



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES CONVENTION (APLC)

Landmine Treaty: Progress in Phnom Penh

Human Rights Watch, 02 December 2011, www.hrw.org/

The international treaty banning antipersonnel landmines [APLC] is making strong progress toward its objective of a mine-free world, Human Rights Watch said today, as a major meeting on landmines wrapped up in Phnom Penh. (650 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

Deputy OPCW Director-General Addresses 7th BWC Review Conference

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 06 December 2011, www.opcw.org

Mrs. Grace Asirwatham, the OPCW Deputy Director-General, delivered an address today to the general debate session of the conference, which is taking place at the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland from December 5-22, 2011. She spoke at the invitation of the conference President, Ambassador Paul van den Ijssel of the Netherlands. (317 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

U.S. Remarks at the 7th BWC Review Conference

U.S. Department of State, 07 December 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland
The advances in science and technology make it possible to both prevent and cure more diseases, but also easier for states and non-state actors to develop biological weapons. (1,327 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russia Urges Verification Powers Be Added to BWC Regime

Global Security Newswire, 08 December 2011, www.gsn.nti.org

Russia would like to see a mandatory verification system established for the BWC to ensure that member nations are abiding by their obligations not to develop or store disease materials for offensive purposes. (501 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

U.S. Address to the 16th Conference of the States Parties to the CWC

U.S. Department of State, 28 November 2011, www.state.gov

The United States has met the 1 percent, 20 percent, and 45 percent treaty milestones. To date we have destroyed more than 89 percent of our Category 1 chemical weapons. (1,833 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

Russia, U.S. Under Microscope at Chemical Weapons Pact Meeting

Global Security Newswire, 30 November 2011, www.gsn.nti.org

Member nations of the CWC this week are considering a plan for addressing the Russian and U.S. inability to eliminate stockpiles of lethal materials by the 2012 deadline set under the international accord. (714 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CMA Progress at a Glance

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 07 December 2011, www.cma.army.mil

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) progress as of November 22, 2011. (619 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

Conference Outcomes Bolster OPCW's Future Agenda

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 09 December 2011, www.opcw.org

The 16th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC delivered a number of decisions that will position the OPCW to meet new challenges in the years ahead as the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles nears completion. (626 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

History of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

U.S. Department of State, 06 December 2011, www.state.gov

The effort to end nuclear explosive testing has spanned five decades with efforts culminating in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was opened for signature in 1996.

(513 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011



COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT) (CONT.)

Further U.S. Nuclear Tests Highly Unlikely: Former NNSA Chief

Global Security Newswire, 29 November 2011, www.gsn.nti.org

The United States is “almost certain” never to conduct another test detonation of a nuclear device, a former top U.S. nuclear weapons official said on Monday. (1,008 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

Indonesia’s Ratification of CTBT Should Prompt Action by Hold-Out States

Arms Control Association, 06 December 2011, www.armscontrolnow.org

Today, the Indonesian parliament approved the ratification of the 1996 CTBT, bringing the number ratifications necessary for entry into force down from 9 to 8. (592 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

Obama, Clinton Praise Indonesia over Nuclear Treaty Ratification

Associated Press December 07, 2011 www.thejakartaglobe.com

U.S. President Barack Obama has praised Indonesia for ratifying the CTBT, a move which brought the pact one step closer to coming into force. (385 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW)

Talks on Curbing Cluster Weapons Fizzle and Fail [OPINION]

The Economist, 03 December 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Four years of bargaining over cluster munitions have failed – despite a drive by America, backed by Russia and China, to promote a deal that would have curbed but not banned the devices. (655 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

Celebrating 20 Years of Nunn-Lugar

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 December 2011, www.carnegieendowment.org/

December 12 marks the twentieth anniversary of one of the most innovative and important nonproliferation initiatives of the post-Cold War period: the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. (621 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

[back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT)

Why the Conference on Disarmament Still Matters [OPINION]

Fissile Materials Working Group, 30 November 2011, www.thebulletin.org/

Why? Because only CD consensus can lead to a global agreement on nonproliferation and disarmament. While the CD can be maddening, no other forums offer buy-in by all major powers. (1,640 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

UN General Assembly Presses Conference on Disarmament to End Impasse

Global Security Newswire, 05 December 2011, www.gsn.nti.org

The UN General Assembly on Friday expressed its "grave concern" over the continued impasse at the international Conference on Disarmament. (535 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms

U.S. Department of State, 01 December 2011, www.state.gov

Strategic offensive arms data as of September 1, 2011, as drawn from the exchange of data by the Parties. (280 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russia to Start Construction of Borey-A Class Nuclear Submarines in 2012

RIA Novosti, 03 December 2011, <http://en.rian.ru>

Russia will start building modernized Borey-A class strategic nuclear-powered submarines in 2012, the Sevmash shipyard said. (241 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russian Navy to Receive 1st Graney Class Attack Submarine by End of 2012

RIA Novosti, 03 December 2011, <http://en.rian.ru>

The delivery of the first Graney class nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine to the Russian Navy has been postponed until the end of 2012 due to additional tests of its weapons systems, the Sevmash shipyard said. (280 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Montana Senators Oppose ICBM Cuts

Global Security Newswire, 09 December 2011, www.gsn.nti.org

The U.S. senators from Montana this week warned Defense Secretary Leon Panetta of dangers that would accompany reductions to the nation's arsenal of nuclear-tipped ICBMs. (382 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011



OPEN SKIES TREATY

Russian Inspectors Carry Out Reconnaissance Flight over U.S. Skies

ITAR TASS, 28 November 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Russia's military inspectors will carry out aerial reconnaissance flights over U.S. skies within the framework of the Open Skies Treaty in late November – early December. (172 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

VIENNA DOCUMENT

OSCE Makes Progress Updating Vienna Document

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 30 November 2011, www.osce.org/fsc

A special meeting of the [Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE)] Forum for Security Cooperation, currently chaired by Kazakhstan, adopted a decision on November 30, 2011 on reissuing a document that encompasses key OSCE confidence- and security-building measures, the Vienna Document. (263 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

FULL TEXT OF BI-WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Landmine Treaty: Progress in Phnom Penh

Human Rights Watch, 02 December 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/>

The international treaty banning antipersonnel landmines [Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention (APLC) or “Mine Ban Treaty”] is making strong progress toward its objective of a mine-free world, Human Rights Watch said today, as a major meeting on landmines wrapped up in Phnom Penh. However, the United States’ review of its policy has regrettably entered its third year without conclusion, Human Rights Watch said.

“We’ve largely succeeded in stigmatizing this coward’s weapon, but antipersonnel mines continue to claim too many lives and limbs in Cambodia and elsewhere years after they were laid,” said Steve Goose, arms division director at Human Rights Watch. “It is very encouraging that more and more countries continue to embrace the movement to ban landmines, and that impressive progress is being made in landmine clearance and stockpile destruction.”

The Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively prohibits antipersonnel mines and requires their clearance and assistance to victims. A total of 158 nations are party to the treaty, which entered into force on March 1, 1999, and another two states have signed, but not yet ratified.

A total of 97 countries participated in the Mine Ban Treaty’s Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, held in Phnom Penh from November 27 to December 2, 2011 – 82 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and 15 countries that have not yet joined. Observer delegations participated from China, India, Burma, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam.

The meeting reviewed progress and challenges in implementation and universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Major developments included the following:

- Finland’s minister of international development, Heidi Hautala, announced that her government will join the treaty in the coming weeks;
- Somalia declared that it would join in the next few months, if not sooner;
- The two newest treaty members – South Sudan, the world’s newest nation, and Tuvalu – actively participated in the meeting;
- Turkey announced it has completed the destruction of its stockpile of 2.9 million antipersonnel landmines, a very significant achievement since it had missed its treaty-mandated deadline of March 1, 2008;
- Belarus, which also missed its stockpile destruction deadline of March 1, 2008, said it would complete the job in May 2013; and

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

- Burundi and Nigeria declared the completion of their mine clearance obligations, bringing the total of mine-free states parties to 18.

“The United States needs to stop sitting in the back row as an observer in Mine Ban Treaty talks,” Goose said. “The United States needs to conclude its landmine policy review, join the rest of the international community that has rejected this weapon, and play a positive leadership role.”

In late 2009, the United States began a comprehensive landmine policy review initiated at the direction of President Obama. The Clinton administration, in 1998, set the objective of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in 2006, but the Bush administration reversed course in February 2004, and announced that it did not intend to join.

The United States and nearly all of the 38 other states that remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty are in *de facto* compliance with most of the treaty’s provisions. Every NATO member has forsworn the use of antipersonnel mines except for the United States, as have other key allies, including Afghanistan and Iraq.

The United States has not used antipersonnel mines since 1991, in the first Gulf War, has not exported them since 1992, has not produced them since 1997, and is the biggest donor to mine clearance programs around the world. But it still stockpiles millions of antipersonnel mines for potential use.

Cambodia, the host of the meeting, is one of the most mine-affected countries in the world. According to Landmine Monitor, Cambodia has approximately 44,000 survivors of landmines and explosive remnants of war. An extensive mine action program established in 1992 has resulted in a dramatic decline in the number of new mine victims, but lives continue to be lost. There were at least 286 Cambodian casualties in 2010 from mines, explosive remnants of war, and cluster munitions.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Deputy OPCW Director-General Addresses 7th BWC Review Conference

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 06 December 2011, www.opcw.org

Mrs. Grace Asirwatham, the OPCW Deputy Director-General, delivered an address today to the general debate session of the conference, which is taking place at the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland from December 5-22, 2011. She spoke at the invitation of the conference President, Ambassador Paul van den Ijssel of the Netherlands.

The three-week conference is intended to review the implementation of what is formally known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC for short) and to take decisions on its future direction. The Convention was opened for signature in 1972 and currently has 165 States Parties.

In her statement, the Deputy Director-General emphasized the shared history of the BWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which together represent “a crucial barrier against the use of disease or poison against humanity”. She reviewed the current status of CWC implementation and referred to the ongoing debate on the future priorities of the OPCW.

Mrs. Asirwatham reported to the conference that three quarters of declared chemical weapons stockpiles will be destroyed by April 2012, which she termed “an achievement without parallel in disarmament.” She further noted that the OPCW has conducted more than 2,100 industrial inspections to date, and that the annual number will increase from 209 currently to 241 by 2014, which will help to broaden the geographical distribution of industry inspections and significantly reduce the intervals between inspections.

The Deputy Director-General cited four areas of common interest between the two treaties:

- full and effective national implementation;
- the impact of advances in science and technology;
- assistance and protection; and
- promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry and biology.

She concluded by saying that, in preparing for its own 3rd Review Conference in April 2013, the OPCW can benefit from the experience of the BWC conference, and that the OPCW stands ready to provide its experience and expertise to BWC States Parties if so requested.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

U.S. Remarks at the 7th BWC Review Conference

U.S. Department of State, 07 December 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland

Thank you, Mr. President. And I would also like to express my appreciation to all of the delegates and to my colleague, Minister Rosenthal, for his comments. I want to thank the Implementation Support Unit for all the efforts to advance the work here.

I want to start by acknowledging that our countries have accomplished a great deal together under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. One hundred sixty-five states have now committed not to pursue these weapons, and I am delighted to welcome Burundi and Mozambique to the Convention, and I join in urging all states who have not yet done so to join.

President Obama has made it a top goal of his Administration to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, because we view the risk of a bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a foreign policy priority. In an age when people and diseases cross borders with growing ease, bioweapons are a transnational threat, and therefore we must protect against them with transnational action.

The nature of the problem is evolving. The advances in science and technology make it possible to both prevent and cure more diseases, but also easier for states and non-state actors to develop biological weapons. A crude, but effective, terrorist weapon can be made by using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology. Even as it becomes easier to develop these weapons, it remains extremely difficult – as you know – to detect them, because almost any biological research can serve dual purposes. The same equipment and technical knowledge used for legitimate research to save lives can also be used to manufacture deadly diseases.

So of course, we must continue our work to prevent states from acquiring biological weapons. And one of the unsung successes of the Convention is that it has engrained a norm among states against biological weapons. Even countries that have never joined the Convention no longer claim that acquiring such weapons is a legitimate goal. But unfortunately, the ability of terrorists and other non-state actors to develop and use these weapons is growing. And therefore, this must be a renewed focus of our efforts during the next 14 days, as well as the months and years ahead.

Now, I know there are some in the international community who have their doubts about the odds of a mass biological attack or major outbreak. They point out that we have not seen either so far, and conclude the risk must be low. But that is not the conclusion of the United States, because there are warning signs, and they are too serious to ignore.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Terrorist groups have made it known they would want to acquire and use these weapons. And in the 1990s, the apocalyptic cult, Aum Shinrikyo unleashed two attacks in Tokyo by spraying a liquid containing anthrax spores into the air and unleashing sarin gas into the subway. In 2001, we found evidence in Afghanistan that al-Qaida was seeking the ability to conduct bioweapons attacks. And less than a year ago, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for – and I quote – “brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction.”

We all have an interest in ramping up our efforts to prevent outbreaks and attacks and then to be prepared to respond if they do occur. The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States killed five people and sickened 17. More than 10,000 were required to go on to antibiotics. A mass outbreak could cripple an already fragile global economy by cutting off the movement of people, goods, and sparking food shortages. And of course, a victim of an attack could justly as easily travel from one country to another.

So shoring up our domestic and international defenses will make it easier to detect and respond. We need public health systems that can quickly diagnose outbreaks, whatever their source, and mobilize the right medical resources and personnel. By making any one country more secure, we make the international community more secure at the same time.

Two years ago, the Obama Administration released our national strategy for countering biological threats, which is a whole-of-government approach designed to protect the American people and improve our global capacity. We support our partners' efforts to meet new international standards in disease preparedness, detection, and response. We are helping make laboratories safer and more secure, engaging 44 countries in these efforts this year. And since 2007, we've conducted more than a dozen workshops to help train public health and law enforcement officials.

But there is still more to do, and I want to briefly mention three areas.

- *First*, we need to bolster international confidence that all countries are living up to our obligations under the Convention. It is not possible, in our opinion, to create a verification regime that will achieve this goal. But we must take other steps. To begin with, we should revise the Convention's annual reporting systems to ensure that each party is answering the right questions, such as what we are each all doing to guard against the misuse of biological materials.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Countries should also take their own measures to demonstrate transparency. Under our new Bio-Transparency and Openness Initiative, we will host an international forum on health and security to exchange views on biological threats and discuss the evolution of U.S. bioresearch programs. We will underscore that commitment by inviting a few state parties to the Convention to tour a U.S. biodefense facility next year, as Ambassador van den Ijssel and the UN 1540 Committee did this past summer. And we will promote dialogue through exchanges among scientists from the United States and elsewhere. In short, we are intending and our meeting our obligation to the full letter and spirit of the treaty, and we wish to work with other nations to do so as well.

- *Second*, we must strengthen each country's ability to detect and respond to outbreaks and improve international coordination. As President Obama said earlier this year at the UN, "We must come together to prevent and detect and fight every kind of biological danger, whether it's a pandemic like H1N1, or a terrorist threat, or a terrible disease." Five years ago, 194 countries came together at the World Health Organization and committed to build our core capacities by June 2012, and we should redouble our efforts to meet that goal. We will support the WHO in this area, and I urge others to join us.
- *Finally*, we need thoughtful international dialogue about the ways to maximize the benefits of scientific research and minimize the risks. For example, the emerging gene synthesis industry is making genetic material widely available. This obviously has many benefits for research, but it could also potentially be used to assemble the components of a deadly organism. So how do we balance the need for scientific freedom and innovation with the necessity of guarding against such risks?

There is no easy answer, but it begins with open conversations among governments, the scientific community, and other stakeholders, in this forum and elsewhere. We have recently had our U.S. President's Commission on Bioethics develop ethical principles that could be helpful in this dialogue, and we urge a discussion about them. Ambassador Kennedy and the U.S. team look forward to working with all of you for a strong set of recommendations.

And let me conclude by saying we know the biological threats we face today are new, but our commitment to face threats together is not. More than 85 years ago, after the horrors of World War I, the international community took a stand against the use of poison gases and bacteriological weapons. And nearly a half-century later, that shared commitment brought us together to adopt the Biological Weapons Convention. So in that same spirit, let us move forward to address the challenges we face together in the 21st century. Thank you very much.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



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DTRA

Russia Urges Verification Powers Be Added to BWC Regime

Global Security Newswire, 08 December 2011, www.gsn.nti.org

Russia would like to see a mandatory verification system established for the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] to ensure that member nations are abiding by their obligations not to develop or store disease materials for offensive purposes, ITAR-Tass reported December 7. Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov said a verification protocol was needed as "ordinary transparency measures, with all their importance and usefulness, cannot give such certainty."

The Biological Weapons Convention prohibits the development, purchase or possession of disease agents or toxins that lack a peaceful justification, as well as associated delivery systems. The treaty lacks a formal verification mechanism, relying instead on voluntary measures – such as the optional submission of public reports by Stated Parties. Member nations this week opened the seventh five-year treaty review conference for the accord in Geneva, Switzerland.

The United States does not support a binding verification mechanism, partly on the grounds that the biological science research community is too diffuse and complex for such a regime to be practical. Speaking at the conference yesterday, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged that the pact's annual reporting section instead be amended to "ensure that each party is answering the right questions, such as what we are each all doing to guard against the misuse of biological materials."

Gatilov called for membership of the Biological Weapons Convention be expanded to include all nations. To date, 165 nations have ratified the pact. "We cannot but be worried by the fact that three dozen states remain outside the convention," the Russian deputy minister said. "Some of them are located in areas of regional instability, which exacerbates the situation further. ... We believe that this situation is extremely dangerous. To make the convention universal is our common priority." He urged all states parties to "comply with their obligations in good faith" to ensure that extremists and criminals are not gaining access to dangerous pathogens.

"We regret that there are still many state parties where laws to implement the convention have not been put into effect or do not exist at all," the Russian diplomat said, urging that the conference be used to address the deficiency. He added that Moscow is ready to supply specialists to assist other nations in improving their domestic regulations to bring them into compliance with the convention.

"We have to note again that more than half of the states parties ... still fail to comply with their obligation to annually submit information on their biological facilities and biological activities," he

 back to top

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

said. "The lack of information concerning biological activities of any country inevitably makes us question whether the convention is being implemented in good faith."

Gatilov urged more attention be paid to monitoring the latest developments in biological research and technology for potential projects that "conflict with the [BWC] provisions." He called for the convention to consider what key areas of biotechnology development should come under further scrutiny. "We cannot let the biological research cross the thin line that can open the way to the production of biological weapons."

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

U.S. Address to the 16th Conference of the States Parties to the CWC

U.S. Department of State, 28 November 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Robert P. Mikulak, U.S. Permanent Representative to the 16th Session of the Conference of the States Parties, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in The Hague, Netherlands

I am pleased to be here among so many colleagues at the Sixteenth Conference of the States Parties. [...] The first priority this week must be to bring the 2012 budget negotiation to a successful conclusion, drawing on our culture of cooperation and consensus building.

The U.S. Delegation supports in principle the proposal by the Director-General for an increase in both industry inspections and in funding for international cooperation. My delegation is committed to finding a holistic solution that will strengthen both industry verification and international cooperation and assistance. Both elements are important for achieving the goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

A fundamental goal of this Organization that is certainly on everyone's mind this week is the total destruction of chemical weapons. For the United States, the safe and environmentally sound destruction of more than 27 thousand metric tons of assorted chemical weapons has been an enormous challenge. The United States has made significant strides towards meeting this challenge, and I am proud to report on these achievements.

The United States has met the 1 percent, 20 percent, and 45 percent treaty milestones. To date we have destroyed more than 89 percent of our Category 1 chemical weapons. The United States has also destroyed all of our former chemical weapons production facilities. I am pleased to announce that since we met last December, the United States has completed destruction activities at two more stockpile sites. On September 22, 2011, the United States completed destruction of all chemical weapons at the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Alabama. And on October 25, 2011, the United States completed destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile at Umatilla, Oregon.

This brings the number of chemical weapons destruction facilities that have completed operations to six. Now the United States has only one chemical weapons destruction facility operating, at Tooele, Utah, with two additional sites under construction. The destruction at Tooele is 99.9 percent complete and will be finished before the final extended deadline of April 29, 2012. To date, the United States has expended an estimated 23.7 billion dollars for the destruction of chemical weapons in the United States.

Over many years, the United States has addressed and resolved complex safety and environmental concerns raised by state and local authorities, as well as local citizens living near

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

our chemical weapons storage and destruction facilities. Technical issues that arose in the course of destruction operations have also been surmounted. We have made, and will continue to make, every effort to ensure that our chemical weapons are destroyed consistent with the CWC: safely, without harm to workers, people living near the facility, or the environment; verifiably, under the eyes of OPCW inspectors; and as rapidly as practicable. In 2011, this commitment was reaffirmed by both the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and by the U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton.

We are also committed to transparency of our chemical weapons destruction program, so that States Parties can evaluate our efforts for themselves. To that end, we have provided 90-day reports for the past five and one-half years that track our progress in three-month intervals. We have also made informal destruction presentations at every informal meeting of the Executive Council on chemical weapons destruction to offer frank and honest information on our program.

We have invited Executive Council representatives to make site visits to our facilities and meet with senior officials – which allow an opportunity for these representatives to judge for themselves what we are doing, based on their own observations. In fact, the participants in an Executive Council visit to two U.S. facilities in March 2011 stressed that they came away with a better understanding of the local and technical challenges the United States has successfully overcome and the strong U.S. commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Tomorrow ... the U.S. Delegation will provide an informal presentation on the status of U.S. chemical weapons destruction efforts, which will be delivered by Mr. Andrew Weber, the senior Defense Department official in charge of this program. We offered a similar presentation last year, which garnered considerable interest. This year Mr. Weber has returned to demonstrate our continuing commitment to transparency and 100 percent destruction. The United States will continue to provide the transparency measures necessary to ensure that the States Parties of this Organization have confidence in our chemical weapons destruction efforts.

This week, the Conference must take a fundamental decision on the way forward for this Organization regarding the likelihood that the United States and Russia will miss the April 29, 2012 final extended deadline for the complete destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles. We welcome the action taken by the Executive Council last week to forward a recommendation to the Conference. The recommended draft decision garnered overwhelming support in the Executive Council and is the result of two years of negotiation. It has many shortcomings, but it represents a precarious balance of interests and concerns.

Last week, the Executive Council demonstrated the political will to deal seriously and decisively with this important issue. This week it will be incumbent on the Conference to recognize the

[back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

results of two years of intense negotiations and demonstrate equal political will in adopting the draft resolution recommended by the Executive Council. We hope that it can be approved by consensus, or if consensus is not present, by an overwhelming majority.

One of the most important developments of the last twelve months was the Director-General's initiative to begin a dialogue with States Parties on the future of the OPCW. We welcome this initiative. The report of the advisory group, and the Director General's comments, provide a broad strategic vision and a number of very useful recommendations. I look forward to continuing discussions on the future of the OPCW with colleagues, a process that began in September with the very useful ambassadorial-level retreat at Noordwijk. This topic will naturally also be a critical element in our preparations for the Third Review Conference.

There is naturally a tendency to think of the future of the OPCW in terms of the advisory group report. But we also need to be aware that some of the decisions that we are addressing this week also will have a major influence on whether the OPCW continues to be a successful and effective international organization – an organization that is a model and an inspiration to others. I have already mentioned the importance of the Conference taking a decision on the 2012 deadline issue.

One less prominent, but still important practical issue affecting the future of the OPCW is the extension of the Director-General's authority to grant limited exceptions to the seven-year tenure restriction. It was a significant achievement for the Executive Council to recommend that the Conference renew this authority. The Conference must approve this decision so that those experts who are needed for verification may be retained.

Another decision that is important for the future is the proposed Agreed Framework on Article XI. I have already indicated U.S. support for increased funding for international cooperation and assistance in the 2012 budget. In the Executive Council we are close to a consensus recommendation to the Conference. I would urge delegations to focus on what can be agreed to in this text and not to insist on trying to resolve very sensitive export control-related matters.

Adoption of an agreed framework will provide the Technical Secretariat guidance on areas that States Parties consider particularly important for future work. In particular, the focus on strengthening chemical safety and security programs will help States Parties deal with new security threats and at the same time facilitate development of their chemical industries. In support of this work the United States, in addition to supporting additional Article XI-related funding in the regular budget, has made a voluntary contribution of more than \$500,000 to allow the Technical Secretariat to improve and expand its chemical safety and security programs.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Bringing the seven remaining non-member states, particularly those that may possess chemical weapons, into the Convention, is also clearly essential to realize its objectives fully. Realistically, this will depend more on geopolitical developments than on continued demarches. Nonetheless, the trend of recent developments gives us some encouragement. We should patiently continue to lay the groundwork by efforts at engagement with each of the non-States Parties and take every opportunity to stress that there is no justification for any country to keep the option to have chemical weapons.

Joining the Convention is only the beginning of the story, however, and not the end. The Director-General's annual report on Article VII implementation, which is before us this week, makes clear that 53 percent of States Parties still have much work to do to implement their Article VII obligations fully. In many cases, this unfortunate situation exists fifteen years after the State became legally bound by these obligations. In responding to the Director-General's report, we as States Parties must consider what more can be done to remedy the current very unsatisfactory situation.

The Technical Secretariat, as well as the United States, stands ready to provide Article VII support and technical assistance to any State Party requesting it. It is also important to note that fulfillment of Article VII obligations also satisfies part of CWC States Parties obligations under 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540. When a State Party takes this important step, another gap is closed, and our collective security is enhanced.

As possessor States continue working hard to complete the destruction of their remaining stockpiles, the OPCW must also remain focused on preventing the acquisition of chemical weapons. The provisions of Article VI are key tools for ensuring the nonproliferation of chemical weapons. The Convention compels us to maintain visibility of not only those facilities producing Scheduled chemicals, but also "other chemical production facilities" [OCPF] that could be misused for the illicit production of chemical weapons. This particular group of facilities is both diverse and vast – more than 4,000 so-called OCPF sites are declared to the Technical Secretariat annually.

Because our verification resources are not limitless, it is incumbent upon us, the States Parties, to ensure that the most relevant of these facilities are credibly verified. To this end, States Parties should consider further improvements to site selection procedures and discuss ways to increase the efficiency of the declaration and inspection regime without compromising its effectiveness. In this regard, the United States welcomes two important achievements in 2011:

- the adoption at EC-65 of a site selection methodology that leads to the selection of sites of most relevance for inspection; and

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011



- the adoption at EC-66 of an agreement that will help to determine the number and frequency of industry inspections.

We must carry forward this positive momentum into 2012 to continue to improve the industry inspection regime.

Regarding speechmaking, U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt once said, "Be sincere; be brief; be seated." With that, I request that this statement be circulated as an official document to the 16th Session of the Conference. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Russia, U.S. Under Microscope at Chemical Weapons Pact Meeting

Global Security Newswire, 30 November 2011, www.gsn.nti.org

Member nations of the Chemical Weapons Convention this week are considering a plan for addressing the Russian and U.S. inability to eliminate stockpiles of lethal materials by the 2012 deadline set under the international accord. A 41-state council to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the convention's verification body, earlier this month approved recommendations for how to deal with the delays, but details have not been released.

Preliminary discussion of the draft declaration occurred behind closed doors on Wednesday at the annual meeting of the 188 states parties to the pact. No action will occur before Thursday, OPCW spokesman Michael Luhan said on Wednesday. The document, the product of two years of negotiations, "has many shortcomings, but it represents a precarious balance of interests and concerns," according to Robert Mikulak, U.S. permanent representative to the Hague, Netherlands-based organization. "We hope that it can be approved by consensus or, if consensus is not present, by an overwhelming majority," he added on Tuesday in his opening statement to the conference.

Russia and the United States both joined the convention in 1997, pledging that within 10 years they would eliminate their world's-largest stockpiles of chemical warfare materials. These include mustard blister agent and VX and sarin nerve agents. The two former Cold War foes received five-year extensions to April 29, 2012, as the first deadline approached. Washington has spent nearly \$24 billion on disposal operations and has destroyed more than 89 percent of its Category 1 chemical weapons – those filled with materials considered to pose a high threat to the convention, Mikulak told delegates.

"We have made, and will continue to make, every effort to ensure that our chemical weapons are destroyed consistent with the CWC: safely, without harm to workers, people living near the facility, or the environment; verifiably, under the eyes of OPCW inspectors; and as rapidly as practicable," he said. The U.S. Army's Chemical Materials Agency is expected to finish demilitarization work by next April. A separate service branch is assigned to eliminate the last 10 percent of the United States' declared 29,918 tons of chemical warfare materials and is still building destruction plants in two states.

The U.S. government has openly acknowledged that disposal operations will continue at least six years past next year's mandatory end date. The effort has been slowed by fluctuating funding over the years and has faced "complex safety and environmental concerns" from local and state governments and residents near the chemical storage depots, Mikulak said. Those issues forced the Defense Department to develop new chemical neutralization facilities for

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky, rather than using incineration technology deployed at most other weapons storage sites.

Russia, meanwhile, expects it will need until 2015 to complete its disposal operations. The Kremlin said last month that it had finished off roughly 65 percent of its 40,000-metric ton chemical stockpile.

Member states of the Chemical Weapons Convention are unlikely to deliver penalties against the two powers, such as barring them from voting on OPCW matters, issue experts have said. "The gist of the emerging approach is to enable the two possessor states to complete their destruction programs while they, on their part, agree to implement an enhanced package of transparency- and confidence-building measures," OPCW chief Ahmet Üzümcü said in an October speech to the UN First Committee in New York.

Üzümcü on Monday called the Executive Council recommendation a "constructive and forward-looking decision," and echoed Mikulak's hopes that the declaration would be approved by consensus. The Conference of States Parties to the convention makes almost all decisions by consensus. If that is not possible in this matter, a decision would have to be made whether to put the declaration to a vote, where it would require a two-thirds majority to be approved.

Iran, a longtime antagonist to the United States, suggested it would not support the plan. "It is imperative that we have a comprehensive approach toward the complete destruction of all chemical weapons," Iranian envoy Kazem Gharib Abadi told the conference on Monday. "We cannot simply close our eyes to the complicated and sensitive dimensions of this subject matter and attempt as announced by America to explore a political solution to this issue. Unfortunately, the United States of America expresses its view as if nothing has happened." [...]

[back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

CMA Progress at a Glance

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 07 December 2011, www.cma.army.mil

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) progress as of November 22, 2011:

Anniston Chemical Activity, Alabama

Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) closure activities have been ongoing since the last chemical munition in the Anniston inventory was destroyed on September 22. Since then, employees have been removing heating and air conditioning carbon filters, chemical agent collection systems and equipment from the explosion containment vestibule. The ANCDF met Treaty and Surety termination requirements allowing the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on-site treaty team to leave Anniston.

At the Anniston Chemical Activity (ANCA), employees continue to monitor and clean igloos that once stored munitions. Due to the realignment of the ANCA mission from munition storage to closure, preparations for a Reduction in Force are underway this month and letters were issued November 29.

Blue Grass Chemical Activity, Kentucky

Blue Grass Chemical Activity (BGCA) will continue Igloo Filtration System testing through January 2012. Senator McConnell's and Senator Paul's Congressional Staffs toured BGCA on November 30. BGCA is involved in monthly speakers' bureau events to educate local communities on safe storage and to build a stronger community relationship. BGCA is now available to view and "like" on Facebook. Please let them hear from you!

Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah

Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) workers are processing the remaining 155 mm mustard projectiles. On November 10, workers at the Area 10 Liquid Incinerator (ATLIC) safely completed destruction of Deseret Chemical Depot's (DCD) stockpile of GA nerve agent. This represents complete disposal of DCD's nerve agent as well as the first chemical disposal operations to take place at the ATLIC, which commenced October 31. Workers at the ATLIC are preparing for the final agent destruction campaign to destroy DCD's small stockpile of lewisite blister agent.

The Tooele Army Depot has received approval to obtain DCD facilities and property when the chemical weapons storage mission is complete. The official transfer of authority will be in July 2013 during an official casing of the colors ceremony, marking the end of DCD's command.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas

Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (PBCDF) received approval of the closure certification from the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality for five of the eleven Hazardous Waste Management Units at PBCDF. These units include: the Dunnage Room, Agent Collection System, Deactivation Furnace System, Process Utility Building and the Container Handling Building. Refractory brick removal from the Liquid Incinerator was completed on November 16. All the agent perimeter monitoring stations have been removed from their various locations at the Pine Bluff Arsenal.

Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado

Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) stores mustard-filled munitions: 105 mm projectiles and cartridges, 155 mm projectiles and 4.2-inch mortar cartridges. Lt. Col. Greenhaw, PCD Commander, was a keynote speaker at the annual Veterans Day celebration in Pueblo, Colorado, held at the Colorado State University Pueblo Campus for the rededication of the Southeast Asia War Memorial.

Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon

Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) closure activities are in full swing following the October 25 completion of chemical agent disposal operations at the facility. Demolition activities in the Brine Reduction Area (BRA) Pollution Abatement System (PAS), including removal of the BRA PAS exhaust stack and removal of the last major piece of the BRA baghouse, were completed November 16. In addition, workers have completed removal of the refractory brick in the Deactivation Furnace System and have removed equipment from Explosive Containment Room (ECR) A. ECR B equipment removal is underway.

On November 15, the Surety Termination Packet was signed by the Umatilla Chemical Depot (UMCD) Commander following the completion of surety agent flush requirements. The action rescinds the security requirements of Army Regulation 190-59 initiating installation-wide changes through the UMCD Surety Termination Action Plan.

[back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Conference Outcomes Bolster OPCW's Future Agenda

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 09 December 2011, www.opcw.org

The 16th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention delivered a number of decisions that will position the [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)] to meet new challenges in the years ahead as the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles nears completion.

The Conference took place from November 28 – December 2, 2011 in The Hague and was chaired by Ambassador Paul Arkwright of the United Kingdom. It was attended by representatives of 131 States Parties to the Convention, two Signatory States (Israel and Myanmar), 21 [non-governmental organization (NGOs)] and chemical industry associations, and several international organizations. Among the key decisions taken by the Conference, *inter alia*:

Final extended deadline for destruction of declared chemical weapons

Three possessor States – Libya, Russia and the United States – had notified the OPCW that they will not meet the final extended deadline of April 29, 2012. The Conference decision noted the statements by these countries underlining their unequivocal commitment to completing destruction of their stockpiles, and imposed additional measures to be taken by the possessor States. These measures include the preparation of detailed destruction plans with completion dates to be submitted to the Executive Council immediately after expiration of the deadline.

2012 Program and Budget

For the seventh consecutive year, the Conference adopted a zero-based growth Program and Budget for 2012, totaling 70.5 million Euros. Its decision welcomed the continued implementation of result-based budgeting with key performance indicators, which was introduced by the Technical Secretariat in 2011, and underlined the need to further develop this process.

Chemical industrial inspections (Article VI)

The Conference decision on the 2012 Program and Budget also welcomed new policy guidelines adopted by the Executive Council for determining the number of industrial inspections under Article VI of the Convention, which aim to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons. Under the guidelines, the annual number of industrial inspections will be

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

gradually scaled up from 209 currently, to 241 in 2014, using a revised selection methodology that focuses on industrial facilities of most concern to the Convention.

International Cooperation (Article XI)

Of the 188 States Parties to the Convention, only seven have declared possession of chemical weapons stockpiles and fewer than half have chemical industries that are subject to inspection under Article VI of the Convention. The OPCW's international cooperation programs, which promote the peaceful uses of chemistry, provide an important benefit for such States Parties that enhances their engagement with the Organization and sense of ownership.

The Conference adopted a decision on the components of an agreed framework for implementing Article XI, and requested the Executive Council to explore additional measures within the framework to ensure the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of all Article XI provisions.

Tenure policy

Preserving the continuity of knowledge and expertise in the Technical Secretariat is of vital importance for ensuring the ability of the Organization to maintain operational effectiveness. The Conference decided, as a one-time measure, to extend until 2016 the exceptional authority of the Director-General to grant contract extensions or renewals to staff members beyond the seven-year length of service stipulated by OPCW regulations. The exceptional authority applies to the operational requirements of verification and inspection of destruction-related activities. The Conference decision limits the total amount of service to 10 years.

Executive Council membership

The Conference elected 20 States Parties to the Council for 2-year terms starting May 12, 2012 for the following elective places:

- Africa: Algeria, Libya, South Africa, Sudan;
- Asia: Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Qatar;
- Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Russia, Ukraine;
- Latin America and the Caribbean: Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru; and
- Western Europe and Other States: Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Norway, Portugal.

The new States Parties will join 21 other members of the Council that were elected in 2010.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011



History of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

U.S. Department of State, 06 December 2011, www.state.gov

The effort to end nuclear explosive testing has spanned five decades with efforts culminating in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was opened for signature in 1996.

The first nuclear explosive test was conducted by the United States on July 16, 1945. The Soviet Union followed with its first nuclear test on August 29, 1949. By the mid-1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union were both conducting high-yield thermonuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere.

The radioactive fallout from those tests drew criticism from around the globe. The international community's concern about the effects on health and the environment continued to grow. In 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposed a ban on all nuclear testing. The increasing public concern over explosive tests led to the negotiation and entry into force of the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (LTBT). This treaty banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, but underground tests were still permitted.

When the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] was being negotiated in 1968, a comprehensive test-ban was discussed, but the international community failed to reach agreement on the issue. Advocates for a ban on explosive testing persisted.

In 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, also known as the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty (TTBT). It established a nuclear "threshold" by prohibiting the United States and the Soviet Union from conducting tests that would produce a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT). The mutual restraint imposed by the treaty reduced the explosive force of new nuclear warheads and bombs, which could otherwise be tested for weapons systems.

The TTBT was not intended as a substitute for a comprehensive test-ban. Article I of the treaty states that, "the Parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests." In 1976, scientists from different countries formed the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) and began conducting joint research into monitoring technologies and data analysis methods for the verification of a comprehensive test-ban.

Almost two decades later, the Cold War ended, bringing with it increased possibilities for progress on disarmament and self-imposed testing moratoriums from the United States and the former Soviet Union. Capitalizing on this momentum, the United Nations' disarmament body, the

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, began formal negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1994.

Capitalizing on the GSE's research, the CD was able to reach consensus on the verification regime. Other parts of the negotiations proved more difficult, but members of the CD were able to find common ground and move forward. Australia submitted the Treaty to the UN General Assembly, where it was adopted on September 10, 1996 and opened for signature on September 24, 1996.

Since then, 182 nations have signed the CTBT, and 156 have ratified it. Of the 44 nations whose ratifications are specifically required by the treaty for it to enter into force, 41 have signed and 36 have ratified.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Further U.S. Nuclear Tests Highly Unlikely: Former NNSA Chief

Global Security Newswire, 29 November 2011, www.gsn.nti.org

The United States is “almost certain” never to conduct another test detonation of a nuclear device, a former top U.S. nuclear weapons official said on Monday. In the nearly 20 years since the nation’s last nuclear trial, technological alternatives to such detonations have advanced substantially while political obstacles to testing have grown close to insurmountable, said Linton Brooks, who headed the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA] from 2002 to 2007 under President George W. Bush.

The negotiation in the early 1990s of a global ban on atomic trial blasts marked “the beginning of the end of the U.S. nuclear testing era,” Arms Control Association head Daryl Kimball added in a panel discussion. The independent expert called for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty [CTBT], which the Senate previously rejected in 1999. Upon taking legal effect, the pact would prohibit explosive nuclear testing by any member state.

“The United States current bears all the responsibilities of a CTBT signatory state, but because we haven’t ratified, we do not enjoy the considerable benefits of a legally binding global ban,” including the ability to demand on-site inspections of suspected violators, Kimball said.

The 182-signatory pact cannot become binding until it is ratified by 44 “Annex 2” states that participated in drafting the 1996 treaty while operating nuclear power or research facilities. Nine of those nations have yet to acquire legislative approval for the agreement: China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States.

The U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program has achieved significant strides in obviating the need for test explosions to ensure the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure and reliable, Brooks said. The effort, which includes surveillance of aging weapons and production of replacement components, is overseen by the semiautonomous Energy Department agency he once led.

During his tenure, Congress repeatedly refused to provide funding for basic preparations that would be required to resume testing. “We aren’t going to test,” Brooks said. “Therefore, the question is not, ‘Should you support stockpile stewardship because you like the CTBT?’ The question is, ‘Should you support stockpile stewardship because you think it’s important that nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, reliable and effective?’”

Nuclear test blasts carried out during the Cold War were not intended to confirm that fielded U.S. systems operated as intended, said the former official, now a consultant to four Energy Department laboratories and a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Studies in Washington. “This was not like you pull every 18th device off an assembly line and test it to make sure it works,” he said. “It gathered data, it was a tool of scientific exploration. And the question, therefore, for the Stockpile Stewardship [Program] is, ‘Can we replace that tool [testing] with another?’”

Advocates consider the treaty a means of discouraging explosive tests necessary for the development of new or more sophisticated nuclear weapons, but detractors contend that a U.S. pledge never to conduct such work could undermine confidence in the country’s nuclear deterrent.

The Obama administration has pledged to bring the treaty before the Senate for ratification, though the schedule for that initiative remains unclear. Kimball warned that insufficient time remains for the Senate to scrutinize, debate and vote on the test-ban treaty prior to the November 2012 elections.

To help lay the groundwork for legislative consideration of the pact in 2013, the Obama administration should “step up its CTBT outreach work and ... pursue a fact-based, quiet discussion with Senate offices and staff about the issues that are at the center of the [treaty] discussion,” he said.

Brooks said he had observed no serious discussion of a potential resumption in regular U.S. nuclear testing. “What’s on at the very most, even from enthusiasts for testing outside the government, is two or three tests. And nobody is prepared to divert the funds from stockpile stewardship into two or three tests,” he said. “There is no plausible situation in which current stockpile stewardship and the deep scientific understanding ... will not be enough to ensure the safety, security and reliability of our nuclear weapons for the indefinite future,” Brooks later added.

The program “has been successful to date,” though its future effectiveness would depend on updates to nuclear weapons facilities and a continued infusion of skilled personnel, said Marvin Adams, a veteran nuclear weapons scientist who has served at the Los Alamos, Sandia and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories.

To date, the U.S. arsenal’s safety, security and reliability – and the absence of need for new tests – has been verified each year by the Defense and Energy secretaries, the directors of the three nuclear-weapon laboratories and the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, Adams said. Brooks noted that the NNSA administrator cannot influence the findings of the annual stockpile assessment.

[back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Brooks said he was unaware of any proposal for a new nuclear weapon that would require testing, including a potential deep earth penetrator. "It's not just against our current policy, it's solving a problem that we don't appear to have," he said.

The former NNSA chief said he had not heard from technical experts "opposed to the CTBT" any potential "safety or security problem that's so great that the only way you can fix it was to involve nuclear testing." In addition, it is "extremely difficult" to conceive of a problem that would require testing to diagnose a problem or certify a solution, he said.

Putting the treaty into effect might deter Iran from potentially conducting a nuclear-weapon test, panel experts suggested. The Middle Eastern nation maintains its uranium enrichment operations are strictly civilian in nature.

Brooks noted, though, that every past test of a uranium-based weapon has proven successful, and South Africa maintained a small nuclear arsenal for a period with no testing. "CTBT does not prevent people from developing nuclear weapons," he said. If Iran opted against nuclear testing under a potential CTBT regime, it would have less confidence in any nuclear-capable missile it produced, Adams said. The nation might still move to produce such delivery systems, he added.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Indonesia's Ratification of CTBT Should Prompt Action by Hold-Out States

Arms Control Association, 06 December 2011, www.armscontrolnow.org

Today, the Indonesian parliament approved the ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, bringing the number ratifications necessary for entry into force down from 9 to 8. We hope to “create new momentum so that the other countries in a similar position to Indonesia can also follow suit in beginning their ratification process,” Indonesia's Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said in September 2011.

“We want our country to be at the vanguard of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,” said Hemly Fauzy, the Indonesian Parliament's coordinator for the CTBT ratification. “We intend to extend our involvement in the CTBT beyond the Treaty's ratification,” he said. Support for the CTBT in the Indonesian Parliament was unanimous across its nine parties.

As [the Arms Control Association's (ACA's)] press statement from earlier today notes, although ratification by key countries is still needed and the long journey to end testing is not over, with Indonesian ratification we are one step closer. Formal entry into force of the CTBT requires that a specific group of 44 states named in Annex 2 of the treaty have ratified. Eight more Annex 2 states must still ratify the treaty, including the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Iran and North Korea

Ratification by the United States and China is particularly important. Given their existing nuclear test moratoria and 1996 signature of the CTBT, Washington and Beijing already bear most CTBT-related responsibilities, yet their failure to ratify has denied them – and others – the full security benefits of CTBT entry into force.

In his address before the UN General Assembly on September 21, U.S. President Barack Obama said “America will continue to work for a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.” Earlier this year President Obama and President Hu Jintao of China issued a joint statement expressing support for early entry into force of the treaty.

Today in a written statement, President Obama said: “The United States remains fully committed to pursuing ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty and will continue to engage members of the Senate on the importance of this treaty to U.S. security. America must lead the global effort to prevent proliferation, and adoption and early entry into force of the CTBT is a vital part of that effort.”

Now is the time to follow Indonesia's example and to translate lofty words into concrete action. As former Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary and I wrote in September, the case for the CTBT is

 back to top

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

stronger than ever. To indicate the seriousness of his intentions and to sustain the effort, nongovernmental organizations have urged President Obama to promptly name a senior, high-level White House CTBT coordinator.

The process of reconsidering the CTBT must be done deliberately and carefully and will take months, meaning that the next realistic opportunity for the Senate to debate and vote on the treaty will be in 2013 or after. But to build the support necessary for U.S. ratification, the Obama administration and Senators concerned about the nuclear proliferation threat can and must begin to review the new evidence that has accumulated in favor of the treaty beginning now.

As the Obama administration provides updated information, undecided senators have a responsibility to take a serious look at the merits of the treaty in light of the new evidence and not rush to judgment on the basis of old or misleading information.

In a statement issued earlier today in praise of Indonesia's action on the CTBT, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said "My message is clear: Do not wait for others to move first. Take the initiative. Lead. The time for waiting has passed."

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Obama, Clinton Praise Indonesia over Nuclear Treaty Ratification

Associated Press 07 December 2011, www.thejakartaglobe.com

U.S. President Barack Obama has praised Indonesia for ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a move which brought the pact one step closer to coming into force. Obama said the move Indonesia where he spent four years as a boy showed the “positive leadership role” that Indonesia could play in combating the spread of nuclear weapons.

“I urge all states to sign and ratify the agreement so that it can be brought into force at the earliest possible date,” Obama said. The president also said that he will continue to press the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty, which he said was important to future U.S. security. “America must lead the global effort to prevent proliferation, and adoption and early entry into force of the CTBT is a vital part of that effort,” Obama said.

The Senate blocked ratification of the treaty in 1999 and it has still not been ratified, despite a pledge by the Obama administration to seek such a step. Advocates say U.S. ratification of the treaty would send an important signal to the rest of the world on the importance of checking nuclear proliferation. But U.S. critics of the treaty argue that by committing itself to a long-term binding pledge never to test nuclear weapons, the United States could undermine confidence in its atomic weapons arsenal.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also praised Indonesia’s move. “The United States, which has observed a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing since 1992, is committed to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and to its early entry into force,” she said. “The United States calls on all governments to declare or reaffirm their commitment not to conduct explosive nuclear tests, and we urge all states that have not yet ratified the treaty to join us in this effort,” Clinton said in a statement.

So far, the CTBT, which aims to outlaw all nuclear explosions, has been signed by 182 states but 44 key states – all with nuclear technology – need to ratify it before it can come into force. With Indonesia’s vote, 36 of these countries have now ratified the treaty. But among those still missing are North Korea, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, India, China and the United States – all states known to have, or are suspected of developing, nuclear weapons.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Talks on Curbing Cluster Weapons Fizzle and Fail [OPINION]

The Economist, 03 December 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Disarmament talks are getting harder. Efforts to agree on a treaty banning production of fissile material have stalled for years because of objections from Pakistan. Now four years of bargaining over cluster munitions have failed – despite a drive by America, backed by Russia and China, to promote a deal that would have curbed but not banned the devices.

Cluster weapons are a prime target for arms-control campaigners because of their indiscriminate effect. Such bombs or shells typically scatter hundreds of smaller submunitions over an area the size of a football pitch. When they work, they blast the enemy from the battlefield. But not every bomblet explodes. Those that remain menace civilians for decades, maiming, killing and blighting livelihoods. Children suffer most.

Yet for most of the past decade, the big users and producers, the self-styled "key states", have refused to consider any curb on their freedom to use the weapon. For years that stymied attempts to add a protocol on cluster munitions to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). A turning point came in 2006 amid outrage over Israel's use of cluster weapons in Lebanon.

Frustration over the paralysis of the UN process prompted Norway, backed by campaigners, to launch talks on a separate treaty to ban the weapons. By 2008, some 94 countries, including most NATO members, had signed a convention in Oslo that comprehensively banned the production, use, stockpiling or sale and transfer of all cluster munitions. Since then the number of signatories has climbed to 109.

That progress set the wheels turning in the UN talks. The big users and producers made what would once have counted as big concessions: one was a ban on use of the cruder cluster munitions made before 1980. These are the most likely to fail, leaving deadly unexploded bomblets.

In another gesture, the big states backed new rules on reporting the size of stockpiles. Their draft would at least have regulated the cluster munitions held by countries never likely to sign the Oslo agreement – in other words more than 85 percent of world stocks. It would also have led to the destruction of far more devices than the Oslo deal ever could.

To counter the contention that its proposal was a step backwards, America inserted language that allowed for the possibility of higher standards being imposed in future. But those arguments did not impress. The 50-plus countries that opposed the draft protocol, and the campaigners

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

who egged them on, complained that the text still allowed the use of cluster munitions known to cause unacceptable harm. The International Committee of the Red Cross said the American proposal would simply stimulate the development of devices that met the new standards but might still be lethally unreliable; and backsliding from the Oslo rules would set a bad precedent.

The big countries were cross. America (which has argued that a total ban on cluster munitions would make life impossible for NATO) expressed "deep disappointment". Russia grumbled that opponents were "irrational" and China said they would bear indirect responsibility for future cluster-bomb casualties. Whatever their public stance, some smaller countries that rather like cluster munitions may be privately rejoicing over the talks' failure.

The failure also exemplifies the declining clout of the big powers. Delegates in Geneva stressed that in multilateral talks, every country has a vote: mighty states must not count on cajoling weaker ones. And all sides said the process was complicated by the scrutiny of do-gooding outfits. Startled delegates found their interventions relayed to the world by Twitter even before they had finished speaking. Such transparency, some warn, reduces the room for diplomatic maneuver. In talks where the best is often the enemy of the good, this lack of flexibility can cause harm.

Few see much prospect of the CCW returning to cluster bombs in the foreseeable future. Before that happens, the chances are that stray bomblets will ruin or end a lot more innocent lives.

 [back to top](#)

News articles and publications found on the DTIRP website are compilations of open source current news articles and commentary concerning significant arms control treaty and related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, other government organizations, and the media may view these arms control and threat reduction programs and issues. They are intended to serve the informational needs of Department of Defense (DoD) officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions. Further reproduction or redistribution for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. The views and opinions expressed in these articles are not necessarily those supported by DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or the DTIRP.



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Celebrating 20 Years of Nunn-Lugar

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 December 2011, www.carnegieendowment.org/

December 12 marks the twentieth anniversary of one of the most innovative and important nonproliferation initiatives of the post-Cold War period: the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The disintegration of the former Soviet nuclear security apparatus did not result in a major nuclear catastrophe as many experts worried, and CTR is clearly due a significant share of the credit. It has been one of the most successful “whole-of-government” responses to a potentially cataclysmic threat. It remains an important tool today for international cooperation to reduce nuclear dangers, but some tough questions about the continued viability of the model loom.

The CTR program suffered a rough start both in the United States and Russia. In Washington, legislators agreed that the threat of nuclear collapse in the disintegrating Soviet Union was real, but they questioned the imminence of the threat. Many Nunn-Lugar critics in Congress argued that channeling nonproliferation assistance to Russia would simply free up Russian resources for modernizing its nuclear forces. Meanwhile, lawmakers in Moscow also had suspicions about the motives behind CTR and understandably worried about letting the United States anywhere near their nuclear arsenal. And skeptical bureaucrats on both sides, still recovering from their Cold War modus operandi, had trouble accepting an innovative initiative such as CTR. The initial obstacles and subsequent implementation problems rooted in bureaucratic politics and lack of trust made CTR’s eventual achievements even more impressive.

The most important CTR contribution to international security is the non-nuclear status of three post-Soviet republics – Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. When the Soviet Union collapsed, all three states had nuclear weapons on their territories, and the fate of these weapons was far from certain. While CTR was not the sole or even the primary factor to lead all three republics toward denuclearization, it was a critical tool for making it happen. CTR paid for removal and dismantlement of nuclear weapons and all weapons-related infrastructure in all three states.

CTR also significantly reduced proliferation threats stemming from Russia and other post-Soviet states. It assisted Russia with meeting its obligations under START by providing equipment for dismantlement of submarines, bombers, and missiles. CTR programs secured thousands of tons of vulnerable nuclear material, strengthened physical security of scores of nuclear facilities, and enhanced detection capabilities at borders to prevent nuclear material smuggling. Several CTR offshoot programs also engaged thousands of former weapons scientists in civilian projects aimed at preventing “brain-drain” of Soviet scientists to states looking to develop nuclear weapons.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Despite these successes and the acceptance of CTR by Russia and other former Soviet states, the program has suffered growing pains. In part, it has never managed to escape questions from skeptical members of Congress that it is anything more than foreign aid in fancy clothes. In order to demonstrate success, U.S. agencies were pushed to develop metrics for some programs that confused outputs and outcomes. Now, amid the deficit/debt crises in the United States and Europe, funding will diminish and these programs will inevitably contract.

As the mission has evolved beyond destroying delivery vehicles, securing fissile material, and redirecting weapons scientists, some CTR elements appear to be solutions in search of problems. Agencies now look for new countries or new threats against which to apply existing capabilities. Such countries or threats may exist, but current programs as designed for the former Soviet states may not suit them well. Just as Tolstoy observed that each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way, countries with nuclear weapons have unique pathologies. Efforts to mitigate nuclear or other WMD threats effectively in these countries therefore must be customized to each case.

Celebrating twenty years of Nunn-Lugar success is appropriate, but serious thought will be required to guide CTR past major conceptual hurdles going forward.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Why the Conference on Disarmament Still Matters [OPINION]

Fissile Materials Working Group, 30 November 2011, <http://www.thebulletin.org/>

It has expanded from 10 member countries to 65, negotiated seven international nonproliferation and disarmament treaties, and next March turns 52 years old. It is the Conference on Disarmament (CD) – the world's only disarmament negotiating forum – and, for almost 16 years, it has stagnated in deadlock. The ongoing stalemate has led some to question the forum's utility and even to suggest conducting negotiations outside of the multilateral body in order to obtain a treaty to halt the production of fissile materials. This would be a mistake.

Enough fissile material for 100,000 nukes

Since the first nuclear explosion in 1945, enough fissile material for 100,000 nuclear warheads has been produced globally. Over the decades, the accumulation and spread of nuclear weapons material have led to calls for their international control to ensure security, nonproliferation, and disarmament. In 1995, the CD approved a mandate to negotiate a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty" to ban the "production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Such a treaty would have revolutionized nuclear security by limiting the chances that fissile materials are used in nuclear weapons – by state or non-state actors.

Three years later, the mandate was adopted in the CD's program of work, but stalled when consensus fell apart. With the CD in limbo, several countries and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon have suggested the possibility that the UN General Assembly get involved. Meanwhile, at a meeting in August, the five recognized nuclear weapon states – the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China (the "P5" states) – reiterated support for fissile negotiations in the CD. The United States noted, however, that if the CD process failed, it would prefer negotiations led by the P5, which could potentially exclude vital voices that might be found in the CD or the General Assembly.

Either way, the CD's history of negotiations demonstrates that the CD's machinery is not what is holding up talks. Instead, it is countervailing national interests that have deadlocked in response to what has become a distinctly tiered system of nuclear diplomacy. Though it may be tempting for countries to campaign for a solution that includes the General Assembly or the P5 just to move the ball forward, the stalled and often frustrating CD is still the best forum.

Why? Because only CD consensus can lead to a global agreement on nonproliferation and disarmament. While the CD can be maddening, no other forums offer buy-in by all major powers.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Climbing out of windows

The CD and its predecessors have established a range of globally recognized treaties that govern the possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Still, the CD had a slow start and these provisions were far from perfect. A study published in 1989 concluded that "efforts to curb arms have been decidedly meager to date."

But then came the end of the Cold War and the 1990s – years when diplomats were locked in after a day's talks had gone long past UN operating hours and were forced to climb out of the windows of Geneva's Palais des Nations – yielding a flurry of negotiations and agreements:

1. Decades-long negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) came to a close in 1993 with its entry into force four years later – the world's first, and only, internationally verifiable disarmament treaty.
2. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations were held from 1994 to 1996.
3. Parallel negotiations on a compliance protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) began in 1995 (outside of the CD, but inside the Palais).
4. The CD adopted a mandate for negotiating a treaty on fissile materials.

Disarmament diplomacy was on a high. The power of CD consensus facilitated the CWC's entry into force with its unprecedented scope and third-party verification of possession, use, destruction, and nonproliferation of chemical weapons. These weapons were used without restraint throughout the last century, and CWC negotiations were a major global effort, taking nearly 24 years to complete.

But the timeline for consensus was worth it. Today, the world is close to being entirely free of chemical weapons, and – with no state employing them in conflict since 1988 – the world is also enjoying its longest chemical peace in 100 years. Nearly 62 percent of the world's declared stockpile of 71,194 metric tons has been destroyed and the mission is ongoing. In short, the treaty is working.

Unfortunately, disarmament euphoria did not last. Talks on BWC compliance fell apart in 2001, and, while the CTBT opened for signature in 1996, the treaty still waits for eight countries to ratify or accede before it can enter into force. Despite the success of the CWC, the new millennium brought stagnation, disagreements, and shifting global powers. If CD diplomats are climbing out of windows today, it is because of disarmament despair, not a diplomacy high.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Nevertheless, the success of the CWC clearly shows the vital importance of consensus. That's why this despair is not a function of the CD. It is a reflection of a tiered system of nuclear governance.

Haves, have-nots, and non-haves that have

The 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) created a three-tiered system: "haves" (the P5), "have-nots" (non-nuclear weapon states), and "haves that are considered have-nots" (four non-NPT States Parties that possess nuclear weapons – currently, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel). In 2008, a fourth tier was effectively created when India received an exemption by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to make it the only non-NPT state to engage in the global trade of nuclear technology (a move made outside of the CD).

Not surprisingly, Pakistan is less than pleased with the NSG deal. For years, China, Russia, and the United States stalled the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations. Since 2009, Pakistan has taken its turn, offering two ways out of the impasse: either a similar deal is given to Pakistan, or a new treaty is needed to address Pakistan's fissile disparity with India.

These tiers, and tensions between tiers, have also spilled into the peaceful uses of nuclear technology; emerging powers will not accept the continuation of a tiered system, particularly in the nuclear power industry. Although the ramifications of India's "fourth tier" are not yet fully understood, it has clearly put additional strains on CD talks.

With nine possessors of nuclear weapons today, coupled with a potential tenth, any nuclear negotiations leading toward a treaty are going to be long and arduous. But that is the nature of consensus, and it is the only way to create meaningful global treaties. Going outside of the CD, on the other hand, will lead to P5 nations potentially dominating global nuclear policy, the concerns of smaller states not being heard, a diminishment of worldwide goodwill, and the possibility of yet more tiers.

Tales from outside the CD

Notably – and often forgotten – the CD was unable to reach consensus on the CTBT, with India twice opposing the draft text in 1996. It took a procedural move to introduce the treaty's text as a draft resolution to the [United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)] later that year, where it was adopted by more than two-thirds of the General Assembly's membership. But India noted that the draft was a non-consensus text and reiterated its opposition. The CTBT's entry into force provision – requiring India and 43 other countries possessing nuclear reactors to ratify or

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

accede to the convention before enactment – was a breach of international law and affected the sovereignty of India. India also argued the treaty lacked any real commitment toward nuclear disarmament.

Since then, the CTBT has been waiting for eight of the 44 nuclear technology states to ratify or accede to the convention: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States. In effect, the last treaty negotiated in the CD remains in non-consensus. Passing the CTBT through the General Assembly did not alter this reality; it also did not stop several nations – India, Pakistan, and North Korea – from testing nuclear weapons.

Negotiations on the disarmament of conventional weapons tell a similar story. In 1997, when the CD could not reach consensus for a ban on landmines, a process of civil society, global organizations, and governments took the campaign out of Geneva and held international meetings to draft a landmine treaty. A mine ban entered into force less than two years later; a similar process brought the entry into force of a treaty banning cluster munitions in 2010. But, unlike the CWC, the conventional treaties do not provide for international inspection. Moreover, only two (France and the United Kingdom) out of the nine possessors of nuclear weapons have ratified the conventional disarmament treaties. Conversely, all but two (Israel and North Korea) are party to the CWC, and all but Israel are a party to the BWC.

Frustrating but necessary

The CTBT and conventional disarmament treaties demonstrate that the use of forums outside the CD can yield treaties with some impact. But the CD's record underscores that consensus rule is what makes treaties adoptable by major powers and therefore more effective. If circumventing the CD is an attempt to isolate Pakistan (or Iran) from the debate, the result could be similar to landmines or the CTBT – treaties that the United States itself has yet to endorse. I

n other words, the spread of nuclear technology has moved beyond the P5 and NSG, and today's international disarmament negotiations require the multilateral legitimacy of the CD more than ever before. Reconciling interests in the CD may be a frustrating exercise, but it's necessary to reach enforceable global nonproliferation and disarmament treaties. The world is too dangerous for anything short of total consensus.

Editor's Note: This column was written by Cindy Vestergaard, a project researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies and an international partner of the Fissile Materials Working Group.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

UN General Assembly Presses Conference on Disarmament to End Impasse

Global Security Newswire, 05 December 2011, www.gsn.nti.org

The UN General Assembly on Friday expressed its "grave concern" over the continued impasse at the international Conference on Disarmament. The 65-nation conference in 2009 ended a deadlock that had lasted for more than 10 years, agreeing to a work plan that would focus on matters including establishment of a prohibition against the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. While Pakistan initially backed the work plan, it later withdrew its consent and demanded further consideration of the program. Decisions at the conference are made by consensus.

The UN First Committee, which focuses on disarmament and security matters, this year failed to approve a resolution that would have called on the General Assembly to take action if the Geneva, Switzerland-based forum remained paralyzed. Instead, "the assembly, acting without a vote, reiterated "grave concern about the current status of the disarmament machinery, including the lack of substantive progress in the Conference on Disarmament for more than a decade, and urged the conference to adopt and implement a work program to enable the resumption of substantive work on its agenda early in its 2012 session," the United Nations said in a press release.

"It invited states to explore, consolidate options, proposals and elements for a revitalization of the United Nations disarmament machinery as a whole, including the Conference on Disarmament," the release adds. "It would decide to include the item of revitalizing the conference's work on the agenda of the 67th session and to review progress made in implementing the present resolution and, if necessary, to further explore options for taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations."

The resolution was approved in a vote of 158-2, with North Korea and Pakistan providing the sole opposition. Twenty-one nations abstained from the decision. In total, the General Assembly on Friday approved 47 resolutions and five related measures that were submitted by the First Committee during its 2011 session, which ended in October.

The assembly backed a resolution that emphasized the crucial nature of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and urged nations holding nuclear weapons to meet obligations established by the 2010 review conference on the accord. It called for continued efforts to bring all nations into the pact, "and in that regard, urged India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states promptly and without delay" – moves that would require the nations to give up their atomic arsenals.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

France, India, Israel, North Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States voted against the resolution, while Bhutan, China, Micronesia, Pakistan, Palau and Russia abstained. A total of 168 nations backed the decision.

The General Assembly in a separate resolution "called for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in this context, immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons," the release states. In another resolution it "called upon nuclear weapon states to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and nondeployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures."

The host of other resolutions approved on Friday addressed matters including a prohibition against nuclear weapons in the Middle East, WMD threats and the Biological and Chemical weapons conventions.

[\[Full UN Report\]](#)

[back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011



New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms

U.S. Department of State, 01 December 2011, www.state.gov

As of September 1, 2011, as drawn from the exchange of data by the Parties.^[1]

Category of Data	United States of America	Russian Federation
Deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed Heavy Bombers	822	516
Warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed Heavy Bombers	1790	1566
Deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed and non-deployed Heavy Bombers	1043	871

United States of America Data^[2] Effective Date of September 1, 2011

ICBMs and ICBM Launchers	MM-III	PK	Total
Deployed ICBMs	448	0	448
Non-deployed ICBMs	266	58	324
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs	506	51	557
Deployed Launchers of ICBMs	448	0	448
Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs	58	51	109
Test Launchers	6	1	7
SLBMs and SLBM Launchers	Trident II	Total	
Deployed SLBMs	249	249	
Non-deployed SLBMs	161	161	
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs	336	336	
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	249	249	
Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs	87	87	
Test Launchers	0	0	



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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Heavy Bombers	B-2A	B-52G	B-52H	Total
Deployed Heavy Bombers	11	39	75	125
Non-deployed Heavy Bombers	9	0	16	25
Test Heavy Bombers	2	0	2	4
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-nuclear Armaments	0	0	0	0

[1] Data in this Fact Sheet comes from the biannual exchange of data required by the New START Treaty. It contains data declared current as of September 1, 2011. Data will be updated each six month period after entry into force of the treaty.

[2] The complete unclassified data for the United States is available upon request from the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520. Please contact Jamie Mannina at ManninaJF@state.gov

[back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Russia to Start Construction of Borey-A Class Nuclear Submarines in 2012

RIA Novosti, 03 December 2011, en.rian.ru

Russia will start building modernized Borey-A class strategic nuclear-powered submarines in 2012, the Sevmash shipyard said. Fourth-generation Borey class submarines are expected to constitute the core of Russia's modern strategic submarine fleet. Russia is planning to build eight Borey and Borey-A class subs by 2020.

"We will lay down the first modernized Borey-A class submarine next year," Sevmash General Director Andrei Dyachkov said on Friday in an exclusive interview with RIA Novosti. Dyachkov said the contracts on the construction of two more Borey-A class submarines would be signed in the first quarter (Q1) of 2012.

The official did not specify the differences between the Borey and Borey-A class submarines, but it was reported earlier by some Russian military sources that modifications could include major structural changes and the installation of four more missile launch tubes.

Three Borey class vessels, the Yury Dolgoruky, the Alexander Nevsky, and the Vladimir Monomakh, are in different stages of completion at Sevmash. The Yury Dolgoruky has recently completed all sea trials and is expected to enter service with the Russian Navy as soon as the Bulava ballistic missile successfully passes the final tests.

A Borey class strategic submarine is 170 meters (580 feet) long, has a hull diameter of 13 meters (42 feet), a crew of 107, including 55 officers, a maximum depth of 450 meters (about 1,500 feet) and a submerged speed of about 29 knots. It can carry up to 16 ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Russian Navy to Receive 1st Graney Class Attack Submarine by End of 2012

RIA Novosti, 03 December 2011, en.rian.ru

The delivery of the first Graney class nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine to the Russian Navy has been postponed until the end of 2012 due to additional tests of its weapons systems, the Sevmash shipyard said.

Construction of the Severodvinsk submarine began in 1993 at the Sevmash shipyard in the northern Russian city of Severodvinsk but has since been dogged by financial setbacks. It was floated out in June last year and has undergone two sets of sea trials.

“The delivery of the [Severodvinsk submarine] to the Defense Ministry has been postponed until next year,” Sevmash General Director Andrei Dyachkov said on Friday in an exclusive interview with RIA Novosti. Dyachkov said the testing of the submarine’s weaponry required at least six months of additional sea trials in 2012.

“The submarine itself showed a good performance [during previous trials],” the official said. “It will be commissioned by the end of 2012.”

Graney class nuclear submarines are designed to launch a variety of long-range cruise missiles (up to 3,100 miles or 5,000 km), with conventional or nuclear warheads, and effectively engage submarines, surface warships and land-based targets. The submarine’s armament includes 24 cruise missiles and eight torpedo launchers, as well as mines and anti-ship missiles.

Meanwhile, the construction of the second Graney class submarine, the Kazan, at the Sevmash is going according to schedule. The Kazan will feature more advanced equipment and weaponry than the Severodvinsk, and can be considered as a prototype of modernized Graney-M class submarines.

Dyachkov said on Friday that Sevmash would start building a series of five advanced Graney-M class attack submarines in 2012 under a recent contract between the Russian United Shipbuilding Corporation and the Defense Ministry.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Montana Senators Oppose ICBM Cuts

Global Security Newswire, 09 December 2011, www.gsn.nti.org

The U.S. senators from Montana this week warned Defense Secretary Leon Panetta of dangers that would accompany reductions to the nation's arsenal of nuclear-tipped ICBMs. The Pentagon is already planning to cut \$450 billion in projected spending over the next decade. The recent failure of the congressional "super committee" to identify additional deficit-reducing budget cuts means that amount could more than double. Panetta stated last month that such a situation could force his department to eliminate its entire fleet of 450 ICBMs.

The missiles are deployed in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming. As many as 420 of the systems are currently expected to remain fielded under the U.S.-Russian New START nuclear arms control treaty.

"We believe eliminating the ICBM wing would be disastrous for national security and fail to deliver significant budget savings over the next 10 years," Senators Jon Tester (D) and Max Baucus (D) stated in a letter sent on Wednesday to Panetta. "We hope to work with you to make the cuts required by our nation's financial constraints without jeopardizing national security or gutting critical national assets such as the ICBM force and we urge you to include robust funding for the ICBM wing in the fiscal year 2013 budget."

The two lawmakers suggested that cuts to the U.S. strategic force could better come from the submarines or bombers that make up the other two branches of the nuclear triad.

"ICBMs are by far the most cost-efficient leg of the nuclear triad. The ICBM fleet provides a critical deterrent because of its considerable survivability. Unlike an attack on the submarine or bomber leg of the triad, an enemy would be required to strike deep within the continental United States in order effectively eliminate ICBM strike capability," the letter states. "Such a visible, highly dispersed force creates a powerful disincentive for any adversary while also providing clear reassurance to our allies, many of whom have chosen not to pursue their own nuclear arsenal because of the security provided by America's nuclear umbrella."

The senators also questioned whether the Defense Department could, as assessed, save \$8 billion by phasing out the ICBMs. "The large costs associated with closing down large installations, such as environmental remediation and other costs associated with dismantling nuclear infrastructure, would likely offset most potential savings," they wrote.

 [back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

Russian Inspectors Carry Out Reconnaissance Flight over U.S. Skies

ITAR TASS, 28 November 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Russia's military inspectors will carry out aerial reconnaissance flights over the U.S. skies within the framework of the Open Skies Treaty in late November – early December, the Defense Ministry's press service told Itar-Tass on Monday [November 28].

"In the period from November 28 to December 3, within the framework of the Open Skies Treaty, a group of Russian inspectors plans to carry out a reconnaissance flight onboard a Tu-154M-LK-1 jet over the U.S. skies," the source said. "The flight will be carried out from Travis Air Force Base in California. Its maximum distance will be 4,250 kilometers."

"Onboard the Russian plane, Russian and U.S. specialists control the order of using surveillance technologies and the fulfillment of the reached agreements," the source said.

This will be the 33rd reconnaissance flight carried out by Russian specialists over the territories of the treaty's signatories this year.

The Open Skies Treaty was signed by 27 countries in 1992 and ratified by all of them [34 states] in 1995. The treaty establishes a program of unarmed aerial surveillance flights over the entire territory of its participants.

[back to top](#)

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BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



29 November 2011 – 12 December 2011

DTRA

OSCE Makes Progress Updating Vienna Document

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 30 November 2011, www.osce.org/fsc

A special meeting of the [Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE)] Forum for Security Cooperation, currently chaired by Kazakhstan, adopted a decision on November 30, 2011 on reissuing a document that encompasses key OSCE confidence- and security-building measures, the Vienna Document.

The reissue marks the first time in twelve years that the Document has been updated. The Vienna Document of 2011 establishes the procedure for a regular update of the Vienna Document every five years.

Other updates focus on, among other matters, the eligibility of air bases for hosting visits, the accuracy of coordinates of formations, combat units, air formations and air combat units, and the timing of verification activities and demonstrations of new types of weapon and equipment systems. The participating States are considering a number of other proposals to update the Vienna Document.

The Vienna Document requires participating States to share information on their military forces, equipment and defense planning; provides for inspections and evaluation visits to any participating State that has armed forces; and contains mechanisms to prevent or decrease tensions and to reduce the risk of unusual military situations that could cause tensions.

In 2011, in line with the priorities identified in the Astana Commemorative Declaration signed at the OSCE Summit in December 2010, the Forum for Security Cooperation engaged in intensive discussions to update, revitalize and modernize confidence- and security-building measures, and in particular, to update the Vienna Document of 1999 to reflect the current politico-military realities.

The OSCE Forum for Security and Cooperation is an OSCE decision-making body that meets weekly in Vienna to discuss arms control, military confidence-building measures and disarmament.

[back to top](#)

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