



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



30 August 2012 – 12 September 2012

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ARMS CONTROL (GENERAL)

Building Partnerships for Disarmament

U.S. State Department, 11 September 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

To say that things have changed dramatically since October 1962 is an understatement. The Cold War ended and the world as we know it has been forever changed. It is hard to imagine that my predecessor who served at the State Department in 1962 could have predicted that 50 years later, I would be standing in Moscow, talking to a group of Russian and international policymakers, as well as to academics, experts and students about how we can work together on disarmament. (1,989 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russian Ministry: S-500 Systems Will Surpass U.S. Analogs

Interfax News, 05 September 2012, <http://www.interfax.com>

The new S-500 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system being built for the Russian Aerospace Defense will surpass U.S. analogs by tactical and technical characteristics, Aerospace Defense Troops Commander Col. Gen. Oleg Ostapenko told Interfax-AVN. (313 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

Arms Control in the Information Age: Harnessing "Sisu"

U.S. State Department, 29 August 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

I would like to start out by saying that this is not a policy speech; this is an ideas speech. The United States has an ambitious arms control agenda and as such, we are doing some big thinking. I know Finns are no strangers to big thinking, so I think I am in the right place to discuss arms control in the information age. (1,964 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

BioWatch Upgrade Apparently Postponed

Los Angeles Times, 07 September 2012, <http://www.latimes.com>

Amid concerns about cost and reliability, the federal Department of Homeland Security has quietly postponed plans to buy technology that officials have long claimed could provide a life-saving upgrade of BioWatch, the nation's system for detecting biological attacks.

(638 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC) (CONT'D)

Building Partnerships for Biological Threats

U.S. State Department, 05 September 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Remarks by Greg Delawie, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

As you know, President Obama is committed to creating an unprecedented level of transparency and openness in our own Government and working together with our partners in the Open Government Partnership, to ensure greater transparency, accountability and effectiveness in governance. Transparency also is the word of the day in numerous arms control and nonproliferation initiatives we are collectively pursuing to build a foundation of trust and confidence. (918 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Controlling Chemical Weapons in the Information Age

U.S. State Department, 06 September 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

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Federal Judges Rule in Pueblo Chemical Depot Case

The Pueblo Chieftain, 06 September 2012, <http://www.chieftan.com>

An appeals court decided Wednesday that Colorado public health authorities cannot regulate or set deadlines for the chemical weapons stored at the Pueblo Chemical Depot. The decision of the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals is a win for the Army, which runs the depot.

(295 words) [7 JW \ YfYz f Z "" hM H'](#)

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COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

Marking the International Day against Nuclear Tests

Arms Control Now, 29 August 2012, <http://www.armscontrolnow.org>

Today is the official International Day Against Nuclear Tests, established in 2009 on the anniversary of the closure of the main former Soviet test site of Semipalatinsk, where more than 456 nuclear explosions contaminated the land and its inhabitants. (1,614 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY (CFE)

Revitalizing Conventional Arms Control in Europe

U.S. State Dept., 04 September 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

Thank you so much for having me here to speak today. I am always glad to be back in Stockholm and I am very happy to be here at SIPRI. The work of this organization is widely-respected and world-renowned. I was proud to be a part of the SIPRI Board before I joined the Obama Administration. Today, I am here to talk to you about the importance of revitalizing conventional arms control in Europe. (1,970 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russia Rules Out Return to Conventional Arms Treaty

Moscow Interfax, 04 September 2012, <http://www.interfax.com>

There can be no return to the old Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Russian Foreign Ministry has said. (394 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NST)

Germany to Keep U.S. Warheads

Interfax News, 05 September 2012, <http://www.interfax.com>

Germany has agreed to NATO's plans to keep U.S. nuclear warheads in the country, military sources said. (152 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NST) (CONT'D)

Russia to Build New ICBM by 2018

Ria Novosti, 03 September 2012, <http://en.rian.ru>

Russia will build a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile by 2018, Strategic Missile Forces commander Col. Gen. Sergei Karakayev said on Monday. "Construction of the missile is ongoing," he said. "It is to be completed by 2018." (141 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

VIENNA DOCUMENT (VDOC)

Belarus Representative Takes Part in Military Inspection in Sweden

Belarusian Telegraph Agency, 07 September 2012, <http://new.belta.by>

A representative of the Armed Forces of Belarus has taken part in a military inspection as part of the inspection team of the Swiss Confederation in Sweden, representatives of the Belarusian Defense Ministry told BelTA. (165 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

FULL TEXT OF BI-WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:

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[...]

Cuban Missile Crisis

As you heard this morning, we are fast approaching the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis. At that time, the tension and pressure of the Cold War had built up so much that our nations teetered on the edge of annihilation. Thanks to the resolute and sober judgment of our leaders, we were able to surmount that crisis and we learned to mitigate the tension in our relationship through constant – and sometimes painstaking – communication.

To say that things have changed dramatically since October 1962 is an understatement. The Cold War ended and the world as we know it has been forever changed. It is hard to imagine that my predecessor who served at the State Department in 1962 could have predicted that 50 years later, I would be standing in Moscow, talking to a group of Russian and international policymakers, as well as to academics, experts and students about how we can work together on disarmament.

Thinking About the Next Steps in Bilateral Reductions

In Prague in 2009, when President Obama laid out his vision for the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, he made clear that the road would be long and the goal may not be reached in his lifetime. But, in order to achieve this vision, we will need to follow a step by step process in which we maintain nuclear stability at the same time that we pursue responsible reductions in our nuclear arsenals through arms control.

The New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty or New START was a first step on this path. When New START is fully implemented, we will be at the lowest levels of deployed strategic nuclear warheads since the 1950s – pre-Cuban Missile Crisis. The implementation of the Treaty is going very well, and the Treaty's robust verification system is providing the predictability and mutual confidence that will be essential to any future nuclear reduction plans.

We are now spending a lot of time thinking about next steps in arms control. I sometimes refer to it as a homework period, which is not a bad term for what we are doing. We are looking at fundamentals and lessons learned, as we work to develop new policies to advance our security.



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Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

We would like to further the partnership between the United States and the Russian Federation on these issues. The entry into force of New START was an important step on the road, but not the end of the process.

One of the items on the agenda is the reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) and it is clear that there will be new challenges facing us. Although the 1990 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives reduced the readiness and numbers of NSNW, we have not tried to formally limit nondeployed or nonstrategic nuclear weapons before, which President Obama called for the day he signed New START. We are thinking about how we would verify reductions in those categories; experts have different ideas about what terms like 'nonstrategic' even mean. Even more complicated: the lower the numbers of nuclear weapons and the smaller the components, the harder it will be to effectively monitor compliance.

That is why, over the course of the past few years, the Administration has taken a number of steps towards charting a path to reach this goal. We have been conducting internal reviews, while also reviewing this matter with our allies, including our NATO Allies, through the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). We have also been engaging with our Russian colleagues in a strategic stability dialogue.

In approving the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review at Chicago this past May, the Allies determined that NATO's current posture meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture. NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of and reliance on nuclear weapons, but has indicated that it is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance. The context is important here: NATO would consider such steps in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Allies have supported and encouraged the United States and Russia to continue their mutual efforts to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their nuclear weapons in every category.

NATO Allies look forward to developing and exchanging transparency and confidence-building ideas with Russia, with the goal of enhancing European security and stability by increasing mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.



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I have been quite interested in how many non-governmental organizations are producing research and policy suggestions on the subject of NSNW. They have come up with ideas, starting with minimal transparency measures such as exchanging white papers, moving on to other types of information exchanges; then hosting site visits to current or abandoned facilities; and conducting mock inspections. On this broad spectrum, these are all ideas worth thinking about.

ISAB Report

Beyond specific actions items, we are also exploring how we view stability and security between our nations through a post-Cold War lens. The State Department's International Security Advisory Board, or ISAB, is helping us with this kind of "big thinking." This Federal Advisory Committee was established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of independent insight, advice and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation. One of the ISAB's tasks was to undertake a study of how the United States could pursue and manage a transition from a security foundation of mutual assured destruction to a security foundation of mutual assured stability, characterized by increasingly interdependent states having incentives to cooperate on political, military, and economic issues, thereby reducing the need for adversarial approaches to managing security challenges.

I would like to give credit to my predecessor, Ellen Tauscher, who coined the term "mutual assured stability."

Among the topics that the ISAB was asked to examine and assess in this area were the possible components of mutual assured stability: what would the United States need to see happen to have the confidence to consider reductions to very low numbers and, eventually, agree to the elimination of nuclear weapons? Their report, titled "Mutual Assured Stability: Essential Components and Near Term Actions" is posted on our website: www.state.gov/t/avc. It makes for an interesting read. While ISAB reports are not official State documents, their ideas are helpful as we make our own assessments.

The Indispensability of P5 Leadership

Of course, it is not just the United States and the Russian Federation that must show leadership on these issues. We must be joined by the United Kingdom, France and China. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty accords these P5 nations special status. They hold among them the overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons in the world, and progress on nuclear disarmament



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cannot be achieved without their active participation. But they must do more than participate; they must lead collectively. There are certainly more bilateral steps for the U.S. and Russia to take, but there is much the P5 can do to build the foundation for future multilateral steps. The recent P5 Conference in Washington, D.C. is a good example of this.

The Washington conference, in which Anton participated, was a part of a newly-established regular, multilateral dialogue among the P5, which includes discussion of nuclear verification and transparency. The P5 are committed to the implementation of the Action Plan that was adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The first constructive step in this direction took place at the Paris conference in June 2011, when the P5 met to discuss transparency, verification, and confidence-building measures – pursuant to the Action Plan – following on the groundbreaking meeting of this new P5 process in London in 2009.

All the P5 states recognize the fundamental importance of transparency in building mutual understanding and confidence. In Paris, we exchanged information on nuclear doctrine and capabilities and discussed possible voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures. We also conferred on the steps we have taken to implement our Article VI commitment, including reporting, a topic of great interest to the NPT community and one for which the P5 acknowledges a special responsibility.

The Washington P5 Conference began on June 27 with a U.S.-hosted public event titled “Three Pillars for Peace and Security: Implementing the NPT.” This forum addressed how each of the three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament – plays a part in the move towards a negotiated, effectively verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. At the conference, the P5 reaffirmed their unconditional support for the NPT and the NPT Review Conference's Action Plan, reaffirmed the commitments to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization, discouraged abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision (Article X), stressed the need to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and promote universalization of the Additional Protocol, and worked to pursue their shared goal of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.

The P5 continued their discussion of how to report on their relevant activities, and considered proposals for a standard reporting format. The P5 also discussed ways to kick start negotiations on a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices that has stalled in the Conference on Disarmament. The P5 agreed on the work plan for a P5 working group led by China, to develop a glossary of

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definitions for key nuclear terms. We expect this process will increase P5 mutual understanding and facilitate further P5 discussions on nuclear matters.

We regard this year's Washington P5 Conference as a success, much like its predecessors. It has ushered in an energetic intersessional period. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues, to further promote dialogue, predictability, and mutual confidence. We plan to hold a fourth P5 conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee in 2013.

The P5 has also been working with other relevant parties to promote the early commencement of Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The FMCT is the next step in multilateral arms control, and it is time to move forward on it. Meeting several times over the past year, key stakeholder countries have discussed the way ahead, and this has already resulted in a more positive and cooperative atmosphere among these countries with regards to FMCT. Currently, I believe it is our very best chance at progress on the issue, and has the best potential to move the CD to action on the Treaty.

Conclusion

The United States looks forward to continued cooperation with both the Russian Federation and the rest of the P5, as we all work towards nuclear disarmament. We have much to do and many obstacles in our way, but together we can meet these challenges through communication, transparency, diplomacy and plain old persistence: step by step, we will make progress.

In closing, let me return to the Cuban Missile Crisis. We survived those terrifying days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, because our leaders chose reason and diplomacy over fear and brinksmanship. When negotiators from the United States and the Soviet Union first began having bilateral nuclear reduction talks, I am certain that in their minds they carried with them the darkest moments of that crisis. The reality of how close we came to our own destruction – the destruction of the world – must never be forgotten. We must remember why we are here talking today, why our nations meet each other at the negotiating table and why we must show leadership among our allies, partners and friends.

Thank you again for inviting me to join you today. I am now happy to take some questions.



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"Work on the S-500 SAM system is going to be scheduled. The work is part of the state armament program and will be completed before 2020," Ostapenko said. The S-500 will be better than any U.S. analog, he said.

"Our newest S-500 system with a new missile is better than any other U.S. analog. While Americans are still seeking publicity in electronic mass media, we already have an actual missile," the general said.

Fifth-generation missiles, including S-500 SAM systems, will be the basis of Russia's Aerospace Defense in the 2020s, he said. The work on the S-500 SAM system is going concurrently with efforts to create a new missile for this new system, Ostapenko said.

The commander would not give the technical characteristics of the missile for the S-500. "Our work on the missile is going to plan, there are some great ideas but not without elements of superstition. We do not normally talk about it before it (the missile) flies," the general said.

It was reported earlier that about ten divisions of S-500 SAM systems are due to be purchased under the state armament program by 2020. They will become the main weapon of the newly formed Russian Aerospace Defense Forces.

The S-500 SAM system designed by Almaz-Antei is a long-range, high-altitude interception system with an enhanced missile defense potential.

The main requirements for the S-500 SAM system are: an increased capability to destroy ballistic targets (medium-range ballistic missiles, tactical and operational-tactical ballistic missiles) at an interception altitude of up to 200 kilometers and flight speed of up to 7 kilometers per second, and a capability to destroy warheads of hypersonic cruise missiles, according to the Russian Defense Ministry.

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The Challenges Ahead

It has been over three years since President Obama made his now-famous speech in Prague, in which he stated that the United States would seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. That speech was not just a rhetorical gesture; the Prague Agenda is a step by step path to the elimination of nuclear weapons. For the first two years of my service in the Administration, I worked on one step in that path – the New START treaty. I am happy to report that treaty has now been in force for over 18 months and its implementation is going very well. Both the United States and Russia are benefitting from the enhanced predictability it provides, which in turn enhances security for both nations and the world.

In the context of moving the President's overall nuclear policy agenda forward, the entry into force of New START is just the beginning. In order to reach our goals, we are going to have to think bigger and bolder. Indeed, persistence, determination and willpower will be important to the next steps in arms control. I believe the Finns have the perfect term for what it will take: "sisu."

As we look towards the next steps in reductions, it is clear that there will be new challenges facing us. We have not tried to limit non-deployed or non-strategic weapons before, which President Obama called for the day he signed New START. We are thinking about how we would verify reductions in those categories and people have different ideas about what terms like 'non-strategic' even mean. Even more complicated: the lower the numbers of nuclear weapons and the smaller the components, the harder it will be to effectively verify compliance.

New Concepts

With this in mind, I have been challenging myself to think about how we use the knowledge from our past together with the new tools of the information age. The seed of an idea was planted in



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my mind in Geneva during the New START negotiations. As we considered verification mechanisms for New START, it occurred to me that, by and large, we were still thinking about verification through the lens of the 1970's. The advancements in technology since then have been nothing short of revolutionary, but it wasn't quite clear how to incorporate these advancements into an effective verification regime.

It was actually a conversation with my two tech-guru sons over the dinner table that helped to further develop my thoughts on the subject. We discussed the incorporation of open source technologies – including social networking – into the verification of arms control and nonproliferation treaties.

Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. These people exchange and share ideas on a wide variety of topics: why not put this vast problem-solving entity to good use?

Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us make sure that countries are following the rules of arms control treaties and agreements.

I look out at a crowd like you and realize that I don't need to convince you that the technologies of the 21st century are changing the world as we know it. Finland has been a leading force in innovation in the information age. Over 95 percent of Finns have access to the internet and broadband access is now considered a legal right. It was not too many generations ago that Finland was a primarily agrarian state and now it is an economic powerhouse, with cutting-edge research and development. I am always amazed that Nokia went from making rubber boots to revolutionizing the communications world with its inexpensive and efficient cellular phones. It is this kind of creativity and adaptability that will be needed as we think about how to verify reductions going forward.

Of course, I should caveat that this is not actually a new idea. Renowned physicist and Nobel-laureate Joseph Rotblat proposed the concept of involving everyday citizens in the verification of arms control agreements back in the 1960's. But without the tools to "crowd-source" verification, the idea languished. In the 1990s, Joseph Rotblat revived the idea of establishing an international system for public reporting and whistle-blowing as a complement to technological verification. Rotblat termed this concept "societal verification," to reflect the idea that entire communities of non-experts could be involved. While Rotblat and others saw that the



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new global political conditions could be fertile ground for cultivating societal verification, there was still a need for technical tools. Today, we may finally have those tools.

New Possibilities

So now, armed with an idea and technological capacity, we can start to think about the possibilities. Social verification can take place on a scale that moves from active participation, like public reporting and crowd-sourced mapping and analysis, or to passive participation, like ubiquitous sensing or data mining and analytics.

On this scale, the open source information technologies in use can improve arms control verification in at least two ways: either by generating new information, or by analyzing information that already is out there.

Let me give you some examples, to give you an idea what I'm talking about. In 2009, in recognition of the 40th anniversary of the Internet, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) held a competition where 10 red weather balloons were moored at visible fixed locations around the continental United States. The first team to identify the location of all 10 balloons won a sizable cash prize – \$40,000. Over 4,300 teams composed of an estimated 2 million people from 25 countries took part in the challenge.

A team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology won the challenge, identifying all of the balloon locations in an astonishing time of 8 hours and 52 minutes. Of course, to win in such a short time or complete the challenge at all, the MIT team did not “find” the balloons themselves. They tapped into social networks using a unique incentive structure that not only incentivized people to identify a balloon location, but also incentivized people to recruit others to the team. Their win showed the enormous potential of social networking, and also demonstrated how incentives can motivate large populations to work toward a common goal.

Social networking is already being incorporated into local safety systems. RAVEN911 – the Regional Asset Verification & Emergency Network – is a multilayer mapping tool that supports emergency first response in Cincinnati, Ohio. RAVEN911 uses live data feeds and intelligence gathered through Twitter to provide details that cannot be given on an everyday geographic map, such as the location of downed electric power lines and flooded roads.

Authorities are cooperating with communities in Southwestern Ohio, Southeastern Indiana and Northern Kentucky to develop and implement this emergency management system, in order to help fire departments assess the risks and potential dangers before arriving on the scene of an



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accident. This open source system gives emergency responders a common operating picture, to better execute time-critical activities, such as choosing evacuation routes out of flooded areas.

In addition to collecting useful data, the ability to identify patterns and trends in social networks could aid the arms control verification process. In the most basic sense, social media can draw attention to both routine and abnormal events. We may be able to mine Twitter data to understand where strange effluents are flowing, to recognize if a country has an illegal chemical weapons program or to recognize unexpected patterns of industrial activity at a missile production plant. In this way, we may be able to ensure better compliance with existing arms control treaties and regimes, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Now, how could approaches such as this work, specifically in the arms control context? Let's just imagine that a country, to establish its bona fides in a deep nuclear reduction environment, wishes to open itself to a verification challenge, recruiting its citizens and their iPhones to help prove that it is not stashing extra missiles in the woods, for example, or a fissile material production reactor in the desert. Of course, some form of international supervision would likely be required, to ensure the legitimacy of the challenge and its procedures. And we would have to consider whether such a challenge could cope with especially covert environments, such as caves or deep underground facilities.

Sound far-fetched? Just consider that even today, tablets such as your iPad have tiny accelerometers installed – that's what tells the tablet which way is up. But the accelerometers also have the capability to detect small shakes, like an earth tremor.

Now, imagine a whole community of tablet users, all containing an "earth shake" app, dispersed randomly around the country, and connected into a centralized network node. An individual shake could be something as simple as bumping your iPad on a table. But a whole network of tablets, all shaking at virtually the same time? That tells you that something happened; knowing where all the tablets are and the exact time they started shaking can help you to geo-locate the event. It could be an earthquake, or it could be an illegal nuclear test. Of course, other sensors and analysis would have to be brought to bear to figure out the difference.

This is called "ubiquitous sensing," that is, collecting data and basic analysis through sensors on smartphones and other mobile-computing devices. These sensors would allow citizens to contribute to detecting potential treaty violations, and could build a bridge to a stronger private-public partnership in the realm of treaty verification.

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Joining Forces

Even with great ideas and fool-proof planning, another issue that we have to consider is: how do we create, organize and, when necessary, fund efforts such as these? Developing partnerships among governments, civil society groups, philanthropic organizations and private businesses will be the key to moving ahead.

We are just now starting to think about how governments can actively enlist their publics to help prove that they are in compliance with their arms control and nonproliferation obligations. To this end, on Tuesday, the U.S. Department of State launched the “Innovation in Arms Control Challenge” asking, “How Can the Crowd Support Arms Control Transparency Efforts?”

We want to get ideas on if and how the everyday citizen can help support arms control transparency efforts. While the contest can only be won by U.S. citizens or permanent residents, we encourage anyone who is interested in the subject to participate. You can read more about the challenge on our website: www.state.gov/t/avc.

The Future

As I said at the outset, this is not about policy; this is about coming up with the bold ideas that will shape policy in the future. As governments around the world work to enhance and expand our arms control and nonproliferation efforts, we will need your help to find new ways to use the amazing information tools at our disposal. It is increasingly apparent that we are going to need every tool we have, and many we have not yet developed or perhaps even thought of, to fulfill the Prague Agenda. We will need “sisu”.

Thank you again for inviting me here to speak. I would now love to take some questions.



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BioWatch Upgrade Apparently Postponed

Los Angeles Times, 07 September 2012, <http://www.latimes.com>

Amid concerns about cost and reliability, the federal Department of Homeland Security has quietly postponed plans to buy technology that officials have long claimed could provide a life-saving upgrade of BioWatch, the nation's system for detecting biological attacks.

One year ago, the department had said a contract for the new, automated system would be awarded by mid-May 2012, at an estimated cost of \$3.1 billion during its initial five years of operation. But in a three-sentence posting to a government website late last month, Homeland Security said it had shifted the time frame for soliciting final proposals to the final quarter of the year. The posting provided no explanation for the delay.

Scientists familiar with the matter said the development reflects a lack of confidence in the new technology, known as Generation 3. A department spokesman, Peter Boogaard, declined to comment.

The postponement comes as Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and her aides are facing pointed questions about BioWatch from lawmakers of both parties in Congress. The program has cost taxpayers about \$1 billion so far.

The senior Democrat on the House Homeland Security Committee, Rep. Bennie Thompson of Mississippi, as well as Republican leaders of the House Energy and Commerce Committee have sent separate inquiries to Napolitano asking for documents on BioWatch and citing shortcomings with the system that were reported in July by the *Los Angeles Times*.

Two House subcommittees have scheduled a hearing for September 13 to discuss BioWatch and a recently concluded review of Generation 3 by the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

In a statement late Friday, the chairman of one of the subcommittees, Rep. Gus M. Bilirakis (R-Florida), cited the multibillion-dollar commitment envisioned for Generation 3, calling it "one of the most costly at the Department of Homeland Security." "We must ensure that the development and procurement of the next generation of BioWatch is based on sound science and that we are getting an appropriate return on our investment," Bilirakis said.

The *Times* article reported a range of deficiencies with both the existing BioWatch system and with the automated sensors intended for Generation 3. At least 56 false alarms – including an incident that threatened to disrupt the 2008 Democratic National Convention – occurred through 2008, the article reported. Due to insufficient sensitivity, BioWatch would be unlikely to detect an

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actual attack. Moreover, field and lab tests of the Generation 3 prototypes have suggested that they could not be relied on to detect an attack because of insufficient durability and sensitivity.

The original, non-automated system has been in place since early 2003, when President George W. Bush said that BioWatch would provide "the nation's first early-warning network of sensors to detect biological attack."

Once a day year-round, technicians collect a filter from each BioWatch air-sampling unit and deliver it to a local public health lab, which searches for the DNA of anthrax and a handful of other pathogens targeted by BioWatch. Since BioWatch's inception, some have touted the promise of automated sensors – each a so-called "lab in a box" – which might speed detection of an attack and better enable authorities to dispense emergency medicines before those exposed became sick or died.

On February 14, 2007, Jay M. Cohen, a Homeland Security undersecretary appointed by Bush, told a House committee that Generation 3 would likely be "four times cheaper to operate" than the existing, more manually dependent system. Generation 3 would also expand BioWatch from its present coverage of about 30 cities to 50 – communities that make up approximately 90 percent of the U.S. population.

On March 29 of this year, Dr. Alexander Garza, Homeland Security's chief medical officer, told a House subcommittee that Generation 3 was "imperative to saving thousands of lives." Garza, appointed by President Obama, is among three witnesses scheduled to testify at the upcoming congressional hearing, according to a spokesman for the panel.

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Building Partnerships for Biological Threats

U.S. State Department, 05 September 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Remarks by Greg Delawie, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

As you know, President Obama is committed to creating an unprecedented level of transparency and openness in our own government and working together with our partners in the Open Government Partnership, to ensure greater transparency, accountability and effectiveness in governance. Transparency also is the word of the day in numerous arms control and nonproliferation initiatives we are collectively pursuing to build a foundation of trust and confidence.

Likewise, this International Conference on Health and Security is a key step in the implementation of the Bio-Transparency and Openness Initiative that Secretary Clinton announced this past December at the Seventh Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference. This Initiative includes a series of steps the United States is taking to demonstrate our support for the Convention and its tenets, because we recognize that the biological threat to global security is as pressing as that posed by nuclear and chemical weapons.

In her remarks at the Review Conference, Secretary Clinton underscored our commitment to building an environment of openness and collaboration in our biodefense enterprise and outlined the planned activities for this Initiative. One such activity was a tour of United States Government biodefense facilities, in order to offer direct insight into our programs. The goal was to help to build understanding and confidence in our defense work and further demonstrate our commitment with respect to biological threat preparedness and response.

I am pleased to report that the tour took place on July 24th at Fort Detrick, Maryland. It provided a clearer picture of how the many parts of the U.S. Government contribute to our biodefense programs and presented a new window for our guests into how we collaborate with each other and our international partners for the benefit of the public at large. It is our impression that in addition to the tour, briefings provided by the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and Agriculture on the scope of our biodefense efforts were also well-received by the Ambassadors who participated. I believe, we achieved in our goal to remove misconceptions about ongoing research and showcase that our biodefense work is overwhelmingly open and public.

While we seek no reciprocity from our initiative, I do encourage all other countries with biodefense programs to follow this example in order to facilitate greater understanding and transparency at their own facilities. We believe for the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] to

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remain a viable treaty, we must work together in a cooperative and transparent fashion to improve implementation of our obligations.

As we move forward we are going to have to think bigger and more boldly. . In 2009, President Obama stated clearly in Prague that the United States was committed to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. With the understanding that this ambitious goal will take patience and persistence, and will not be reached in his lifetime, he boldly outlined concrete steps to create the conditions for this vision.

Similarly, we all need to be making similar commitments to addressing emerging infectious diseases that still pose a huge threat to humankind and have the potential to disrupt our livelihoods. While we work to defend against the threat of biological risks that may be posed by terrorists or state-based bioweapon programs, we need to start thinking seriously about the connections between global health and security and how we work to mitigate potential threats in both arenas. That's why this conference is important.

We are here to build partnerships for biological threat prevention, detection, preparedness and response, regardless of whether the cause of an outbreak is natural, accidental or of malicious intent. With this in mind, the United States commends the ongoing synergies and convergence between the BWC and other international public health organizations and security regimes like those of the World Health Organization and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in recognition of the interconnection of biological weapons with other biological risks.

As the World Health Organization works towards establishing an effective global network for disease surveillance, for example, we acknowledge that more needs to be done to avoid impact on global health security. In recent years, we have experienced some serious disease events, in which it took weeks or even months to learn the true cause of the outbreak and from where it originated.

Today, we pledge to continue to work with the international community to make certain that surveillance of human, animal, and plant diseases is integrated, in order to be vigilant in our response on a global scale. At the same time, we call on Member States to join us in taking the appropriate steps to move towards that common objective of sharing relevant information which can foster better insight on current and emerging infectious risks.

In closing, it is important to recognize that in today's interconnected world, infectious diseases are not bound by political borders. Infectious diseases can and will find ways to challenge current measures of prevention, detection and containment of disease outbreaks. That is why

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we invited diplomatic, health and security communities from around the world to this Conference. We all need to cooperate to minimize the risk of disease being used as a weapon.

It is our intention under the Bio-Transparency Initiative to expand further dialogues and engagements in the near future to other areas such as research in the life sciences and biotechnology to help us reduce this risk. For it is only when we work together can we see the bigger picture and respond effectively as these challenges evolve.

Thank you.

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Controlling Chemical Weapons in the Information Age

U.S. State Department, 06 September 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

I am honored to speak today in this important room. I appreciate the opportunity to join the permanent representatives of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and disarmament and nonproliferation colleagues in support of The Hague Week on Disarmament and Nonproliferation, as well as the 15th Anniversary of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW]. We can all be proud of the great strides we have made toward eliminating an entire category of weapons of mass destruction since the Convention's entry into force in 1997.

We will soon be approaching another anniversary. The Cuban Missile Crisis happened fifty years ago this October. We have come a long way since then, but today arms control is at a crossroads. We are facing new challenges and entering new terrain. We have not tried to limit nondeployed or nonstrategic weapons before, which President Obama called for the day he signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in April 2010 in Prague. We are thinking about how we would verify reductions in those categories and people have different ideas about what terms like 'non-strategic' even mean.

Even more complicated: the lower the numbers and the smaller the components, the harder it will be to monitor compliance. To make matters more complicated, other weapons of mass destruction – chemical and biological weapons – pose even greater verification challenges, because they are dual use and difficult to disentangle from normal industrial or commercial processes. In order to deal with these new problems, we are going to need innovative ideas about how together, we can improve and augment the tools needed for the verification of treaties and agreements controlling weapons of mass destruction, as well as create new ones.

Today, I'd like to talk to you about one such idea – the incorporation of publicly available technologies and social networking into arms control verification and monitoring. Now it is important to point out that this is not a policy speech, this is an ideas speech. I've been making similar remarks around Europe and at universities and think tanks in the United States. The first incarnation was delivered at Stanford University for the – Drell Lecture named for noted arms control expert and physicist, Sidner Drell. The purpose of that lecture series is to think of new ideas for arms control. We have ambitious goals and we will need big ideas to meet them. It is also important to note that while I will focus on arms control, these ideas could lend themselves to nonproliferation policy, and safeguards policy as well.

Nowadays, we verify that countries are fulfilling their arms control treaty obligations through a combination of information exchange; notifications of weapon status; on-site inspections; and

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National Means, including so-called National Technical Means (NTM). NTM are big assets – observation satellites, phased-array radars – that individual countries manage and control. It has long been a rule of arms control treaties that we don't interfere with each other's National Technical Means – we allow each other these eyes and ears to monitor treaties. All of the elements I've listed off work together to make an effective verification regime.

I should say what we mean in the United States by effective verification. Ambassador Paul Nitze defined it as follows: if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation. In our view, that's effective verification, and it has been the benchmark for verifying compliance in the United States. To help meet this benchmark, I've been asking myself, can we incorporate publicly available information technologies and social networking into arms control verification and monitoring?

Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. These people are exchanging and sharing ideas on a wide variety of topics: why not put this vast problem-solving entity to good use? Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, can be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us make sure that countries are following the rules of arms control treaties and agreements.

Application to the CWC

Since we are here at the OPCW, I want to dive a little deeper into how this can apply to the CWC. Compliance with the CWC is already monitored through a comprehensive international system of declaration and international inspections. Could this already robust system be further integrated with publicly available information, providing independent confirmation of official conclusions? It is something to think about. The Advisory Panel on Future Priorities of the OPCW has already identified this as an idea worth studying when it recommended that the organization should seek to find acceptable ways of using open source information to enhance the verification process back in 2011.

Open source information covers a wide variety of data, including general media stories, self-reporting from companies and information officially released by governments. A recent informal paper from the Technical Secretariat noted that open source information can support the work of the Secretariat and of States Parties in the implementation of the CWC and the task of ensuring destruction of chemical weapons and working to prevent their re-emergence. The paper details a number of ways that publicly available information is already used within the



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Secretariat for purposes related to verification. The paper then goes on to suggest several additional ways that publicly available information might be applicable. I applaud this effort to explore these ideas, whether or not those particular suggestions turn out to be useful to the Organization.

The Challenges Ahead

Of course, for any of this to work, there are technical, legal and political barriers ahead that would need to be overcome – it is no easy feat to pursue these ideas. On the technical front, it would be necessary to work together to make sure nations – or industries – cannot spoof or manipulate the public verification challenges that they devise. We also have to bear in mind there could be limitations based on the freedoms available to the citizens in particular countries.

On the legal front, there are many questions that must be confronted about active vs. passive participation. How can we prevent governments from extracting information from citizens without their knowledge, or manipulating results collected in databases? Further, in some circumstances, how can active participants be sheltered from reproach by authorities? It may be possible, through careful handling and management, to mask sources of information, even if locations are public.

On the political front, we cannot assume that information will always be so readily available. As nations and private entities continue to debate the line between privacy and security, it is possible to imagine that we are now living in a golden age of open source information that will be harder to take advantage of in future. These questions deserve to be considered.

Conclusion

In the end, the goal of using open source information technology and social networks should be to augment our existing arms control verification capabilities, and I challenge this community to think about how it can be done. As you leave here today, I challenge you to help us find new ways to use the new information tools at our disposal to move the world closer to successfully tackling the control and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. If we were clever enough to invent these weapons, then surely we are clever enough to get rid of them.

Thank you again for inviting me here to speak. I would now be happy to take some questions.



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Federal Judges Rule in Pueblo Chemical Depot Case

The Pueblo Chieftain, 06 September 2012, <http://www.chieftan.com>

An appeals court decided Wednesday that Colorado public health authorities cannot regulate or set deadlines for the chemical weapons stored at the Pueblo Chemical Depot. The decision of the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals is a win for the Army, which runs the depot, and a loss for the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment.

The department sued the Army in 2008, seeking federal court authority to set deadlines for destruction of the weapons and to exert its power to regulate hazardous wastes, such as the mustard gas chemicals. "Understandably, Colorado has grown impatient with the delay in destroying the chemical weapons stored at the depot," judges of the six-state court, based in Denver, wrote in a 23-page decision.

Congress has extended the deadline at least five times, the judges stated, citing information provided by the federal government. However, the judges stated that requiring the Army to comply with Colorado's hazardous waste regulations "will impede or interfere with" congressional mandates.

The laws passed by Congress specify the method of destroying the weapons, by neutralizing them, and the deadline, December 31, 2017, to complete the destruction. The department wanted to be able to enforce the 2017 deadline to ensure no further extensions.

The judges concluded the federal mandates preempt the health department's authority to regulate hazardous wastes at the depot. "Permitting Colorado to be a second enforcer of the 2017 deadline, and to add other enforceable interim deadlines of its own, interferes with the measured, flexible and frequently revised approach Congress has taken to destroy these weapons," the judges wrote.

The Army cannot comply with a Colorado regulation that prohibits the storage of hazardous wastes "and also comply with Congress' mandate that it must biotreat and neutralize the depot's chemical weapons," the judges stated.



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Marking the International Day against Nuclear Tests

Arms Control Now, 29 August 2012, <http://www.armscontrolnow.org>

Today is the official International Day against Nuclear Tests, established in 2009 on the anniversary of the closure of the main former Soviet test site of Semipalatinsk, where more than 456 nuclear explosions contaminated the land and its inhabitants.

Largely as a result of the courageous efforts of the Kazakh people to close down the Semipalatinsk site, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev declared a nuclear test moratorium on October 5, 1991. This, in turn, prompted a bipartisan coalition of U.S. legislators, including Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Oregon), George Mitchell (D-Maine), Rep. Mike Kopetski (D-Oregon) and Rep. Dick Gephardt (D-Missouri) to introduce legislation for a one-year nuclear test moratorium legislation.

With strong popular support in the United States, the legislation gathered momentum and was later modified to mandate a nine-month U.S. testing halt and negotiations on a CTBT. The legislation was approved by strong majorities in the House and Senate in September 1992. The last U.S. nuclear test explosion was conducted at the Nevada Test Site on September 23, 1992.

The following year, after an intensive policy review, President Clinton extended the U.S. test moratorium and launched multilateral negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). With the help of international protests over French and Chinese nuclear testing in 1995 and 1996, governments agreed to adopt a “zero-yield” test-ban, and the CTBT was opened for signature on September 24, 1996.

By banning all nuclear weapon test explosions, the CTBT prevents the established nuclear-weapon states from proof-testing new, more sophisticated warhead designs. Without the option of nuclear explosive testing, newer members of the club cannot perfect smaller, more easily deliverable warheads.

With the CTBT in force, global and national capabilities to detect and deter possible clandestine nuclear testing by other states will be significantly greater. Entry-into-force is essential to making short-notice, on-site inspections possible and maintaining long-term political and financial support from other nations for the operation of the International Monitoring System and International Data Center.

Accelerating CTBT Entry into Force

The CTBT has reinforced the global nuclear test moratorium. Since 1998, only one country (North Korea) has engaged in explosive nuclear testing. Unfortunately, the job of addressing the

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damage caused by nuclear testing and achieving a permanent and verifiable ban on all nuclear testing is incomplete. As UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said this month, “while existing voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests are essential, they are no substitute for a total global ban.”

One-hundred eighty-three states have signed the CTBT, but the treaty must still be ratified by eight remaining hold out states – the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Egypt, and North Korea – before it can formally enter into force.

Ratification by the United States and China is particularly important. Given their existing nuclear test moratoria and 1996 signature of the CTBT, Washington and Beijing already bear most CTBT-related responsibilities, yet their failure to ratify has denied them – and others – the full security benefits of CTBT entry into force.

In April 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama pledged to “immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.” He said, “After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.”

The technical and political case for the CTBT is even stronger than it was in 1999 when the Senate failed to provide its advice and consent for ratification. To do so, the President must exert the necessary political will and resources to pursue ratification and all Senators must be prepared to review the new evidence in support of the treaty rather than arrive at judgments based on old information or misinformation.

It is also time for China’s leaders to finally act on the CTBT. For years, Chinese government representatives have reported that the CTBT is before the National People’s Congress for consideration but has apparently taken no action. The January 19, 2011 Joint Statement by President Hu Jintao and President Barack Obama stating that “... both sides support early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.”

Washington’s renewed pursuit of CTBT ratification opens up opportunities for China and other hold-out states to lead the way toward entry into force by ratifying before the United States does. Action by Beijing would increase its credibility as a nonproliferation leader and improve the chances that other states in Asia, as well as the United States, would follow suit. [...]

Addressing the Damage Caused by Nuclear Testing

The damage caused by the 2,052 nuclear test explosions conducted worldwide lingers on at dozens of test sites from Lop Nor in China, to the atolls of the Pacific, to Nevada, to Algeria



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where France conducted its first test, to western Australia where the U.K. exploded nuclear weapons, to Semipalatinsk, across Russia, in Kazakhstan, and beyond.

Our knowledge of the extent of the harm caused by five decades of nuclear test explosions underground, in the atmosphere, and underwater is still incomplete. The governments responsible for the damage have not adequately provided the assistance to survivors and resources necessary to mitigate the environmental contamination. In fact, the major testing states have been reluctant to recognize the harm inflicted by testing and the rights of those people who have been most affected.

In 2009, the government of Kazakhstan made an important proposal: the establishment of an international fund – to be managed by the United Nations – to support the survivors of nuclear testing. To translate the idea into action, the UN Secretary-General to organize a conference under the auspices of the United Nations to help mobilize resources for the remediation of contamination and health monitoring and rehabilitation of downwinders near nuclear test sites around the world.

The U.S. government needs to do its part. A new report by a UN special rapporteur finds that as a result of the 67 atmospheric nuclear tests on the Pacific islands of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik from 1946-1958, the people of these communities have suffered dislocation from their indigenous way of life and adverse health damage. The current U.S. plan for ongoing monetary compensation for the residents of the islands (which is due to expire in a decade) does not constitute an effective long-term or sustainable plan, yet the U.S. government seems to have no plan for the future, the rapporteur found.

Beginning in 1951, the United States also conducted 100 atmospheric nuclear tests in Nevada. A 1997 U.S. National Cancer Institute report estimated that the 90 dirtiest U.S. nuclear tests could cause 7,500-75,000 additional cases of thyroid cancer across the country.

In 1990 Congress passed the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA). Since then, about 16,000 people from rural counties in Nevada, Utah, and northwestern Arizona have made proven claims for compensation. All told, the federal government has paid out almost \$800 million over the last two decades. [...]

The August 29 commemoration is a reminder of the need to accelerate action toward entry into force of the CTBT and improve programs to better understand and responsibly address the health and environmental damage caused by past nuclear testing. The following numbers speak for themselves.



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Revitalizing Conventional Arms Control in Europe

U.S. State Department, 04 September 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

Thank you so much for having me here to speak today. I am always glad to be back in Stockholm and I am very happy to be here at [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)]. The work of this organization is widely-respected and world-renowned. I was proud to be a part of the SIPRI Board before I joined the Obama Administration. Today, I am here to talk to you about the importance of revitalizing conventional arms control in Europe.

Little known fact: my first trip to Stockholm was in 1986, to speak with participants in the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. Pulled up the document last night, here is an excerpt from the first page:

The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)...met in Stockholm in from January 17, 1984 to September 19, 1986, in accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contained in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE. The participants were addressed by the Prime Minister of Sweden, the late Olof Palme, on January 17, 1984. I want to convey my great respect of Olof Palme, and Swedish diplomacy, for sowing the seeds for conventional arms control in Europe.

So I am glad to back here in Stockholm talking about this issue. Sweden has frequently and productively worked together with the United States and NATO on many shared international security objectives. We in the United States are very appreciative of Sweden's support of NATO security objectives.

Strengthening European security through reevaluation and revision of European conventional force structures is essential to the future of security on the continent and around the globe. Before going into our thinking about the conventional arms control regime, I would like to briefly discuss an issue that tends to draw more attention than conventional arms control and that is the possible negotiations between NATO and Russia to reduce nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

Both the President and the Senate – in the New START Resolution of Ratification – have placed a priority on seeking to initiate new negotiations with the Russians on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW).



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Over the past few years, the Administration has taken a number of steps towards this goal. We have been conducting our own internal reviews, while also reviewing this matter with our Allies through the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). We have been consulting with our allies, and we've been engaging with the Russians in a strategic stability dialogue.

In approving the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review at Chicago this past May, the Allies determined that NATO's current posture meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture. NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of and reliance on nuclear weapons, but has indicated that it is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Allies have supported and encouraged the United States and Russia to continue their mutual efforts to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their nuclear weapons in every category. NATO Allies look forward to developing and exchanging transparency and confidence-building ideas with Russia with the goal of enhancing European security and stability by increasing mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's nonstrategic nuclear force postures in Europe.

Conventional Arms Control in Europe

While we continue to work on nonstrategic nuclear force issues, we are keeping in mind the importance of European security overall. Secretary Clinton stated in 2010, "[a] strong Europe is critical to our security and our prosperity. Much of what we hope to accomplish globally depends on working together with Europe." In this context, we have all seen that predictable conventional force structures in Europe will contribute to enhancing European security and strengthening trust, including between NATO Allies and Russia.

The three pillars of our conventional arms control agreements in Europe – the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document confidence and security-building measures – provide a foundation for stability in our strategic relationships. Each regime is important and contributes to security and stability in a unique way and when they are working in harmony, the result is greater confidence for all of Europe.

Open Skies

First, I want to touch on the very successful Open Skies Treaty. This treaty establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the territories of its 34 signatories, including Sweden.



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Open Skies is one of the most wide-ranging international arms control efforts to date to promote openness and transparency in military forces and activities.

This year, we are celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the treaty and the tenth anniversary of the treaty's entry into force. The treaty itself remains a solid regime. The observation flights – more than 800 to date – serve to enhance military transparency. They also provide an opportunity for our governments – in most cases, military personnel – to regularly and effectively work together.

The biggest single challenge we face for the continued success of the treaty is the future availability of resources. The treaty will only be as good as the States Parties make it, and we cannot make it as effective with old aircraft and sensors. For its part, the United States has recently completed an internal review of future implementation plans. The key development involves a U.S. commitment to transition from the film-based cameras we use today to digital sensors. We urge all parties to also redouble their efforts to modernize the treaty to allow for the use of these sensors and ensure sufficient assets for future operations.

The United States has proposed a number of ways to improve treaty implementation, while bearing in mind the budgetary constraints that are a reality in the U.S. and across Europe. One thing we believe has been underutilized is the possibility of sharing Open Skies assets among States Parties. This is the type of creative thinking we need to do to continue to advance European security in the current fiscal environment.

Vienna Document

The Vienna Document is another important part of the European security architecture. This set of politically-binding confidence and security building measures, which applies to all 56 member nations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has contributed immeasurably to Europe-wide military transparency and reassurance. It is also a useful template for other regions, as they look to build confidence in the military intentions of their neighbors.

Since 2010, we have been working to modernize the Vienna Document to make it more relevant for 21st century military capabilities and security realities. In December of last year, an updated Vienna Document was issued – and one of the key changes was to make it a living document to be updated on a regular basis. We are actively engaged with our partners to further modernize the Vienna Document paying particular attention to enhancing military transparency and expanding the content of information exchanges, while increasing efficiency in the conduct of verification activities.



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Again, mindful of budgetary realities, we are working with our partners to ensure that these enhancements do not impose unreasonable expenses on participating States. Going forward we have two goals in mind: we want to strengthen existing provisions at the same time that we ensure the document remains relevant to today's security challenges.

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

Now, let me turn briefly to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or CFE. Since its entry into force, more than 72,000 pieces of Cold War military equipment – tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters – have been eliminated. Under CFE, thousands of inspections have taken place at military sites all over Europe, dramatically increasing confidence and military transparency on the continent by providing a means to verify the information provided in data exchanges.

The CFE regime remains important to the United States, and for European security as a whole. Unfortunately, Russia ceased implementation of its CFE obligations in December 2007. Since then, Russia has refused to accept inspections and ceased to provide information to other CFE treaty parties on its military forces as required by the treaty.

After trying for several years to encourage Russia to resume implementation, in November 2011, the United States ceased carrying out certain obligations under the CFE treaty with regard to Russia. We were joined by our NATO Allies that are party to the treaty, as well as Georgia and Moldova, in taking this important step – in all, 24 of the 30 countries that are party to the treaty.

This decision came after the United States and NATO Allies made two major – but ultimately unsuccessful – efforts since 2007 to find a way to overcome the impasse on CFE. We stand ready to return to the negotiating table whenever we have a signal that real progress can be made on the remaining issues, including the right of states to choose whether to allow foreign forces to be stationed on their territories and transparency among all parties essential for preserving confidence during the negotiations.

In the meantime, we have also embarked upon a ground-up reexamination of the entire conventional arms control enterprise.

Moving Conventional Arms Control Forward

We know that a conventional arms control regime in Europe is worth preserving. NATO confirmed the importance of conventional arms control at the 2012 Chicago Summit. Allies are



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determined to preserve, strengthen and modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, and continue to explore ideas to this end.

Modernization is the key word here. We have made a serious investment in building the current security architecture in Europe. We must adapt and improve our efforts to meet our current and future security needs, and do it in a way that is efficient and effective for all countries involved. We need some new thinking, and we have been devoting a lot of time and energy to this task.

We're asking fundamental questions: What are the security concerns in Europe in 2012 that a conventional arms control agreement should address? And, taking into account the lessons learned from the implementation of CFE and other existing agreements, what kinds of arms control measures could best address those concerns and uphold core principles of European security?

The fact is, the basic problem that the original CFE treaty was meant to resolve – the destabilizing surplus of conventional arms on the continent – has been resolved, in no small part through implementation of this important treaty.

Today, for the most part, quantities of conventional armaments across the continent are far below the negotiated ceilings, and are likely to continue to drop.

While the problems of 1989 no longer exist, it is my view that conventional arms control, done right, can significantly improve security on the continent by helping to address today's concerns. It can provide confidence regarding the military activities and intentions of neighbors, especially in sensitive areas. We also need to spend our stretched defense budgets wisely. Arms control can help us do that, for the more predictable our relationships, the better we can plan our defense spending.

Final Thoughts

With that, I would like to stop and take some questions, but I will leave you with a final thought. The conventional arms control regime that has been in place in Europe since the end of the Cold War contributes to the security of the continent. In order to maintain security and stability, this regime requires constant tending. Now is the time for action. If conventional arms control is allowed to falter, then we all will be the worse for it – this includes Russia, too.

Thank you and I am happy to take some questions.



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Russia Rules out Return to Conventional Arms Treaty

Moscow Interfax, 04 September 2012, <http://www.interfax.com>

There can be no return to the old Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Russian Foreign Ministry has said.

"It should be clear to everyone that there is and can be no return to the old schemes, and that one should talk about a fundamentally new accord which would take present-day realities into account. Nonetheless, unfounded reproaches are once again being hurled. We are in effect being accused of unwillingness to act to the detriment of our own interests," says a Foreign Ministry press release issued on Tuesday.

This was the Russian Foreign Ministry's response to the 2011 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments report published by the U.S. Department of State on August 31 and the separate reports on compliance with the CFE treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the New START treaty.

"In its report, the U.S. State Department continues to complain about Russia's noncompliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Our 2007 moratorium on compliance with the obligations under this treaty is described as "a wrong step", even though the U.S. side itself, in the form of its previous administration, did everything it could to leave us with no other option," the Russian Foreign Ministry stressed.

"All this cannot but cast doubt on the sincerity of the assurances received from Washington about its readiness to proceed together with Russia towards agreement on all the issues relating to conventional weapons in Europe on a mutually acceptable basis," the press release says.

The Russian Foreign Ministry also notes that the report mentions Russian military presence in Moldova and Georgia as an "unresolved issue". "If our U.S. colleagues intend once again to weave the subject of conflicts into the fabric of new talks on conventional weapons, they knowingly doom them to failure; all the more so if U.S. negotiating positions are based on the non-recognition of the new political realities in the Caucasus region," the Foreign Ministry says.

"On the whole, we regard the latest publication of the State Department report in which crusty old grievances are laid at Russia's door as counterproductive. We believe that it is more sensible to resolve issues that arise in the implementation of arms control agreements at bilateral consultations between experts, where one cannot get away with unfounded allegations," the press release says.

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Germany to Keep U.S. Warheads

Interfax News, 05 September 2012, <http://www.interfax.com>

Germany has agreed to NATO's plans to keep U.S. nuclear warheads in the country, military sources said. The sources told the German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau that in addition to putting off plans to have the atomic weapons removed, the Berlin government has agreed to let the United States modernize them, The Local.de reported Wednesday.

Officially there are between 10 and 20 nuclear bombs at the Buchel Air Base in Rhineland Palatinate. Germany's Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle had put the removal of the warheads at the heart of his foreign policy aims. Military experts said the government gave up that position at the NATO summit in Chicago at the end of May.

Research director Karl-Heinz of the NATO Defense College in Rome said there were several reasons why Germany backed down. "Generally the euphoria about nuclear disarmament has dissipated and the relationship between Russia and the United States has cooled again," he said.

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Russia to Build New ICBM by 2018

Ria Novosti, 03 September 2012, <http://en.rian.ru>

Russia will build a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile by 2018, Strategic Missile Forces commander Col. Gen. Sergei Karakayev said on Monday. “Construction of the missile is ongoing,” he said. “It is to be completed by 2018.”

The new missile is to replace the R-36M2 Voyevoda (NATO reporting name SS-18 Satan) missile. So far, all of Russia’s recent ICBM projects, both sea-launched (Bulava) and ground-based (Topol-M, Yars), have been solid fuel.

Karakayev said the new ICBM will have a launch mass of around 100 tons with a better payload-launch weight ratio than in a solid fuel missile. Such ICBMs can only be deployed in silos.

The Russian Defense Ministry previously said that unless the United States abandons its plans to create a missile defense system in Europe, Russia will take counter measures, including the building of a new heavy liquid-propellant missile.

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Belarus Representative Takes Part in Military Inspection in Sweden

Belarusian Telegraph Agency, 07 September 2012, <http://new.belta.by>

A representative of the Armed Forces of Belarus has taken part in a military inspection as part of the inspection team of the Swiss Confederation in Sweden, representatives of the Belarusian Defense Ministry told BelTA.

The inspection ended on September 7. The absence of the activities, which are subject to preliminary notification in line with the 2011 Vienna Document, has been confirmed, said the source.

BelTA has been told that on August 27 – September 7 the National Agency for Control and Inspections of the Defense Ministry arranged a series of training sessions relating to the fulfillment of international treaties on arms control for representatives of verification centers of the NATO and OSCE member states.

Attending the sessions were 17 representatives of verification centers of the UK, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, the United States, France, Czech Republic, and Sweden. A representative of the verification center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine took part in the training sessions in the capacity of an arms control expert.

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