the United States has reduced its tactical nuclear arms deployments in Europe to 200 or fewer, located at military bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, the analysts said.

[Henry] Sokolski, [executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center] said senior Obama administration officials anticipate the United States might have to achieve a new

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Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty prior to winning any Russian agreement on additional reductions in tactical nuclear forces.

The first such conventional forces accord – concluded at the end of the Cold War after years of negotiations involving nearly two dozen nations – capped heavy armor and aircraft deployments in Europe and mandated the destruction of excess weapons.

Moscow in 2007 suspended its participation in the CFE agreement and has pushed for a renegotiation that might increase its flexibility in moving troops and equipment, following harsh Western criticism of its military actions in Georgia and Moldova. Meanwhile, Russia has bristled at NATO enlargement over roughly the past 10 years, and could use conventional-force negotiations as a forum to seek limits on Washington's plans for missile defense installations in the region.

"The first time we tackled the conventional military balance [it] took over a decade of talks to get to 'yes'," Sokolski said in a telephone interview yesterday. A CFE Treaty revision might be accomplished more quickly, but "probably would take more than 10 weeks and probably more than 10 months," he said at the Heritage event.

An Obama administration official acknowledged that Moscow is concerned about conventional force levels, but insisted the matter remains on a track separate from tactical nuclear dialogue.

"We see no direct link between discussions aimed at updating conventional arms control agreements in Europe and follow-on nuclear arms reductions discussions with Russia," the senior official told Global Security Newswire on Monday on condition of not being named. "However, we note that Russia justifies its large tactical nuclear weapons inventory as a counterbalance to Western conventional force capabilities."

Yesterday, a Russian Embassy official sounded a distinctly similar theme. "There is actually no direct link between the CFE Treaty and possible discussions on the tactical nuclear weapons," said the Russian official, also speaking anonymously. "There is no direct link between these two issues."

In fact, it appears that following New START's entry into force, Moscow would be prepared to discuss tactical nuclear forces with Washington – but only in the context of broader discourse about all military deployments in the region, to include both conventional and atomic arms, government officials told GSN. […]

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One White House official this week said that while debate over New START is currently taking political center stage, that focus has not interfered with administration progress in policy planning. "The top arms priority of the administration is getting the New START treaty ratified …" National Security Council spokesman Mike Hammer told GSN. "We are also giving careful consideration to the next steps in nuclear arms control, including the timing of any additional discussions."

Another U.S. official involved in nonproliferation issues, Ambassador Susan Burk, recently said the White House would seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty [CTBT] after lawmakers approve New START. […]

"It is still our plan to try to get the Senate to work on CTBT sometime after New START … passes, but that time line has not been determined," said the senior administration official who asked not to be named.

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Russian Plane to Check Military Buildings in Czech Republic

Prague CTK, 23 July 2010, accessed via Open Source Center

A Russian mission will monitor military objects on the territory of the Czech Republic under the Open Skies Treaty next week, Jan Pejsek, from the Defense Ministry press and information service, has told CTK.

He said an Antonov An-30B aircraft will arrive at Pardubice airport on Monday [July 26]. Twenty-one experts will complete the observation mission on Friday [July 30].

"Every signatory to the treaty has the right to carry out an observance flight. It monitors whether unreported shifts of military equipment and unreported large military exercises are [being] carried out or whether armament is … under way," Pejsek said.

Under the treaty, the Czech Republic is obliged to receive up to four such flights annually and may carry out the same number of flights over other signatory countries.

This will be the eighth observation flight over the Czech Republic since 2002, when the treaty took effect. These flights were carried out by the Americans and Swedes in the past, for instance.

Czech soldiers have carried out observation flights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Ukraine.

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