



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



28 June – 11 July 2011

DTRA

GENERAL ARMS CONTROL

Statement at the Annual Security Review Conference

U.S. Department of State, 01 July 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at Vienna, Austria

As Secretary Clinton highlighted in Paris in early 2010, strengthening and maintaining European security is a top U.S. priority (2,236 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

BWC Review Conference Could Revive Verification Debate, Chairman Says

Global Security Newswire, 07 July 2011, gsn.nti.org

There is growing sentiment among involved nations that the upcoming review conference for the Biological Weapons Convention should reopen the debate on the historically controversial issue of creating an international verification regime for the pact, according to the meeting's chairman. (1,879 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

CMA Progress at a Glance

CMA News, July 2011, www.cma.army.mil

CMA Progress as of June 19, 2011. (598 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Umatilla Chemical Agent Depot Destroys 75 Percent of Mustard Ton Containers

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 05 July 2011, www.cma.army.mil

Today, July 5, 2011, the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility [UMCDF] destroyed its 1,976th mustard agent filled ton container [TC], leaving 659 TCs remaining in inventory.

(184 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Last Munitions Head for Detonation

The Anniston Star (AL), 10 July 2011; www.annistonstar.com

The majority of the some 2,000 mustard munitions left to be destroyed at the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility will not be burned in the incinerators used to demilitarize the stockpile for the past eight years... (530 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission

U.S. Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna, 14 June 2011, vienna.usmission.gov

Statement of the United States to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission

Entry into force of the CTBT is an essential step toward the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a vision articulated by the President when he spoke in Prague in 2009. (1,532 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS (CCM)

Impressive Gains Noted in Implementing Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions

Voice of America News, 02 July 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Campaigners working for a world free of cluster munitions say impressive gains have been made in implementing the Convention that bans the production, use and stockpiling of cluster munitions since it came into force 11 months ago. (449 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

Nunn-Lugar Program Dismantles Nuke-Capable Sub

Global Security Newswire, 12 July 2011, gsn.nti.org

The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program dismantled a ballistic-missile submarine during a two-month reporting period this spring, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) announced on Monday. (233 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Nexus

U.S. Department of State, 29 June 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

The progress we make, as the recognized nuclear-weapon states, helps build international support to bolster nonproliferation norms and reduce the odds that new states will join the nuclear club. (1,463 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)(CONT.)

Joint Statement on First P-5 Follow-Up Meeting to the NPT Review Conference

U.S. Department of State, 01 July 2011, www.state.gov

The P-5 met in Paris on June 30 –July 1 for their first follow-up meeting to the NPT Review Conference, with a view to considering progress on the commitments they made at ... in September 2009. (610 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NEW START TREATY (NST)

Russia to Spend \$730 Billion on New Weapons

Voice of America, 06 July 2011, www.voanews.com/english

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has announced his government plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on weapons modernization by 2020. (495 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NNSA Conducts Successful W78 JTA Flight Test

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 08 July 2011, nnsa.energy.gov

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), working with the U.S. Air Force, recently conducted a successful W78 Joint Test Assembly (JTA) flight test. (244 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

OPEN SKIES TREATY

Russian Aircraft Carries Out Aerial Inspection above United States

Russian Aviation, 28 June 2011, www.ruaviation.com/news

Russian military specialists performed [inspection] flights above U.S. territory using the Tu-154 Lk-1 [aircraft] in accordance with the “Open Skies” agreement. (146 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Canadian, Hungarian Experts to Fly Open Skies Mission over Russia

Moscow Interfax-AVN Online, 04 July 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

Canadian and Hungarian military inspectors will fly a joint inspection mission over Russia between July 4 and 9. (108 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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Statement at the Annual Security Review Conference

U.S. Department of State, 01 July 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at Vienna, Austria

It is my pleasure to be back in Vienna at the [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] OSCE, and to have this opportunity to discuss European security issues with all of you today. I also am pleased to participate on this panel with Mr. Ulyianov, with whom I look forward to engaging in a thoughtful discussion on the issues before us today as well as many others.

This conference provides an opportunity for this organization and our governments to take stock of our current security concerns and discuss how best to address them together. Our counterparts have already addressed a number of issues and important OSCE efforts in other sessions; in this one, we will focus on the OSCE's [political-military] pol-mil dimension, specifically, conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. I last presented before this organization just over a year ago, when I shared the podium with Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov to talk about the New START Treaty [New START or NST], which we had recently concluded. I also chaired the Open Skies Review Conference here in Vienna last June. A lot has happened since then, and I want to spend a few minutes sharing my perspective on some of our accomplishments and future challenges.

New START

By far, the most important arms control success of the past year has been the entry into force of the New START Treaty with Russia in February [February 5, 2011]. The treaty responsibly limits the number of strategic nuclear weapons and launchers that the United States and Russia may deploy. When the treaty is fully implemented, it will result in the lowest number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age.

The implementation of the treaty is well underway. We have exchanged data on our strategic nuclear facilities and forces. This information forms the foundation of the treaty's database, which will be updated by the Parties continuously through a notification process and exchanged anew every six months throughout the life of the treaty. As of April, the Parties began conducting on-site inspections of each other's treaty-related facilities.

We look forward to pursuing further limits on and reductions in nuclear arms in consultation with our NATO Allies. When President Obama signed the treaty, he said "the United States intends to pursue with Russia additional and broader reductions in our strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, including non-deployed nuclear weapons."

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Conventional Arms Control

As Secretary Clinton highlighted in Paris in early 2010, strengthening and maintaining European security is a top U.S. priority. Speaking at L'Ecole Militaire in Paris, she said: "A strong Europe is critical to our security and our prosperity. Much of what we hope to accomplish globally depends on working together with Europe." Sadly, she was also compelled to note the reality that "arms control regimes that once served us well are now fraying."

It is for this reason that our work here is so important. Conventional arms control and associated confidence building measures are part of a larger network of security instruments, both bilateral and multilateral. Our conventional agreements play a vital role in providing a foundation for stability that, in turn, has allowed our strategic relationships to become more stable. Without such stability, it would be difficult to move forward with our strategic security objectives.

Within the OSCE context, there are three key regimes that form the foundation of our collective security efforts aimed at ensuring stability, and building confidence. Recognized as part of the Framework for Arms Control, they are: the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty, the Vienna Document 1999 and the Open Skies Treaty.

Each regime contributes to security and stability in a unique way, but when they are all implemented and work in harmony, the result is greater confidence for all OSCE participating States. Each regime is important. We are facing a number of challenges and it is important that we find ways to overcome these challenges and advance security in Europe.

Conventional Arms Control – Open Skies Treaty

First, I want to touch on the Open Skies Treaty which is clearly one of the most successful conventional arms control regimes in place, with the States Parties conducting over 780 flights since entry into force. As we agreed at the Review Conference last year, the treaty itself remains a solid regime and the observation flights serve to enhance military transparency and provide an opportunity for our governments – in most cases, military personnel – to regularly and effectively work together.

There are a number of challenges related to Open Skies that warrant our attention, some of which we began discussing at the Review Conference. The biggest single challenge we face is the future availability of resources. The treaty will only be as good as the States Parties make it, and we cannot make it as effective as it could be with old aircraft and sensors. As I did a year



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ago, I urge all parties to redouble their efforts to modernize the treaty to allow for the use of digital sensors and ensure sufficient assets for future operations.

Now, we are also facing a political stalemate on the work of the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC). The OSCC has been at an impasse for six months now, and despite the efforts of the Spanish and Estonian Chairs, as well as several delegations, we have not resolved the procedural issues that have prevented the body from conducting business.

The United States has studied the legal arguments regarding plenary procedure and we are convinced that the treaty is clear in providing the right for any party to raise an issue for discussion before the OSCC, particularly compliance issues. This right is essential for the effective operation of the OSCC. Accession by additional parties is clearly provided for within the treaty. We should be flexible in the way treaty rights are implemented in the OSCC, but we cannot accept procedures that deny treaty rights of principle, such as the right to raise issues for discussion in the OSCC. On the other hand, in the exercise of those rights we should all be working together to find ways forward that enhance this regime, not distract from it. I urge all parties to resume efforts to live up to this multilateral commitment before the current impasse begins to erode the successful implementation of the Open Skies Treaty to date and puts at risk a regime that holds promise for the future.

It seems clear that multilateral arms control regimes cannot – and should not be expected to – solve all the bilateral issues that may be in play between the parties involved. But conventional arms control regimes must take account of existing security relationships and concerns, and should provide a level of transparency about those relationships, allowing for confidence-building at the sub-regional level and within the larger group of participants.

Conventional Arms Control – Vienna Document 1999

Transparency in military activities and equipment holdings for confidence and security-building purposes is embodied within the Vienna Document 1999, and a series of accompanying measures adopted by the Forum for Security Cooperation [FSC].

I know the FSC has been hard at work on a number of proposals aimed at modernizing the Vienna Document to provide additional transparency among OSCE participating States and I applaud that work. To date, the FSC has agreed on six updated provisions for “Vienna Document 2011.” We have made progress but work still needs to be done before December. Although these updates are technical in nature, agreement on these updated provisions after more than a decade without updating the text of the Vienna Document – even slightly – is an

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important step. The United States is actively engaged and has contributed to that effort by tabling a number of proposals for consideration that would further enhance transparency among the participating States. Specifically, we are seeking to increase the number of opportunities for inspections and evaluation visits, increase team sizes for inspections and evaluation visits, and improve the content of information exchanged annually. We want to work with our partners to ensure that these enhancements do not impose unreasonable expenses on participating States. Also, the United States has joined a number of other delegations in co-sponsoring a proposal to lower troop and equipment thresholds for the prior notification of certain military activities – a politically significant enhancement that we hope can be included in the updated Vienna Document to be presented to our Ministers in December for endorsement.

The Vienna Document has contributed immeasurably to Europe-wide military transparency and reassurance. It is also a useful template for other regions, as they look to build confidence in the military intentions of their neighbors. The United States values the Vienna Document for its contribution to European security and we are pursuing updates with two goals in mind: we want to strengthen existing provisions and also ensure the Document remains relevant to today's security challenges.

But it is important to remember that the Vienna Document is not a substitute for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (or CFE) Treaty with its system of verifiable equipment limits, information exchange, and verification. These regimes are complementary, not interchangeable. Each has a specific purpose and distinct contribution to overall stability in Europe. As we saw several years ago when we attempted to “harmonize” the regimes, there is no simple way to adjust the provisions of the Vienna Document to incorporate all the elements of the CFE Treaty.

Conventional Arms Control – CFE Treaty

Now, let me turn briefly to the CFE Treaty. I want to say from the outset that the CFE regime remains important to the United States, and it is important for European security as a whole. We want to continue working to find a solution to the impasse of the past several years.

As many of you know, Ambassador Victoria Nuland, who worked hard to advance the CFE process through numerous discussions in Vienna and other venues, became the Spokesperson for the Department of State in June. I have resumed the lead on CFE discussions.

Since April 2010, the United States led renewed and intensified efforts among the 30 CFE States Parties, plus the six non-CFE NATO Allies, to try to break the impasse that has

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prevented full implementation of the treaty. Together, we launched an effort to agree on a short Framework statement of key provisions and principles to guide new negotiations to strengthen and modernize the CFE regime.

Considerable progress was made this past year in narrowing differences but more work remains to close gaps on the most difficult issues: the right of states to choose whether to allow foreign forces to be stationed on their territories, and transparency among all parties essential for preserving confidence during the negotiations. The United States and our Allies stand ready to return to the negotiating table whenever we have a signal that real progress can be made on the remaining issues.

However, in the absence of this signal, we must ask, "What is next for CFE?" I am sure this is a question in everyone's mind here today. I will be consulting with my CFE Treaty colleagues, and will be in close touch as we develop alternatives for consideration.

Achieving Future Security Goals

I would like to emphasize that during this pause from the Framework discussions, it is important for all of us to spend some time considering the current security architecture, and to ask ourselves some questions about what our future needs will be and what types of measures will help achieve those security goals.

Colleagues, I would like to note that this Annual Security Review Conference comes at a good time to contribute to this type of reflection, assessment and analysis of next steps. I would like to encourage all of you to engage in a fresh review of European security affairs, and challenge you to come up with creative ideas that could help move us forward, especially with regard to conventional arms control.

Today there is less transparency regarding European military forces than there was ten years ago. We need to change directions. This is not the way to build confidence among partners as we go forward. At the High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar in May, many of you heard the Commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe, Lieutenant General Hertling, extend an offer to other militaries to visit U.S. activities taking place during training exercises at the U.S. Joint Multinational Training Command in Germany. This is but one example of additional military to military transparency among parties which helps build greater confidence. We encourage all parties to consider being more open about their military training and exercises.

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Enhancing European security remains a key U.S. policy objective. Conventional arms control in Europe has been a tremendous success story in the history of European security affairs since the early 1990s. The United States wants to build on that success and work with partners to find ways to revitalize and modernize these regimes.

We have all made a serious investment in the building of the current security architecture. We must ensure its continued viability by devoting resources to our verification agencies and institutions to keep the regimes going strong. And we must redouble our efforts to adapt and improve in ways that meet today's European security needs.

I look forward to working with you in the coming year to build on our success and address the challenges before us.

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BWC Review Conference Could Revive Verification Debate, Chairman Says

Global Security Newswire, 07 July 2011, gsn.nti.org

There is growing sentiment among involved nations that the upcoming review conference for the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] should reopen the debate on the historically controversial issue of creating an international verification regime for the pact, according to the meeting's chairman.

"I think we have to devote attention to the issue of compliance and verification, not only at the review conference but also, probably, in the intersessional process," said Paul van den Ijssel, president-designate for the convention's seventh review conference. "The issue is not off the table and there are many countries who want to keep it on the table in some form or the other."

"For many countries it's difficult to accept we would not have any discussion in the future of compliance and verification," he told Global Security Newswire last week between sessions at the two-day 2011 Biosecurity Conference here. "It should not be swept off the table; that's basically what they tell me." The ambassador did not name specific member nations.

Other topics likely to be raised at the December meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, include: an evaluation of the pact's provisions; the impact of science and technology on the agreement; the future of the treaty's "intersessional process" and its three-member support staff; a possible overhaul of the agreement's confidence-building measures; and the pact's technology transfer clause, according to the Dutch diplomat.

The Biological Weapons Convention entered into force in 1975 and forbids the development, production and stockpiling of weaponized pathogens such as anthrax and smallpox. The review conferences, held every five years, assess the performance of the accord during the intervening period and can recommend fixes to the nonproliferation regime.

The accord lacks a body akin to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons or the International Atomic Energy Agency that would monitor nations' compliance with BWC mandates.

Debate over a formal verification regime for the pact ended in 2001 when the Bush administration suddenly withdrew the United States from close to seven years of talks aimed at creating an inspections protocol. White House officials argued that such a system would not succeed in boosting confidence in adherence to the international agreement and would prove financially burdensome to U.S. biodefense efforts and the biotechnology industry.

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The Obama administration in 2009 reaffirmed U.S. opposition to a verification regime when it released its approach to the convention. The U.S. representative for the Biological Weapons Convention, though, recently said Washington is open to other measures that would increase confidence in the agreement.

The idea of standing up a system for the Biological Weapons Convention "is perfectly understandable, perfectly legitimate," as its principal counterparts – the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – boast verification systems of some form, according to van den Ijssel, who also serves as Dutch disarmament ambassador and is Amsterdam's representative to the international Conference on Disarmament.

"Some countries not only argue that we should start work on verification, we should resume work" on the scrapped 2001 protocol, he said. While he emphasized his neutrality as review conference chairman, van den Ijssel warned that "just saying the answer to all my problems is going back to the protocol of 2001 is perhaps not the wisest approach."

The Dutch diplomat cited continued resistance from the United States and developments in biotechnology that have occurred in the last decade as two main obstacles to reopening that debate. "I've also heard people who have a great interest in verification say that we are very doubtful [the inspections protocol] would answer our questions now," he told GSN.

The worldwide proliferation of biotechnology and the large number of existing facilities that would be subject to routine inspections under the terms of the BWC protocol make that approach "even less practical than it was in 2001," according to Jonathan Tucker, manager of the Biosecurity Education Project at the Federation of American Scientists.

The ambassador's remarks on reviving discussion about the feasibility of BWC verification, though, are a "positive development, because for the past 10 years this issue has been very contentious. It's been effectively taboo," he said. [...]

"It is now time to revisit the issue of BWC verification with cool heads in an objective, scientific way and to depoliticize it," Tucker told GSN. "The chairman sees an opportunity here now that 10 years have passed since the collapse of the protocol negotiations, emotions have cooled a bit and we can now return to the issue."

He said that states parties might examine how recent advances in biotechnology "not only pose new risks to the regime, but perhaps new opportunities for monitoring compliance." For example, the development of new microbial forensic techniques, such as those used in the U.S.

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probe of the 2001 anthrax mailings, might enable member states that are accused of a BWC violation to clear their name by voluntarily allowing sampling and analysis at a suspect facility, according to Tucker.

The United States and the international community are right to be cautious about committing to a formal inspection-based verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention, according to Kavita Berger, associate program director at the American Association for the Advancement of Science's Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy.

"There's no technology that you can use to tell the difference between, for example, a fermentor in a microbrewery versus a fermentor in a potential weapons lab," she told GSN on Tuesday in a telephone interview. "I'm skeptical that there is a good single solution out there." "We don't know whether in the future something might be developed but I don't know of anything right now that would be able to tell you the difference between what is legitimate and what is not," she added.

Berger said any future discussions on a verification regime must include representatives from the private sector, including industry and scientists engaged in academic biological research. "If we don't get the private sector involved in the discussion from the outset, if it stays at the political level, you will not necessarily get the outcome that you would be interested in getting," she told GSN.

Van den Ijssel said that while states parties might continue to disagree on the subject "we realize that in order to achieve a result we'll need to have all countries onboard and that means we have to somehow find a way to proceed which is acceptable to all and that certainly doesn't mean you can say 2001 is where we start again."

The ambassador said he doubted that the 164 BWC member states would be able to reach agreement on the topic during the three-week review conference. "It seems to me highly unlikely, in the art of the possible, we will have the decision of the [review conference]," he said. However, "I've heard no 'No's' yet on the idea of having compliance and verification as one of the topics of the intersessional process," van den Ijssel added, referring to the process of annual meetings that is up for renewal at the December conference.

Tucker agreed with that approach. "The idea of discussing compliance and verification in the intersessional process makes sense, and could provide a way to finesse the differences between countries," he said.

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Other Topics

Diplomats at the December review conference are due to determine the final fate of the intersessional process and its Implementation Support Unit. Since the sixth review conference in 2006, the United Nations in Geneva has hosted a pair of annual meetings on the convention. The sessions focused on specific topics, such as disease surveillance and prevention of bioterrorism.

In each summer gathering, experts gave and heard presentations related to the chosen topic. In the winter conference, representatives from member states evaluated the conclusions of the earlier meeting and passed along recommendations, or "common understandings," for the review conference. Last year marked the fourth and final installment of the process.

"I haven't heard a single country arguing against a continuation of some sort of an intersessional process," van den Ijssel said. "All countries realize that meeting only once every five years is not enough to keep the convention up to standard." He said that member nations are working on a variety of proposals, including establishing working groups among delegates focused on specific subjects related to the accord or granting the annual meeting some decision-making authority.

The mandate that created the Implementation Support Unit is set to expire with this year's review conference. The three-person organization, headquartered within the U.N. Disarmament Affairs Office in Geneva, provides administrative support to the intersessional meetings.

The review conference is also likely to consider ways refurbish the confidence-building measures that nations are required to submit each year to demonstrate adherence to the convention's nonproliferation rules, according to van den Ijssel.

The paper forms for the declarations were originally prepared in 1986 and last updated in 1991. They offer data on matters such as infectious diseases outbreaks and information on vaccine production facilities. "We have to look at them because they don't do the things we want them to do and they may be too complicated and they may be providing all kinds of information we don't need or don't use," van den Ijssel told GSN, without elaborating on what the revamped declarations might look like.

Last year only 72 of the convention's then-163 members submitted the annual accounting, the website for the Implementation Support Unit shows. Of those, only 15 are accessible online and, in the case of the United States, the statement is a public version of a classified document.

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The ambassador said there is "wide support" among BWC member nations to delegate a more in-depth debate on revamping the submissions to a presumably reaffirmed intersessional process, an approach he finds "attractive." "It would force the [review conference] to give guidance to that process and it would prevent the review conference from being a mailbox," according to van den Ijssel.

Another topic that could prove contentious among states parties is Article 10 of the convention, the Dutch diplomat said. That clause encourages nations to exchange equipment, materials and scientific and technological expertise related to the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. "The idea that if you see a good capacity to counter biological threats, whether they are caused by intended use or normal occurrence, it is an excellent means to defend yourself against and attack and helps prevent the use of biological weapons," he said.

He noted the global spread of biotechnology to countries such as India, which is believed to have the world's fastest growing industry, as proof that the debate is about providing assistance and not the "have and have nots." However, "there are some who still sometimes give the impression that they want to play along the old rules, 'Countries endowed in the West are not providing us, the poor, with the things we need.' Without always specifying what they exactly need it for," according to van den Ijssel.

He said it would be his job to take existing ideologies out of the debate and forge a more "forward-looking" agenda for the December conference that would enable nations to find common ground on the subject. "If you want to do harm, you can always do harm. If you want to create havoc, you can always create havoc," van den Ijssel said.

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CMA Progress at a Glance

CMA News, July 2011, www.cma.army.mil

CMA Progress as of June 19, 2011:

Anniston Chemical Activity, Alabama

Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) has demilitarized more than 658,000 rockets, landmines, artillery shells, mortars and ton containers. The storage igloos are nearly empty, and the last mustard agent-filled munition will be safely demilitarized in September. Processing has slowed down because many of the final mortars and projectiles are in overpack containers, after being identified as leakers, or the projectiles cannot be easily disassembled by the ANCDF robotic equipment. These munitions will be processed in the nearby Static Detonation Chamber (SDC). The SDC, an explosion proof, large, kettle-type system, heats the rounds until they are safely destroyed in a controlled explosion. So far, the SDC has safely disposed more than 25 percent of the munitions that it will process.

Blue Grass Chemical Activity, Kentucky

Blue Grass Chemical Activity [BGCA] has completed X-ray assessment operations of the 155 mm mustard agent-filled munitions in the Chemical Limited Area. The operation identified which munitions have heels, or solidified agent, and which may result in difficulties when removing the bursters from the projectiles. The data will assist in determining the path forward in safely and efficiently destroying these munitions.

Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah

The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility [TOCDF] has completed scheduled operations. Preparations are underway to destroy the remaining munitions in two separate facilities located within the Deseret Chemical Depot's (DCD) Area 10 storage yard – the Area 10 Liquid Incinerator (ATLIC) and the Detonation of Ammunition in a Vacuum Integrated Chamber (DAVINCH). Construction of the DAVINCH is nearly complete and systemization activities are scheduled to begin this month. These activities include function testing of various system components and verifying that they can be operated from the control center. As ATLIC systemization activities continue, workers have been preparing for the operational readiness review. Approximately 330 mustard projectiles and mortars will be destroyed in the DAVINCH, and the DCD's small stockpile of GA nerve and Lewisite blister agents will be destroyed in the ATLIC.

Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas

Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility [PBCDF] continues safe and compliant closure operations. Closure activities have begun on the Deactivation Furnace System, the Container

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Handling Building and the Bulk Drain Station. The surety termination package for the site has been approved by the Department of the Army and endorsed by both the U.S. Army Materiel Command and the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, which officially puts the site out of the surety program. The site has reached 4.8 million hours since a lost day away from work.

Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado

Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) stores mustard-filled munitions: 105 mm projectiles and cartridges, 155 mm projectiles and 4.2-inch mortar cartridges. The Chemical Stockpile Propellant Sampling Operations on 4.2-inch mortar cartridges scheduled for June was postponed until August. Random samples will be taken to test the stability of propellant in the munitions.

Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon

Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) has eliminated more than 70 percent of its total HD stockpile. The UMCDF completed its first shipment of spent sulfur-impregnated carbon for off-site disposal. The special carbon filters were designed and used in Umatilla's pollution abatement system to control potential mercury emissions during the destruction of mustard agent. This initial shipment of nearly 25 tons of the carbon follows final approval from the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality in May for the facility's use of sampling and analytical methods to classify the spent carbon as agent-free. Off-site disposal of the carbon provides an alternative to processing it in the Metal Parts Furnace. Completion of the mustard campaign is on pace for late November this year.

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Umatilla Chemical Agent Depot Destroys 75 Percent of Mustard Ton Containers

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 05 July 2011, www.cma.army.mil

Today, July 5, 2011, the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility [UMCDF] destroyed its 1,976th mustard agent filled ton container [TC], leaving 659 TCs remaining in inventory. This represents destruction of 75 percent of the HD mustard ton containers in the Umatilla Chemical Depot chemical stockpile.

“75 percent of our inventory has been destroyed while accruing more than 8 million man hours without a lost-time accident,” Gary Anderson, UMCDF Site Project Manager, said. “Our workers demonstrate around the clock their professionalism, attention to detail and ability to deliver as we transition toward the closure of the chemical mission here at Umatilla.”

UMCDF has been steadily destroying chemical agents since the plant became operational in 2004. About 1,150 workers at the Depot are involved in storage, security and destruction of chemical agents.

“This is another significant milestone that shows the dedication, hard work and commitment to safe and compliant operation throughout the UMCDF and UMCD workforce,” said Bob Dikeman, URS plant manager. “Congratulations to all!”

UMCDF is in its 13th and final campaign of destroying chemical agent and anticipates destroying the last mustard agent in November.

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Last Munitions Head for Detonation

The Anniston Star (AL), 10 July 2011; www.annistonstar.com

The majority of the some 2,000 mustard munitions left to be destroyed at the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility will not be burned in the incinerators used to demilitarize the stockpile for the past eight years, according to officials in charge of the operation. Those mustard munitions are all that's left of the chemical weapons that have been stored in Anniston since the 1950s – three tenths of a percent of the original total stockpile, officials said.

Most of the weapons that comprise that 0.3 percent will be sent to the facility's Static Detonation Chamber to be destroyed rather than sent to the furnaces that were previously the means of demilitarizing the stockpile. That's because the munitions left to be destroyed are a cross-section of older, leaky weapons that date back to World War II and newer munitions that are considered problematic or leaky themselves, Army spokesman Mike Abrams said.

The Static Detonation Chamber – which officials describe as a sort of “kettle” – is a metal cylinder where the weapons are heated up, detonated, then burned off. It's a process that site manager Terry Staggs said is necessary for leaky weapons which have been packed with extra metal and, therefore, can't be taken apart by the robotics systems at the incinerator furnaces. “It ... works like a pressure cooker,” Staggs said.

But officials said the furnaces that have carried the chemical demilitarization mission won't be shut down completely. Abrams said the 1,000 government and Westinghouse contract workers at the site will continue to process some of the munitions' parts, secondary waste and a contamination solution in the furnaces.

“The basic Anniston Chemical Demilitarization Facility itself is not shut down, but it is not anything like in the earlier days when we were just pushing hundreds of thousands of munitions through there,” Abrams said. Sending weapons through the static detonation chamber is an effective, safe process. But officials have learned it's also a slow one.

Although there are only approximately 2,000 munitions left for processing, officials don't expect the dwindling stockpile to be completely gone until September. “We don't have a really good feel that we can do this last less-than-2,000 in three weeks or four weeks,” Abrams said. “We are doing them in small numbers at a time at the static detonation chamber.”

Incinerator workers are taking advantage of the slow process at the chamber by allowing the chemical weapons assessment team to gather information and data about the demilitarization process in Anniston. “We are gathering some additional data that they can use for their plans to

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prepare for future destruction operations,” Abrams said. “Our focus is to eliminate the Anniston stockpile and to do it safely, but at the same time, we can also record what we’re doing.”

Incinerator workers had destroyed nearly 99.7 percent of the Anniston stockpile by Friday [July 8], according to a U.S. Army press release. The static detonation chamber has processed more than 1,200 of the 3,000 old and leaky munitions it was built last year to destroy, the release noted. “This is our two-minute drill,” Abrams said of the dwindling stockpile and now-occasional use of the incinerator furnaces. “It’s looking good for the home team.”

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Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission

U.S. Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna, 14 June 2011, vienna.usmission.gov

Statement of the United States to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission

Delivered by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

I am pleased to have the opportunity to join you in Vienna for this important meeting. I would like to congratulate you, Ambassador Davidovic, as you begin your tenure as Chairman of the [Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization] CTBTO Preparatory Commission, and to thank you in advance for your efforts. The U.S. delegation looks forward to working closely with you. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Mabhongo, for his hard and capable work during his tenure. As I begin my remarks, I would like to congratulate this organization for the Science and Technology Conference, held June 8-10 at the Hofburg in Vienna. I have heard both in Washington and here in Vienna how useful it was.

Before addressing some of the programmatic and budgetary issues before this Commission, I would like to assure you of President Obama's unshakeable commitment to ratification of the CTBT by the United States and its entry into force at the earliest possible date. Entry into force of the CTBT is an essential step toward the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a vision articulated by the President when he spoke in Prague in 2009. Secretary Clinton reaffirmed our commitment to the CTBT at both the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2009 and at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 2010. More recently, the President's National Security Advisor, Thomas Donilon, said in March that "We are committed to working with members of both parties in the Senate to ratify the CTBT, just as we did for New START," a commitment that was echoed last month by Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher at the annual meeting of the Arms Control Association in Washington.

Our recent experience working with the U.S. Senate to gain their advice and consent to ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – New START – with the Russian Federation has prepared us for what is expected to be an equally thorough and robust debate over the CTBT. We do not expect it will be easy or happen quickly, but we will work hard to make it happen.

In anticipation of the ratification effort, the Administration commissioned a number of reports, including an updated National Intelligence Estimate and an independent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report to assess the ability of the United States to monitor compliance with the treaty and the ability of the United States to maintain, in the absence of nuclear explosive testing, a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal so long as these weapons exist. A public

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version of the NAS report is expected to be released soon. These authoritative reports, together with others, will give the U.S. Senate a wealth of information to assist them in making a determination on the merits of ratification of the CTBT.

In addition, we have begun a process of engaging the Senate and the American public on the national security benefits of the CTBT. While we have no date in mind for a ratification vote, we will work to engage members of the Senate on the national security rationale behind our support for the CTBT.

Mr. Chairman, as you are well aware, the U.S. Senate declined to provide its consent to ratification of the CTBT in 1999. At that time, the Senate expressed concerns about whether the treaty could be effectively verified. Today, we have a much stronger case in that regard. It is thanks to the hard work of this Commission, its member States, and the staff of the Provisional Technical Secretariat that great progress toward establishing the treaty's verification regime has been made in the last decade.

In 1999, the International Monitoring System (IMS) existed only on paper. Today, the IMS is roughly 85 percent complete and, when completed, there will be IMS facilities in 89 countries spanning the globe. At entry into force of the treaty, the full body of technical data gathered via the IMS will be available to all States Parties. This will enable us to fulfill our shared obligation to enforce the global ban on nuclear explosive testing, a nonproliferation goal we all seek. Even now, very useful data is available to States Signatories and those states hosting IMS facilities.

As the Administration engages the U.S. Senate, the United States has increased its participation in all of the Preparatory Commission's [PrepCom's] activities in preparation for the entry into force of the CTBT, especially with respect to the effective implementation of the treaty's verification regime. U.S. technical experts are working closely with their counterparts from the Provisional Technical Secretariat and with other experts from many Signatory States represented here today in collaborative efforts to improve the capabilities of the global International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre.

After an eight-year absence, U.S. experts since 2009 have been fully engaged in further developing the On-Site Inspection element of the verification regime, both from policy and technical perspectives. The United States has also continued to bear the full costs of operating, maintaining and sustaining the 31 stations of the International Monitoring System assigned by the treaty to the United States. These actions tangibly demonstrate the commitment of the United States to prepare for the entry into force of this treaty.

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While much has been accomplished, more hard work lies ahead. We need to maintain the momentum towards completion and maintenance of a fully functioning verification system. Such a system, meeting the requirements established by the PrepCom, serves as a strong deterrent for any State Party contemplating a nuclear test. Demonstrating that the treaty can be verified also supports the argument that it should be ratified, and helps build further momentum for the treaty's entry into force.

Turning from political issues to more practical ones, I would like to express our gratitude to the Provisional Technical Secretariat for preparing the initial draft 2012 Program and Budget, and I would like now to share with you our views on it.

The United States supports realistic and program-driven budgets. In the current budget climate, we must be judicious in differentiating between essential tasks and ones we would undertake under ideal conditions, but which are not exigent. Assessments as to which efforts to fund should be made by the Commission based on clear information from the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) about the resources needed to carry out those tasks.

We well understand and appreciate that budget strictures have sharpened the need to identify savings and limit budget growth, but we frankly do not believe a zero-real-growth budget is a tenable option. We cannot effectively maintain existing IMS facilities and continue the build-out of additional stations within the constraints of a zero-real-growth budget. There is a point at which seeking ever greater cost efficiencies from the PTS becomes counter-productive to the health of the organization and the verification regime.

In addition, we are skeptical about the proposed shift of resources from the International Data Centre (IDC) and International Monitoring System [IMS] Divisions to the On-Site Inspection [OSI] Division as a long-term approach to funding the OSI regime. As affirmed in previous statements by the PrepCom and Working Group B, development of the OSI regime represents a core activity of the PTS. The OSI Division should be supported in its own right – out of the regular budget – without taking away resources from the IDC and the IMS Divisions.

The United States is frankly disappointed that the initial draft 2012 Program and Budget provides no regular budget funding for the two core Directed Exercises in the approved OSI Action Plan, or for the Integrated Field Exercise scheduled for 2014 (IFE14). These exercises are necessary for the further development and refinement of the On-Site Inspection regime preparatory to entry into force. Like the rest of the OSI Division's activities, IFE14 and the build-up exercises should be viewed as part of the essential work of the Provisional Technical

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Secretariat, and should accordingly be funded out of the regular budget, not out of supplementary appropriations.

Consistent with the views expressed by a number of States Signatories at both the May 5 briefing on IFE funding and the recent meeting of Working Group A, the United States would urge the PTS to identify alternative funding modalities, including the incorporation of some costs for the build-up exercises and IFE14 into the regular budget. By including some of the IFE14 costs in the regular budget, a more accurate picture of the CTBTO's funding needs will be presented, affording States Signatories a better sense of the trade-offs between competing requirements.

Before concluding, I would like to comment on two personnel appointments, that is, the new Director of Administration for the PTS, and the new Director of the International Monitoring System Division. I would like to note that for the United States of America, attention to gender balance in professional and technical personnel appointments is of utmost importance. And I know that if my boss, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was here, she would strongly underscore that message.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for your work in leading the efforts of the Commission. The United States wishes you, the members of the Commission, and the staff of the Provisional Technical Secretariat success in the days and months ahead.

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Impressive Gains Noted in Implementing Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions

Voice of America News, 02 July 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Campaigners working for a world free of cluster munitions say impressive gains have been made in implementing the Convention that bans the production, use and stockpiling of cluster munitions since it came into force 11 months ago. More than 400 representatives from 81 countries are wrapping up a four-day meeting to assess progress on the ban and to discuss the challenges ahead.

Since the treaty became binding international law on August 1, 2010, 109 States have joined the Convention and 58 have ratified it. The umbrella group overseeing the Convention, the Cluster Munition Coalition, calls this an impressive achievement for a Convention that is so young.

Chair of the Coalition, Steve Goose, says the treaty to ban cluster munitions is off to a roaring start and is making a real and concrete difference in saving lives and preventing future casualties. He notes cluster munitions do not discriminate between civilian and military targets. Many of them fail to explode immediately and can lie hidden for years, killing and maiming civilians, including children, even decades after the original conflict is over.

He says two States parties, Albania and Zambia, have completed clearance of their contaminated land and eight State Parties and three signatories to the Convention have completed the destruction of their stockpiles of cluster munitions.

"They are allowed eight years to do this under the Convention and here eight States Parties and at least three signatories have already finished, including an announcement from Hungary just this past week that they had completed," said Goose. "Together, States Parties have already destroyed more than 64 million sub-munitions, contained in almost 600,000 cluster munitions. More than 64 million sub-munitions [are] already destroyed – sub-munitions that will now never take a civilian casualty." [...]

[Goose] says a big challenge facing the Coalition is to get every State in the world to join the Convention. He says major holdouts include the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Israel. He says it is particularly important to get them on board.

"The reason why States have stayed away are, in part because countries like the United States and Russia and China have so many [cluster munitions]," he said. "The United States has five million cluster munitions that contain about 700 million sub-munitions. It is likely that Russia and China have similar stockpiles."

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The United States has declared it plans to get rid of its cluster munitions by 2018.

However, Goose says he is convinced the Convention will be a success because advocates of a ban have stigmatized cluster munitions to such an extent that almost every State agrees they should not be used. He says this stigmatization will act as a potent deterrent to their use.

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Nunn-Lugar Program Dismantles Nuke-Capable Sub

Global Security Newswire, 12 July 2011, gsn.nti.org

The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] program dismantled a ballistic-missile submarine during a two-month reporting period this spring, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) announced on Monday. The Nunn-Lugar initiative in March and April also safeguarded nine nuclear arms train shipments, constructed and outfitted eight biological agent monitoring stations and neutralized 112.52 metric tons of chemical warfare materials.

Since being established in 1991 to secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction in former Soviet states, the CTR program has deactivated 7,599 strategic nuclear warheads and destroyed 791 [intercontinental ballistic missiles] ICBMs, 498 ICBM silos, 180 mobile ICBM launchers, 670 submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs], 492 SLBM launchers, 33 ballistic missile-capable submarines, 155 strategic bombers, 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles and 194 nuclear test tunnels.

The effort has also provided safeguards for 524 nuclear-weapon train shipments, boosted security at 24 nuclear weapons storage facilities and constructed 32 biological agent monitoring stations. It supported the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, nations that once respectively held the world's third, fourth and eighth largest nuclear arsenals.

The Nunn-Lugar program supported the elimination of Albania's small stockpile of chemical warfare materials, its first effort outside the former Soviet Union. The initiative has neutralized 1,922.5 metric tons of Russian and Albanian chemical agents.

Lugar toured several East African disease research facilities late last year as part of a bid to safeguard potential biological weapon materials on the continent.

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The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Nexus

U.S. Department of State, 29 June 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the Foundation for Strategic Research Conference in Paris, France

Thank you, Bruno, for that kind introduction. I want to convey my thanks to the Foundation for Strategic Research for hosting this public event as an adjunct to the critical dialogue taking place this week at the P-5 [permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, which are also the five recognized nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States] follow-on conference. Senior officials, and perhaps more importantly technical experts, from the P-5 have gathered here in Paris for a dialogue on the key confidence building and transparency measures that can help facilitate further disarmament.

The theme of today's panel is "The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Nexus." Too often, we approach these dual imperatives in a binary, "either or" fashion. That's silly because they are two sides of the same coin.

Advances like the New START Treaty reinforce the nonproliferation regime, while success in restraining the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials is crucial if we are to proceed on further reductions. Disarmament cannot ultimately prevail so long as nonproliferation is neglected, and vice versa.

President Obama and Secretary Clinton understand this dynamic. Just four months into his Presidency, President Obama said that we can make the world safer from the threat of nuclear war and move toward a world without nuclear weapons. And, in Prague, he offered a path forward to do that. As he declared at that time, "The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful energy."

The progress we make, as the recognized nuclear weapon states, helps build international support to bolster nonproliferation norms and reduce the odds that new states will join the nuclear club. This nexus between nonproliferation and disarmament is best embodied by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which legally binds nearly every country in the world.

It is for this reason that the international community is compelled to address the significant challenges Iran and North Korea pose. Their actions continue to undermine the treaties and institutions that underpin the global nonproliferation regime.

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Iran remains unable to convince the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful, as underscored by [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] Director General Amano's most recent report issued last month. The United States remains willing to engage with Iran to resolve the international community's collective concerns, but Iran must take the initiative to engage in a serious and meaningful manner. Meanwhile, we continue to urge the IAEA to provide a comprehensive assessment regarding the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.

With respect to North Korea, if the regime can demonstrate a serious and sincere willingness to take concrete steps to initiate a denuclearization process and enhance regional stability, we are prepared to resume a dialogue. Until then, we will continue to take the necessary steps to counter North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles as well as its proliferation activities.

The more progress we make on addressing such serious nonproliferation challenges, the better placed we will be for further progress on disarmament. No one should doubt the U.S. commitment to that goal. President Obama has put forward a series of concrete steps to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons beginning with his landmark speech in Prague in April 2009. Taken together, these steps can provide a roadmap not just as we look forward to the 2012 NPT [Preparatory Commission] PrepCom and the 2015 Review Conference, but also in reaffirming our fundamental commitment to our Article VI obligations.

Over a year ago, the United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty. We brought it into force at the beginning of this year. When fully implemented, the United States and Russia's deployed strategic warheads will be at their lowest levels since the 1950s.

The United States also released a Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] that reduces the prominence of nuclear weapons in our national defense. We made clear that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons under extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies and partners. We further noted that the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies and partners. We also sought to underscore the security benefits of forswearing nuclear weapons by issuing a new "Negative Security Assurance" that declares the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states who are party to the NPT and complying with their nonproliferation obligations.

While an important milestone, the NPR certainly was not the end of the road for U.S. efforts. In March, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon announced that the Department of Defense will

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review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our nuclear stockpile. This effort could involve potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures.

On transparency, at the NPT Review Conference last year, Secretary Clinton revealed the actual size of the United States stockpile and our annual warhead dismantlement figures to show how far we have come since the end of the Cold War.

However, no one nation can create the conditions that would lead to the day when nuclear weapons are obsolete. We need other countries to step forward with us and follow in our footsteps. Other countries need to be as transparent and as open as we are to provide confidence for deep reductions. Our actions show that transparency and security can go together. Secrecy may sometimes be necessary, but it also can lead to misunderstandings, miscalculations, and mistrust.

While we have a growing consensus that a world without nuclear weapons is in all our interests, it is still fragile. Nuclear disarmament itself is not necessarily the Holy Grail, especially if we do not increase international stability and security. The journey and each step along the way is just as important, if not more important than the destination. These steps can enhance our mutual security and create a growing sense of momentum.

It is for this very reason why the P-5 follow-on conference, which begins tomorrow morning and will continue through Friday, is such a valuable exercise. It is a successor to an initial conference held in London in September 2009.

All of us have brought our experts from capitals to have a frank and detailed exchange on verification and transparency measures that can further enable future steps on disarmament.

From an American perspective, we so enjoy coming to these conferences that we want to make it a regular habit. It is important that our emerging dialogue in the P-5 context evolve into a regular component of our bilateral and multilateral relationships. That is essential if we are to make progress on the objectives set forth in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan.

One core principle we should all share is that, as we draw down, other countries should not build up. That is why the United States is investing so much energy to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). There are already too many nuclear weapons and too much fissile material for such weapons in this world. We do not need more fissile material that could be used to make more bombs, and we do not want to add to the risk of theft or misuse.

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It remains our strong preference to house FMCT negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Yet, so long as efforts to agree on a Program of Work remain deadlocked, it is only appropriate that we explore alternate venues. Preserving the FMCT inside the CD when that body remains paralyzed only ensures that progress on an FMCT will remain out of our collective grasp.

We also call on others to continue the moratorium on explosive testing. The Obama Administration remains committed to securing U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. We are initiating a significant process of engagement with Members of our Congress to highlight what has changed since the Senate last took up this treaty.

Let me conclude by quoting from our Nuclear Posture Review: "It is in the United States' interest and that of all other nations that the nearly sixty-five year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever." So long as such weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent. But our hope and interest remains that these weapons will never be used again as we move, in a step-by-step manner, toward their eventual abolition. The measures we discuss this week, and the possible momentum they may create, can help contribute to that ultimate goal. And they will help reinforce and strengthen the nonproliferation norm.

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Joint Statement on First P-5 Follow-Up Meeting to the NPT Review Conference

U.S. Department of State, 01 July 2011, www.state.gov

The P-5 [permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, which are also the five recognized nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States] met in Paris on June 30 – July 1 for their first follow-up meeting to the NPT Review Conference [RevCon], with a view to considering progress on the commitments they made at this Conference, as well as to following up on the London Conference on Confidence Building Measures towards Nuclear Disarmament in September 2009.

They reaffirmed their unconditional support for the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They also reaffirmed the recommendations set out in the balanced Action Plan agreed in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and called on all States Parties to the NPT to work together to advance its implementation.

They met with the determination to work together in pursuit of their shared goal of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT, including engagement on the steps outlined in Action 5, as well as reporting and other efforts called for in the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. They called on all States, both States Parties and Non Parties, to contribute to this nuclear disarmament objective, including by ensuring that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime remains robust and reliable.

The P-5 continued their previous discussions on the issues of transparency and mutual confidence, including nuclear doctrine and capabilities, and of verification, recognizing such measures are important for establishing a firm foundation for further disarmament efforts. In order to increase efficiency of P-5 nuclear consultation, they approved to continue working on an agreed glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms, and established a dedicated working group.

The P-5 discussed the particular political and technical challenges associated with verification in achieving further progress towards disarmament and ensuring nonproliferation. They shared information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification. They will continue their discussion of this issue later this year at an expert-level meeting in London.

As a follow-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon discussions, the P-5 shared their views on how to respond to notifications of withdrawal from the treaty, while recognizing the provisions of

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Article X. They also stressed the need for strengthening [International Atomic Energy Agency] IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the adoption of the Additional Protocol and the reinforcement of IAEA's resources and capabilities for deterring and detecting non-compliance.

The P-5 States recalled their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. They called upon all States to uphold the moratorium on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the objective and purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force.

They reiterated their support for immediate commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including verification provisions. In order to sustain the potential of negotiations in the CD, the P-5 will, prior to the next United Nations General Assembly, renew their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations.

The P-5 welcomed the steps taken by the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom towards holding a Conference on a Middle East WMD Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) in 2012.

The P-5 will follow on their discussions and hold a third P-5 Conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee.

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Russia to Spend \$730 Billion on New Weapons

Voice of America, 06 July 2011, www.voanews.com/english

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has announced his government plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on weapons modernization by 2020. In his address to parliament earlier this year, Putin said Russia must be strong enough to fend off any threats from abroad, so missile production will double starting in 2013. Analysts in Moscow say this ambitious plan is intended mainly to preserve the government's domestic and regional influence.

Russia plans to spend \$730 billion by 2020 to upgrade and re-arm its military. That's nearly \$20 million a day. The new state arms procurement program includes purchases of eight missile-carrying strategic submarines equipped with Bulava ballistic missiles. Plus 600 aircraft and S-400 and S-500 air defense systems. The arms purchases, both at home and abroad, would allow Russia to raise the proportion of modern weaponry in its arsenal to 70 percent by 2020.

Independent military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer says upgrading the strategic nuclear forces is at the top of the list, but the rest of the military needs a boost as well. "Then there's of course the air force, the air defense system, the army – actually, everything needs re-arming because right now they say that [only] 10-15 percent of our weaponry is modern," Felgenhauer noted.

As Russia exports weapons worth billions of dollars abroad, the country's armed forces are mostly equipped with outdated Soviet-era weaponry. In the last 10 years the government has increased the defense budget tenfold, says Felgenhauer, but still failed to bring the military up to date. "Now the present defense minister says that there was massive misappropriation of funds," Felgenhauer added. "The Russian defense industry, which is also downgraded, and its capabilities are much smaller than in Soviet times, responded to more funding by just raising prices. They are producing the same several fighters or missiles, but for a much bigger price."

Prime Minister Putin says it is necessary to spend billions on re-arming the military due to the need to fend off foreign threats. But while that will demonstrate Russia's military might, analysts say the main goal really is to create more business for the country's military-defense complex ahead of next year's presidential and parliamentary elections.

"Russia has inherited a large military-industrial potential and unfortunately, no real conversion from the military production to the civil production has occurred," noted Yevgeny Volk, a political analyst Yeltsin Foundation in Moscow. "So [the military spending plan is necessary] in order to provide more working places, more jobs, more people involved in this production who are really the electorate for Mr. Putin pending the parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia."

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The new proposed arms import plan is expected to come in two stages. In the first, Russia would purchase equipment and licenses, and in the second, it would set up joint ventures with Western arms providers, and begin production of Western-designed weapons systems inside the country. In post-Soviet Russia, analysts say, "military" mostly means "business" - no matter what ideological wrapping it has.

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NNSA Conducts Successful W78 JTA Flight Test

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 08 July 2011, nnsa.energy.gov

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), working with the U.S. Air Force, recently conducted a successful W78 Joint Test Assembly (JTA) flight test. The joint flight testing program helps ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile.

The Minuteman payload consisted of a single instrumented JTA launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base. It was the first flight test incorporating a new command destruct system, Command Receiver Decoder, developed for the Minuteman program. A JTA contains a set of sensors and hardware used during flight tests to ensure that weapons perform as intended.

“JTA flight tests are essential in ensuring that all weapon systems perform as designed,” said Brig. Gen. Sandra Finan, NNSA Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Military Application. “The working relationship between NNSA and the Department of Defense is vital as we continue our strong partnership in support of our national security.”

NNSA produces JTAs in support of the Joint Surveillance Flight Test Program between the Department of Defense and the NNSA. JTAs are built to simulate actual weapon configurations utilizing as much war reserve hardware as feasible. JTAs are assembled at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, and are not capable of nuclear yield, as they contain no special nuclear materials.

The JTA includes a telemetry system which collects and transmits data on the warhead. The data is fed into a reliability model developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories to evaluate the warhead reliability.

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Russian Aircraft Carries Out Aerial Inspection above United States

Russian Aviation, 28 June 2011, www.ruaviation.com/news

Russian military specialists performed [inspection] flights above U.S. territory using the Tu-154 Lk-1 [aircraft] in accordance with the “Open Skies” agreement, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports.

Besides Russian experts, American experts were also onboard. Russian officers are always onboard the American aircraft when flying above Russian territory. They control the use of surveillance equipment and maintenance of the agreement, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) press service administration reports.

The survey flight above the United States was carried out from Wright-Patterson Airfield, Ohio. The maximum range is 4,900 km. It is the 15th survey flight by Russian specialists above the territory of different states who take part in the agreement, the MoD notes. The international “Open Skies” agreement was signed in Helsinki in 1992 in order to check the claimed data on arms and troop disposition. Thirty-five states from Europe and North America are taking part in this agreement.

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Canadian, Hungarian Experts to Fly Open Skies Mission over Russia

Moscow Interfax-AVN Online, 04 July 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

Canadian and Hungarian military inspectors will fly a joint inspection mission over Russia between July 4 and 9 under Open Skies international arrangements, the Russian Defense Ministry has reported.

"A Hungarian Antonov An-26 and the equipment installed have gone through international attestation by experts, including Russian, which rules out the use of the gear unauthorized by the Open Skies Treaty, the Defense Ministry said in a statement received by Interfax on Monday.

The observation mission will be flown along a route agreed with Russian experts, who will be aboard the plane to control the observance of the agreement on the use of observation equipment, the Defense Ministry said.

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