



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

CMA Progress at a Glance

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, February 2012, www.cma.army.mil

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) progress as of January 23, 2012. (552 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

Defense Budget Cuts Won't Hit Chem Demil

The Pueblo Chieftain, 15 February 2012, www.chieftain.com

Expected cuts in defense spending won't affect the weapons destruction program at the Pueblo Chemical Depot. (284 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CAMDS Demo Underway at Deseret Chemical Depot

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 16 February 2012, www.cma.army.mil

Nearly 40 years after its construction began, the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) is being torn down. (365 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

CTBTO PrepCom 15th Anniversary

U.S. State Department, 17 February 2012, www.state.gov

Today marks the 15th Anniversary of the establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization's Preparatory Commission. (218 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

CTR Program Destroys Nine Nuclear Warheads

Global Security Newswire, 08 February 2012, www.nti.org

The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] Program in November supported elimination of nine nuclear warheads and nine mobile [intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)] launchers, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind) announced on Tuesday. (753 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) (CONT.)

Two Milestones of Largest Nunn-Lugar WMD Destruction Project

Senator Lugar Press Release, 15 February 2012, lugar.senate.gov

U.S. Senator Dick Lugar announced today that the Nunn-Lugar Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Shchuchye, Russia has successfully eliminated half of the nerve agent stored there. (867 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT)

The Nuclear Impasse [OPINION]

Khalee Times (UAE), 13 February 2012, www.khaleejtimes.com

By Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former Pakistan envoy to the United States and the United Kingdom

The UN Conference on Disarmament [CD] opened last month amid conflicting expectations among its 65 member states about what the focus should be in the world's sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament issues. (791 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

U.S., Russia Agree to Exchange Information on ICBM Launches

Xinhua News, 08 February 2012, chinaview.cn

Russia and the United States have signed an agreement about two-way exchange of information regarding strategic missiles launches, the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday. (141 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

Upcoming Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Obstacles [OPINION]

Jane's Intelligence Review, 14 February 2012, www.janes.com

By Mark Hibbs

The second of its kind, the Seoul summit aims to reach consensus on securing nuclear materials against their use by militants. However, despite some progress in 2010, agreement may be harder to find this time. (2,598 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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CMA Progress at a Glance

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, February 2012, www.cma.army.mil

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) progress as of January 23, 2012:

Anniston Chemical Activity, Alabama: Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility is preparing to use a pressurized liquid nitrogen system to perform concrete scabbling in the Munitions Demilitarization Building during closure. The system – nitrocision – works by thermal expansion as the liquid nitrogen (at extremely high pressure) penetrates the surface of the concrete to remove potentially agent-contaminated surfaces. The advantages of nitrocision include no additional waste stream, no potential for generating heat or creating a source of ignition, integration of a vacuum to minimize dust generation and material handling, no need to remove walls or enlarge openings for traditional machines; reducing the number of entries which should improve schedule and operating costs and an overall improvement in safety and risk reduction compared to using hydraulic hammers.

Blue Grass Chemical Activity, Kentucky: Blue Grass Chemical Activity (BGCA) school and community tours have begun and will run through May. BGCA will host the Eastern Kentucky University Safety Division on Feb. 23 and the Pattie A. Clay Hospital Board of Directors on March 22. BGCA leadership is continuously involved in speakers' bureau events to educate local communities on safe storage and build stronger community relationships. BGCA is now available to view and "like" on Facebook. Please let them hear from you!

Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah: Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility workers completed destruction of the Nation's single-largest stockpile – 1.1 million munitions containing more than 13,600 tons of chemical agent – on Jan. 21. During the next two years, secondary waste operations will be completed and the disposal facilities will be decontaminated and dismantled.

Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas: Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (PBCDF) Systems Contractor, Washington Demilitarization Company, completed 2011 without any recordable injuries, lost workday away cases, environmental fines or RCRA non-compliances. The PBCDF workforce also achieved more than 5.6 million man-hours without a lost workday away case in 2011. All of these accomplishments were achieved during closure. Additionally, the laboratory subcontractor, Southwest Research Institute, achieved seven years without any recordable injuries and only one recordable injury during the company's 12-year tenure at PBCDF. The facility is approximately 108 days ahead of the life cycle closure schedule, a significant schedule compression.



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Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado: Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) stores mustard-filled munitions: 105 mm projectiles and cartridges, 155 mm projectiles and 4.2-inch mortar cartridges. A Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) with 13 subject matter experts from CMA visited PCD Jan. 9-13. The SAV will assist the depot workforce with preparations for a Department of the Army Inspector General Chemical Surety Inspection on March 5-9.

Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon: Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) closure activities continue with workers completing final decontamination of the Deactivation Furnace System and the Automatic Continuous Air Monitoring System survey. Rinsate Collection System (RCS) piping removal is near completion and removal of the RCS tank is pending. The facility continues to await the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality's decision on the site's proposed revisions to the UMCDF Closure Plan and the Closure Analytical Methods Program Management Review, both of which are still in the public comment period. Closure continues with the Base Realignment Closure Commission, allowing the Umatilla Land Reuse Authority to enact Umatilla's land reuse plan which includes space for Oregon National Guard training, a wildlife refuge and commercial development.

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Defense Budget Cuts Won't Hit Chem Demil

The Pueblo Chieftain, 15 February 2012, www.chieftain.com

Expected cuts in defense spending won't affect the weapons destruction program at the Pueblo Chemical Depot. The president's 2013 budget calls for a \$778.7 million for the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA] program, the amount that the agency had requested for the next fiscal year.

The ACWA program oversees the efforts at the Pueblo depot and the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky to destroy the last stockpiles of chemical weapons. Of the amount budgeted, \$340 million would go to the Pueblo program and \$36 million of that was designated for construction, most of which is nearly finished. The Blue Grass allocation was \$411 million with \$115 million for construction. The remaining \$27.7 million will cover costs of work at the ACWA headquarters.

The Pueblo depot houses 780,000 artillery shells and mortar rounds containing 2,611 tons of mustard agent. Most of the work now is developing and testing the systems that will be used to destroy it with actual destruction of the agent expected to begin in 2015 and finish by the end of 2017 if there are no major problems. Blue Grass has mustard agent but also holds nerve agent rockets, which are expected to take longer to destroy.

Craig Williams, director of the Chemical Weapons Working Group in Berea, Kentucky, said that the budget numbers were good news. His group led the effort to use water neutralization at the two depots instead of incineration, which was the Army's preferred method.

"The funding request for the Kentucky and Colorado disposal projects reflect the continued commitment by the Pentagon to the accelerated effort to rid us of these weapons. This funding level, if approved by Congress, will maintain aggressive progress toward completing this important project."

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CAMDS Demo Underway at Deseret Chemical Depot

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 16 February 2012, www.cma.army.mil

Nearly 40 years after its construction began, the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) is being torn down. Demolition got into full swing this week as crews started to tear apart the Equipment Test Facility. A handful of employees watched as the massive equipment easily tore through the structure.

Readying CAMDS for demolition started in 2006. Non-toxic structures and equipment were torn down and recycled, if possible, (such as the iconic water tower), salvaged (the 1940s CAMDS railcar that is now at a Utah museum) or sent off-site for reuse (the explosive containment cubicle that is now at the Army's Edgewood Chemical Biological Center). All equipment and structures that were or possibly could have come into contact with chemical agent were decontaminated and decommissioned. Thorough tests and monitoring were then conducted to ensure contamination levels were within accepted safety limits before demolition could begin.

Soil sampling will continue during the early part of demolition. Nearly 150 samples will be taken from areas that are known or suspected to be contaminated by either chemical agents, metals, Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) or semi-VOCs. "All of the soil samples will be taken before demolition starts in that particular area so that the soil being sampled remains undisturbed," explained Heather Jansen, CAMDS field office lead.

The soil sampling is required under the CAMDS closure permit and will determine if additional remediation will be needed once demolition and debris cleanup is finished. URS CAMDS Demolition Project Manager, Randy Fowles, said the demolition schedule will be closely coordinated with the transportation of debris, which will be taken to a permitted hazardous waste landfill for disposal. Fowles said demolition of CAMDS will continue over the next few months and is expected to be completed by the end of May.

For 25 years, from September 1979 to January 2005, CAMDS developed and tested methods for destroying chemical weapons. Its research encompassed all aspects of chemical demilitarization, from the proper handling of munitions to the treatment and disposal of secondary waste.

"CAMDS was the foundation on which all other chemical weapons destruction facilities, including TOCDF, were based," said CAMDS Site Project Manager Jerry Linn. "The work done here at CAMDS should never be forgotten."



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CTBTO PrepCom 15th Anniversary

U.S. State Department, 17 February 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Today marks the 15th Anniversary of the establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Organization's Preparatory Commission (PrepCom). The United States congratulates the PrepCom for its hard work since its inception in carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the treaty once it enters into force.

The CTBT calls for the establishment of a worldwide network of 321 monitoring stations utilizing a variety of technologies to detect and identify an event as a possible nuclear explosion conducted in violation of the treaty. Since its establishment, the Preparatory Commission has worked closely with Signatory States to build this International Monitoring System (IMS), which is now over 82 percent complete and already showing its utility. Complemented by our own excellent National Technical Means, this worldwide system can verify compliance with the CTBT and detect violations of it.

A global ban on nuclear explosive testing benefits the security of all nations and is central to leading the world toward a diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament. As the United States continues to lay the groundwork for its own ratification process, we call on all governments to declare or reaffirm their commitment not to conduct explosive nuclear tests, and encourage all States that have not done so to sign and ratify the treaty.

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Global Security Newswire, 08 February 2012, <http://www.nti.org>

The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] Program in November supported elimination of nine nuclear warheads and nine mobile [intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)] launchers, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) announced on Tuesday.

The Nunn-Lugar program that month also supported disposal of three submarine-fired ballistic missiles and 98.36 metric tons of Russian chemical nerve agent, the lawmaker said in a press release. In addition, it facilitated the establishment of four biological agent monitoring sites and provided protection to five nuclear-weapon train shipments.

Since being established in 1991 to secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction in former Soviet states, the CTR program has assisted in deactivation of 7,610 strategic nuclear warheads and destruction of 792 ICBMs, 498 ICBM silos, 191 mobile ICBM launchers, 677 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 492 SLBM launchers, 33 ballistic missile-capable submarines, 155 strategic bombers, 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles and 194 nuclear test tunnels, according to the announcement.

The effort has also provided safeguards for 556 nuclear-weapon train shipments, boosted security at 24 nuclear weapons storage facilities and constructed 38 biological agent monitoring stations. It supported the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, nations that once respectively held the world's third-, fourth- and eighth-largest nuclear arsenals, Lugar's office said.

The Nunn-Lugar program aided the elimination of Albania's small stockpile of chemical warfare materials, its first effort outside the former Soviet Union. In total, 2,601.8 metric tons of Albanian and Russian chemical agents have been eliminated with assistance from the U.S. initiative.



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Two Milestones of Largest Nunn-Lugar WMD Destruction Project

Senator Lugar Press Release, 15 February 2012, <http://lugar.senate.gov/>

U.S. Senator Dick Lugar announced today that the Nunn-Lugar Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Shchuchye, Russia has successfully eliminated half of the nerve agent stored there. Last July, workers at the facility completed destruction of the projectiles/shells at the facility. As of today, they completed the draining, neutralizing and bituminizing chemical agent that was in the shells.

Lugar hailed these milestones as a testament to U.S.-Russian cooperation and a shared dedication to addressing the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. These destruction efforts at Shchuchye mirror U.S. domestic chemical weapons destruction efforts under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Both Washington and Moscow have reaffirmed their commitment to proceeding expeditiously with the further destruction of the remaining chemical stockpiles in both countries.

More than a decade in the making, the Shchuchye facility will destroy nearly 2 million chemical weapons shells and nerve agent that has been stored there since Soviet days. It is arguably the largest facility in the world destroying chemical munitions, and is currently the only operating facility that can accommodate the destruction of 2 million munitions.

“The path to peace and prosperity for both Russia and the United States depends on how we resolve the threats posed by the arsenals built to fight World War III. Thankfully, that confrontation never came. But today, we must ensure that the weapons are never used and never fall into the hands of those who would do harm to us or others. The United States and Russia have too much at stake and too many common interests to allow our relationship to drift toward conflict. Both of our nations have been the victim of terrorism that has deeply influenced our sense of security,” Lugar said.

“The experience of the Nunn-Lugar program in Russia has demonstrated that the threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on mutual interest. As new dangers emerge in third countries, the U.S. and Russia must work together around the world and aggressively pursue any non-proliferation opportunities that appear. Together, we can utilize the Nunn-Lugar concept to address global threats.”

On at least a dozen occasions over the past decade and a half, Lugar has interceded to keep the Shchuchye project on track. The program was challenged by Congressional restrictions, contractual problems, cost over runs, and delays.



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“Our own national security is bolstered by a vigorous international campaign to contain and eliminate all chemical weapons stockpiles. Global terrorists remain on the prowl, looking for new targets and, no doubt, new weapons. Destroying the huge cache of weapons at Shchuchye will make Americans safer,” Lugar said.

Lugar co-authored the Nunn-Lugar program in 1991 with then Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia). Lugar also led the 1997 Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which helped spur Russia to agree to the treaty. Chemical weapons at Newport, in Lugar’s home state of Indiana, have already been eliminated in compliance with the treaty. The United States and Russia continue to work on destruction at other locations in both countries. Shchuchye is located about 1,000 miles east-southeast of Moscow. Approximately 14 percent (about 5,460 metric tons) of Russia’s nerve agent stockpile has been stored in munitions at the site.

“The stockpile poses a threat because of the size and lethality of the weapons. In 1999, a Russian Major and I demonstrated the proliferation threat posed by these weapons by easily fitting an 85 mm shell, filled with VX, into an ordinary briefcase. Room was available for at least two more shells. One briefcase alone could carry enough agent to kill thousands of Americans,” Lugar said. The nerve agents, including VX, Sarin and Soman, are being neutralized into nonlethal bitumen (tar) and stored in secure bunkers. The munitions shells are also destroyed in the process.

Lugar last visited Shchuchye in May 2009 to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar program. The opening ceremonies constituted Lugar’s fourth visit to Shchuchye, the previous as part of the ongoing oversight inspections. In addition to the United States, Russia, Canada, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom supported the project. It is the largest Nunn-Lugar project. [...]

The Nunn-Lugar scorecard now totals:

- 7,610 strategic nuclear warheads deactivated,
- 792 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) destroyed,
- 498 ICBM silos eliminated,
- 191 ICBM mobile launchers destroyed,
- 677 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) eliminated,
- 556 nuclear weapons transport train shipments secured,
- upgraded security at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites, and
- built and equipped 38 biological monitoring stations. [...]



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The Nuclear Impasse [OPINION]

Khalee Times (UAE), 13 February 2012, <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/>

By Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former Pakistan envoy to the United States and the United Kingdom

The UN Conference on Disarmament [CD] opened last month amid conflicting expectations among its 65 member states about what the focus should be in the world's sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament issues. The U.S.-led group of western and other countries will continue to push for starting negotiations on a treaty banning bomb-making nuclear material (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT).

They will insist that the CD accord priority to the 2009 work plan, calling for negotiations on an FMCT and discussions on the three other core issues: a nuclear disarmament treaty, negative security assurances for non-nuclear states and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

This group of countries has been contending that the consensus rule (under which all countries must agree) has made the CD dysfunctional and enabled some states to hold up FMCT negotiations. Countries belonging to the Group of 21 developing nations will want the CD to focus on all four core issues, not just the FMCT to strike a fair and necessary balance between nonproliferation and disarmament. Along with Russia and China they reject the notion that the present deadlock is due to the rules of procedure. They argue that it is not the consensus rule that is barring progress but the security interests of states. What is therefore required is a political resolution of these issues to end the stalemate.

Pakistan has long identified the problem at the CD and how to solve it. Its misgivings about the treaty are rooted in a vital security interest. As currently envisaged the FMCT fails to address existing and unequal fissile stockpiles. By not taking into account the prevailing asymmetry in stocks the proposed treaty will upset the strategic equilibrium in South Asia by freezing the imbalance between Pakistan and India. While Pakistan's deterrent capability would be curbed, India has been provided the means to escape a similar cap on its nuclear arsenal – by the nuclear exceptionalism conferred on it by the United States and the waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG]. India's subsequent fuel agreements with many countries will assure supply and enable it to process reactor-grade material because there are no safeguards to prevent this. This is only a small step to its conversion to weapons-grade material.

Pakistan's stance for the CD's 2012 session was finalized in meetings held in Islamabad last December. The imperative to preserve the credibility of its deterrent capability was further reinforced. Several developments in 2011 have clouded the country's longer-term security picture and affected its strategic calculus. This included reports of Washington's willingness to



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consider supplying India with ballistic missile defenses. These indicated that the United States is keen to sell India the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile defense system, regarded as the most advanced air defense missile in the world.

Whether or not this is part of Washington's strategy to build India as a counterweight to China – also signaled by America's new defense strategy and its strategic pivot to Asia – the move will have serious security implications for Pakistan. The target may be China but its consequence will be to oblige Pakistan to multiply its missile capabilities to penetrate the missile shield in order to maintain deterrent credibility. Pakistan has long advocated the non-induction of anti-ballistic missile systems into the region and reiterated this in talks on nuclear [confidence building measures] CBMs with India in December. But this has elicited no support either from Delhi or any western country.

Another development that has been noted by Islamabad is how Australia was prodded by the Americans to join the queue of countries eager to supply India with nuclear fuel. While these developments speak to the future security environment, also weighing on Islamabad's mind is the marked deterioration in the country's military capabilities in the decade following 9/11. Protracted engagement in military operations in the tribal areas and the accompanying wear and tear has occurred just when Indian military capabilities have been increasing. These factors are likely to urge Pakistan to hold the line on the FMCT.

The continuing deadlock in the CD may revive the demand by some states to take FMCT negotiations to another forum. But efforts to pursue this option last year came to naught. The United States now opposes transferring negotiations to an alternate venue. This means any renewed attempt to pursue this course is unlikely to succeed. The only way then to revive the CD's momentum and ensure its centrality in upholding the rule of law in the disarmament process is to address the issues that lie at the heart of the present deadlock. That means evolving an acceptable treaty on the basis of the principle of undiminished and equal security for all.

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U.S., Russia Agree to Exchange Information on ICBM Launches

Xinhua News, 08 February 2012, <http://chinaview.cn>

Russia and the United States have signed an agreement about two-way exchange of information regarding strategic missiles launches, the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday.

The ministry said in a statement that the third session of the Russian-U.S. consultative commission on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [New START] was held in Geneva from January 24 to February 07.

"The sides agreed the number of launches of the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) or submarine-based missiles (per year) and they would exchange telemetric information about it in 2012," the ministry said.

It added that Moscow and Washington have been continuing their discussions on the practical issues related to the treaty's implementation.

According to the new START signed in 2010, Russia and the United States must provide each other with information about five test or training launches of their inter-continental ballistic missiles annually.

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Upcoming Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Obstacles [Editorial]

Jane's Intelligence Review, 14 February 2012, <http://www.janes.com>

By Mark Hibbs

The second of its kind, the Seoul summit aims to reach consensus on securing nuclear materials against their use by militants. However, despite some progress in 2010, agreement may be harder to find this time. Mark Hibbs outlines the obstacles.

Between March 26 and 27 in Seoul, approximately 50 world leaders will convene for the second time in two years to discuss how to address the risk of nuclear terrorism. The Seoul summit follows an earlier summit in 2010, convened by U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington DC, which was the first time that global leaders assembled for this specific purpose.

As in 2010, the leaders in Seoul are likely to pledge to take specific steps to keep nuclear materials secure and reduce the possibility that they could be illegally diverted into terrorist or criminal hands. However, there remain considerable differences between the stances of the various countries, and so they will struggle to generate the political will to craft a global nuclear security regime that is similar to those that exist for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety.

Part of the reason for this discrepancy between rhetoric and action is a lack of belief on the part of many countries in the genuine risk of terrorists or criminals gaining access to nuclear materials. Concerns about the possibility date back to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the consequent risk posed to former Soviet arsenals, but there have as yet been very few incidents that have served to focus international attention on the issue. It is only in the decade since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States that the issue has gained a higher profile, leading Obama to call in 2009 for an international summit.

Improving standards

Since 2001, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has repeatedly warned legislators that the militant Islamist group Al-Qaeda, as well as more than 20 other militant groups, aim to acquire nuclear weapons. [...] These findings served as the backdrop for the announcement by Obama in Prague, Czech Republic, in April 2009 that he would convene and host a global summit on nuclear security a year later. [...] The result was a non-binding work plan and a communiqué voicing general aspirations to improve nuclear security, as well as a set of specific pledges made by individual countries.

The work plan, for example, pledged general support for the UN International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; for the UN Convention on the Physical Protection of



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Nuclear Material, which had been revised five years previously but had not entered into force; for implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540, passed soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks and requiring all countries to take measures to secure nuclear items; and for nuclear security initiatives at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The IAEA provides training for countries, advisory services, legal assistance, and support in managing nuclear materials and radioactive sources. In addition, it maintains a global database on illicit nuclear trafficking. More generally, the work plan urged countries to prudently manage inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, and to pass legislation and participate in international co-operation and capacity building.

More significant were some of the 54 specific commitments made by 29 countries that testified to active engagement in international programs and contributed to a reduction of specific liabilities on their territories. [...] After nearly two years, many of these important national commitments have been fulfilled. Chile sent its inventory of 18 kg of HEU to the United States; Kazakhstan, working with the U.S. government, removed a large inventory of spent fuel from an HEU-fuelled breeder reactor to a secure storage depot and secured more than 10 tons of HEU and three tons of weapons-grade plutonium.

Japan is working to convert some HEU-fuelled installations and Ukraine removed 106 kg of fresh and irradiated HEU to Russia; a smaller amount of HEU still remains in Ukraine. In addition, Russia shut down the third and last reactor that it had used to make weapons plutonium. Six countries held educational conferences and workshops; three passed new export control laws; five ratified the two international conventions; four joined Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT); five took legislative measures to deter nuclear smuggling; two invited IAEA security reviews; and six (Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia and the UK) donated funds to the IAEA nuclear security program.

Behind deadline

Despite these advances, Obama's stated aim of securing the world's unsecured nuclear materials by 2013 looks unlikely to be achieved. This is perhaps unsurprising: while technically feasible, this aim was politically ambitious. As soon as the 2010 summit concluded, questions were raised about how much work needed to be done, where and at what cost. [...] While many countries have been willing to allow the United States to take the lead in paying for global nuclear security programs [...] some countries seem reluctant to let Washington tell them how best to manage their nuclear materials. The [Government Accounting Office (GAO)] report, released months after the 2010 summit, documented problems faced by the U.S. government in



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working with counterparts in Russia, China and India, where, it said, "political sensitivities have limited [U.S.] efforts to relatively non-controversial exchanges of best practices, training and demonstration projects". In interviews with the GAO held between April and September 2010, U.S. government officials backed away from the four-year timetable, describing it as having a "forcing function" to galvanize national and international efforts that must continue beyond 2013. [...]

Expanding the 2012 agenda

[...] The Seoul meeting will have similarities to the 2010 summit but departs from it in some respects. It will include a somewhat larger number of countries, perhaps just over 50 compared to the 47 attendees in 2010. The three new participants will be Azerbaijan, Denmark and Lithuania. As in 2010, the major achievements of the summit will be in the commitments made by participating governments. Officials preparing the summit drew up a 'matrix' for each country, focusing on what diplomatic steps would be necessary to persuade leaders to agree to make specific pledges; they told IHS Jane's that a few countries will announce significant commitments. [...]

Following an initiative by the German government, the scope of the 2012 meeting will be expanded to include treatment of nuclear sources and other radiological materials. Governments stress that militant groups, including Al-Qaeda, have declared their intention to obtain material to build so-called 'dirty bombs', explosive devices that would disperse radioactive material amid a local population. A few of these materials, such as caesium-137, cobalt-60, strontium-90 and americium-241, could be deadly if used in such a weapon.

Accounting for radioactive sources is difficult because there are many thousands being used for civilian applications. Moreover, during the second half of the 20th century, many radioactive sources were lost or discarded without being subject to collection and disposal by government authorities. Before the U.S. government began to address this problem in the 1990s, with better management and source recovery programs, as many as 100,000 discarded sources may have accumulated in the United States alone, according to information from U.S. officials presented at an IAEA symposium in 1998.

The decision to include radiological materials on the 2012 agenda was opposed by some governments on the grounds it would detract from the greater threat posed by plutonium and HEU. However, this reflects the nuclear security concerns faced by the vast majority of countries that do not have fissile materials on their territories, indirectly raising the politically sensitive issue of which countries would be invited to attend the summit meeting.

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Likely outcomes

The summit's managers express confidence that, as in 2010, a number of specific national commitments, including a few major items, will be announced by participants. Perhaps one or more governments might agree to convert HEU-fuelled reactors, and non-binding agreements or statements in the communiqué may be made to encourage reactor conversion and deployment of technologies for isotope production that do not rely on HEU.

The communiqué will probably support the role of the IAEA, and perhaps the International Criminal Police (Interpol), in nuclear security, and encourage the development of nuclear security culture, securing radioactive materials and combating nuclear smuggling through forensics and border controls. It could also contain general commitments to excellence in nuclear security, to protect all HEU and plutonium against design-basis threats and an endorsement of the latest revision of the IAEA's recommendation on physical protection of nuclear material. Individual countries might commit themselves to reducing their plutonium and HEU inventories, invite IAEA assessments and peer reviews, and report on ongoing progress to other summit participants.

However, some important issues that advocates want to put on the international nuclear security agenda are highly unlikely to reach consensus in Seoul, such as a proposed agreement to convert all reactors using HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. [...] 77 reactors worldwide have been converted from HEU to LEU fuel.

The 2010 summit communiqué vowed to "promote" reactor conversion "where appropriate". In line with a consensus statement made by all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) during a review conference in 2010, the Seoul summit will include a commitment "in principle" to minimize the use of HEU in civilian nuclear reactors. However, there have so far been no watertight commitments to convert HEU-fuelled units in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Russia. As yet, neither the U.S. nor others have called for a global ban on the use of HEU. [...]

A related topic of discussion is whether to seek a common commitment to convert HEU-fuelled naval propulsion reactors and to deploy in the future only LEU-fuelled propulsion reactors. Facing a shortage of domestic HEU fuel and aiming to consolidate its nuclear industry, France has built a fleet of LEU-fuelled nuclear submarines. However, the U.S., which has a large HEU inventory, will not convert HEU-fuelled naval reactors requiring about three tons of HEU annually. Similarly, Russia will not convert its nuclear submarines, which use around 600 kg HEU per year. Regardless of French success with LEU-fuelled naval reactors, neither the



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United States nor Russia have committed to develop LEU fuelled-technology for future submarines, thereby preventing establishment of a global norm to delegitimize use of HEU by non-nuclear weapons states for future propulsion reactors.

Another issue unlikely to gather consensus is an agreement to reduce inventories of separated plutonium. The world's growing inventory of separated plutonium may be around 500 tons, nearly all of it in nuclear weapons states; around half of the plutonium is for weapons and half of it is for civilian programs. The amount is increasing owing to civilian reprocessing programs in France, India, Russia and the UK, and plutonium stocks will rise again if reprocessing programs are expanded in China, India and Japan.

While military stockpiles are being reduced through the efforts of the United States and Russia, which possess by far the greatest proportion of the world's military plutonium, between 1996 and 2010, the world's civilian plutonium inventory increased from around 150 tons to around 250 tons, according to the International Panel on Fissile Materials' Global Fissile Material Report 2010.

For this reason, some advocates, such as the Fissile Materials Working Group, a U.S.-based non-governmental coalition of nuclear security experts, favor making a global commitment in Seoul to halt this build-up. However, this is highly unlikely, owing to ongoing national programs.

[...] Perhaps most crucially, the summit is also unlikely to result in a commitment to create common international standards for nuclear security. More than is the case for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety, nuclear security, defined as the prevention and detection of, and response to, malicious acts involving nuclear material, radiological materials and associated facilities, is a subject that relies on the voluntary participation of individual states and sharing information that is considered by governments to be extremely sensitive. Unlike non-proliferation and nuclear safety, where civilian industry is subject to national laws, international obligations and intensive outreach, the role of industry in nuclear security has been comparatively limited.

The absence of common international standards could arguably contribute to undisclosed security deficits that could be revealed to, and exploited by, terrorists or criminals. At the same time, some experts argue that creating such a baseline could establish a low level of security and prevent standards from being improved above that level. In addition, a publicly accessible list of security standards could prove useful to potential illegal infiltrators, by allowing them to identify security vulnerabilities within the system.

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Credibility problem

[...] Perhaps the biggest obstacle to greater political commitment in addressing nuclear security issues is the fact that an attack has not so far been made using radiological or nuclear materials. Many nuclear professionals seem to believe it is only a theoretical possibility that these materials could be used in an attack. [...] In addition, international concern about the risk posed by former Soviet arsenals is now declining. [...] The threat from the Soviet nuclear weapons legacy appears currently to have receded, in part because Russia's political leadership has reasserted control since the late 1990s and because Russia has co-operated with the United States and other countries in rectifying deficiencies in control over its nuclear materials.

As of 2012, the IAEA had identified a total of 18 cases in which stolen nuclear weapons-usable materials were recovered. However, in very few of these cases was the material's origin detected, nor who stole it, under what circumstances, or where the materials were being taken. Moreover, in none of the cases were terrorist groups identified as having stolen or obtained these materials.

The GAO did warn in 2010 that certain programs the United States had established under the Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] program in 1991, to secure nuclear assets in the former Soviet Union, would soon expire or be taken over by Russian authorities. This was a troubling prospect for the United States as much work remained to be done. [...]

Future resolutions

The sheer volume of directly usable nuclear weapons materials in the world – as much as 1,600 tons of HEU and 500 tons of plutonium – implies that the task of meeting nuclear security challenges will be far from being achieved when Obama's four-year deadline expires in 2013. As such, the nuclear security regime will remain considerably weaker than that of non-proliferation, for example, and governed by few international treaties or agreements.

Yet, the prospect of another summit after Seoul, currently set for 2014 and potentially in the Netherlands, may act as a spur to maintain momentum, with governments making commitments in 2012 keen to demonstrate their progress before Obama's deadline. After that point, it may prove difficult to sustain summits with such a large number of heads of state attending, but governments might agree to continue meeting annually at the working level.



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As the international nuclear security fabric is comparatively weak compared to the web of commitments in non-proliferation and nuclear safety, the best prospect for institutionalizing the 200-plus commitments and pledges generated by the Washington and Seoul summits may be for the March event to conclude with a statement in the communiqué spelling out a common understanding that assuring nuclear security must be a dynamic, continuing endeavor.

Such commitments could be buoyed by a planned international conference in 2013, probably at the IAEA, to address the issue of deficiencies in the architecture of the nuclear safety regime. The gradual implementation of these commitments and recommendations would therefore help contribute to an incremental improvement in global standards of nuclear security, helping to guard against any sustained efforts by terrorist groups to access nuclear materials.



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