



# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

## GENERAL ARMS CONTROL

### **A Farewell to Nuclear Arms [OPINION]**

*European Daily*, 09 October 2011, [europeandaily.com](http://europeandaily.com)

Written by Mikhail Gorbachev, former President of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), [who] founded Green Cross International, the independent non-profit and nongovernmental organization working to address the inter-connected global challenges of security, poverty eradication, and environmental degradation

Twenty-five years ago this month, I sat across from Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik, Iceland to negotiate a deal that would have reduced, and could have ultimately eliminated by 2000, the fearsome arsenals of nuclear weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union. (1,104 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **“Sorry to Report,” Conference on Disarmament Official Tells First Committee, No Key Disarmament, Nonproliferation Treaties in Pipeline Now**

*United Nations*, 12 October 2011, [www.un.org](http://www.un.org)

“We are sorry to report,” the Deputy Secretary-General of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament [CD] told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today, “once again – despite the genuine efforts of the successive [CD] Presidents, negotiations on any issue on its agenda have been absent.” (858 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

### **Biological Weapons Convention: The Next Five Years [EXCERPT]**

*U.S. Department of State*, 04 October 2011, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

Remarks by Thomas Countryman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at *Charting the Future of Biosecurity: Ten Years after the Anthrax Attacks*, Center for Biosecurity – University of Pittsburgh Medical Center in Pittsburgh, PA

As we go to the [BWC] Review Conference in December in Geneva, our steps should line up with the aims of President Obama’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats which was announced at the BWC two years ago. (1,697 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

[back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

### **Umatilla Depot to Deliver Last Chemical Containers**

*Tri-City Herald, 09 October 2011, [www.tri-cityherald.com](http://www.tri-cityherald.com)*

The Umatilla Chemical Depot plans to take its final containers of chemical weapon agent to the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility on October 20. (87 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **TOCDF Overpacked Munitions Disposal Campaign**

*U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 12 October 2011, [www.cma.army.mil](http://www.cma.army.mil)*

Two separate facilities will jointly destroy Deseret Chemical Depot's remaining stockpile of mustard rounds in an effort to meet the international treaty deadline. (733 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

### **NATO Panel Urges Nations to Eradicate All Chemical Arms**

*Global Security Newswire, 11 October 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)*

A key NATO panel on Sunday approved a draft text that urges Iraq, Russia and the United States to eradicate their chemical warfare materials in a safe and secure manner, the ACTMedia News Agency reported. (329 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

### **No "50-Yard Dash" to Nuclear Test-Ban, Key Nonproliferation Official Says**

*Global Security Newswire, 11 October 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)*

Attempts to draw the United States and a handful of other key states into a global ban on nuclear testing will be more a marathon than a sprint, according to the nonproliferation veteran leading the push. (1,602 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Forum for a Nuclear-Free World**

*U.S. Department of State, 13 October 2011, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)*

*Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in Astana, Kazakhstan*

As President Obama has said, the United States is committed to securing ratification of the CTBT, and we are currently engaging with the United States Senate and the American public on the merits of the treaty. (687 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

[back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

DTRA

## COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)(CONT.)

**When It Comes to Nonproliferation, Arms Limitation, Disarmament Agreements, “Rules Must Be Binding, Violations Must Be Punished,” First Committee Told United Nations, 14 October 2011, [www.un.org](http://www.un.org)**

For the United States, when it came to nonproliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments, “rules must be binding, violations must be punished, and words must mean something”, that country’s representative told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today upon the introduction of a draft resolution on compliance. (650 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

**Ramstein Prepares for CFE Treaty Inspection Exercise**

*Kaiserslautern American, 26 August 2011, [www.kaiserslauternamerican.com](http://www.kaiserslauternamerican.com)*

The 86<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing and all tenant units are currently preparing for the upcoming Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty inspection exercise, which will take place on September 13 at Ramstein. (626 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

**CFE Treaty Talks Stall**

*Arms Control Association, September 2011, [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org)*

After a year-long, high-level effort by the Obama administration to revive the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the process appears to have ground to a halt in May and remained stuck since then. (909 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

**Moldova Requests Completing Withdrawal of Russian Ammunition from Transnistrian Region**

*MOLDPRES, 30 September 2011, [bsanna-news.ukrinform.ua/?lang=en](http://bsanna-news.ukrinform.ua/?lang=en)*

The fourth assessment conference of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was held in Vienna on September 29. (334 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

DTRA

## FISSILE MATERIALS

### **NNSA and Kazakhstan Complete Operation to Eliminate Highly Enriched Uranium**

National Nuclear Security Administration, 12 October 2011, [nnsa.energy.gov](http://nnsa.energy.gov)

Completed in secrecy over a seven week span, the operation was a combined effort between the [National Nuclear Security Administration] (NNSA), the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (662 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

## NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

### **New START for Less Money**

Arms Control Association, 13 October 2011, [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org)

Outgoing Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn said October 5, 2011 that defense planners are looking to stay at New START limits “but to do it in a more fiscally responsible fashion.”

(845 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Senators Call for Retention of ICBMs**

Global Security Newswire, 14 October 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)

The United States should retain no fewer than 420 launch-ready ICBMs and evenly disperse any reductions across three host bases as it moves to comply with a strategic nuclear arms control treaty with Russia, senators from four states said in a Wednesday letter to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. (460 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## OPEN SKIES TREATY

### **British Inspectors to Fly over Russia, Belarus Territories**

ITAR-TASS, 17 October 2011, [www.itar-tass.com/en](http://www.itar-tass.com/en)

A group of British inspectors will have a flight over the territories of Russia and Belarus during the period from October 17 to 21, in accordance with the Open Skies Treaty. (195 words)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011



## PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION AGREEMENT (PMDA)

### **NNSA Completes Initial Feedstock for MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, First Step in Permanent Plutonium Disposition**

National Nuclear Security Administration, 06 October 2011, [nnsa.energy.gov](http://nnsa.energy.gov)

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced this week that it had successfully disassembled nuclear weapons “pits” and converted them into more than 240 kg of plutonium oxide, an initial step in permanent plutonium disposition. (438 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

## FULL TEXT OF BI-WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:

[back to top](#)

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DTRA

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Twenty-five years ago this month, I sat across from Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik, Iceland to negotiate a deal that would have reduced, and could have ultimately eliminated by 2000, the fearsome arsenals of nuclear weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union.

For all our differences, Reagan and I shared the strong conviction that civilized countries should not make such barbaric weapons the linchpin of their security. Even though we failed to achieve our highest aspirations in Reykjavik, the summit was nonetheless, in the words of my former counterpart, “a major turning point in the quest for a safer and secure world.”

The next few years may well determine if our shared dream of ridding the world of nuclear weapons will ever be realized. Critics present nuclear disarmament as unrealistic at best, and a risky utopian dream at worst. They point to the Cold War’s “long peace” as proof that nuclear deterrence is the only means of staving off a major war.

As someone who has commanded these weapons, I strongly disagree. Nuclear deterrence has always been a hard and brittle guarantor of peace. By failing to propose a compelling plan for nuclear disarmament, the United States, Russia, and the remaining nuclear powers are promoting through inaction a future in which nuclear weapons will inevitably be used. That catastrophe must be forestalled.

As I, along with George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and others, pointed out five years ago, nuclear deterrence becomes less reliable and more risky as the number of nuclear-armed states increases. Barring preemptive war (which has proven counterproductive) or effective sanctions (which have thus far proven insufficient), only sincere steps toward nuclear disarmament can furnish the mutual security needed to forge tough compromises on arms control and nonproliferation matters.

The trust and understanding built at Reykjavik paved the way for two historic treaties. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty destroyed the feared quick-strike missiles then threatening Europe’s peace. And, in 1991, the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) cut the bloated U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals by 80 percent over a decade.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

But prospects for progress on arms control and nonproliferation are darkening in the absence of a credible push for nuclear disarmament. I learned during those two long days in Reykjavik that disarmament talks could be as constructive as they are arduous. By linking an array of interrelated matters, Reagan and I built the trust and understanding needed to moderate a nuclear arms race of which we had lost control.

In retrospect, the Cold War's end heralded the coming of a messier arrangement of global power and persuasion. The nuclear powers should adhere to the requirements of the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and resume "good faith" negotiations for disarmament. This would augment the diplomatic and moral capital available to diplomats as they strive to restrain nuclear proliferation in a world where more countries than ever have the wherewithal to construct a nuclear bomb.

Only a serious program of universal nuclear disarmament can provide the reassurance and the credibility needed to build a global consensus that nuclear deterrence is a dead doctrine. We can no longer afford, politically or financially, the discriminatory nature of the current system of nuclear "haves" and "have-nots."

Reykjavik proved that boldness is rewarded. Conditions were far from favorable for a disarmament deal in 1986. Before I became Soviet leader in 1983, relations between the Cold War superpowers had hit rock bottom. Reagan and I were nonetheless able to create a reservoir of constructive spirit through constant outreach and face-to-face interaction.

What seems to be lacking today are leaders with the boldness and vision to build the trust needed to reintroduce nuclear disarmament as the centerpiece of a peaceful global order. Economic constraints and the Chernobyl disaster helped spur us to action. Why has the Great Recession and the disastrous meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan not elicited a similar response today?

A first step would be for the United States finally to ratify the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). President Barack Obama has endorsed this treaty as a vital instrument to discourage proliferation and avert nuclear war. It's time for Obama to make good on commitments he made in Prague in 2009, take up Reagan's mantle as the Great Communicator, and persuade the U.S. Senate to formalize America's adherence to the CTBT.

This would compel the remaining holdouts – China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan – to reconsider the CTBT as well. That would bring us closer to a global ban on nuclear tests in any environment – the atmosphere, undersea, in outer space, or underground.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011



A second necessary step is for the United States and Russia to follow up on the New START agreement and begin deeper weapons cuts, especially tactical and reserve weapons, which serve no purpose, waste funds, and threaten security. This step must be related to limits on missile defense, one of the key issues that undermined the Reykjavik summit.

A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), long stalled in multilateral talks in Geneva, and a successful second Nuclear Security Summit next year in Seoul, will help secure dangerous nuclear materials. This will also require that the 2002 Global Partnership, dedicated to securing and eliminating all weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical, and biological – is renewed and expanded when it convenes next year in the United States.

Our world remains too militarized. In today's economic climate, nuclear weapons have become loathsome money pits. If, as seems likely, economic troubles continue, the United States, Russia, and other nuclear powers should seize the moment to launch multilateral arms reductions through new or existing channels such as the UN Conference on Disarmament. These deliberations would yield greater security for less money.

But the buildup of conventional military forces – driven in large part by the enormous military might deployed globally by the United States – must be addressed as well. As we engage in furthering our Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement, we should seriously consider reducing the burden of military budgets and forces globally.

U.S. President John F. Kennedy once warned that “every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment.” For more than 50 years, humanity has warily eyed that lethal pendulum while statesmen debated how to mend its fraying cords. The example of Reykjavik should remind us that palliative measures are not enough. Our efforts 25 years ago can be vindicated only when the bomb ends up beside the slave trader's manacles and the Great War's mustard gas in the museum of bygone savagery.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

## **“Sorry to Report,” Conference on Disarmament Official Tells First Committee, No Key Disarmament, Nonproliferation Treaties in Pipeline Now**

United Nations, 12 October 2011, [www.un.org](http://www.un.org)

“We are sorry to report,” the Deputy Secretary-General of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today, “once again – despite the genuine efforts of the successive [CD] Presidents, negotiations on any issue on its agenda have been absent”. That was the reality, said Jarmo Sareva, 15 years after the conclusion of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and more than two years after the short-lived promise of CD/1864 (2009 Program of Work).

Participating in a panel on the current state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament and the role of international organizations with mandates in this field, Mr. Sareva said, looking at the podium, that the panel represented some of the finest creations of the Conference or its predecessors: the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty), CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty), in absentia. There was also the BWC (Biological Weapons Convention), yet another pillar of the international community’s efforts against the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.

“Today, however, there is nothing of the kind of NPT, BWC, CWC, or CTBT in the CD pipeline now,” he said. “The questions that then beg for an answer are, how are we to continue and try and break the deadlock next year and possibly beyond? Or should one contemplate more drastic action on the future of the Conference?” he said. “In short, is the [Conference on Disarmament] glass half empty, or is it still at least half full?”

To some observers, the “CD glass” appeared more than half empty, whereas to others, the Conference was useful and irreplaceable, he said. A number of wide-ranging proposals were being discussed that could impact the future of the Conference, he said, of the view that this was “one of the most important sessions of the First Committee in the history of the Conference on Disarmament”. In the end, he hoped every effort would be made to “revalidate” the Conference as a single platform for conducting multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues.

“The CD’s continued frozen inability to function is unacceptable and unsustainable,” the United Kingdom’s Ambassador to the CD said during the Committee’s thematic debate on nuclear weapons, following the panel discussion. Breaking the deadlock would not be easy, but it remained the only option for negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty, she said. That shared goal would not be achieved by initiating negotiations elsewhere, as that would lead to an instrument to which some key players had not signed up.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

The Conference's inability to get to work on a fissile material treaty, she stressed, was not due to an intrinsic structural problem, but caused by one country blocking the will of the majority. The Conference would not be bolstered by undermining its mandate and "leaving it to languish". It was a unique forum that had proved its worth in the past, and one to which her country was committed. The Permanent Five nuclear-weapon States were fully engaged to set the Conference to work negotiating a fissile material treaty.

The United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Sergio Duarte, said he recognized the widely felt need to overcome the negotiating stalemate at the Conference, but said that despite some variations in perspectives here on arms control and disarmament issues, most noteworthy of all was the extent of agreement. Everyone shared a "deep common commitment to the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction," he said, adding that the common cause was not simply in regulating such weapons, or limiting the risk or frequency of their use, but in abolishing and eliminating them safely.

The world's resolve to pursue disarmament goals "is unshakable, though it is continually subject to new challenges." At the same time, he cautioned, the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction must never be viewed as an invitation to the proliferation of conventional wars. "The fact that there is no representative of an international agency focused on limiting the production or proliferation of conventional arms is quite telling, as we consider the views of this panel".

The representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Geoffrey Shaw, called for additional efforts to address the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. That, he said, remained a real and current concern, with the Agency receiving reports "virtually every second day" of a new incident involving unauthorized possession and/or attempts to sell or smuggle these materials. Much had been done to improve nuclear security globally, but clearly more needed to be done, he implored.

Preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons and their misuse, said Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), was a multidimensional undertaking that entailed strengthening the industry verification regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention and a sustained effort to keep abreast of developments in science and technology.

Even as declared chemical weapon stockpiles were being destroyed, he said, the world must remain vigilant and prepared to deal with the threat of use of those weapons or of toxic chemicals as weapons. The Convention was not yet universally accepted and there existed new threats, including terrorism.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



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## Biological Weapons Convention: The Next Five Years [EXCERPT]

U.S. Department of State, 04 October 2011, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

Remarks by Thomas Countryman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at Charting the Future of Biosecurity: Ten Years after the Anthrax Attacks, Center for Biosecurity – University of Pittsburgh Medical Center in Pittsburgh, PA

My job today is to speak a little about the international aspect, using the tool of the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] and what we can expect in the next five years. [...] The year 2001 was not only the year of the anthrax attacks. A few months before, in the summer of 2001, the U.S. officially withdrew its support for negotiations on a legally binding verification protocol for the [BWC]. [...]

Getting countries to put in place domestic laws to deal with perpetrators of such acts, making labs safer and pathogens secure and training life scientists on the potential danger of the misuse of their work, all of these were very relevant to countering the threats that were revealed to the world in October 2001. Our proposals foresaw – and the anthrax demonstrated – that when it came to the proliferation of biological weapons and the risk of an attack, the world community faced a greater threat, from a wider range of sources, based on a new calculus. They understood that the BW threat from non-state actors needed to be addressed, and focusing on what countries were doing domestically to counter this real-world threat from sub-state actors was both critical to our collective security and to achieving the goals of the [BWC].

This approach as we rolled it out in 2003-2005 intersessional period, was at first very Western-oriented. The procedures that we proposed and highlighted were very much centered on the methodologies of the technologically advanced industrialized world and put forth without gaining much buy-in from lesser developed nations. But the BWC quickly showed that it had this very important role of showcasing best practices for countering a wide range of biological threats. We demonstrated then, and we remain convinced today, that our approach must include measures to help with human, animal and plant diseases and their consequences.

As we progressed, those countries that were actively engaged in the process brought their best scientists and practitioners to give briefings and interact with the diplomats and their counterparts from other countries. Fairly rapidly, a much wider array of states and other nongovernmental and intergovernmental actors recognized the relevance of this approach not just to their national security but to their public health. So, over those years, attendance by States Parties doubled in the first year from that of the Protocol negotiations and continues to increase year by year.

Between 2007 and 2010, the [BWC] Work Program resumed its focus on biosafety and pathogen security, national implementation and codes of conduct for scientists, and also

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

focused on disease surveillance capacity building and assistance in the event of a suspicious outbreak or alleged use of BW. This focus on disease surveillance, and the demonstration that SARS, H1N1 and H5N1 knew no boundaries – that concerted national and international coordination was needed – brought home the value of the work ongoing in Geneva. The meetings were no longer just for diplomats; we had participants from all parts of the world and had the interaction of the disarmament, scientific, law enforcement, academic and private sector communities. These meetings stimulated significant activity at the national level and increased the knowledge base around the world in best practices in biosafety and biosecurity, disease surveillance, in science education. This new approach started with limited and modest goals but it was clearly a success.

That is the last ten years. Of course, today, the threat has not gone away. We fully recognize that a major biological attack on one of the world's major cities could cause as much death and economic and psychological damage as a nuclear attack. And while the United States is still concerned about state-sponsored biological warfare and proliferation, we are equally, if not more, concerned about an act of bioterrorism due to the rapid pace of advances in the life sciences.

And so today, it is time for still more ambitious thinking. As we go to the [BWC] Review Conference in December in Geneva, our steps should line up with the aims of President Obama's National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats which was announced at the BWC two years ago. This strategy has a clear, overarching goal to protect against the misuse of science to develop or use biological agents to cause harm.

Let me outline [...] the broadest goals of the national strategy:

First, that we will work with the international community to promote the peaceful and beneficial use of life sciences, in accordance with the [BWC]'s Article Ten, to combat infectious diseases regardless of their cause.

Second, we will work to promote global health security by increasing the availability of and access to knowledge and products of the life sciences to help reduce the impact from outbreaks of infectious disease, whether of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin.

Third, we will work toward establishing and reinforcing norms against the misuse of the life sciences. We seek to ensure a culture of responsibility, awareness, and vigilance among all who use and benefit from the life sciences.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

And fourth, we will implement a coordinated approach to influence, identify, inhibit, and interdict those who seek to misuse scientific progress to harm innocent people.

These are the goals of the National Strategy that inform our approach and they have a few specific implications for our work between now and the Review Conference in December and beyond.

We will continue to seek timely and accurate information on the full spectrum of threats and challenges so that we can take appropriate actions to manage the evolving risk. We will make clear, as we have in the National Strategy that the revolutionary advances that are taking place in the life sciences are overwhelmingly positive. We need to embrace and support those developments while taking balanced, appropriate, steps to minimize the risks posed by potential misuse. To remain effective, the [BWC] must continue to adapt to the wider range of biological threats we will face in this century. We need to continue to translate these strategic goals, which are shared overwhelmingly by the other States Parties to the BWC, to enhance the BWC still further.

We want to enhance the effectiveness of this Convention as the norm against biological weapons, through our actions and not only through our words. We have consulted widely, and we have listened widely, on how we can all benefit from a range of tools that increase mutual confidence; from specific confidence-building measures, to more frequent consultations, to proactive, national steps that demonstrate compliance by states. We will seek endorsement of expanded efforts to prevent bioterrorism by strengthening national legislation and oversight in the States Party, fostering greater understanding of the scope of national implementation measures that the Convention requires and enlisting the support and cooperation of the international scientific and commercial sectors in these efforts.

We know that the best time for international assistance should come before, and not after, a biological weapons attack. We will continue to focus on providing targeted and sustainable international assistance, joined by other donors in the international community, aimed at building the national capacities in all countries to detect and respond to a disease outbreak, regardless of the cause, and identifying and addressing barriers to effective international response. We will take a multi-sectoral approach as and seek assistance from other donors. [...]

The intersessional process in between each Review Conference has been effective – and where the real work of the BWC has been done – more than in the Review Conference that will be in the spotlight in December. The intersessional process has brought together national security, public health, law enforcement, scientific and academic communities, private industry,

[back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

and intergovernmental organizations that did not previously interact with the BWC, such as the World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Organization for Animal Health. The [BWC] has become, and should be, fully utilized as a forum to share information with all states of the bilateral and regional activities that relate to the BWC, to consult with each other on new avenues of bilateral and multilateral engagement, and to seek the support of the international community for national protection efforts. These activities, those States Party now realize will enhance their real-world capability and real-world security. [...]

We would like the Review Conference in December to reinvigorate, or to give added vigor, to this intersessional process, to continue this expert-level interaction and to look to more concrete results in such discussions. [...]

Doing more in this forum will cost a little more for the international community – that is the bad news. If we want international experts to produce specific recommendations and results, we will need more time to meet and work than we have in the past. We're making better use of electronic platforms, but at the end of the day, if we want the BWC to contribute more to our security, we will have to contribute a little more to it. And has that has been pointed out, that's never easy, and is especially difficult today given what State and AID and others are facing with budget cuts. But the good news is that we're talking about a remarkably cheap investment. The BWC is supported by a staff of only three people. Right now the experts meet for only five days a year. Fairly small increases here can make a huge difference in the results we can deliver through this Convention.

Let me mention one more goal for this Review Conference for it is one of our oldest goals for the BWC and still valid today. We want to establish universal adherence. Universal membership will strengthen the global norm against the use of disease as a weapon and reinforce the international community's determination that such use would be, as the preamble to the BWC states, "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." [...]

We are bringing specific ideas to the Review Conference, we are consulting widely and we are listening to our partners in other countries and to our own indispensable partners – the scientific and business communities in the United States as we move forward. Thank you for your time and the opportunity to share our thoughts on how to use the [BWC] to help with the critical challenges which we face.

Full text of article can be accessed at: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/175121.htm>

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

## Umatilla Depot to Deliver Last Chemical Containers

*Tri-City Herald, 09 October 2011, [www.tri-cityherald.com](http://www.tri-cityherald.com)*

The Umatilla Chemical Depot plans to take its final containers of chemical weapon agent to the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility on October 20. A ceremony for workers is planned that day to mark delivery of the last mustard ton containers to the incineration facility.

The final shipment of chemical weapons will occur 70 years after the depot's formation on October 14, 1941. The depot received its first conventional weapons that year, and chemical weapons were brought to the depot in 1962 and have been stored there since.

[back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

DTRA

## TOCDF Overpacked Munitions Disposal Campaign

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 12 October 2011, [www.cma.army.mil](http://www.cma.army.mil)

Two separate facilities will jointly destroy Deseret Chemical Depot's [DCD] remaining stockpile of mustard rounds in an effort to meet the international treaty deadline. It was originally planned that the rounds – less than 350 overpacked 4.2 inch mortars and 155 millimeter projectiles – would be destroyed in a detonation chamber known as the DAVINCH, Detonation of Ammunition in a Vacuum Integrated Chamber. But as an international treaty deadline of April 29, 2012 draws nearer, the DAVINCH has suffered unexpected delays and has fallen significantly behind its initial schedule.

Now the plan is to utilize the DAVINCH detonation chamber along with the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) to destroy the overpacked mustard rounds. Most of the 4.2-inch mortars were placed into overpacks, tightly sealed containers, during agent sampling operations. However, the majority of the 155mm projectiles are overpacked because they have either leaked or they are so badly deteriorated that they could not be destroyed using TOCDF's normal disposal process.

A few years ago, TOCDF workers attempted to process the problematic 155mm projectiles, but manually removing the explosive components, known as bursters, proved to be difficult – if not impossible – with the knowledge and resources available at the time. Inside many of the 155s, the mustard agent fill had solidified, binding the burster and burster well in place. If the burster is in the munition, the munition cannot be sent through the plant's Metal Parts Furnace (MPF).

Since that initial attempt, the overpack disposal process has been modified to include improved work procedures and enhanced equipment to re-open the door to safely resume overpacked munitions disposal at the TOCDF.

### TOCDF

The disposal of overpacked munitions occurs inside the facility's two Explosive Containment Rooms (ECRs), which are fortified with 28-inch thick reinforced concrete walls. Workers are not inside the ECR during the most hazardous tasks; those operations are done remotely.

Workers (dressed in personal protective equipment) transport the munitions into the ECR, remove them from their overpack containers and position them for cutting. Workers leave the ECR and the cuts are completed by a rotary cutter similar to those cutters used in past agent disposal campaigns. Once the cuts are complete, workers re-enter the room and attempt to manually remove the burster. If the burster cannot be removed, workers re-position the munition

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

on the cutting machine and put the new pull-shoe feature in place. Workers once again leave the ECR and control room operators remotely activate the pull-shoe, which is packed with 500 pounds of pulling force.

At this point, the burster either comes out or it breaks. Those rounds with broken bursters are further treated with the new Projectile Washout System (PWS) that is attached to the cutter machine. The PWS uses a high-pressure, warm-water spray to break down the solidified mustard agent. A warm water bath may also be used to loosen the burster. Once the burster is removed, it is destroyed in the Deactivation Furnace System (DFS), which was designed and built to handle explosives. The munition casings and their chemical agent fill are processed through the MPF [Metal Parts Furnace].

## *DAVINCH*

The DAVINCH is a proven Explosive Detonation Technology (EDT) system that has successfully and safely destroyed more than 5,400 chemical weapons in Japan, Belgium and China. The DAVINCH at Deseret Chemical Depot [DCD] is located in the DCD's secure storage yard, known as Area 10, and is housed within its own environmental enclosure. It has its own laboratory module to support agent monitoring activities, a control room module from which operations are managed, two diesel-powered generators and other support trailers.

The DAVINCH uses explosives to destroy chemical munitions and their overpack containers. The force of the detonation and the off gases and particulates generated by the explosion are contained within the chamber. The off gases are processed through an Off-Gas Treatment (OGT) system that cleans, cools, and neutralizes the acidic gases. The OGT system also incorporates a hold-check-release design feature that allows for testing the treated off gases prior to their release into the atmosphere. The remaining metal fragments are removed from the detonation chamber and safely stored and monitored before they are shipped off site to be disposed of as hazardous waste.

The DAVINCH is expected to start operations in December; the TOCDF began destroying overpacked mustard rounds in September 2011. By utilizing both facilities, it is anticipated DCD's entire stockpile of overpacked mustard munitions will be destroyed by the international treaty deadline of April 29, 2012.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

## NATO Panel Urges Nations to Eradicate All Chemical Arms

*Global Security Newswire*, 11 October 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)

A key NATO panel on Sunday approved a draft text that urges Iraq, Russia and the United States to eradicate their chemical warfare materials in a safe and secure manner, the ACTMedia News Agency reported. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly Science and Technology Committee in Bucharest dismissed an effort by Russia to substitute the call for the three nations to complete chemical demilitarization operations "in due time" with the word "soon."

Russia and the United States have announced they do not expect to meet an extended deadline of April 2012 set by the Chemical Weapons Convention to completely destroy their chemical weapons. Iraq also has a small cache of Saddam Hussein-era chemical weapons that it has yet to begin eliminating.

The NATO panel chose to keep its original wording on the thinking that Russia and the United States, as the holders of the world's two largest chemical arsenals, should act as positive role models to other nations in the elimination of their stockpiles.

"We are running late and we need to give an example," said the committee's vice chairman and author of the resolution, U.S. Representative David Scott (D-Georgia). "We need to act seriously." The resolution additionally urges all nations to notify the international community of any secret arsenals of biological and chemical warfare agents and to halt such military efforts.

The committee also pressed NATO members to implement steps to thwart potential biological and chemical terrorist strikes. "Terrorists have ... largely failed to weaponize biological and chemical agents," the draft resolution reads. "Nevertheless, measures to counter biological and chemical threats still have to cope with numerous issues to become truly effective tools of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation."

As general rapporteur of the resolution, Scott said he hoped to see a robust discussion by the NATO committee on best practices for thwarting chemical and biological attacks. The Georgian lawmaker also said he hoped to see the NATO Parliamentary Assembly take up the issue at its annual meeting in Bucharest.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

DTRA

## No "50-Yard Dash" to Nuclear Test-Ban, Key Nonproliferation Official Says

*Global Security Newswire*, 11 October 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)

Attempts to draw the United States and a handful of other key states into a global ban on nuclear testing will be more a marathon than a sprint, according to the nonproliferation veteran leading the push. The United States set off the first atomic bombs more than 50 years ago, and today it remains one of nine nations that will determine whether the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty enters into force.

The Obama administration has affirmed its intention to deliver the treaty for ratification by the U.S. Senate, but has not said when. Its chances for success remain in question given the bitter partisan divide on Capitol Hill and persistent debate over the wisdom of permanently swearing off nuclear blasts.

"The history of this treaty shows that, unfortunately, it's not a 50-yard dash," said Tibor Tóth, executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. "It took 50 years to get where we are. Reality might dictate that in the next 15 weeks or even 15 months the U.S. ratification won't happen."

For Tóth, whose organization is affiliated with the United Nations, there are no questions about the benefits of the accord: deterring development of new or more advanced nuclear weapons that require detonation to ensure they function as designed; and promoting stability in regions where some nations might be considering building an atomic arsenal to get an edge over neighboring antagonists.

Critics counter that the United States actually stands to lose assurance of its own security if it pledges never to conduct explosive-yield tests to ensure the nation's existing nuclear deterrent is in working order. The future might also bring unforeseen threats that demand the nation produce new weapons that would need testing, according to opponents.

Tóth and his staff in Vienna, Austria, have regular opportunities to make their case to Washington and to show off their organization's technical capabilities. Delegations of U.S. lawmakers, congressional aides or federal officials have arrived for visits on average of every two weeks for the past six months.

"I very much welcome visits which we have in Vienna by senators and congressmen and their staffers and institutions that are responsible for the ratification process," the Hungarian diplomat said. "I take it as a process which will be longer than a few weeks. It's important that all the information is put on the table and it's important that there is a serious assessment of what this treaty can bring to the security of the United States."

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

Tóth took his current job in 2005 after representing his nation at the International Atomic Energy Agency and other multilateral disarmament bodies. He spoke to Global Security Newswire late last month in New York on the sidelines of the seventh Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The UN event occurred one day before the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the date on which the treaty was opened for signatures – September 24, 1996.

The last decade and a half delivered a series of successes and setbacks for the test-ban regime, Tóth acknowledged. India and Pakistan conducted dueling underground blasts in 1998, and the U.S. Senate one year later rejected the Clinton administration's ratification bid for the treaty. More recently, North Korea set off two nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009. Despite those challenges, "we as a community did not close the shop and wait until better times," according to Tóth.

The accord since 1996 has picked up 182 signatory states, 155 of which proceeded to ratify the document. While roughly 2,000 nuclear tests were conducted in the decades prior to the treaty's establishment, the ban has become an informal political norm with only occasional breaches. The agreement must be formalized to ensure the norm does not break down, Tóth said.

His organization also established the International Monitoring System [IMS], a web of monitoring technology intended to verify compliance with treaty mandates. Nearly 300 facilities around the world are now operational; they have proven their worth in detecting signs of the North's underground nuclear detonations and in tracking the dispersal of radioactive contaminants from Japan's crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, Tóth said.

"There were two tests during the last decade," he noted. "I call it two too many, but this is where we are. I think it's important that both the challenges and the achievements of this regime are clear. The challenge is repeated again and again that we are nine ratifications away from entry into force."

Enacting the treaty requires ratification by 44 "Annex 2" states that participated in drafting the accord while operating nuclear research or energy reactors. Nine of those nations have yet to take that action – China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States.

Delegates from dozens of nations used much of their allotted speaking time at the UN conference to urge those nine countries to take the steps needed to make the treaty the rule of the land. The event closed with a final declaration pressing the same call. Senior diplomats from

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

Indonesia and the United States made clear their intentions to push to have lawmakers in their respective capitals to sign off on the pact. Their colleagues from China and Israel expressed support for the treaty but were more circumspect about their immediate plans.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon told delegates that he and Tóth were prepared to visit any holdout state in hopes of resolving their reluctance to join the treaty. "I'm very much at the disposal of the secretary general and the member states," the CTBTO chief said. High-level dialogue like that at the UN conference is necessary to promote the treaty, but the campaign goes much deeper, officials said. It involves regular contact with policy-makers at various levels of government, along with legislators, technical experts and those in the nongovernmental community.

Following the New York conference, Tóth spent several days in Russia for talks with senior diplomatic and defense officials on entry into force and development of the CTBTO monitoring regime. In June, the organization hosted a Vienna conference for 800 scientists. The intent there was to update visiting researchers on developments in the CTBT monitoring system and its broad applications to science.

Working closely with scientists can also help to promote support for the treaty in India and other nations that have deep research sectors, said CTBTO spokeswoman Annika Thunborg. "Politicians also listen to technical experts," she told GSN last week. A 2010 workshop in China allowed scientists from the Asian giant, the United States and elsewhere to discuss issues such as verification and the on-site inspections that could be conducted following suspicious events once the treaty is brought into force.

The organization also offers regular training events and workshops, and participates in all relevant multilateral and regional meetings, Thunborg said. It recently launched a video campaign aimed at raising awareness among youth on the dangers posed by the absence of a formal test prohibition. "In a situation where the Cold War is 20 years away [in the past] ... young people don't always know that this is an outstanding issue. They don't always know that we still have all these nuclear weapons in the world, either," Thunborg said.

Proponents acknowledge the significant difficulty in persuading the remaining Annex 2 states to accept the pact. The regime in North Korea today shows no inclination to join any arms control agreement. India and Pakistan continue to build up their nuclear arsenals even as the longtime foes seek opportunities to reduce tensions. Nations in the Middle East typically are inclined to focus first on achieving some sort of stable peace before joining nonproliferation agreements such as the test-ban treaty.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

However, supporters say that positive action in Washington could persuade Beijing and other capitals to move on ratification, bringing the treaty that much closer to taking effect. Others doubt that assertion, given the intransigence of some of the nations involved.

Ratification in Washington "could give North Korea an additional opportunity to play its favored game of extorting the international community. How much might we have to pay for North Korea's favor in this regard, if such favor is even possible?" former CIA chief James Woolsey and Keith Payne, a former senior Defense policy official, wrote in a September commentary. The pair also questioned whether all treaty states would accept the position that a nuclear test of any yield is unacceptable, and argued that identifying a blast does not equate to being able to punish the violator.

No matter what action the United States takes, the treaty should be perceived as an underpinning to security in the Middle East or Asia rather than something to be considered once stability is achieved, Tóth suggested. Nations in those regions often hold large arsenals of conventional or even nuclear weapons, but lack nonproliferation treaties and other multilateral instruments, according to Thunborg.

Tóth described a potential ban on nuclear testing as one of three "legs" that could help support a proposed nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East, alongside a prohibition on weapons and fissile material. This type of Mideast ban has become a hot-button topic in the wake of last year's Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, where diplomats called for a major 2012 meeting on establishing the region as a WMD-free sector.

"The potential U.S. ratification would be a game changer," Tóth said. "But there is a need to reassess and assess the situation in those [other] regions. The countries themselves should see the treaty ... as a safety net below them." The other option, he added, "is more open-ended [arms] races in certain regions."

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011



## Forum for a Nuclear-Free World

U.S. Department of State, 13 October 2011, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in Astana, Kazakhstan

First of all, I would like to thank our gracious hosts. It is such a pleasure to be back in Kazakhstan. Your warmth and hospitality always make visits here so memorable. I made my first trip here back in 1976, as part of one of the first U.S. cultural exchanges to Soviet Kazakhstan. It was a beautiful golden October in the city of apples – Almaty. Even though it was 35 years ago, I still remember those delicious apples.

The United States and the Republic of Kazakhstan are both committed to the worthy goal of creating the conditions for a nuclear-free world. We both know that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is central to leading the world toward a diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament.

As you heard in President Obama's statement, the U.S. extends its congratulations to Kazakhstan on the twentieth anniversary of the permanent closure of the Soviet nuclear test site located at Semipalatinsk. This anniversary is a clear reminder that we need to end explosive nuclear testing once and for all. In order to do this, we must ensure that the CTBT enters into force and is universally enforced.

With a global ban on nuclear explosive tests, states interested in pursuing or advancing their nuclear weapons programs would have to either risk deploying weapons uncertain of their effectiveness or face international condemnation and possible sanctions for conducting nuclear tests. As President Obama has said, the United States is committed to securing ratification of the CTBT, and we are currently engaging with the United States Senate and the American public on the merits of the treaty.

Concerns about the verifiability of the treaty and the continuing safety and reliability of the United States' nuclear deterrent derailed the U.S. ratification process in 1999. Today, with those concerns mitigated we have a much stronger case to make in support of ratification

Great progress was made toward establishing the treaty's verification regime in the last decade. Today, the International Monitoring System (IMS) is roughly 85 percent complete and when fully completed, there will be IMS facilities in 89 countries spanning the globe. The treaty's robust verification regime, supplemented by the national technical means capabilities of Member States, will make it extremely difficult for any state to conduct militarily significant explosive nuclear tests that escape detection.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

Further, the extensive surveillance methods and computational modeling developed under the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program over the past 15 years have allowed our nuclear experts to understand how nuclear weapons work and the effects of aging better than when explosive nuclear testing was conducted. The United States can maintain a safe and effective nuclear deterrent without conducting explosive nuclear tests.

As we move forward with our ratification process, we call on all governments to declare or reaffirm their commitment not to conduct explosive nuclear tests. We also ask that the remaining Annex 2 States join us in moving forward toward ratification.

It is in this remaining march towards entry into force that we will need Kazakhstan's aid and leadership on this issue. Together we can engage audiences at the government and non-governmental level – we can reach mothers, fathers, students, retirees, government workers, factory workers and farmers. Since explosive nuclear testing affects us all, the goal should be to have people talking about the CTBT in their legislatures and around their kitchen tables. Leading by example, Kazakhstan and the United States can build the momentum needed to bring the CTBT into force.

At the United Nations Article XIV Conference last month, Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher said “we do not expect that the path remaining to entry into force will be traveled quickly or easily...but move ahead we will, because we know that the CTBT will benefit the security of the United States and that of the world.”

I know that is a sentiment that Kazakhstan shares and I hope our nations can continue to work together as we move toward our ultimate goal of a world free from the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. Again, thank you for inviting me and for the opportunity to speak.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

DTRA

## When It Comes to Nonproliferation, Arms Limitation, Disarmament Agreements, “Rules Must Be Binding, Violations Must Be Punished,” First Committee Told

United Nations, 14 October 2011, [www.un.org](http://www.un.org)

For the United States, when it came to nonproliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments, “rules must be binding, violations must be punished, and words must mean something”, that country’s representative told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today upon the introduction of a draft resolution on compliance.

This year’s resolution – one of six tabled this afternoon – would acknowledge the widespread recognition within the international community of the impact of non-compliance challenges on international peace and stability and of diplomacy as a tool to encourage a return to compliance by States not currently in compliance, she said.

Holding States accountable for failing to comply strengthened not only confidence in the integrity of the agreements and commitments, but also in the prospects for progress towards achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, she said. Failing to do so would undercut not only the integrity of agreements and commitments, but also the prospects for future progress, and pave the way for other States to follow the path of willful noncompliance and undermine the authority of the relevant nonproliferation treaties.

Other draft resolutions introduced today were on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons; united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; and the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties.

Tabling the draft resolution on the Test-Ban Treaty, the Ambassador of Mexico to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva, on behalf also of Australia and New Zealand, noted that commitment to the CTBT 15 years ago had led all 182 State signatories to abstain from nuclear explosive testing, even though the instrument had not yet entered into force. Its impact was without question, and those countries that remained outside the treaty and had performed tests faced universal condemnation, he said.

Australia’s Ambassador of Disarmament added that in the complex and difficult path to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, there was no instant solution. “There is no magic bullet,” he said. “We have to work through a rigorous step-by-step approach.” However, it was a serious failure that 15 years after the CTBT had opened for signature, the treaty had not yet

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

entered into force, and he called on those States yet to ratify the instrument to do so as soon as possible.

The test-ban treaty, said Sweden's Ambassador to the International Organizations in Geneva, speaking also on behalf of Mexico as current [CTBT] Article XIV Process Coordinating States, would significantly constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and make an indispensable contribution to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The overwhelming majority of the international community already agreed on the urgent need for [the treaty's] entry into force, and those numbers were growing. The built-in safety valve of the so-called "Annex II" should alleviate any possible concerns among states to commit to the treaty.

The draft resolution, entitled "united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", said the Ambassador of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, put emphasis on concrete and practical united actions to be taken by the international community towards the total elimination of those weapons. One year after the 2010 NPT Review Conference, it was necessary to be pragmatic and focus on the steady implementation of the Action Plan in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. With that in mind, last September, Japan and nine other like-minded states had launched a cross-regional group, the "NPDI" (Nonproliferation and Disarmament), and would continue to make tangible contributions to promote the implementation of the NPT Action Plan.

Malaysia's delegate tabled the draft resolution on the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion. Nigeria and Thailand tabled draft resolutions on the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties in their respective regions.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

DTRA

## Ramstein Prepares for CFE Treaty Inspection Exercise

*Kaiserslautern American*, 26 August 2011, [www.kaiserslauternamerican.com](http://www.kaiserslauternamerican.com)

The 86<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing and all tenant units are currently preparing for the upcoming Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty inspection exercise, which will take place on September 13 at Ramstein.

“The CFE treaty contains a very demanding and intrusive verification regime that allows foreign inspection teams to conduct on-site inspections of U.S. forces located in Europe,” said Tim Jachowski, Threat Reduction Branch chief at U.S. Air Forces in Europe. “Each inspectable base must annually test their ability to host one of these inspections.”

There are 30 State Parties (nations) that participate in the CFE treaty, and each of these Parties can send a nine-person inspection team to the other 29 State Parties’ declared sites to conduct on-site inspections. Each year, the treaty members report the number of military personnel and the numbers and types of treaty limited equipment [TLE] assigned by location during the annual exchange of information. There are five major categories of TLE that are inspectable under the treaty: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters.

“It is the base’s responsibility to properly prepare all assigned TLE, CFE treaty inspectable facilities and containers to allow immediate access to the foreign inspection teams,” Jachowski said. This is the most critical aspect of the CFE inspection, because providing immediate access to inspectable locations clearly demonstrates the U.S. government’s compliance with international laws and mandatory treaty requirements.

“To meet this huge challenge, we will need the support of most of the organizations on the installation,” said Ray Crowell, 86<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing vice director. “Units with any facilities containing doors measuring 2 meters or greater in width will play a role in this inspection.” In accordance with the CFE treaty, these facilities are considered inspectable locations because they could store TLE items. Additionally, all containers with dimensions measuring 2 (length)-by-2 (width)-by-2 (height) meters are inspectable.

CFE inspection teams are not allowed to enter facility locations that contain doorways that are less than 2 meters in width. Even if they can initially enter a facility door measuring 2 meters or greater in width, once they reach a section in the facility that doesn’t have a 2 meter or greater entrance, then they must stop.

Units that control facilities or own containers that meet the inspectable CFE treaty criteria must be able to provide immediate access during the inspection window. If possible, doors and

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011



containers should be left open on inspection day. If this is not possible, personnel must be standing by with the keys or combinations in-hand.

CFE inspection teams are authorized to return to the same inspectable location multiple times, so these locations must be accessible until the inspection has been terminated by the 86<sup>th</sup> AW Command Post. The inspection window for the exercise on September 13 will be from 8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m.

The 86<sup>th</sup> AW, the 435<sup>th</sup> Air Ground Operations Wing, and the 521<sup>st</sup> Air Mobility Operations Wing have appointed group-level CFE points of contact who have received specific CFE training and who will work with unit POCs and facility managers to prepare for CFE inspections. The Treaty Compliance Office will work directly with the other Ramstein tenant units concerning their CFE inspection support responsibilities. CFE inspections at Ramstein only affect those organizations that are physically located within the base boundary (fence line).

“CFE treaty compliance inspections are no-fail missions and we need to approach this CFE inspection exercise with the same commitment to success,” said Brig. Gen. Mark Dillon, 86<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing commander. “The primary measurement of success for Ramstein Air Base units will be timely and safe access to all inspectable facilities.” [...]

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

## CFE Treaty Talks Stall

*Arms Control Association, September 2011, [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org)*

After a year-long, high-level effort by the Obama administration to revive the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the process appears to have ground to a halt in May and remained stuck since then.

After some initial progress, the U.S. and Russian negotiating positions remain far apart with little prospect for near-term success, knowledgeable sources said. A senior Obama administration official told Arms Control Today in an August 24 interview that negotiators are taking a “serious pause” to rethink “what we need for conventional arms control in Europe.”

Experts are concerned that if the CFE treaty ultimately collapses, Russia will increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons to defend itself from what Moscow now sees as NATO’s conventional superiority in Europe. This could become a roadblock to President Barack Obama’s plans to seek a follow-on to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia that would place limits on tactical nuclear weapons, as well as strategic weapons and nuclear warheads in storage.

In a sign of the current stalemate, Victoria Nuland, the administration’s special envoy on CFE issues, left her post in June to become Department of State spokesperson and has not been replaced. The State Department appears to have little hope for constructive proposals from Russia and to be in a wait-and-see mode.

In a July 1 statement at CFE talks in Vienna, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Rose Gottemoeller said that “the United States and our Allies stand ready to return to the negotiating table whenever we have a signal that real progress can be made on the remaining issues.”

Mikhail Ulyanov, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Security and Disarmament Department, was more blunt, saying at the same event that CFE treaty consultations are at “an impasse” and that unless the situation changes, “we may passively watch the European arms control system die.”

The central unresolved issues, according to U.S. officials, are that Russia has not been meeting its obligation under the CFE treaty to share data on its military deployments and has stationed forces in the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Moldova without their consent. These issues date back to 1999, when the CFE treaty was modified; to 2007, when Russia suspended its compliance with the treaty; and to 2008, when Moscow recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states following the Georgian-Russian conflict.

 [back to top](#)

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## BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in April 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that, to make progress on CFE issues, “Russia must be willing to talk to its neighbors about its equipment and forces in disputed territories” and “must be completely transparent about its military forces.” Russia has met neither U.S. demand.

Moscow’s position is that the CFE treaty has been overtaken by events and must be replaced by the 1999 Adapted CFE treaty, which Russia has ratified. NATO agrees, but its members have refused to ratify the modified treaty until Moscow meets its political commitments from 1999 to withdraw its forces from Moldova and close its military bases in Georgia. NATO says these deployments violated the 1999 political deal, which Moscow denies.

The Obama administration had been hoping that it could repair the CFE regime as part of a broader effort to improve U.S.-Russian relations, an effort that included the successful negotiation of New START. Since April 2010, the United States has led renewed efforts among the 30 CFE Member States and six non-CFE NATO allies to “try to break the impasse that has prevented full implementation of the treaty,” Gottemoeller said in her July 1 remarks. These states started a diplomatic effort to craft a “framework” statement of key provisions and principles that would guide new negotiations to strengthen the CFE regime.

According to current and former officials, NATO and Russian leaders met in Vienna numerous times between June 2010 and May 2011. NATO overcame Moscow’s initial opposition to any preconditions for talks on a new treaty, but Russia ultimately could not agree to the principle of host-country consent or to a resumption of compliance with the old CFE treaty while talks continued, the officials said. They said that agreement on these two points would have required new instructions from senior Russian leaders, but that CFE issues did not appear to be high enough on the list of Russian priorities.

The CFE treaty, signed at the end of the Cold War on November 19, 1990, eliminated the Soviet Union’s overwhelming quantitative advantage in conventional weapons in Europe by setting equal limits on the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains.

The treaty was designed to prevent either alliance from amassing forces for a blitzkrieg-type offensive, which could have triggered the use of nuclear weapons in response. Although the threat of such an offensive all but disappeared with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, Member States have spoken of the enduring value of the unprecedented degree of transparency on military holdings under the CFE treaty regime.

[back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

Gottemoeller said in July that, without a new Russian position on the key issues, real progress could not be made and “we must ask, ‘What is next for CFE?’” The senior administration official said that preparations are now being made for the CFE review conference in late September but that no breakthroughs are expected.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011



## Moldova Requests Completing Withdrawal of Russian Ammunition from Transnistrian Region

MOLDPRES, 30 September 2011, [bsanna-news.ukrinform.ua/?lang=en](http://bsanna-news.ukrinform.ua/?lang=en)

The fourth assessment conference of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was held in Vienna on September 29. The Moldovan delegation, led by Deputy Foreign and European Integration Minister Andrei Popov, held the chairmanship of the conference by rotation, the Foreign and European Integration Ministry's (MAEIE) press service has said.

The agenda of the conference included a string of topical issues on the implementation of the CFE treaty, among which were: restrictions on holding conventional armament; carrying out control inspections; exchange of information; and other transparency measures in the military field. A key issue on the agenda was the situation created after the 2007 moratorium on the treaty's implementation imposed by the Russian Federation, as well as ways out of the ongoing stalemate in the control mode of the conventional forces in Europe.

In its statement, the Moldovan delegation reiterated its commitment towards the obligations set in the CFE treaty. Also, the delegation reiterated the official stance that the Russian ammunition stocks in the village of Cobasna, as well as of the military forces guarding them, should be completely withdrawn from the Moldovan territory. In the same context, the delegation pointed out the need to transform the actual peacekeeping forces into a multinational civilian mission operating under an international mandate.

Moldova confirmed its interest and willingness to participate in the efforts meant to liven up the control over the conventional armed forces in Europe, in line with the fundamental principles of international law, in particular, the principle according to which the consent of the host-country is needed for the deployment of the foreign military forces.

On the sidelines of the conference, the Moldovan delegation held consultations with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Security and Disarmament Department Mikhail Ulyanov, Georgian First Deputy Foreign Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze, Romanian Foreign Ministry's Director General for Strategic Policy Cristian Istrate, as well as the heads of the Dutch, Ukrainian, and other delegations.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

## **NNSA and Kazakhstan Complete Operation to Eliminate Highly Enriched Uranium**

*National Nuclear Security Administration, 12 October 2011, [nnsa.energy.gov](http://nnsa.energy.gov)*

In an address today at the International Forum for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World in Astana, Kazakhstan, Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman announced the removal and permanent disposition of 33 kilograms (approximately 72 pounds) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fresh fuel from the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty. The HEU was sent to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, where it was downblended into low-enriched uranium (LEU) and can no longer be used to make a nuclear weapon.

Completed in secrecy over a seven week span, the operation was a combined effort between the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It follows two decades of cooperation and reflects the shared commitment by the United States and Kazakhstan to secure dangerous nuclear and radiological material from terrorists.

“This latest milestone builds on a history of successful efforts between our two nations to secure nuclear material, to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological material, to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and to pursue a world without nuclear weapons,” said Deputy Secretary Poneman.

“The removal and downblending of highly enriched uranium in Kazakhstan demonstrates the success of working collaboratively with the international community to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, bringing us closer to achieving President Obama’s goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material around the world,” said NNSA Administrator Thomas D’Agostino. “Kazakhstan’s leadership on this project will prevent dangerous nuclear material from falling into the wrong hands. Our shared commitment to nuclear security has made the world safer.”

In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama called for an international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. These operations reduce global threats by securing, removing or eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material.

Kazakhstan is an important partner in nuclear security. It gave up the substantial number of warheads on its territory when the Soviet Union collapsed and has consistently played a nuclear security leadership role in the region. This is crucial given Kazakhstan’s prominent role as a supplier of uranium and its large commercial nuclear infrastructure.

This week’s International Forum for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World, which brought together international leaders committed to eliminating the global threat of nuclear weapons, marks the

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the closing of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site and recognizes the leadership Kazakhstan has shown pursuing global nuclear security, safety and cooperation.

Under the auspices of NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the HEU was shipped in August to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant, which has the capability to convert HEU into LEU through a process that involves dissolving the HEU. Either depleted or natural uranium is then added in, reducing the enrichment of the resulting uranium. After seven weeks time, the HEU was completely eliminated. The LEU will now be returned to the Institute of Nuclear Physics for future scientific work that will support the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

GTRI and Kazakhstan share a long history of cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation issues. In May 2009, Kazakhstan completed the return of over 70 kilograms (150 pounds) of used HEU fuel to Russia. Last November, GTRI and Kazakhstan worked with international partners to secure 10 tons of HEU and 3 tons of weapons-grade plutonium contained in used nuclear fuel from the BN-350 Reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan. GTRI and Kazakhstan are currently working together to convert the research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics from the use of HEU to LEU fuel.

Additional cooperation between NNSA and Kazakhstan has improved security for nuclear and radiological materials through efforts such as the development of a workshop to share ideas and tools for nuclear security, equipping Kazakhstan ports of entry with radiation detection equipment, bilateral cooperation on safeguards implementation, training of Kazakhstani officials on export controls, and working to apply the expertise of former nuclear weapon scientists to civil pursuits that advance global nonproliferation and security efforts.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

DTRA

## New START for Less Money

*Arms Control Association, 13 October 2011, [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org)*

Next month the congressional “super committee” is expected to propose major reductions in federal spending. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said on October 11, 2011 that the Pentagon will reduce projected spending by more than \$450 billion over the next ten years as a result of Congress’ debt agreement, and that “every program, every contract and every facility will be scrutinized for savings.”

Congress must now tackle the question of how large the spending reductions will ultimately be and what programs will get the axe. The size of the reductions could double depending on what the super committee decides to do. And, according to Panetta, some of the biggest savings will come from “reduced levels of modernization in some areas.”

The same day as Panetta spoke, Representative Ed Markey (D-Massachusetts) announced that he and 64 other House members had signed a letter to the super committee asking for major reductions to nuclear weapons programs. Reducing “outdated and unnecessary nuclear weapons,” they wrote, would “allow us to continue funding the national defense programs that matter most.” Representative Michael Turner (R-Ohio), chairman of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, shot back later that same day that “what Mr. Markey proposes amounts to unilateral disarmament of the [United States].”

A closer look at what Representative Markey and his colleagues propose reveals that Representative Turner’s accusation is off the mark. In fact, both congressmen should be able to agree that the Pentagon could save tens of billions of dollars on new strategic submarines and bombers while still fielding as many nuclear warheads as already planned. Doing so would also allow Russia to scale back its modernizations plans, making both sides safer.

Under the recent U.S.-Russian New START treaty, both nations are limited to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Outgoing Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn said on October 5, 2011 that defense planners are looking to stay at New START limits “but to do it in a more fiscally responsible fashion.”

For example, Representative Markey pointed to the Navy’s new \$350 billion nuclear-armed submarine program as a prime target for spending cuts, saying that, “reducing America’s submarine fleet from 14 to 8 and delaying procurement of new submarines will save \$27 billion over the next ten years.” At \$29 billion per boat, this is the most expensive nuclear weapons program by far. If the Navy were to right size the force to 8 subs, it could save \$27 billion over 10 years and \$120 billion over the life of the program. And we wouldn’t have to give up any

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

nuclear firepower to do it. Eight operational boats would allow the Pentagon to deploy the same number of sea-based warheads (about 1,000) as planned under New START.

Is this “unilateral disarmament”? Hardly.

Key to this plan is the fact that the Navy has extra space on its missiles. Each Trident missile deployed on subs can carry up to 8 nuclear warheads, but the Navy currently loads each with 4 or 5. So, if we made more efficient use of the space on each missile, the Navy could buy fewer missiles and subs. And this extra space costs big money. Is it worth \$120 billion to buy four subs and 64 missiles just to have warhead slots that are unlikely to ever be used? No. Those billions could buy a lot of body armor for troops in the field. Maintaining an expensive “upload potential” may have made sense during the Cold War when the Pentagon wanted the ability to expand its nuclear force quickly in case of unforeseen threats. But today there is no threat that would justify expanding the U.S. arsenal. Moreover, upload capacity will still exist on strategic missiles and bombers.

Meanwhile, the Air Force wants a new strategic bomber that would cost at least \$50 billion in procurement alone. But its current strategic bombers (B2s and B52s) are being modernized to last until 2040. There is no rush to field a new bomber, and the Pentagon’s plan to deploy 60 bombers under New START can be achieved with existing aircraft. Delaying this program would save almost \$4 billion over the next decade. The budget saving potential from U.S. nuclear forces is so compelling that Senator Tom Coburn (R-Oklahoma) recently proposed reducing nuclear weapons spending by \$79 billion over ten years, in part by curtailing and delaying the new submarine and bomber programs.

Russia has already cut its nuclear forces below New START, and would need to rebuild some systems if it wants to maintain these levels. But just like us, Moscow has better things to do with its scarce resources.

To reduce the deficit, Republicans and Democrats will need to put away the alarmist rhetoric and make some tough choices. This one, however, is just common sense. By being more efficient in how it fields warheads, the Pentagon can maintain a New START force and save tens of billions over ten years and more than \$100 billion beyond that. If policy-makers are serious about reducing defense budgets, this is one example of fiscal responsibility that we cannot afford to ignore.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

DTRA

## Senators Call for Retention of ICBMs

*Global Security Newswire*, 14 October 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)

The United States should retain no fewer than 420 launch-ready ICBMs and evenly disperse any reductions across three host bases as it moves to comply with a strategic nuclear arms control treaty with Russia, senators from four states said in a Wednesday letter to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.

The United States now deploys 500 warheads on 450 nuclear-armed Minuteman 3 ICBMs in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming. New START, which took effect on February 5, requires Russia and the United States to each reduce deployment of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, down from a cap of 2,200 mandated by next year under an older treaty. It also limits the number of fielded warhead delivery platforms to 700, with an additional 100 strategic systems permitted in reserve.

"As the administration seeks to implement the New START treaty, it is distressing to hear some argue for a significant reduction, or even abandonment, of our ICBM force. We believe such an unprecedented reversal of our long-held and successful nuclear deterrent strategy is unwise and would create an unnecessary strategic danger," states the letter signed by Montana Senators Max Baucus (D) and Jon Tester (R), Wyoming Senators John Barasso (R) and Mike Enzi (R), North Dakota Senators Kent Conrad (D) and John Hoeven (R), and Utah Senators Orrin Hatch (R) and Mike Lee (R).

"Accordingly, we continue to strongly support the deployment of 450 ICBMs. We do understand that the administration and the Department of Defense intend to reduce the number of deployed ICBMs as part of a wider New START treaty compliance effort. If those plans proceed, we strongly urge [the Defense Department] to maintain at least 420 ICBMs on alert." The senators also called for the nation's 450 ICBM launch facilities to be maintained in "warm status." The condition "means that the silos remain functional and staffed," a Turner spokeswoman clarified in an e-mail.

"We further urge that any reductions be spread equally between each of the three operational ICBM bases. Such a dispersal will not only provide the maximum effective deterrent, but if all 450 ICBM silos are maintained in a warm status this will further leverage the deterrence effect created by dispersal," the letter states.

The lawmakers said they concurred with the findings of the Strategic Posture Commission and the Pentagon's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review about the potential pitfalls of cutting any leg of the nuclear triad of land-, air- and sea-based assets. "Reducing our force to a dyad or a monad

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

structure could be destabilizing in unpredictable ways," the letter states. "Given the irreplaceable contributions to stability that the ICBM force provides, the strategic value of preserving the triad, and the relative cost advantages of the Minuteman, we continue to support the deployment of 450 ICBMs," the senators wrote.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011



## British Inspectors to Fly over Russia, Belarus Territories

ITAR-TASS, 17 October 2011, [www.itar-tass.com/en](http://www.itar-tass.com/en)

A group of British inspectors will have a flight over the territories of Russia and Belarus during the period from October 17 to 21, in accordance with the Open Skies Treaty, the Russian Defense Ministry's press service told Itar-Tass. Their Saab-340 plane will fly from Kubinka airfield. The range of the flight will be up to 5,500 km.

It is a Swedish aircraft not designed to be equipped with any weapons. Internationally certified equipment, with the participation of Russian representatives, is installed aboard. Russian and Belarussian specialists have agreed on the route. They will be present onboard the plane to monitor the observance of the agreements on the use of technical devices.

The Open Skies Treaty was signed by 27 states in 1992... The main objective is to develop openness and transparency, help monitor the observance of existing and future [arms control] agreements ... and enhance the capability for crisis prevention and crisis management within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international organizations. It is planned to extend the Open Skies regime to new areas, such as environmental protection.

[back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

## **NNSA Completes Initial Feedstock for MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, First Step in Permanent Plutonium Disposition**

National Nuclear Security Administration, 06 October 2011, [nnsa.energy.gov](http://nnsa.energy.gov)

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced this week that it had successfully disassembled nuclear weapons “pits” and converted them into more than 240 kg of plutonium oxide, an initial step in permanent plutonium disposition. The certified oxide is an initial source of feed for NNSA’s Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, which is currently under construction at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The disassembly, conversion and certification, which were completed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), is a significant accomplishment in an ongoing effort to safely dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium.

“The successful conversion of plutonium metal into plutonium oxide resulted from a partnership between NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Defense Programs offices and is an important accomplishment that demonstrates a safe and proven process for disassembling nuclear weapon cores that also provides material for the MOX Facility,” said Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Anne Harrington. “This key component of the U.S. plutonium disposition strategy enables the United States to meet international nonproliferation commitments while advancing President Obama’s goal of permanently reducing the number of nuclear weapons across the globe.”

NNSA developed technologies that would both disassemble nuclear weapon pits and convert the resulting plutonium metal into an unclassified plutonium oxide form that is suitable as feed for the MOX Facility. LANL is expected to convert at least two metric tons (MT) of plutonium to oxide by 2018 as part of a larger effort to provide up to 10 MT of early feedstock for MOX.

NNSA used the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) at LANL to prepare, package and certify the plutonium oxide product. LANL successfully demonstrated that the ARIES process and procedures met the demanding Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements for nuclear facility operations and record-keeping (NQA-1). Following a rigorous product certification process, Shaw AREVA MOX Services, the prime contractor for the design, construction and start-up of the MOX facility, has officially accepted the first 240 kg of plutonium oxide from LANL for the MOX facility.

Once at the MOX facility in South Carolina, the plutonium oxide from LANL will be blended with depleted uranium, fabricated into MOX fuel and irradiated in domestic nuclear power reactors. After the MOX fuel is irradiated in civilian reactors, it is no longer suitable for use in nuclear weapons.



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04 October – 17 October 2011

**DTRA**

Through the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), the United States and Russia have agreed to each dispose of at least 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade plutonium, enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. To implement plutonium disposition in the United States, NNSA is building the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility to fabricate the plutonium feedstock into MOX fuel.

 [back to top](#)

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