



# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

DTRA

## GENERAL ARMS CONTROL

### **The Role and Perspectives of Arms Control and Confidence- and Security-Building Regimes in Building Trust in the Evolving Security Environment**

U.S. Department of State, 20 October 2010, <http://www.state.gov/>

Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance  
Statement by the United States of America at the 2010 OSCE Review Conference

Building on the accomplishments we have made since the Helsinki Final Act thirty-five years ago, we believe the Summit in Astana should result in a commitment to continue our work to update and modernize our arms control and CSBM instruments. (1,973 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

## BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

### **Lugar Touts U.S. Effort to Safeguard Disease Materials**

Global Security Newswire, 09 November 2010, <http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/>

U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) described in an address yesterday how the nation's Cooperative Threat Reduction program was seeking to secure potential biological-weapon ingredients beyond the former Soviet Union. (491 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

### **Pueblo Depot Explosives Robot to Take Test Runs**

Pueblo Chieftain, 02 November 2010, <http://www.chieftain.com/>

The first of three robotic units that will do the dangerous job of removing explosives from chemical weapons has arrived at the Pueblo Chemical Depot. (492 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

### **Russia Continues Chemical Weapons Disposal**

Global Security Newswire, 08 November 2010, <http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/>

Nearly three-fourths of the chemical warfare materials at two Russian storage sites have been eliminated, Interfax reported today. (230 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) (CONT.)

### **Wildlife Affects Pueblo Chemical Depot Work**

*Pueblo Chieftain*, 10 November 2010, <http://www.chieftain.com/>

The international treaty requiring the United States to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile isn't the only agreement that comes into play at the Pueblo Chemical Depot. (372 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

### **OPCW Director-General Visits China and Meets Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi**

*OPCW*, 11 November 2010, <http://www.opcw.org/>

The OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, visited China from 9-11 November 2010 where he called upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Mr. Yang Jiechi, and held meetings with other high-level government and chemical industry officials. (296 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

## COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

### **CTBTO Exercise to Inspect a Simulated Nuclear Test Site**

*CTBTO*, 01 November 2010, <http://www.ctbto.org/>

An exercise to inspect a simulated nuclear test site is to be conducted from 1 to 12 November 2010, beside the Dead Sea in Jordan. (321 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Statement of the United States to the Thirty-Fifth Session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission**

*U.S. Department of State*, 08 November 2010, <http://vienna.usmission.gov/>

*Ambassador Glyn Davies, U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA and the UN Office in Vienna*

We assure you of our full cooperation and support as this body moves forward to complete the preparations necessary for the effective implementation of the CTBT. (1,359 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

### **A Decade of "Remarkable Achievements" in Advancing the CTBT, Says CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Toth**

*CTBTO*, 09 November 2010, <http://www.ctbto.org/>

By the end of 2012, a global network of facilities to detect nuclear explosions will be more than 90 percent in place, Tibor Tóth, head of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) told its executive body. (506 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

## CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS (CCM)

### **Cluster Bomb Treaty: Nations Approve Bold Action Plan Milestone First Meeting Concludes in Laos**

*States News Service, 13 November 2010, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

Nations that have joined the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions approved a bold and comprehensive action plan to eradicate cluster bombs as they concluded their first meeting. (311 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## FISSILE MATERIALS

### **U.S., Europe Expand Nuclear Security Cooperation**

*NNSA, 02 November 2010, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/>*

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) today announced that it has signed a new agreement with the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to promote greater cooperation in nuclear security and nonproliferation. (288 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Verification Challenges for the Future**

*U.S. Department of State, 04 November 2010, <http://vienna.usmission.gov/>*

*Ambassador Glyn Davies, U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA and the UN Office in Vienna*

The United States is committed to ensuring that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the necessary resources and support to carry out its mission in all three pillars of its work. (1,989 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **NNSA, IAEA Share Physical Protection Best Practices at 22nd International Nuclear Security Training**

*NNSA, 08 November 2010, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/>*

The NNSA, in partnership with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), today concluded the 22nd International Training Course (ITC) on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials. (343 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



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**DTRA**

## NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

### **General Calls "New START" Critical to Improving U.S.-Russia Ties**

*Global Security Newswire*, 10 November 2010, <http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/>

With lingering questions about whether the Senate will consider the "New START" arms-reduction treaty before the end of the year, the officer in charge of the Air Force's intercontinental ballistic missiles yesterday called for U.S. ratification of the accord with Russia "as soon as possible." (320 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Obama Confident on Ratifying START Treaty**

*AFP American Edition*, 14 November 2010, <http://www.blnz.com/>

The Obama administration has been locked in heated negotiations with Republican lawmakers over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which slashes U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. (368 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Clinton and Gates: Why the Senate Should Ratify New START [OPINION]**

*The Washington Post*, 15 November 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, and Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense  
For decades, American inspectors have monitored Russian nuclear forces, putting into practice President Ronald Reagan's favorite maxim, "Trust, but verify." (733 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION AGREEMENT (PMDA)

### **NNSA, Rosatom Officials Meet to Discuss Plutonium Disposition**

*NNSA*, 10 November 2010, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/>

Officials from the Department of Energy's NNSA and the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) yesterday concluded two days of consultations on U.S. and Russian efforts to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. (333 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## FULL TEXT OF BI-WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:



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*U.S. Department of State, 20 October 2010, <http://www.state.gov/>*

*Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Statement by the United States of America at the 2010 OSCE Review Conference*

It is a pleasure to be here with you today and to have this opportunity to share thoughts and hear from you as we approach the Summit. Building on the accomplishments we have made since the Helsinki Final Act thirty-five years ago, we believe the Summit in Astana should result in a commitment to continue our work to update and modernize our arms control and CSBM instruments. This Review Conference affords us a moment to reflect on how far we have come, to examine where we are, and to look toward where we want to go.

I don't think there is any doubt among us that conventional arms control is a key element for cooperative and indivisible security in Europe. The OSCE Framework for Arms Control, an interlocking web of mutually reinforcing agreements in the OSCE's political-military toolbox, including the Treaties on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and Open Skies, the Vienna Document 1999, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the Global Exchange of Military Information and others, continues to make a very important contribution to European security. Specific elements of these arms control agreements are in need of updating to reflect the evolution in the size and character of military forces, doctrine, and activities since the end of the Cold War, but their core principles of transparency, openness, and confidence are no less important now than when they were agreed. Our commitment to their full implementation and further development is essential for enhancing stability and security within the OSCE area.

I want to begin looking at how far we have come in our effort to strengthen the OSCE's political-military toolbox by noting the current effort to update and enhance the Vienna Document. The Vienna Document 1999 continues to contribute significantly to transparency, openness, and confidence. While some measures are used rarely, if at all, others are employed more broadly, helping to increase transparency and build trust among the participating States. I have in mind the annual exchange of military information and the more than one hundred inspections and evaluation visits that take place each year. Nevertheless, we all recognize that there are elements of the Vienna Document that should be modernized. Over the past year, our delegations here in Vienna have laid the foundation for this modernization with agreement on a process for moving forward with much-needed updates to VD99 in the coming weeks and months.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

For our part, when the Forum for Security Cooperation resumed in September, the United States identified four priority areas for updates to Vienna Document 1999:

- increasing opportunities for inspections and evaluations;
- enhancing inspection/evaluation teams;
- lowering thresholds for notification and observation; and, improving and updating implementation modalities, including the content of the Annual Exchange of Information.

We want to update VD99 because we recognize that conventional arms control and CSBMs are useful tools for building and maintaining trust, increasing transparency about military forces and activities, and strengthening security in the OSCE region.

Looking at another part of this framework, our work on the CFE Treaty regime is a key part of our efforts toward ensuring the viability of conventional arms control. Although not all OSCE participating States are CFE States Parties, we know this Treaty regime plays a significant role in increasing security and stability in Europe. The United States has worked closely with our NATO Allies and CFE partners to break the long impasse and move on to strengthen and modernize the CFE regime for today's Europe. The concrete proposals that we and 27 other countries around this table have put forward are grounded in the most essential guiding principles of conventional arms control and European security: reciprocal transparency and verification, reciprocal limits and restraint, and host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces on sovereign territory. We will continue to work with all involved states to make concrete progress this year toward the goal I believe is held by all of us – a modernized Euro-Atlantic conventional arms control regime which truly reflects 21st century realities.

I would also like to highlight the contribution that the Open Skies Treaty makes to the Euro-Atlantic security environment. The Treaty's 34 members have conducted over 700 observation flights since entry into force, making a significant contribution to increasing openness and transparency across the OSCE area. At the June 2010 Open Skies Review Conference, Treaty members reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty and collectively identified activities for future work to modernize the Treaty. A number of these activities are already underway, and we will work to continue the ongoing strong collaboration among Treaty partners.

In addition to these arms control elements, the Forum for Security Cooperation has made progress on strengthening other parts of the OSCE's existing political-military toolbox, notably:

We have made efforts to facilitate implementation of the OSCE's Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security by developing a comprehensive reference guide to assist participating States in their reporting.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

The OSCE's contribution to non-proliferation is demonstrated by work on a Best Practice Guide on implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (the first chapter has been published and a second is in development) and preparation of a workshop next January to address the role of the OSCE in facilitating implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Also, Ministers issued a declaration last December in Athens, reaffirming our commitments to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

We agreed on – and have begun implementing – a Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, to focus the OSCE contribution in this field in order to strengthen and improve existing measures to counter the dangers presented by uncontrolled proliferation and destabilizing accumulation of illicit weapons in the OSCE space.

The FSC's Security Dialogue continues to afford us a unique platform to hold the types of discussions that I believe are valuable contributions to our shared security. On June 1st of this year, my boss, Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, provided a joint presentation with Ambassador Anatoly Antonov of Russia on the New START Treaty. We have provided speakers on a wide range of security topics in recent years, including the U.S. Africa Command, the U.S. European Command, missile defense, and MANPADS. We encourage active participation by all in the Security Dialogue and believe these exchanges help us learn from one another and understand how we can work better together to achieve our shared goals of increased security and stability through transparency.

Over the past year, we have been pleased with the way the arms control experts in the FSC have worked constructively with the Chairman-in-Office and the Permanent Council to contribute to the ongoing Corfu Process. The result has been discussions in the FSC that complement broader OSCE discussions addressing the range of European security issues.

These accomplishments, and I've highlighted just a few, clearly show momentum is building in our efforts to strengthen the OSCE's political-military toolbox. Now, I want to use this as the starting point to talk about where we are, and where we are going.

So, where are we now? And where do we want to go?

Right now, we are preparing for the Summit in December, which will chart the course for future OSCE work. However, we don't do this in isolation – the FSC was fully engaged on a range of issues even before there was agreement to hold the Summit this year. We fully believe that efforts to achieve both short and long term goals of strengthening the OSCE's politico-military

[back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

toolbox are equally important. This means we are prepared to engage on these issues now as well as in the future.

Our work in the FSC will not end after preparations for the Summit conclude. Therefore, as we ready ourselves for Astana, we should also be thinking strategically about how our work will continue in 2011.

Let's look for a moment at Vienna Document 1999. I don't think anyone would disagree that there is always room to improve cooperation, transparency, and predictability. We believe the willingness that we see demonstrated by participating States to update the Vienna Document, in tandem with other efforts underway to modernize the CFE Treaty regime and Open Skies Treaty, as well as efforts to improve other CSBMs in the politico-military toolbox, has helped to energize renovations of the current arms control architecture and improve military transparency throughout the OSCE area.

I am pleased that work on updating and modernizing Vienna Document is underway, with substantive discussions taking up a large part of the FSC's time. The United States has put forward papers on some of our priority issues, specifically, on increasing verification opportunities and enhancing team size and composition, and we are glad to see the wide range of proposals that have been put forth by others. We believe that discussions should be as comprehensive as possible and that no one should be discouraged from putting forth a proposal, either of political or technical significance, for consideration at 56. Even as we work for tangible progress this fall, we should also ensure that the FSC takes the time it needs to consider all of the proposals that come forward.

We want leaders at the Summit to be able to recognize the work of the FSC on updating VD99, highlight tangible progress towards enhancing military transparency in Europe and launch an overall concept of future OSCE work on arms control and CSBMs. To demonstrate the importance we attach to this effort, we should commit ourselves to intensify efforts to enhance the Vienna Document in 2011.

As we seek to improve our security tools, I think it is important that we keep two thoughts in mind. First, as we move into the next decade, we want to ensure the continued effectiveness of our existing CSBMs. We should consider creative ways to continue to improve implementation – this means looking for more effective ways to meet obligations and “to do more with less” as militaries reform and technological advances increase. For example, last July, the parties to the Open Skies Treaty adopted decisions that allow them to begin the transition to digital sensors, which will result in both cost-effective and technological improvements.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

Second, we should look for ways to expand our CSBM regime to cover new areas and threats that are relevant for the 21st century. This could mean adding new provisions and commitments to the agreements we already have, as well as developing new and/or complementary sub-regional and regional CSBMs.

In this regard, I'd like to thank the Russian delegation for beginning the work on what could be an overall concept for future OSCE work on arms control and CSBMs that will carry us beyond the Summit. Although political and economic realities have changed in the last decade, the fundamental principles on which the basis of our cooperation is grounded have not changed. I have in mind the shared principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other OSCE commitments. Thus, we believe that any future work that we embark on in this forum should reflect these timeless principles, many of which are reflected in the Russian paper.

Finally, let me close by offering my encouragement to our representatives in the FSC as they address these major initiatives. Updating one of the OSCE's fundamental documents – the Vienna Document 1999 – that, along with its predecessors, has ensured openness and transparency in the OSCE space for over two decades, and reaching agreement on a future plan of work are not small tasks. There is much work ahead. Nevertheless, I am encouraged by how far we have come and believe we will continue building on the positive momentum generated this year. We can make progress already this fall on these priority tasks. The Summit provides us with a unique opportunity to highlight that progress and set the stage for further work. Thank you.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

DTRA

## Lugar Touts U.S. Effort to Safeguard Disease Materials

*Global Security Newswire*, 09 November 2010, <http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/>

U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) described in an address yesterday how the nation's Cooperative Threat Reduction program was seeking to secure potential biological-weapon ingredients beyond the former Soviet Union.

The Nunn-Lugar program has already helped to shutter biological weapons capabilities in one-time Soviet states, but deadly biological agents including Ebola, Marburg and anthrax remained largely unprotected at research facilities in Africa. Lugar is set to travel with Defense Department experts to examine scientific facilities in Burundi, Kenya and Uganda.

"The global spread of advanced technologies, the rise of asymmetric warfare, and the growing interdependence of societies and economies have made discerning the intentions of potential adversaries more important than ever before," Lugar said during a speech in Madrid, Spain.

"The footprint of weapons-producing laboratories and the size of today's strategic weapons grow smaller every day," he said. "A delivery system may be as mundane as a commercial cargo carrier. In the case of infectious pathogens, the delivery system could be an individual human being."

"Discovering potential WMD threats is far more challenging now than when the Nunn-Lugar program began," the senator added. "Having the capacity to evaluate and respond to threats will depend on the lines of communication we have established around the world. If the United States and its allies engage only where we know weapons are being produced, we will fail to detect and prevent numerous threats."

"The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the diffusion of scientific knowledge are inextricably linked. Agents used in chemical weapons became part of chemotherapy. Rockets designed to carry nuclear warheads also deliver modern communications satellites into orbit. And advancements in life-science technologies and biochemical engineering can enable the development of biological weapons," he said.

"Communications technology ensures that scientific achievements will travel the globe swiftly. Today, any scientist here could post his or her research online, and within moments it is available to those seeking to use that knowledge for either constructive or destructive purposes.

"When the Soviet Union dissolved, the potential proliferation of weapons, materials and knowledge from Russia and other former Soviet republics represented a new and dangerous

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

threat. This proliferation threat resided not strictly in the military, but also in the scientific establishment. Indeed, the Soviets had built upon the scientific traditions that originated in 19th century Russia, particularly in areas of virology and pathology, to construct the deadliest state-run biological weapons program in history," Lugar said.

"As we look to the future of the Nunn-Lugar program, biological threat reduction is an area that is rapidly increasing in importance. The work of securing dangerous pathogens, building central reference laboratories and establishing disease surveillance and monitoring is critically needed in many parts of the world. Nunn-Lugar biological engagement directly serves vital U.S. interests, including safeguarding the welfare of our troops overseas, preventing terrorist use of deadly pathogens, and detecting emerging infectious diseases and pandemics before they threaten the American people," he said (U.S. Senator Richard Lugar release, Nov. 8).

[back to top](#)

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DTRA

## Pueblo Depot Explosives Robot to Take Test Runs

*Pueblo Chieftain*, 02 November 2010, <http://www.chieftain.com/>

The first of three robotic units that will do the dangerous job of removing explosives from chemical weapons has arrived at the Pueblo Chemical Depot. It will be several years before the robots begin handling actual weapons. Until then, contractors charged with destroying those weapons will spend that time programming them, developing systems for their operations and training the people who will monitor them.

The robots are part of the “Linear Projectile/Mortar Disassembly” system. Their job will be to unscrew the nose cones of most of the 780,000 artillery shells and mortar rounds in the Pueblo stockpile and remove the explosive fuses and bursters. The opened weapons then will be transferred to another building where the mustard agent will be washed out and neutralized with hot water and the empty metal shells superheated and then sent away to be recycled.

Paul Dent, equipment manager for the program, told members of the Colorado Chemical Demilitarization Citizens Advisory Commission that using the robots at the Anniston Army Depot has resulted in an improved success rate.

For more than a year, some of the weapons stored at Anniston have been going through an LPMD system similar to what will be used in Pueblo prior to incineration. While the bulk of the Anniston weapons are being disassembled by Anniston’s older hydraulic machines, the portion going through the LPMD has given Pueblo officials a good idea of what to expect.

The LPMD is a first-of-a-kind process for the nation’s chemical weapons destruction program. Even though the robotic equipment is similar to what automobile manufacturers have used for years, this is the first time it’s been used to handle dangerous explosives.

“Historically, first-of-a-kind equipment is high risk,” Dent told the commission.

Some of the data coming out of the Anniston work was behind a warning last month from the head of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program that includes Pueblo. The warning stated that as many as 40,000 of the weapons here might have to be destroyed in explosion chambers instead of the water neutralization process.

That number could be pared down, however. Dent said that, initially, there was a high failure rate of about 1 percent mostly due to the inability of the gimble cam, the part that grips the nose of the weapon, to twist it open.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

“We set up a root cause team and we’ve been continuously assessing the cause of these rejects,” Dent said. “We made minor changes in the cams and we wold up with cams that worked significantly better.” He said that the failure rate was reduced to a half of a percentage point and could be even less in Pueblo because the safety of the blast-containment rooms will allow for a higher torque.

The Anniston LPMD machinery has processed more than 7,000 weapons, he said. It will run until February. After that, it will be decontaminated if necessary and shipped to Pueblo where the older unit will be used for training.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

DTRA

## Russia Continues Chemical Weapons Disposal

*Global Security Newswire, 08 November 2010, <http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/>*

Nearly three-fourths of the chemical warfare materials at two Russian storage sites have been eliminated, Interfax reported today.

The Leonidovka depot in the Penza Region has eliminated 72 percent of its stockpile of agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention, while the Maradykovsky plant in the Kirov Region is 70 percent complete with its disposal operation.

In excess of 20 percent of the stockpile at the Shchuchye storage depot in the Kurgan Region has been eliminated.

Russia once held a world's-largest stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical warfare materials. As of Sept. 1, nearly half of the arsenal had been destroyed.

Two sites have completed disposal work while preparation continues on the final two demilitarization plants.

Moscow budgeted nearly \$650 million for chemical weapons destruction this year, down from an anticipated \$1 billion. Spending last year also ended up nearly \$292 million less than previously planned, said Viktor Kholstov, treaty implementation chief at the Russian Industry and Trade Ministry.

Russia also expected to receive \$2 billion in foreign support for the project but to date has collected about \$1 billion, according to the Finance Ministry. The Kremlin, though, generally only counts funds provided directly to the government rather than to contractors involved in the work, observers have said.

Chemical weapons disposal in Russia is expected to be completed in 2015, three years after the deadline set by the convention.



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

DTRA

## Wildlife Affects Pueblo Chemical Depot Work

*Pueblo Chieftain*, 10 November 2010, <http://www.chieftain.com/>

The international treaty requiring the United States to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile isn't the only agreement that comes into play at the Pueblo Chemical Depot. Sandy Romero, spokeswoman for Bechtel, said that during the 2010 nesting season, the chemical weapons destruction project has identified and protected 18 active nests covered by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Bechtel is the lead contractor on the long-running project that will destroy the depot's 780,000 mustard agent weapons.

Romero said the most common birds nesting on the project site are western kingbirds, which often will nest in man-made structures like the steel-framed buildings that have been going up on the site.

"Most nests require approximately four weeks for the eggs to hatch and the birds to fledge. During that time, any work which would disturb the nest is suspended. At a minimum, no work is conducted within 15 feet of the nest. Additional work which involves excessive noise or vibration in the area of the nest may also be suspended as needed. The project routinely coordinates actions with U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to obtain their guidance on how best to protect migratory birds."

Despite that, officials told the Colorado Chemical Demilitarization Citizens Advisory Commission last month that work was ahead of schedule. The Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program posted a new YouTube video this week outlining the efforts to protect the wildlife on the site. And it's not just cute little birds, either. "Snakes, including rattlesnakes," Romero said, "are encountered routinely on the construction site during the summer months."

"When a snake is encountered, workers contact the project communications center, who then notifies trained wildlife responders that relocate the snake away from construction activities. Bechtel provides regular training to workers on encounters with wildlife and how to prevent injuries." So far, that hasn't happened. And while prairie dogs are on the depot grounds, none have been found at the weapons destruction plant site, she said, so that issue hasn't come up.

There are, however, regular visits by pronghorns that have no trouble traveling back and forth from the surrounding rangeland to wander around the depot, often standing in the access road. Romero said that low speed limits and awareness training has helped avoid accidents.



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

DTRA

## **OPCW Director-General Visits China and Meets Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi**

OPCW, 11 November 2010, <http://www.opcw.org/>

The OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, visited China from 9-11 November 2010 where he called upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Mr. Yang Jiechi, and held meetings with other high-level government and chemical industry officials. While in China he travelled to Nanjing to visit a new mobile facility for destroying chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China, and to Shanghai where he toured the Lianheng Isocyanate Co. Ltd chemical industry plant.

In addition to his call on Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the Director-General met with H.E. Mr. Xi Guohua, Vice Minister of Industry and Information Technology; with Mr. Cheng Jingre, Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and with Mr. Jia Xiaoning, Deputy Director General, Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defense.

In these meetings he provided an update on the status of implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and discussed related issues of interest to China. The Director-General commended China for its commitment to the Convention and its support to the work of the OPCW, and was assured of China's continuing cooperation in this regard. In Beijing he also met with a group of chemical industry association representatives to discuss non-proliferation aspects of the Convention.

In Nanjing, the Director-General met with Gen. Chen Weiguo, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Nanjing Military Region, and then visited the mobile destruction facility. The facility was inaugurated on 1 September 2010 in a ceremony attended by senior Chinese and Japanese government representatives and entered into operation in mid-October. The Director-General welcomed the excellent cooperation between Chinese and Japanese authorities regarding the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons.

Following his visit to the Lianheng Isocyanate Co. Ltd chemical industry plant, the Director-General met with Dr. Xiao Guiyu, Deputy Secretary General of Shanghai Municipal People's Government.



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

## **CTBTO Exercise to Inspect a Simulated Nuclear Test Site**

CTBTO, 01 November 2010, <http://www.ctbto.org/>

An exercise to inspect a simulated nuclear test site is to be conducted from 1 to 12 November 2010, beside the Dead Sea in Jordan. A team of more than 35 international experts has been assembled by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). They will determine whether a nuclear test explosion was conducted by a fictitious country in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) that outlaws all nuclear explosions.

Jordan is hosting the exercise, to be played within a 1000 square km zone beside the Dead Sea. It is located about 50 km south of Amman and extends to Karak.

On-site inspections can be requested only after the Treaty enters into force.

CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Tóth said that on-site inspections were the final layer in the Treaty's verification regime to make sure that no nuclear explosion goes undetected. "Facts gathered directly on the ground during an inspection help States to establish whether or not a nuclear explosion did indeed take place," Tóth said.

Director of the Exercise, Matjaž Prah, said that the focus of the simulation is to "test ground visual observation techniques and communications, to help prepare inspectors and fine tune inspection methodology."

The team of surrogate inspectors comes from 20 different countries. Prah said they will look for observable signatures which could be connected to a possible nuclear explosion. "There are very specific observable geophysical features that can be linked to a possible nuclear explosion: landslides, depressions, craters and faults, for example," he said.

Jordan offered to host the exercise and was selected due to comparable natural geological features within the inspection area that could be found, if in fact, there had been a nuclear test. "The area around the Dead Sea is quite interesting because of very specific geological features, like sinkholes for example, which can look similar to the depressions that are formed after a nuclear test," Prah said.



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

## Statement of the United States to the Thirty-Fifth Session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission

U.S. Department of State, 08 November 2010, <http://vienna.usmission.gov/>

Ambassador Glyn Davies, U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA and the UN Office in Vienna

My delegation is pleased to take the floor under your leadership of this thirty-fifth meeting of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom). We assure you of our full cooperation and support as this body moves forward to complete the preparations necessary for the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). President Obama has made clear that the CTBT is integral to the U.S. nonproliferation and arms control agenda, and his Administration is committed to seeking the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty and to secure the ratifications by the other remaining Annex 2 States necessary to bring the treaty into force at an early date.

This past May, I was part of the U.S. delegation to the 2010 Review Conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). [...] The NPT RevCon statement called for early completion of the International Monitoring System [IMS] and exhorts us to fully develop the verification regime. Every time that I am told that the regime is “well developed,” I am reminded that it is not yet actually “complete.”

To move forward, our program and budget need to focus on three realities. First, we have an obligation to deliver an operational verification regime to the first Conference of States Parties. I would emphasize that what is required is not just a “well-advanced” verification regime, but an operational one. While stations are the essential foundation for a verification regime, building and certifying stations alone will not achieve the goal of an operational regime.

Second, we need to realize that this regime is only well-advanced, not fully complete, and therefore has not achieved a steady state situation. If we had a fully-established verification regime – one that is comprised of an IMS, an International Data Centre (IDC), and an on-site inspection (OSI) regime that is fully capitalized and tested, and has an established track record - then we could accurately assess our static budget needs. But until we reach such a state, we cannot consider a zero real growth budget as a tenable approach, let alone a budget with less than zero real growth, as is presently before us.

One example of the problem is the case of Hydroacoustic Array 03, the severely damaged hydroacoustic station and shore facilities at Juan Fernandez Island. While we have a funding mechanism in place that should have been able to deal with this needed repair effort, there has been some resistance to ensuring that enough funds were being budgeted in the sustainment

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

account within the capital investment fund to build up reserves that could be used for an expensive project of this kind.

I would recall that my delegation has spoken of the need to accumulate reserves for such repairs, and specifically referred to the likely need to fund repairs to hydroacoustic stations. We are concerned that in some quarters the belief persists that a failure to regularly expend all funds from the sustainment account represents either bad management or bad budget discipline on the part of the Provisional Technical Secretariat. Had we been regularly budgeting a few million dollars more each year for the sustainment fund, we may have avoided the acute spike in our financial needs that we currently face. It is important that we budget appropriately in the future to avoid surges in our budget requirements. It is important that we make the investments needed to ensure that the Treaty and its verification system are fully operational and sustainable.

Even so, there will sometimes be special projects that require temporary increases in the budget level of the organization. The Enterprise Resource Planning tool is an example of this. The need for International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) compliance is something that we all recognize as a prudent action, and one that will improve the cost-effective operation of this organization. However, developing the needed tools requires an up-front investment, and Member States in such cases need to look to the realities before us. Such projects need not increase the future baselines for budgets, but for the duration of such major and important projects, we all should be ready to support the needed funding.

Third, it is essential to focus on the capacity of this organization. In addition to expending a great deal of effort to help Member States develop the capacity to make use of the data and products of this organization, we need to simultaneously invest in and sustain the means of collecting the data and generating the products. A National Data Center is of little benefit if there are no useful data or products for it to receive. The PTS has made important efforts to focus on capacity-building and training young, up-and-coming scientists, who can be expected to contribute to the capacity of the IDC and their own NDCs. Prudent investment to ensure both the future availability of data and products and the ability to make use of them is a good strategy.

It is also important to consider the current “well-advanced” prospects for entry into force (EIF). Nearly eighty percent of the forty-four required instruments of ratification have been deposited. The United States is committed to bringing about CTBT entry into force as soon as possible. The Nuclear Posture Review adopted earlier this year demonstrably reaffirmed this commitment and emphasized the strength that the CTBT can lend to the international nonproliferation regime

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

and strategic stability. Everyone realizes that moving from “well-advanced” to “complete” will require considerable effort, and that while the number of tasks yet before us has shrunk, those remaining are among the hardest and most resource-intensive.

Some say that we are in a position to carry out the needed work to achieve completion of the verification regime with only two formal meetings of Working Group B per year, neither of which should exceed three weeks in length. Although several delegations have called for an assessment of the tasks still requiring completion, both by the PTS and the policy-making organs, this has not been done. Those who adamantly insist that only two meetings a year suffice are those who are most eager to avoid such an assessment. To an extent, this is understandable. It is daunting to be in the midst of a large and difficult project, having already accomplished much, and to confront the reality that significant, complex tasks yet remain. The aphorism that the last five percent of a task requires ninety-five percent of the overall effort applies. We’ve done the easy part with respect to developing a monitoring and verification regime. We did so with three meeting cycles per year with Working Group B OSI experts in parallel to those of the IMS and IDC experts. With three meeting cycles per year, we’ve completed the really easy part, but have only been dabbling in the really daunting tasks that remain. We must evaluate where we are, identify the tasks that we have – consciously or unconsciously – set aside as “too hard” or “not exigent” and make a serious commitment to goals and deadlines to bring our mandate to completion.

We must not lose sight of the important role played by the Advisory Group as a provider of expert advice on budgetary and financial matters that is divorced from the collective biases in the Policy Making Organizations. It is, of course, advice, and it is ultimately up to those advised to judge whether the recommendations should be accepted and implemented. Important though its role is, the Advisory Group is not another PMO, even if its membership is increasingly becoming a subset of this body. [...]

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

## A Decade of "Remarkable Achievements" in Advancing the CTBT, Says CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Toth

CTBTO, 09 November 2010, <http://www.ctbto.org/>

By the end of 2012, a global network of facilities to detect nuclear explosions will be more than 90 percent in place, Tibor Tóth, head of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) told its executive body. There have been some "remarkable achievements" in advancing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its verification regime, Tóth said.

In the past decade, the Treaty's monitoring system has expanded to its current status of 258 certified facilities from zero in 2000, he said. "Just 10 years ago, in 2000, we had only 51 ratifications. Today the number has tripled and the Treaty enjoys 153 ratifications and 182 signatures."

The achievements are being driven by "a vision to bring an end to the era of nuclear weapons," Tóth told diplomats from among States that have signed the Treaty, who are attending the meeting.

Tóth said that the CTBTO's hydroacoustic network, which monitors the oceans, is already complete; its seismic network to detect underground explosions is 90 percent finished; over 70 percent of its infrasound facilities, which detect sounds below the limit of the human ear, are in place, and nearly 80 percent of its radionuclide stations, which analyze the air for evidence of nuclear material, have been installed.

The achievements reflected "a strong desire to establish an international norm against nuclear testing," as well as "a firm political will to advance the Treaty's entry into force," Tóth said.

In the last decade, there had been engineering solutions designed to increase "the robustness and performance of the monitoring technologies," Tóth said. Station design has evolved, leading to increased detection capabilities, and there has been a continuous improvement in the availability of data, now at 85 percent, he said.

The United States Permanent Representative to the CTBTO, Glyn Davies, said that the United States "is committed to bringing about CTBT entry into force as soon as possible."

"The Nuclear Posture Review adopted earlier this year demonstrably reaffirmed this commitment and emphasized the strength that the CTBT can lend to the international non-proliferation regime and strategic stability," Davies said.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

Speaking on behalf of the European Union, Frank Recker, Permanent Representative of Belgium, said “the EU will continue to offer political, financial and practical support, both for the universalization of the Treaty and the completion of its verification regime.”

The meeting of CTBTO Member States will approve extra funding to pay for the replacement of hydroacoustic facilities at Juan Fernandez Island in Chile, which was severely damaged during a tsunami in February. It will also support expenditure to invest in the development of an integrated computer-based management system known as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) for the CTBTO, to provide the organization with an upgraded, state-of-the-art accounting and management tool.

The meeting also approved the appointment of Xolisa Mfundiso Mabhongo, the South African Permanent Representative, as CTBTO Chairperson, and welcomed Oleg Rozhkov, newly appointed Director of the On-Site Inspection Division. It will approve the re-appointment of Lassina Zerbo as Director of the International Data Centre Division for a further three years.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

## Cluster Bomb Treaty: Nations Approve Bold Action Plan Milestone First Meeting Concludes in Laos

*States News Service, 13 November 2010, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

Nations that have joined the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions approved a bold and comprehensive action plan to eradicate cluster bombs as they concluded their first meeting. The Vientiane Declaration and Action Plan were agreed on November 12, 2010, at the meeting in Laos, which is heavily contaminated by cluster munitions.

"This meeting has laid the kind of solid foundation nations need to get rid of cluster bombs once and for all," said Steve Goose, director of the Arms Division at Human Rights Watch and co-chair of the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). "The countries that took part in this meeting made it clear they understand how important and urgent it is to help countries affected by these weapons get rid of them."

Under the Vientiane Declaration, the nations agree to condemn any use of cluster munitions, accelerate progress on clearing cluster bombs and destroying stockpiles, expand the coverage of services for victims and survivors, and increase resources for these efforts. The Declaration says that the Convention on Cluster Munitions "sets a new standard by which states will be judged. We believe the sea change in the opinion of governments around the world towards this weapon will continue."

At the meeting, states parties formally agreed to an offer by Lebanon to be the host of the Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, from September 12 to 16, 2011.

A total of 121 governments attended the first meeting: 40 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 47 signatories that still need to ratify, and 34 nations that have not yet joined.

Major announcements at the meeting included Austria's confirmation that it has finished destroying its stockpiled cluster munitions, the eighth nation to do so. Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Switzerland announced commitments to provide funds for clearance and/or victim assistance. Many signatories said they would complete their ratification process soon.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

## U.S., Europe Expand Nuclear Security Cooperation

NNSA, 02 November 2010, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/>

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) today announced that it has signed a new agreement with the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to promote greater cooperation in nuclear security and nonproliferation. NNSA Assistant Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation and International Security, Mark Whitney, and Dr. Roland Schenkel, Director General of the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), signed the agreement at a nuclear safeguards symposium at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria.

The agreement provides a framework for greater technical cooperation between the United States and Europe in areas such as nuclear safeguards, border monitoring, nuclear forensics, export controls, and physical protection of nuclear materials facilities. It also calls for closer collaboration on research and development of nuclear security and nonproliferation technologies, and for enhanced coordination of outreach to third countries.

“Technical cooperation between the United States and Europe in nuclear security and nonproliferation reflects our shared commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies,” said Mark Whitney. “This agreement is an important step in achieving President Obama’s goal of securing vulnerable nuclear material, preventing nuclear smuggling, and strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.”

The United States and Euratom have a long and productive history of cooperation on nuclear security and nonproliferation that dates back more than 30 years. The cooperative work under this agreement will be managed by NNSA’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI is a robust, multi-year program to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system.

Euratom was created in 1957 to establish the conditions for the development of nuclear energy in Europe by sharing resources, protecting the general public, and associating other countries and international organizations with this work.



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

DTRA

## Verification Challenges for the Future

U.S. Department of State, 04 November 2010, <http://vienna.usmission.gov/>

Ambassador Glyn Davies, U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA and the UN Office in Vienna  
Remarks at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

I'm happy to have the opportunity to talk with you about challenges that the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] faces, particularly verification challenges, and how we think Member States can help the IAEA overcome those challenges.

The United States is committed to ensuring that the IAEA has the necessary resources and support to carry out its mission in all three pillars of its work – safeguards and verification, safety and security, and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. “Resources and support” can mean a lot of things – financial contributions, collaboration and cooperation between technical experts, lobbying for agreement among Member States on initiatives that seek to strengthen the safeguards regime, sharing information with the Agency and other Member States on particular issues of concern, and advocacy for legal authorities to fulfill the Agency’s mission.

In order to meet the Agency’s needs, the United States dedicates a lot of time and effort to evaluating how well our shared goals for a strong Agency are being met. This should come as no surprise given our long track record of support for the IAEA and given President Obama’s Prague agenda. Although it might be easy to interpret U.S. efforts to support strong IAEA verification as relating mainly to the ongoing issues of concern in Iran, Syria, and the DPRK, that same U.S. support for a strong safeguards regime is central to creating the conditions necessary for bringing to fruition a world free from nuclear weapons. Such a world would require the strongest possible international verification assurances. It is in that context that I’d like to talk with you today about challenges that the U.S. sees for the IAEA. [...]

### *Safeguards and Verification Challenges*

First, safeguards and verification – Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda. President Obama called for more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections in his April 2009 Prague speech.

While the Agency is working hard to fulfill its mandate to ensure the effective verification of nuclear materials and activities, there are growing challenges, among them: the global expansion of nuclear activities, the growth in the scope of information available, and the lack of cooperation by states that obscure necessary information and refuse to meet their safeguards obligations.



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

While we support the continued expansion in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, that expansion is not without cost. The global expansion of nuclear activities challenges the Agency's ability to provide confidence that nuclear material, technologies, and expertise are not being diverted to weapon programs. The expanding use nuclear power means the Agency must monitor more facilities and nuclear material requiring safeguards verification. At the same time that the Agency is contending with increased numbers, it must also develop the means to cope with advancing technologies and next generation nuclear facilities.

And as nuclear activities increase, more and more information becomes available to the IAEA, especially as the IAEA is now called upon to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in addition to verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. The Agency must be able to obtain and assess information from countries' own declarations, inspection results, open sources including satellite imagery, and other sources. It is a demanding task to keep up with the growing quantity of data available, and the changing technologies for obtaining that data. The Agency must ensure that it can effectively evaluate all the information about a country as a whole to reach timely and credible conclusions about that country's nuclear material and activities. It is in light of this challenge that I understand much discussion is being generated this week at the Safeguards Symposium in support of the Agency's effort to transform the safeguards regime into a system that takes full account of all of information, rather than relying on criteria that stem only from a state's description of its declared stockpile of nuclear material.

It is not just the significant expansion of nuclear programs that challenges the Agency's verification abilities. As we all know, countries of concern - that is, countries for which the IAEA has found credible reason to doubt the correctness and completeness of their declarations - still present serious verification challenges to the Agency. If a Member State does not uphold its commitments to, and cooperate transparently with, the IAEA, Agency verification that its programs are peacefully intended becomes next to impossible, and the only recourse under the safeguards agreement is to report such cases to the UN Security Council. [...]

## *Overcoming Safeguards and Verification Challenges*

So, given the host of challenges that the IAEA faces in the realm of safeguards and verification, what can Member States do to make sure that the IAEA can successfully overcome those challenges? How can the Agency contend with ever-increasing nuclear activities and information, and address countries which are less transparent than they should be?

[back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

We must enhance the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. The Additional Protocol provides the IAEA the tools it needs to establish confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities by providing additional access to people, information, and locations, and for short-notice inspections. 102 states to date have brought an Additional Protocol into force. That demonstrates significant progress, but more work needs to be done to make the Protocol universal. The Agency must also fully exercise its legal authorities, including special inspections, so that such inspections are understood to be in order in cases where the IAEA finds routine inspections insufficient.

As to strengthening safeguards methodologies, the United States fully supports the Agency's ongoing efforts, with essential support from Member States, to continue the transition to safeguards implementation that is fully informed by all relevant information available to the Agency. In a similar vein, we fully support measures to strengthen national systems of accounting and control.

The United States is working to achieve these goals in a number of ways. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. As the presentation by Assistant Deputy Administrator Mark Whitney this week described, while this program has a domestic focus, it is also a resource for supporting the international safeguards system directly. And through the U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards, we provide assistance through the development of technologies and expertise, including on research and development projects the Agency is not suited to pursue and cannot afford. We are constantly looking to deepen the positive impact of our Support Program for Safeguards and urge other Member States to do the same.

### *Challenges to Safety and Security*

While I have focused today on safeguards and verification challenges, I would be remiss if I did not mention challenges to the other, equally-important pillars: safety and security, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The expansion of nuclear power poses not only safeguards and verification challenges, but also challenges the implementation of safety and security measures. The IAEA plays a crucial role in assisting Member States with their national efforts to establish the necessary physical protection and regulatory structures, and to ensure that adequate safety and security measures are in place. Nuclear power programs demand rigorous nuclear safety, security and regulatory



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

structures for reliable and responsible operation. Existing facilities require continuous evaluation and improvement, and new facilities need the advice and expertise gained from past experience.

In order to continue to lead efforts to advise states and provide the most current expertise to Member States, the Agency is finalizing its Nuclear Security Series, including the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities contained in Revision 5 of INFCIRC/225. The Nuclear Security Series is an important and valuable set of documents. They create consistent, agreed-upon norms available to all Member States.

In addition to actively supporting the Agency's drafting and review of the Nuclear Security Series, the U.S. supports the Agency as it strives to provide high-quality training, missions, and upgrades to Member States. We continue to promote the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We support the establishment of more national Nuclear Security Support Centers. And we continue to coordinate with multilateral and bilateral nuclear security-related initiatives, among them UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

### *Challenges to Promoting the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy*

Finally, on promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy – To support the pursuit of nuclear power, the IAEA must provide significant assistance to States to help build the necessary infrastructure, institutional capacities, and human resources to administer reliable nuclear power programs. Finding the funds to support new nuclear energy programs, particularly in developing countries, is a perennial problem.

The United States has recently made a significant effort to energize the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, Secretary Clinton announced that the U.S. will make a contribution of \$50 million over the next five years for a new Peaceful Uses Initiative. The U.S. contribution will be applied to IAEA projects supporting nuclear power infrastructure development, food security, water resources management, and human health in a broad selection of countries, including Indonesia, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, Morocco, Thailand, Vietnam, Yemen, Ethiopia, Paraguay, Ghana, and Azerbaijan. In fact, I will be travelling to Indonesia and Vietnam in a few weeks to visit some Technical Cooperation projects there to witness firsthand how Agency peaceful uses activities are making a difference in people's lives.



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

As we move forward in funding projects through the Peaceful Uses Initiative, we hope that other countries will join us in supporting this effort to expand the IAEA's ability to provide Member States with access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. President Obama has challenged nations to raise an additional \$50 million by 2015 for the Peaceful Uses Initiative. In September the Japanese Ambassador announced that Japan has requested \$3.5 million for a contribution to the Peaceful Uses Initiative to be included in the Japanese budget for the next fiscal year.

## *Conclusion*

So, having given you a sketch of some of the challenges we see the IAEA facing, I'd like to circle back for a moment and conclude where I began by telling you why we think it's important for Member States to support the IAEA as it works to overcome those challenges.

President Obama has made a significant commitment to reducing the threats posed by nuclear weapons. In April of 2009, in Prague, he made a strong, straightforward statement of principle: "I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."

That commitment has intensified U.S. efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the threat posed by those weapons that still exist. These efforts include reaffirming the NPT, supporting the creation of an international fuel bank so that countries can access peaceful power, establishing the Peaceful Uses Initiative, trying to engage Iran and address other noncompliance issues, and importantly to our discussion today, ensuring that the IAEA has the resources, support, and authorities it needs.

We must ensure that the Agency is equipped with the right tools to meet and overcome the ever-increasing challenges it faces. The expansion of nuclear activities, the development of new technologies, and the behavior of noncompliant Member States add to the perpetual problems of too few resources and a growing desire among Member States for increased access to nuclear technologies. In this context the importance of the IAEA as an independent verifier and as a clearinghouse for peaceful nuclear technology has grown substantially. It is in our interest and to our benefit to lend as much support as we can to the Agency as it seeks to surmount the many challenges before it.



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

DTRA

## NNSA, IAEA Share Physical Protection Best Practices at 22nd International Nuclear Security Training

NNSA, 08 November 2010, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/>

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), in partnership with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), today concluded the 22nd International Training Course (ITC) on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials. This three-week course, hosted by Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, N.M., brought together experts from 35 countries for a series of courses on physical protection and material control and accounting, as well as hands-on nuclear security exercises.

“The breadth of our experience working in nuclear security over the past 60 years enables us to share best practices and lessons learned with our international partners,” said Anne Harrington, NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. “NNSA’s continued cooperation in the area of improving nuclear security is essential in implementing President Obama’s goal of securing all vulnerable material in four years.”

Beginning in 1978, the Department of Energy and then NNSA, together with the IAEA have sponsored this course every 18 months. In that time NNSA and the IAEA have trained more than 600 nuclear security specialists from more than 60 countries. Many of these government officials, nuclear regulators, nuclear facility operators and nuclear material transporters have become national leaders and international experts in nuclear security.

The ITC is the first course of its kind to provide continual training to IAEA member states. ITC emphasizes a performance-based approach to the design and evaluation of physical protection systems. This landmark course helps countries measure the effectiveness of their security systems for both nuclear material and nuclear facilities against country-specific threat assessments.

The course consists of more than two dozen classroom lectures and subgroup exercises conducted in a hypothetical nuclear facility to avoid revealing sensitive security information associated with existing facilities.

Course participants received training in the characterization of a nuclear facility, methods of detecting intruders and contraband brought into a facility, and methods of delaying and defeating an adversary’s entry into a facility. Presentations and panel discussions were conducted with IAEA, NNSA and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) experts on nuclear security. Participants also visited field testing and training facilities at NNSA’s Sandia National Laboratories.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

DTRA

## General Calls "New START" Critical to Improving U.S.-Russia Ties

*Global Security Newswire*, 10 November 2010, <http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/>

With lingering questions about whether the Senate will consider the "New START" arms-reduction treaty before the end of the year, the officer in charge of the Air Force's intercontinental ballistic missiles yesterday called for U.S. ratification of the accord with Russia "as soon as possible."

Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command and a former military attaché to Moscow, said at a breakfast with reporters that Defense Secretary Robert Gates and senior military brass have made "very cogent and compelling arguments in favor of ratifying the treaty."

For Klotz, who has worked on arms control policy since the 1970s, the treaty is central to ensuring a continuous dialogue between the United States and Russia over nuclear weapons and policy, including security, safety, and command and control of the warheads.

Arms control treaties and the military-to-military communications they foster are "critically important for understanding, transparency, and openness between the two largest nuclear powers," Klotz said.

"It is important for peace and stability, and it's also important for our own national security," he added.

The White House wants the treaty ratified this year, and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) wants to bring it to the floor during the upcoming lame-duck session. But Reid will only do so if he has assurances that he has the requisite 67 votes to approve the treaty.

President Obama last week said he is hopeful the Senate will approve the treaty and "send a strong signal to Russia that we are serious about reducing nuclear arsenals." Ratification of the treaty, he added, would "also send a strong signal to the world that we're serious about nonproliferation."

But key Republicans, including Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, have not said whether they will support the treaty or not. And with the GOP picking up several Senate seats during the midterm congressional elections, the treaty could be an even tougher sell in the next Congress.



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

## Obama Confident on Ratifying START Treaty

AFP American Edition, 14 November 2010, <http://www.blnz.com/>

The Obama administration has been locked in heated negotiations with Republican lawmakers over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which slashes U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.

"My hope and expectation is that given this is a good treaty, given it has the support of previous Republican senior government officials, we should be able to get it done," Obama said aboard Air Force One as he flew home from a trip to Asia. He noted Russia's cooperation with the United States on Iran sanctions and facilitating the transit of supplies into Afghanistan for U.S. troops. Obama earlier met his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev on the sidelines of a Pacific Rim summit in Japan on the last day of his Asia visit.

The new U.S. Congress takes office in January, with Republicans set to take control of the House of Representatives and to add members to the Senate after making huge gains in recent elections. The next two months are therefore known as a "lame duck" session, potentially slowing progress on pushing the deal forward amid fears Republicans will stall to press for more concessions.

Obama said he felt "reasonably good about our prospects" for getting the treaty passed through lame duck session. The START treaty, which was negotiated earlier this year to replace a similar treaty which expired at the end of December, faces stiff opposition in the United States amid fears it could hamper national missile defense plans.

The White House says ratifying the treaty is a vital national security priority, and failure to move on it would harm the "reset" in relations the Obama administration engineered between the two former Cold War foes.

Moscow said Friday it hoped the outcome of the U.S. mid-term elections would not affect ties with Washington.

Under the U.S. Constitution, treaties need the approval of two thirds of the Senate, meaning Obama's Democratic allies will need to pick up considerable Republican support. [...] But a growing number of Republicans have voiced opposition, saying it would impede the U.S. ability to set up missile defenses against future potential threats such as Iran.

During his talks with Medvedev, Obama assured the Russian president that passing the treaty this year was a "top priority." [...]



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

DTRA

## Clinton and Gates: Why the Senate Should Ratify New START [OPINION]

*The Washington Post*, 15 November 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, and Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense

For decades, American inspectors have monitored Russian nuclear forces, putting into practice President Ronald Reagan's favorite maxim, "Trust, but verify." But since the old START Treaty expired last December, we have relied on trust alone. Until a new treaty comes into force, our inspectors will not have access to Russian missile silos and the world's two largest nuclear arsenals will lack the stability that comes with a rigorous inspection regime.

Before this session of Congress ends, we urge senators to approve an arms control treaty that would again allow U.S. inspectors access to Russian strategic sites and reduce the number of nuclear weapons held by both nations to a level not seen since the 1950s.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed by President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in April, builds on foundations laid by American leaders from both political parties over the past four decades. It has broad bipartisan backing. Six former secretaries of state, five former secretaries of defense and three former national security advisers have endorsed ratification, along with seven former commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and the entire current U.S. military leadership. They understand that nuclear dangers did not disappear with the Soviet Union and that we have a responsibility – to Americans and our allies – to keep our eyes on the world's other major strategic nuclear arsenal.

Time is running out for this Congress. Here is what's at stake:

New START will advance critical national security objectives: Reducing the number of deployed nuclear weapons while retaining a safe and effective deterrent; providing direct insight into Russia's nuclear arsenal; and creating a more stable, predictable and cooperative relationship between the world's two leading nuclear powers.

It will put in place an effective verification regime to track each side's progress in reducing its arsenal to 1,550 strategic warheads. We will be able to count the number of deployed strategic weapons more accurately, because we will exchange more data on weapons and their movement than in the past. We will also conduct 18 short-notice inspections of Russian nuclear forces each year, including checking warheads on individual missiles.

New START will also set the stage for future arms reductions, including negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. It will help solidify the "reset" of U.S. relations with Russia, which has allowed us to cooperate in pursuit of our strategic interests.



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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

**DTRA**

That's what the treaty will do. Here's what it will not do:

It will not limit our ability to develop and deploy the most effective missile defenses to protect America's forces and territory, and to enhance the security of our allies and partners. This administration is committed to sustaining and improving our missile defense capabilities and has proposed spending nearly \$10 billion in fiscal 2011 to do so.

It will not restrict our ability to modernize our nuclear forces. On the contrary, the United States will continue to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent based on our "triad" of delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers for nuclear armaments. To sustain and modernize these systems, the administration has proposed spending well over \$100 billion during the next decade.

Furthermore, the treaty permits us to make investments as needed to maintain a secure and effective nuclear stockpile. The administration has proposed spending \$7 billion for this purpose in the current fiscal year – a nearly 10 percent increase – and more than \$80 billion to modernize our nuclear weapons complex over the next decade, including a major life-extension program for current warheads. In all, the administration proposes spending more than \$180 billion on the infrastructure that sustains our nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them – a substantial investment in the credibility and efficacy of America's nuclear deterrent.

Finally, New START will not constrain our ability to develop and deploy the most effective conventional capabilities possible, including strike systems that could potentially hit a target anywhere on the globe in less than an hour.

Every president since the beginning of the Cold War has opted for verifiable arms control deals. Each time, the Senate has backed these treaties by overwhelming margins. The START Treaty, negotiated by Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush, was approved in 1992 by 93 votes to 6. The Moscow Treaty, negotiated by President George W. Bush, was approved 95 to 0 in 2003.

The New START Treaty also deserves prompt ratification. Our national security depends on it.

 [back to top](#)

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# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



02 November– 15 November 2010

DTRA

## **NNSA, Rosatom Officials Meet to Discuss Plutonium Disposition**

NNSA, 10 November 2010, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/>

Officials from the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) yesterday concluded two days of consultations on U.S. and Russian efforts to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium.

Led by Rosatom Deputy Director General Ivan Kamenskikh, the Russian delegation met with senior Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA officials in Washington, and toured the facilities NNSA is building at DOE's Savannah River Site in Aiken, S.C. This was the first time Russian officials have visited NNSA's Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility.

"The United States and Russia, as the two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, have a unique responsibility to demonstrate leadership and commitment in downsizing these arsenals," said NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Kenneth Baker. "Our cooperation to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium will result in permanent threat reduction and advance the cooperative goals of the nuclear security agenda outlined by Presidents Obama and Medvedev."

The visit concluded with meetings yesterday in Washington between the delegation from Rosatom and NNSA Administrator Tom D'Agostino, and Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Kenneth Baker.

The Russian delegation also toured the Waste Solidification Building, as well as the Process Assembly Facility under construction at the same site. These facilities, when completed, will support NNSA's program that converts surplus weapon-grade plutonium into MOX fuel for use in commercial nuclear reactors and results in the plutonium no longer being readily usable for nuclear weapons.

This week's visit builds on the progress achieved at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, where Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov signed a protocol amending the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). Under the terms of the PMDA, each country is committed to disposing of no less than 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium – combined enough for 17,000 nuclear weapons. The United States has already identified additional surplus weapons grade plutonium that will be disposed of at the MOX facilities.



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