DEFENSE TREATY INSPECTION READINESS PROGRAM · READINESS THROUGH AWARENESS

BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW

11 January – 24 January 2011

DTRA

GENERAL ARMS CONTROL

Conference on Disarmament to Hold First Public Plenary of 2011 Session

UN Office of Geneva, 20 January 2011, www.unog.ch

The Conference on Disarmament, the world's sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, will hold the first public plenary of its 2011 session on Tuesday, 25 January at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. *(336 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Defense Cuts Not Seen Affecting Pueblo Chemical Depot

Global Security Newswire, 11 January 2011, gsn.nti.org

Anticipated U.S. defense cost-cutting in 2011 is not expected to impact funding for chemical weapons disarmament preparations at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado, the Pueblo Chieftain reported yesterday. *(448 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

Work on Weapons Destruction Plant Progresses Despite Cold Temperatures

The Richmond Register, 16 January 2011, richmondregister.com

The temperature may be in the mid-20s, but workers were busy making progress on the chemical weapons destruction plant at the Blue Grass Army Depot on Thursday as two journalists toured the site off Irvine Road. *(448 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

Year of Transition for the OPCW

The Hindu, 17 January 2011, www.thehindu.com

Interview with Ahmet Uzumcu, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, on its work and goals. *(1,161 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

FISSILE MATERIALS

U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement Enters into Force

U.S. Department of State, 12 January 2011, www.state.gov

U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov today exchanged diplomatic notes to bring into force the Agreement […] for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, referred to as the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement. *(638 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

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FISSILE MATERIALS (CONT.)

United States and China Cooperate on Nuclear Security

World Nuclear News, 20 January 2011, www.world-nuclear-news.org

The United States and China have signed an intergovernmental agreement to establish a center of excellence in China to promote effective nuclear security and safeguards. *(328 words)* *Click here for full text.*

NNSA Announces Completion of First B83 Dismantlement at Y-12

NNSA, 20 January 2011, nnsa.energy.gov

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) today announced that its Y-12 National Security Complex has completed the dismantlement of the first secondary from a retired B83, one of the biggest weapon systems ever built. *(497 words)* *Click here for full text.*

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

Cutting 10 Missiles from Each Base 'The Leading Option,' Visiting Commander Says

Great Falls Tribune, 12 January 2011, www.greatfallstribune.com

Military leaders still are weighing how to trim 30 land-based missiles from the nation's arsenal of 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles as a result of the new arms control treaty with Russia, but "the leading option right now" is to remove 10 from each base, including Malmstrom Air Force Base. *(562 words)* *Click here for full text.*

Russia Says Next U.S. Arms Talks Must Include Others

Wall Street Journal, 14 January 2011, www.wsj.com

Russia said further cuts in nuclear weapons sought by the U.S. can be achieved only as part of a multinational accord limiting other types of armaments, a position that dims the Obama administration's chances for swift progress toward one of its biggest foreign policy goals. *(616 words)* *Click here for full text.*

Cold War Issues Linger Over Arms-Control Negotiations

The Washington Post, 18 January 2011, www.thewashingtonpost.com

As Gottemoeller pointed out, Moscow's concern with missile defense is "nothing new," having been revealed during the days of President Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" plan almost 30 years ago. *(968 words)* *Click here for full text.*

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NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START) (CONT.)

From Reykjavik to New START: Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security in the 21st Century

U.S. Department of State, 19 January 2011, www.state.gov
Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Remarks to the National Academy of Sciences and U.S. Institute of Peace Symposium
Science diplomacy is critical to the work that lies ahead … There have been many joint activities over the years and as we look to the future, we are reflecting very strongly on past government-to-government projects. *(1,869 words)* ***Click here for full text.***

Russian Parliament Panel Supports Final Passage of New START

Global Security Newswire, 24 January 2011, gsn.nti.org
The Russian State Duma's international affairs committee yesterday formally called for ratification of a new nuclear weapons control treaty with the United States when the pact comes up for a third and final vote in the full chamber next week, Interfax reported. *(600 words)*
Click here for full text.

FULL TEXT OF BI-WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:

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Conference on Disarmament to Hold First Public Plenary of 2011 Session

UN Office of Geneva, 20 January 2011, www.unog.ch

The Conference on Disarmament, the world's sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, will hold the first public plenary of its 2011 session on Tuesday, 25 January at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

The session will open under the presidency of Canada. The presidency of the Conference rotates among its Member States according to the English alphabetical order, with each President holding office for four working weeks. Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will also hold the presidency during 2011. The three parts of the 2011 session of the Conference will be held from 24 January to 1 April for the first part; 16 May to 1 July for the second part; and 2 August to 16 September for the third part.

In accordance with its rules of procedure, at its opening meeting, the Conference "shall adopt its agenda for the year at the beginning of the session. In doing so, the Conference shall take into account the recommendations made to it by the United Nations General Assembly, the proposals by its Members, and decisions of the Conference."

During the first week of its session, the Conference will hold three plenary meetings on 25, 26 and 27 January. During this period, it will work on adopting its agenda and program of work for the year. On Wednesday, 26 January, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will address the Conference.

Like in previous years, the items on the agenda of the Conference in 2011 will be cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons; comprehensive program of disarmament; transparency in armaments; and consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

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Defense Cuts Not Seen Affecting Pueblo Chemical Depot

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Anticipated U.S. defense cost-cutting in 2011 is not expected to impact funding for chemical weapons disarmament preparations at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado, the Pueblo Chieftain reported yesterday.

Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program spokeswoman Kathy DeWeese said new ACWA funding figures for fiscal 2012 would not be available before February 7. The Defense Department office is preparing disposal plants for chemical weapons stockpiles at the Pueblo installation and the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky.

Kentucky-based Chemical Weapons Working Group head Craig Williams, however, said that "all indications are that within the defense budget, this program will remain at funding levels necessary to continue acceleration of the project."

While the majority of construction for Pueblo's chemical agent neutralization facility is finished, the plant is not expected to begin operations until 2015. Pentagon funding for the project has been amped up in recent years even while the United States has acknowledged it would not finish off its full chemical arsenal by the 2012 deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The bulk of efforts at Pueblo are now centered on putting in place machinery and fine-tuning the equipment that will neutralize the depot's 2,611 tons of mustard blister agent, managers said.

For the current fiscal year that began October 1, the Defense Department requested $240.2 million for operations at Pueblo, with $174.7 million designated for research and development and $65.6 million allotted for building work. Congress has yet to pass the budget request.

Colorado Chemical Demilitarization Citizens Advisory Commission Chairwoman Irene Kornelly said she was informed by interim ACWA head Conrad Whyne that "to no one's knowledge is there going to be any change in the projected 2012 [funding]."

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Work on Weapons Destruction Plant Progresses Despite Cold Temperatures

The Richmond Register, 16 January 2011, richmondregister.com

The temperature may be in the mid-20s, but workers were busy making progress on the chemical weapons destruction plant at the Blue Grass Army Depot on Thursday as two journalists toured the site off Irvine Road. "The weather limits work from December through March," said Jeff Brubaker, the government's on-site manager for the project, but it does not stop. Thanks to a synthetic tarpaulin and heaters, workers even poured some concrete recently, Brubaker said, pointing to a section of wall draped in black.

As winter weather approached in December, work on the massive plant was more than 25 percent complete. The target date for completion is 2016. The weather for most of 2010 was favorable for construction, Brubaker said, even if it has been limiting since mid-December. "We were actually ahead of schedule in early November," he said. By early January, the first of four tiers of the 26-inch concrete walls that will enclose the plant's blast-containment building were in place. Temperature may limit the pouring of concrete, but only stiff breezes and safety regulations limit work on the structural steel in the complex that will eventually rise to several stories at its highest point. Although both managers and workers are committed to meeting construction target dates, quality and safety remain the top priorities, Brubaker said.

The project has enjoyed nearly 5.5 million safe work hours since it began. A minor mishap this past year was the first lost-time accident to mar what had been a perfect safety record for the project. Strategically placed signs promote the job site's safety ethic in any direction a worker looks. "If you are not confronting unsafe behavior, you are re-enforcing it," one sign reminds workers. Two structures the Control and Support Building and the Utility Building have been enclosed, so work inside can proceed at a steady rate year round. Most of the destruction process will be automated with robotic equipment performing the highly precise, sensitive work. That will be monitored and directed from Control and Support Building, Brubaker said.

The chemicals, including sodium hydroxide, that will be used to neutralize the chemical agents, will be stored and mixed in Utility Building and then piped into the destruction unit. Design of the plant and equipment was completed and approved in mid 2010. Some of the destruction apparatus was completed and shipped to the site last year. If funding continues based on the formula agreed to by the Congress and Defense Department in 2009, the project should proceed on schedule, managers from both the government and the private contractor Bechtel Parsons Blue Grass have told quarterly meetings of the Chemical Destruction Citizens Advisory Board (CDCAB) that meets quarterly to receive progress reports.

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Year of Transition for the OPCW

The Hindu, 17 January 2011, www.thehindu.com

Interview with Ahmet Uzumcu, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, on its work and goals.

Ahmet Uzumcu, who took over as Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] about six months ago, was recently in India on a familiarization visit, even as talk of giving a new direction to the OPCW was on. Some countries see an attempt by the West to intrude unnecessarily in its work. Also, the U.S. and Russia, which possess an overwhelming share of the world's stockpile of chemical weapons, have lagged behind in destroying them. Sandeep Dikshit spoke to him in New Delhi.

How do you rate the Chemicals Weapons Convention (CWC) regime, and how would you describe it?

It's a successful organization. It's non-discriminatory and treats all as equals. It has been able to make progress in the field of disarmament. Though seven states are missing, the CWC regime has seen significant successes. It has also developed its own culture of cooperation among States Parties. Non-state actors have not been taken into account, but this is in a crucial phase.

While making progress in disarmament, we've to think of future priorities. These are being discussed by an advisory panel that consists of retired ambassadors, [representatives of] the chemical industry and scientists. It's going to prepare a report for me. Hopefully this document will constitute a basis for extensive debate to identify future priorities.

So far the main focus has been on disarmament and destruction. We've also been verifying. But the question is whether with the decline in some activities, do we use the resources for other purposes? I hope there'll be some decision at the Conference of State Parties (CSP) by the year-end. It's going to be a hectic year. I see this visit as a timely one. There've been lots of exchanges with senior officials and experts.

The United States and Russia had 90 percent of the chemical stockpiles and they're nowhere near meeting the April 2012 deadline. Only 62 percent of the world's chemical weapons arsenal has been destroyed so far. Also, 188 countries have ratified the CWC but countries are still wary. What are your views on these issues?

I had the opportunity to visit two industrial destruction factories each in the United States and Russia. I'm going to visit one more in the United States in February and then in Russia. I believe

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the [process of] destruction in both countries has been really transparent. They've provided regular reports on the progress of destruction.

By February 2012 we expect the United States to reach 90 percent and Russia 75 percent. For the rest, States Parties obviously want them to do it as early as possible. The deadline for the remaining destruction is being discussed in an informal setting at the moment. I hope there will be a satisfactory solution at an early stage so that it doesn't become a political issue.

We also have other issues to focus on. There is the time pressure as we have to prepare the budget for the next year by June and new priorities will have to be reflected. This is going to be the year of transition.

In 2013, I expect a new, adapted OPCW and CWC regime. I don't think the CWC is being changed. We've to operate within parameters, but the changes could help us address different concerns and parameters.

The deadline issue is on our agenda. The issue of universal extension is also there and we're trying to contact the [remaining] seven states. Myanmar and Israel among them have signed but haven't ratified. We'll continue to engage them. I believe the use of chemical weapons is morally unacceptable and strategically meaningless.

How do you see India's role in the past and in the future?

India has been extremely important. India is sitting in all the bodies. These committees are not open to all, but India is the best-represented with 30, all of whom are very qualified. I've seen how competent and professional Indian colleagues are in the implementation of the Convention. We appreciate their commitment and competence.

India should be seen as taking credit for the implementation of the CWC regime. Other shareholders, such as the Indian chemical industry, have grown to be very cooperative. The Indian role has been very constructive, for example with regard to the declaration. We were able to develop it further due to Indian influence. Some countries are lagging behind in legislating, and India can help in that. Also, some [countries] can't respond in case of an emergency, and India proved its expertise during an exercise in Tunisia. There was a 40-member Indian delegation, and in terms of equipment and action they were very professional.

Some countries, including perhaps India, do not share the perception of the Western countries on the need to expand the OPCW's range of activities. How are you dealing with this?

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I don't mean expanding the area of activity. The question is whether we [all States Parties] agree on certain activities in [terms of] scope and frequency while some activities such as inspection of chemical weapons would decrease. I don't suggest that we review the mandate or create new tasks. The only question is whether the States Parties would agree to refocus our activities in certain areas.

What would you mean by refocusing activities?

By that I mean developing, increasing respect internationally for the Convention, assisting in protecting chemicals and implementing national legislation. We have to build the capacities of some States Parties. Then there are export controls and the training of customs officers.

Are you in favor of extending the scope of activities?

Actually there were views expressed in the past to expand or merge the biological aspect with the CWC. But this was not supported by several states. Therefore, it seems unlikely that such a [merged] convention will happen. On the other hand, there are some synergies between different regimes. For instance, while trying to help increase the capacity in export controls to check misuse of toxic chemicals, those doing so in the CWC can help prevent export misuse of dual-use biological and nuclear technologies. Therefore these controls have a certain bearing on other regimes. There's also close cooperation with the U.N. on Resolution 1540.

What will happen if Russia and the U.S. don't manage to eliminate their stockpiles?

For me this is a priority. I don't underestimate the seriousness of the problem in order to preserve the credibility and integrity of the CWC regime. Both [countries] took some time to convince local communities before setting up destruction factories.

The economic crises also affected the flow of necessary resources in Russia, but they assured us that resources would be allocated. In view of their firm commitment, delays will be addressed from a technical point of view and transparency would be fully assured.

Complete destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles by the possessor-states is a primary objective of the Convention.

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U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement Enters into Force

U.S. Department of State, 12 January 2011, www.state.gov

U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov today exchanged diplomatic notes to bring into force the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, referred to as the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement.

The agreement offers significant benefits to the United States: a solid foundation for long-term U.S.-Russia civil nuclear cooperation; commercial opportunities for U.S. industry; and enhanced cooperation on important global nonproliferation goals.

The commitment to bringing the 123 Agreement into force was highlighted in the July 6, 2009 Joint Statement on Nuclear Cooperation issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev. This agreement provides the basis for joint efforts on innovative nuclear energy systems and technologies, reliable nuclear fuel cycle services, joint ventures in third countries, and other types of cooperation.

The 123 Agreement is based on a mutual commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Over the last 12 months, the United States and Russia have made significant accomplishments in this area, including:

- The signing and U.S. Senate ratification of an historic New START Treaty [NST] that significantly reduces the number of strategic nuclear weapons both countries may deploy;
- The signing of a protocol to amend the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement [PMDA], under which both countries will dispose of approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons-worth of excess weapon-grade plutonium; and,
- The establishment of both a Russian international nuclear fuel bank and an IAEA fuel bank that provide incentives for other nations not to acquire sensitive uranium enrichment technology.

Russia has also shut down its last remaining weapon-grade plutonium production reactor. Taken together, these are significant accomplishments made by both sides.

The U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement satisfies all applicable requirements of U.S. law for agreements of this type with a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT]. It has a term of 30 years and permits the transfer of

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technology, material, equipment (including reactors), and components for nuclear research and nuclear power production.

The entry into force of the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement will advance key nonproliferation and commercial goals:

- *Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation:* The 123 Agreement will create the conditions for improved cooperation on joint technology development to support arms control and nonproliferation activities. It will also provide the necessary legal framework for joint efforts to convert research reactors from highly-enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel. The 123 Agreement will aid cooperation on forensic analysis, allowing us to better identify nuclear material and prevent it from getting into the hands of terrorists, and it will set the stage for expanded joint technical cooperation on next generation international safeguards.
- *Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation:* The 123 Agreement will facilitate cooperative work on reactor designs that result in reduced proliferation risk. It will create the conditions for advanced research and development projects that partner U.S. national laboratories and industry with Russian partners to explore new areas for collaboration, including fuel fabrication, innovative fuel types, and advanced reactor design.
- *Commercial Opportunities:* The 123 Agreement will support commercial interests by allowing U.S. and Russian firms to team up more easily in joint ventures and by permitting U.S. sales of nuclear material and equipment to Russia. This will put the United States and Russia's nuclear relationship on a stronger commercial footing. Russian and U.S. firms will be able to develop advanced nuclear reactors, fuel-cycle approaches, and cutting-edge technologies that are safe, secure, and reliable.
- *Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Action Plan:* The 123 Agreement will allow long-term civil nuclear cooperation to proceed under the U.S.-Russian Presidential Commission Working Group on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security, specifically activities in the Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Action Plan which relate to reactor design, innovative nuclear energy technology options, and developing the global civil nuclear energy framework.

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United States and China Cooperate on Nuclear Security

World Nuclear News, 20 January 2011, www.world-nuclear-news.org

The United States and China have signed an intergovernmental agreement to establish a center of excellence in China to promote effective nuclear security and safeguards. They have also agreed to set up a radiation detection training center in the country. The memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed in Washington by U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu and Chairman of the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) Chen Quifa during a state visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao.

Under the agreement, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) will work with CAEA representatives in China to develop a central site for training in all aspects of nuclear security. In a statement, NNSA said, "The center will serve as a forum for exchanging technical information, sharing best practices, developing training courses, and promoting technical collaborations that will enhance nuclear security in China and throughout Asia." It added, "It will also help to meet the training needs for China's expanding nuclear sector and promote nuclear security best practices throughout the region."

The center, NNSA said, "will enable the training of nuclear site personnel on measurements and accounting of nuclear material and on the design and installation of nuclear material security systems. It will also have the capability to train protective force personnel using scenario-driven response exercises and give hands-on training on international nuclear safeguards requirements and inspection techniques."

Hu agreed to establish such a center during the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Meanwhile, China and the United States have also signed another MOU to establish a radiation detection training center in Qinhuangdao in China's Hebei province – the first of its kind in the region. The agreement was signed in Washington by Daniel Poneman, Deputy Energy Secretary, and Sun Yibiao, Vice Minister of the General Administration of China Customs.

Under the agreement, NNSA will provide radiation detection equipment and support the development of training materials for use at the Qinhuangdao training center.

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NNSA Announces Completion of First B83 Dismantlement at Y-12

NNSA, 20 January 2011, nnsa.energy.gov

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) today announced that its Y-12 National Security Complex has completed the dismantlement of the first secondary from a retired B83, one of the biggest weapon systems ever built. The B83 was introduced into the U.S. nuclear stockpile in 1983. While the B83 remains in service, some of its components have been replaced and some retired B83s have been removed from the stockpile.

"Dismantlement of the first B83 secondary is an important demonstration of our nation's commitment to reducing the size of the nation's nuclear stockpile in support of our arms reduction treaty commitments and our nuclear nonproliferation objectives," said Don Cook, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. "I applaud the men and women at Y-12 and across the enterprise who have worked so hard to ensure the highest standards of safety as we continue to find ways to implement our program."

Y-12 has been working aggressively to prepare for B83 dismantlements for the past several years. Significant upgrades were made to key facilities, equipment, and tooling and new dismantlement personnel were hired and trained to support this program. Significant facility upgrades include electrical and utility improvements. Equipment deployment includes advanced machining equipment and specialized material handling systems and intricate tooling, most of which was designed and fabricated at Y-12.

These new equipment and facility upgrades will ensure the highest level of personnel safety and enable Y-12 to continue to meet dismantlement production requirements. As an added benefit, these upgrades are expected to cut processing times by more than 50 percent when compared to similar operations in the past.

Taking apart nuclear weapons is a complex process that involves almost all of the sites within the nuclear security enterprise. First, NNSA's design laboratories work with Pantex to identify and mitigate hazards that may arise before a particular weapon type is to be dismantled. The labs are able to apply the unique knowledge they gained during the original design process for each weapon in the stockpile.

When a weapon is retired, it is returned to the Pantex Plant, where the high explosives are removed from special nuclear material, and the plutonium core is removed from the weapon. The plutonium is placed in highly secure storage at Pantex. Non-nuclear components are sent to the Savannah River Site and the Kansas City Plant for final disposition. Y-12 receives uranium components which are dismantled over a defined timeframe.

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Dismantlement not only prevents the potential misuse of nuclear material but also allows recycling of the material for national defense uses such as weapon refurbishment (the Life Extension Program) and fuel for the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered fleet. Some of the highly enriched uranium is also down blended to a less concentrated form for use in commercial nuclear reactors.

Y-12 will be taking apart some of the same units that were put together at the site during the Cold War. The safe and secure removal of nuclear weapons components from the stockpile will contribute to nonproliferation efforts and arms reduction.

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Cutting 10 Missiles from Each Base 'The Leading Option,' Visiting Commander Says

Great Falls Tribune, 12 January 2011, www.greatfallstribune.com

Military leaders still are weighing how to trim 30 land-based missiles from the nation's arsenal of 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles as a result of the new arms control treaty with Russia, but "the leading option right now" is to remove 10 from each base, including Malmstrom Air Force Base.

That was the word Tuesday from Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, new commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. The three-star general, who took over the relatively new command earlier this month, held a brief news conference after meeting with Malmstrom airmen Tuesday. He is touring the five bases that handle ICBMs and nuclear-ready bombers.

The U.S. Senate ratified the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [NST] last month. It still must be approved by Russia's legislative body.

The Department of Defense has proposed eliminating 30 land-based intercontinental missiles and even more bomber- and submarine-based weapons to meet treaty requirements. Kowalski said it appears to make the most sense to remove 10 ICBMs each from Malmstrom, F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, and Minot AFB, North Dakota. Each of those bases has 150 silo-based missiles. Engineers still are analyzing if that is the best method to meet treaty requirements, given the complexity of the internal communications systems of the missile systems at each base, he said.

Kowalski supported the treaty, because it "allows us to provide that regime of stability that's important between major nations with nuclear weapons, and gives us some transparency between our forces."

In another matter, he said the confidence level of the nation's military leaders regarding the way nuclear weapons are handled has been restored through the hard work of missile operators and maintainers under the new command.

Kowalski said the command, which began in August 2009 with 40 officers at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana and assumed command of the three missile bases in December 2009, has reached a turning point. All of the command's bases, or wings, did excellent work last year and passed various inspections, he said.

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Independent inspection teams said the forces "are professional, disciplined and ready," Kowalski said. "Their confidence level has been restored." He said he recently met with Air Force Secretary Michael Donley and Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz, who told him they are "extremely confident in our airmen."

The unified command was part of the Air Force's plan to address embarrassing nuclear mishaps that occurred a few years ago, though Kowalski didn't make specific reference to them. Nuclear weapons and components were twice mistakenly shipped to the wrong locations in 2007 and 2008, resulting in the forced resignations of the then-Air Force secretary and chief of staff.

Kowalski said the new Global Strike Command pays close attention as the ICBM and bomber wings focus on tighter controls. "While we weren't interested in micromanagement, there was micro-interest," he said.

One of the command's top goals is to continue to strengthen its nuclear work and focus on a "cultural change of discipline, attention to detail and critical self-evaluation," Kowalski said. Global Strike Command members also need to be ready to deploy overseas when called to conventional warfare roles and to keep modernizing nuclear weapons, he said.

Kowalski said he is comfortable with the ICBM modernization steps begun several years ago, as well as additional measures that are expected in President Barack Obama's upcoming budget. He said the modernization steps will improve communications and security, and sustain the missiles' operational capability.

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Russia Says Next U.S. Arms Talks Must Include Others

Wall Street Journal, 14 January 2011, www.wsj.com

Russia said further cuts in nuclear weapons sought by the United States can be achieved only as part of a multinational accord limiting other types of armaments, a position that dims the Obama administration's chances for swift progress toward one of its biggest foreign policy goals.

Under conditions spelled out Thursday by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, a new round of talks aimed at slashing Russia's large arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons must involve other nuclear powers and focus as well on conventional warheads and weapons in space.

The statement comes in the wake of the two countries' landmark New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New Start. The treaty, a centerpiece of the administration's efforts to "reset" relations with Russia, won U.S. Senate ratification on December 22. Russian lawmakers say they will follow suit this month.

Tommy Vietor, a spokesman for the White House National Security Council, said the administration intends to try to move to talks on tactical nuclear weapons "within one year of the New Start's entry into force." The White House said there is a schedule for talks on missile-defense issues that "will help us advance the broader arms-reduction agenda."

Mr. Lavrov suggested talks on tactical nuclear weapons wouldn't happen quickly. "Before talking about any further steps in the sphere of nuclear disarmament," he cautioned at a news conference, "it's necessary to fulfill the New Start agreement." That process could take years, as the former Cold War enemies shrink their long-range nuclear warheads to a limit of 1,550 each, down from the current ceiling of 2,200.

"Then it will become clear what further steps must be taken to strengthen global security and strategic stability," Mr. Lavrov said. At that point, he added, other nuclear-armed nations must take part and the agenda must include weapons in space, strategic missiles equipped with conventional explosives and other weapons.

Russia has long sought to draw space-based defense systems into arms-control talks, and the United States has long resisted. More complicating was Mr. Lavrov's call to draw in other powers – an apparent attempt to bring China into negotiations. The United States is engaged in its own discussion with China about its growing military might.

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Defense analysts in Moscow said the remarks reflect Russia's reluctance to give up its strength – a large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons – in the face of superior conventional forces in the West and in China.

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, an influential journal, said Mr. Lavrov's insistence on delaying a new round of talks for years "should not be taken literally." But he said Russia is determined to reshape the agenda.

"Russia also needs to compensate for its weakness in conventional forces vis a vis China, in the event of a conflict along that border," Mr. Lukyanov said. "To negotiate about tactical nukes with just the Americans – for Russia it's not relevant anymore."

The strategic warheads covered by New Start are designed to be used against cities. Tactical warheads are meant to be used at short range on a battlefield. Russia has a decided advantage in those, with about 2,050, compared with 500 in the active U.S. arsenal.

Russia needs this edge, Mr. Lavrov said Thursday, because "the balance of forces in Europe has been seriously tilted" with NATO's eastward expansion.

Mr. Lavrov praised the Obama administration's reset of relations. He said the warming ties had brought a "noticeable improvement in the international situation" over the past year. "The most important task in our contacts" with Washington, he added, "is to maintain positive dynamics in our relations."

The White House said it hoped momentum from the strategic agreement will help in working with Russia on issues such as Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs.

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Cold War Issues Linger Over Arms-Control Negotiations

The Washington Post, 18 January 2011, www.thewashingtonpost.com

"There are some Cold War issues that continue to return to the front of the agenda, and missile defenses, and how we interact on missile defenses, is, I would say, at the top of the list." That was Rose Gottemoeller, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations last week on the next steps in U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation.

As Gottemoeller pointed out, Moscow's concern with missile defense is "nothing new," having been revealed during the days of President Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" plan almost 30 years ago. The Russians last year insisted that the preamble to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) contain language that recognizes "the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms."

Of course, that preamble has no legal effect on U.S. missile-defense planning, as U.S. negotiators made clear in their unilateral statement attached to the treaty. Nonetheless, Republicans insisted on saying that more directly in the Senate ratification resolution. Last week, the Russian Duma, during its ratification process, added its own understanding to its resolution, which calls for Moscow to withdraw from the treaty if the U.S. unilaterally deploys missile-defense systems that endanger Russia's national security. It, like the preamble and Senate language, has no legal effect.

What will have an impact is if Moscow and Washington can work together on several missile-defense activities now underway. Before the November NATO-Russia Council meetings in Lisbon, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev asserted three principles for a shared NATO missile-defense agreement: Russia would be a full partner, there would be shared early-warning data (such as shared sensors), and there would be assigned zones of responsibility for protection.

Gottemoeller described it as a "sincere but not serious" proposal that U.S. military planners said "would not fly" in part because the Russians do not have a missile-defense system to protect their own territory nor a sector of NATO countries in the 2015-2020 time frame. Nonetheless, NATO working groups and the NATO-Russia Council are studying what the threat looks like, the prospect of shared early-warning data and potentially shared radars, including those operated by Russia, Gottemoeller said.

"There's a very, very fast pace of activity," she said, "and I do think that both Moscow and Washington are really intent, as are our NATO allies, in getting off the ground quickly and

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completing these joint threat assessments and then in moving on to look at joint concepts and really trying to figure out how to put all these pieces together."

At his annual news conference last week reviewing world affairs, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov agreed that his country's creation of a common missile shield with Europe was key to improving relations with the West. "I am convinced that creating a common missile shield is the real and more important test for the sincerity of statements that security is indivisible," he said.

Behind this new talk of cooperation, the Russians have planted the threat of withdrawal if they are not treated as equal partners. Medvedev told the NATO-Russia Council: "Either we are fully involved, share information, are responsible for solving certain problems, or we do not participate at all." For emphasis he added, "But if we do not participate at all, for obvious reasons, we will be forced to defend ourselves."

Lavrov also made it clear that the Senate's second post-START goal – negotiating within a year to deal with Russia's major advantage in tactical nuclear weapons – may not be met. He brought up the traditional Moscow position that all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons – some 200 bombs stored in five European countries – would have to be taken back to the continental United States as part of any negotiation over Russia's several thousand tactical nuclear-missile warheads, artillery shells, bombs and antiaircraft weapons.

Lavrov suggested that talks on tactical nuclear weapons wouldn't happen quickly. "Before talking about any further steps in the sphere of nuclear disarmament," he cautioned, "it's necessary to fulfill the New START agreement." If he meant that the two sides cutting their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 each, down from the current ceiling of 2,200, that would mean at least half a dozen years.

"Then it will become clear what further steps must be taken to strengthen global security and strategic stability," Lavrov said. Gottemoeller agreed that tactical weapons as the next phase of nuclear arms control is going to be complicated "because we will be grappling with these smaller objects that are more difficult to address in terms of monitoring and verification [of their] elimination."

But she said discussions are taking place inside and outside both governments. She noted one paper that said there could be an overall nuclear weapons number that matched Russia's advantage in tactical, or non-strategic, nuclear weapons to the similar U.S. advantage in non-deployed, or stored, long-range weapons.

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Another complicating issue tossed out by Lavrov: He said other nuclear-armed nations must take part in future talks and the agenda must include weapons in space, strategic missiles equipped with conventional explosives and other weapons. Gottemoeller disclosed that a conference of the original five nuclear powers – the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain – already had taken place in London, where verification and transparency cooperation were discussed. She said a second session was scheduled for Paris within the next few months.

Gottemoeller summed up: "It's little noticed, but, in fact, our relationship with Russia has undergone some great strengthening in the last couple of years." Beyond arms control, she mentioned a "little noticed" agreement on nuclear cooperation and an arrangement to transport material through Russia to U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan.

Lavrov concluded that improving ties between Russia and the United States were especially responsible for the increasing "healthiness of the international situation." We'll see how long that lasts.

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From Reykjavik to New START: Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security in the 21st Century

U.S. Department of State, 19 January 2011, www.state.gov
Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Remarks to the National Academy of Sciences and U.S. Institute of Peace Symposium

Thank you very much for inviting me to join you today. Working at the intersection of policy and science is where I have spent much of my career so a symposium like this is right up my alley. Science diplomacy is critical to the work that lies ahead and this symposium no doubt will generate valuable ideas for moving the nuclear security agenda forward.

I would like to commend the excellent work of [the U.S. Institute of Peace] (USIP) and also the Committees on International Security and Arms Control [CISAC] of both the U.S. National and Russian Academies of Science. For over 30 years, you have had an impact on U.S. and Soviet, now Russian, nuclear security policy. I have to say I miss my time on the Committee and the opportunity to participate in not just the highly technical discussions but also the more informal interactions. I would like to compliment Raymond Jeanloz on his leadership of CISAC and also extend my welcome to the prominent Russian experts who have participated in the work of the Committee or consulted on its work over the years – here present today Yevgeny Avrorin, Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoi, Roald Sagdeev, Viktor Yesin and Viktor Firsov.

There have been many joint activities over the years and as we look to the future, we are reflecting very strongly on past government-to-government projects like the Joint Verification Experiments [JVE]. The JVE was pathbreaking at its time and it set the gold standard for government-to-government efforts. My compliments to Evgeny Avrorin, who along with Victor Mikhailov, Director of the Institute of Strategic Stability and past Minister of Atomic Energy, and Paul Robinson, were responsible for directing the JVE. You set a strong example of scientist-to-scientist cooperation in the government sphere.

When I was head of the Carnegie Moscow Center, it was always extremely valuable to have the opportunity to hear firsthand the views of eminent Russian experts, many of whom had enormous experience in leadership of the Strategic Rocket Forces or the nuclear energy establishment. I would like to show my appreciation to Viktor Yesin, to whom I always look for useful and interesting analyses of nuclear force issues between Russia and the United States; and also to Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoi, Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute, who was one of the most active and effective figures in U.S.-Russia cooperation in the Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] program.

Just this past week, I hosted a conference, the purpose of which was to continue thinking about the verification and monitoring challenges we will face as we work toward a world free of nuclear

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weapons. I say “continue thinking about” because this is a problem with which we have wrestled for decades, and will continue to wrestle for decades to come. We must always be thinking about ways to improve our capacity in these areas, building on the work of the past as we take advantage of new and emerging technologies. This essential work will inform our approach to future arms control agreements.

It will not surprise you that I want to make some remarks today about the New START Treaty and our efforts to get ready for entry into force of the Treaty. I also want to make note of another very important agreement between the United States and Russia on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, referred to as the “123 Agreement.” While New START promotes nuclear security by reducing U.S. and Russian strategic forces, the 123 Agreement with Russia, for the first time, normalizes and expands our civil nuclear relationship with Russia and will facilitate expanded cooperation on nuclear energy, as well as joint efforts relevant to non-proliferation such as nuclear forensics.

I will also address other critical areas on the nuclear arms control agenda including further nuclear weapons reductions, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

New START

On December 22 the United States Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – New START – by a strong bipartisan vote of 71 to 26. The next step will be approval by the Russian Legislature – the Duma and Federation Council – followed by an exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will bring the Treaty into force.

New START is the most significant nuclear arms control agreement in nearly two decades. It provides for limits on the number of strategic nuclear weapons and launchers that the United States and Russia can deploy, while maintaining the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

The Treaty will put in place an effective verification regime to confirm Russian and U.S. compliance with the Treaty, including data exchanges on strategic offensive arms, notifications of changes to that data, and on-site inspections to confirm that data. None of these activities have been occurring since the original START Treaty expired over a year ago.

We are preparing for entry into force of New START, including for the exchange of Treaty-required notifications that begins immediately upon entry into force and the initial exchange of data on missiles, launchers, heavy bombers and warheads subject to the Treaty, which is

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required 45 days after entry into force. And much work is taking place to prepare for the first on-site inspections. The right to conduct on-site inspections begins 60 days after entry into force.

The New START Treaty sets the stage for further limits on and reductions in nuclear arms. As President Obama stated when he signed the New START Treaty in Prague on April 8th of last year, once the Treaty enters into force, the United States intends to pursue with Russia further reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, including non-deployed nuclear weapons.

During the ratification process, the Senate made clear its strong interest in addressing the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia. The Resolution of Advice and Consent calls for the United States to seek to initiate negotiations with Russia on non-strategic nuclear weapons within a year of entry into force of the Treaty. Work is underway, and is intensifying, to prepare for dialogue with Russia on non-strategic nuclear weapons. I would also note the significant work the non-governmental community both here and in Russia has already undertaken in studying and writing about these issues, providing much and very welcome food for thought for those of us working these matters in the government.

123 Agreement

As I mentioned earlier, another major step forward was taken in our relationship with Russia last week when Ambassador Beyrle and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov exchanged diplomatic notes to bring the so-called “123 Agreement” into force. This is an agreement for nuclear cooperation which both sides have been intent on bringing into force for some time. The agreement provides several areas of benefit, but the one I would like to mention here pertains to enhancing cooperation on important global nonproliferation goals.

The 123 Agreement will create the conditions for improved cooperation on joint technology development to support arms control and nonproliferation activities. It will also provide the necessary legal framework for joint efforts to convert research reactors from highly-enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel. The 123 Agreement will aid cooperation on forensic analysis, allowing us to better identify nuclear material and prevent it from getting into the hands of terrorists, and it will set the stage for expanded joint technical cooperation on next generation international safeguards.

FMCT

This brings me to two additional and critical elements of the President’s arms control agenda. First, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Secretary Clinton reemphasized at the NPT

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Review Conference in May that we stand ready to begin multilateral negotiations immediately on a verifiable FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

This set of Treaty negotiations is long overdue and it is an important step on the international arms control agenda. The United States is deeply disappointed over the Conference on Disarmament's (CD's) failure to begin negotiations. The next session of the CD begins next week and I plan to be in Geneva to join our Representative, Ambassador Laura Kennedy, in working with the incoming President of the Conference on Disarmament, Canadian CD Ambassador Grinius and other interested states on ways to move the FMCT agenda forward.

CTBT

Also at the NPT Review Conference, Secretary Clinton reaffirmed the U.S. Commitment to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The entry into force of the CTBT remains an important element of the President's strategy to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and create the conditions for a nuclear free world.

Much has changed since the U.S. Senate declined to provide its consent to ratification of the CTBT in 1999. At that time the Senate expressed concerns, in particular, regarding verifiability of the Treaty and the reliability of America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing. With regard to the first concern, the CTBT's Preparatory Commission has made great progress in the last decade toward establishing the Treaty's verification regime and the United States has enhanced its National Technical Means of monitoring nuclear tests. For example, the International Monitoring System [IMS] is now more than 80 percent complete. At the time of the initial Senate vote on the Treaty in 1999, none of the IMS stations had been certified as meeting approved technical specifications and operational requirements.

With regard to the concerns about stockpile reliability, it is now clear that we can continue to ensure the reliability of our nuclear weapons and the viability of our nuclear complex without resorting to explosive nuclear testing. Moreover, the Administration has committed to substantial investments to maintain our deterrent and to modernize the nuclear weapons complex over the next decade.

For some time, we have been doing our essential "homework" necessary for a successful CTBT ratification effort. This includes an updated National Intelligence Estimate and an independent study by the National Academy of Sciences on verification of the Treaty. The administration will consult with the Senate Leadership, including Senators Kerry and Lugar, Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, regarding the Treaty.

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While the Administration prepares for U.S. Senate reconsideration of the Treaty, the United States has increased its level of participation in all of the activities of the CTBT Organization's [CTBTO's] Preparatory Commission, especially with respect to the Treaty's verification regime. After an absence of eight years, U.S. experts are fully engaged in preparatory work to establish the On-Site Inspection element of the verification regime, as part of the U.S. contribution to the work of the [CTBTO].

These actions demonstrate the commitment of the United States to prepare for the entry into force of this Treaty. We will continue to take additional steps to reinforce the norm against nuclear testing in the months ahead.

Conclusion

The nuclear arms control agenda holds opportunities and challenges ahead. The monitoring, transparency, and verification challenges alone are daunting, but we have talent available to address those challenges that is also quite formidable and a welcome partnership with the scientific community in the U.S., Russia and elsewhere to tackle these challenges. Conferences like this one provide an important and welcome opportunity to exchange ideas and expand horizons. I appreciate the opportunity to address you today and I look forward to your questions, ideas and discussion.

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Russian Parliament Panel Supports Final Passage of New START

Global Security Newswire, 24 January 2011, gsn.nti.org

The Russian State Duma's international affairs committee yesterday formally called for ratification of a new nuclear weapons control treaty with the United States when the pact comes up for a third and final vote in the full chamber next week, Interfax reported.

"Today the committee discussed two drafts of supplementary statements of the State Duma and an alternative draft of the house statement prepared by the Communist Party faction," panel Chairman Konstantin Kosachyov said.

The panel "thanked the Communist Party faction for the quality work it had done and suggested combining their document with the two draft statements elaborated by the committee. Yet the communists refused to do that," Kosachyov said. "Thus, we decided to include about two dozen provisions from the document drafted by the communists in the two draft statements of the State Duma."

The State Duma's third reading of the treaty is scheduled for Tuesday. The Federation Council, Russia's upper house of parliament, is expected on Monday to begin discussing the pact ahead of another required vote, the Voice of Russia today quoted Federation Council international affairs committee Chairman Mikhail Margelov as saying.

President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed New START in April. The pact would require Russia and the United States to cap their deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550, down from a limit of 2,200 required by 2012 under an earlier treaty. It also would set a ceiling of 700 deployed warhead delivery systems, with another 100 allowed in reserve.

The U.S. Senate last month endorsed a ratification document outlining specific interpretations of the pact. Among other stipulations, the text states that U.S. missile defense activities should not be impaired by the treaty and backs heightened financial support for modernizing the nation's nuclear arsenal.

One of the Duma's supplementary statements would respond to the U.S. ratification text while the other would address Russia's implementation of the treaty, Interfax quoted Kosachyov as saying.

"The document addressed to the American side is entitled 'On the Position of the State Duma on the Reduction and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Armaments' and has 6.5 pages. It also

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recommends for the Russian president to add the ratification bill and this statement by the State Duma to the note on the exchange of the ratification instruments," he said.

The document would emphasize that "the U.S. unilateral interpretation of certain provisions of this document does not change the legal commitments of the U.S. side and does not impose any additional commitments on Russia," Kosachyov said.

The text "also appeals to third nuclear powers to join the process of the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons through a ban on their further development," he said. "We urge these countries to ban the development of nuclear weapons outside their territories and to freeze their nuclear arsenals at the current level."

The second, 3.5-page document would be titled, "On the Provision of Combat Readiness and Development of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Nuclear Arms Segment and Defense Plants Operating in it." The statement discusses issues related to the upkeep of Russia's nuclear deterrent and the development of new missile defenses that would provide warning of impending missile strikes, Kosachyov said.

Within 45 days of New START's formal entry into force, Moscow and Washington would complete a preliminary swap of information on strategic warheads and delivery vehicles the treaty would take into account, an Air Force press release quoted Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller as saying.

The implementation of New START and a new U.S.-Russian civilian nuclear trade pact would pave the way for progress on other nuclear weapon-related matters, Gottemoeller said.

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