



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



24 August – 08 September 2010

DTRA

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Russian Depot Destroys 5,300 Metric Tons of Nerve Agent

Global Security Newswire, 25 August 2010, <http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/>

A Russian chemical weapons disposal plant has eliminated more than 5,300 metric tons of the nerve agent sarin in the last two years, ITAR-Tass reported yesterday. (105 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

Bioreactors Arrive at Depot for Installation

Pueblo Chieftain, 26 August 2010, <http://www.chieftain.com/>

A major component of the Pueblo Chemical Depot's high-tech wastewater treatment facility is being installed this week, a part of the program that almost passed Pueblo by. (615 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

Key Program for Destroying Chemical Weapons Sees Costs Soar

Defense Environment Alert, 31 August 2010, <http://www.cwwg.org/cwwg.html>

Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter has notified Congress of a significant increase in the cost of a multibillion-dollar program established by lawmakers to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles. (745 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

OPCW Director-General Has High-Level Meetings in Washington and Visits Blue Grass Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility

OPCW, 06 September 2010, <http://www.opcw.org/>

The OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, visited the United States from 30 August to 2 September where he met with senior U.S. officials in Washington D.C. and visited the chemical weapons storage depot and destruction facility in Blue Grass, Kentucky.

(268 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

The International Day against Nuclear Tests: Time to Bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty into Force

CTBTO, 27 August 2010, <http://www.ctbto.org/>

Last year the United Nations General Assembly unanimously agreed to declare 29 August the International Day against Nuclear Tests. (425 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT) (CONT.)

Russia to Create 32 International Nuclear Test Monitoring System Facilities

ITAR-TASS, 04 September 2010, accessed via Open Source Center

Russia will create 32 facilities as part of the international system of monitoring nuclear tests prohibited by the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the head of the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, Colonel-General Vladimir Verkhovtsev said. (488 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

CTBTO: Noble Gas Detection System Reaches Maturity

Network Weekly News, 06 September 2010, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Radionuclide station RN75 in Charlottesville is one of 80 stations worldwide that can detect radioactive particles in the air that may originate from a nuclear blast. (1,139 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW)

Second 2010 Session of Group of Governmental Experts of States Parties to CCW Opens Meeting

UN Office at Geneva, 30 August 2010, <http://www.unog.ch/>

The Second 2010 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the States parties to the CCW, mandated to continue negotiations to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, opens its week-long meeting today at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. (343 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

U.S. Remarks to CCW Group of Governmental Experts Meeting

Federal News Service, 30 August 2010, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Remarks by Melanie Khanna, Legal Adviser, Head of Delegation, U.S. Mission to the U.N. and Other International Organizations, in an Opening Statement for the U.S. Delegation to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts Meeting

The United States remains committed to reaching an agreement on a legally binding protocol on Cluster Munitions in the CCW to address their humanitarian impact on civilian populations.

(255 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS

Y-12 Removes Nuclear Materials from Two Facilities to Reduce Site's Nuclear Footprint

NNSA, 02 September 2010, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/>

The Y-12 National Security Complex has completed the removal of nuclear materials from two more facilities, significantly reducing its classified storage area and the cost of securing nuclear materials at the site. (360 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

New START: Security through 21st-Century Verification

Arms Control Association, 07 September 2010, <http://www.armscontrol.org/>

By Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation

New START is a continuation of the international arms control and nonproliferation framework that the United States has worked hard to foster and strengthen for the last 50 years.

(2,162 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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A Russian chemical weapons disposal plant has eliminated more than 5,300 metric tons of the nerve agent sarin in the last two years, ITAR-Tass reported yesterday.

Disposal of soman nerve agent stored at the chemical depot near the village of Leonidovka is set to start next month.

Plans are still being developed for building a structure where particularly complicated chemical munitions can be safely disarmed.

The Leonidovka installation held roughly 17 percent of Russia's chemical weapons, originally totaling 6,886 metric tons of warfare materials. The stockpile is scheduled to be eliminated by May 2012, one month past the deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

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Bioreactors Arrive at Depot for Installation

Pueblo Chieftain, 26 August 2010, <http://www.chieftain.com/>

A major component of the Pueblo Chemical Depot's high-tech wastewater treatment facility is being installed this week, a part of the program that almost passed Pueblo by.

Bechtel, the lead contractor for the program to destroy the depot's stockpile of 780,000 mustard agent weapons, is taking delivery of 16 Immobilized Cell Bioreactors.

When weapons destruction gets under way, almost five years from now, the boxcar-sized units will house bacteria that will break down the mustard agent components created when the weapons are flushed out with hot water and the agent neutralized.

The primary ingredient of the wastewater, also called agent hydrolysate, is thiodiglycol, a hazardous substance. Under the international treaty requiring the destruction of chemical weapons, it also has to be eliminated in the demilitarization process.

The ICB units will act in a way similar to municipal wastewater treatment ponds where bacteria is used to break down sewage, only these devices will be a lot more complicated. A system of baffles inside the units provides a large surface area for the bacteria to grow on, eating the thiodiglycol and turning it into salts.

The resulting saltwater then goes to a brine-reduction tank where the salts are separated for disposal at a landfill and the water returned to the Agent Processing Building to be reused in the neutralization process.

Scott Susman, acting site manager for the Defense Department's Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA] program, said that the biotreatment method that will be used here has been used in a number of locations and has been tested at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland and at the Deseret Chemical Depot in Tooele, Utah.

"This is an important milestone for the Pueblo Chemical Alternatives Pilot Plant," he said during a ceremony Wednesday where the second of 16 planned ICB units was put in place. Attending the event were plant workers and local, federal and state officials.

For Irene Kornelly, seeing the units being lowered into place by a massive crane was especially heartening.

Kornelly is the chairwoman of the Colorado Chemical Demilitarization Citizens Advisory Commission. The commission led the fight to get the biotreatment done here when Defense

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Department officials wanted to ship the hydrolysate to an offsite treatment facility. The Pentagon claimed that off-site treatment would save \$150 million in the more than \$3 billion program.

Commission members argued that the estimated savings didn't take into consideration contingencies that could be a lot more costly. They pointed out, for example, that shipping the hydrolysate could set the stage for further delays if there was a spill in transit that brought on litigation stopping further shipments.

"This is a great day," Kornelly said. "For years and years, we argued, fought, debated – whatever term you want to use – with the Department of Defense. Two years ago we won. We did not want to ship our trash elsewhere."

She credited commission members, congressional, state and local political leaders and union officials with winning that battle. "They told us it only meant 30 jobs but 30 jobs is 30 jobs in this economy," she said. That job estimate referred to operations but biotreatment means more than that to Colorado during the construction process.

Bechtel awarded a \$28.7 million contract for construction of the units to Golder Associates of Lakewood and Golder in turn subcontracted with Springs Fabrication in Colorado Springs for the \$8.1 million job of putting them together and delivering the ICBs.

Paul Henry, Bechtel's local manager, said that installation will be done by workers Bechtel has hired through local craft unions. Indicating those contributions, the ICB put in place Wednesday bore banners for Golder, Springs Fabrication and the Pipefitters' union.

Henry also said that deliveries are running ahead of schedule.

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Key Program for Destroying Chemical Weapons Sees Costs Soar

Defense Environment Alert, 31 August 2010, <http://www.cwwg.org/cwwg.html>

Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter has notified Congress of a significant increase in the cost of a multibillion-dollar program established by lawmakers to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles. At the same time, Carter is reiterating previous commitments made by Defense Secretary Robert Gates to back the program.

In a July 21 letter, Carter alerts Congress that the program acquisition unit cost of DoD's Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program has increased by at least 15 percent above the current baseline estimate, breaching a major cost threshold in the Nunn-McCurdy law.

The program is in the process of building two facilities in Colorado and Kentucky to safely destroy chemical weapons stockpiles.

Carter writes that on June 7, the program manager provided "reasonable cause" that, based on a revised ACWA program office estimate, there is "significant unit cost growth due to increased costs associated with the construction and systemization phase" for the program.

This prompted Carter to determine that the program breached the Nunn-McCurdy law's significant cost growth threshold for the program acquisition unit cost, according to the letter. The Pentagon calculates that unit cost for a program by adding the development, production and military construction costs and dividing by the total number of developmental and production units.

The breach is not severe enough to trigger the section of the law that would automatically target the program for termination unless the Defense Department certifies it still needs the endeavor. But DoD is still required to give Congress further information on the soaring costs.

And Carter signals continued commitments to fund the program. "I assure you that the fiscal resources required will be provided to continue the progress of the ACWA program, prevent any delays and ensure completing destruction operations of the chemical weapons stockpiles at Colorado and Kentucky as close as possible to the 2017 congressionally mandated deadline," Carter writes.

Carter's letter pledges to provide lawmakers details of the unit cost increase in a selected acquisition report in September. The selected acquisition report released in April noted the Pentagon had spent a total of \$8.4 billion on the ACWA program in fiscal year 1994 dollars.

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An independent assessment based on the revised ACWA program office estimate is being conducted to validate the cost growth and verify the chemical weapons destruction schedule milestones, the letter states.

A spokesman for the Chemical Weapons Working Group, a coalition of citizen activists, doubts there will be future Nunn-McCurdy cost breaches with the program, now that the facilities' design is complete. "We've got a very stable data base now" from which to make predictions, the source says. ACWA now has data around which to say "this is what we're going to do, this is how we're going to do it – meaning design – this is how long it's going to take to do it, and this is what it's going to cost," notwithstanding unforeseen issues, the source says.

Congress has set a deadline for destroying all of the Pentagon's stockpiled chemical munitions by 2017, but even before this latest cost increase there were serious doubts about whether that deadline would be met.

Pentagon spokeswoman Cmdr. Wendy Snyder said the ACWA Program schedule projects completion of destruction operations in Colorado in September 2017 and in Kentucky in May 2021. DoD is committed to destroying the chemical weapons stockpiles in both states "as close as possible to the 2017 congressionally mandated deadline in a safe, secure, and efficient manner," she said.

The schedule of record calls for the facility being built near the Army's Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado, to start operations in 2015, end operations in 2017 and close in 2019, said Snyder. The facility being built near Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky, is slated to start operations in 2018, end operations in 2021 and close in 2023, she said.

The Pentagon plans to destroy most of these two stockpiles through a water neutralization process. Lately the department has advocated blowing up a select number of munitions. The explosive approach, which might enable destruction operations in Colorado to conclude prior to 2017, initially drew opposition from federal and state environmental authorities as well as the Colorado Chemical Demilitarization Citizens Advisory Commission.

On July 29, the Pueblo Chieftain newspaper reported that Irene Kornelly, head of the commission, said that an agreement "that would be satisfactory to everyone" had been worked out with Kevin Flamm, manager of the ACWA program. But Kornelly said that she could not reveal the details because the decision is still up to Carter.

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The OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, visited the United States from 30 August to 2 September where he met with senior U.S. officials in Washington D.C. and visited the chemical weapons storage depot and destruction facility in Blue Grass, Kentucky.

In Washington, Director-General Üzümcü met with the U.S. National Security Advisor, Gen. James L. Jones, Jr; with Ms. Rose Gottemoeller, the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation; with Mr. Andrew Weber, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Biological and Chemical Defense Programs, who exercises oversight of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program; and with Mr. Kevin Wolfe, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration in the Bureau of Industry and Security, among others.

In his meetings Director-General Üzümcü briefed the officials on the status of implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and discussed a number of CWC-related issues. He also participated in a group discussion with representatives of prominent NGOs and policy institutes.

The Director-General then paid a 2-day visit to Blue Grass, Kentucky. He toured the chemical weapons storage depot there and a new chemical weapons destruction facility that is under construction, and received comprehensive briefings from the heads of the U.S. Army's Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) and Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) Program.

He discussed issues related to the U.S. demilitarization efforts with Mr. Carmen Spencer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Elimination of Chemical Weapons), and Mr. Arthur Hopkins, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Treaties and Threat Reduction, together with other senior officials present.

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The International Day against Nuclear Tests: Time to Bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty into Force

CTBTO, 27 August 2010, <http://www.ctbto.org/>

The declaration of 29 August as the International Day against Nuclear Tests is an acknowledgement of the need to halt nuclear testing once and for all, Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), said today.

“The will to pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world is not in short measure but we need to observe 29 August as a time to act and not to wait,” Tóth said.

Last year the United Nations General Assembly unanimously agreed to declare 29 August the International Day against Nuclear Tests.

“Now is the time for the nine States whose ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) will bring it into force to show the political will and fully endorse it,” Tóth said.

The CTBT has been signed by 182 states and ratified by 153, but to become international law 44 states that were significant nuclear technology holders at the time it opened for signature in 1996 must ratify. Currently 35 have done so. Nine remain. These are China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States.

When the treaty becomes law it will prohibit all nuclear explosions. “The hands of states seeking to develop nuclear weapons and the hands of those that already have them will be tied without their ability to test,” said Tóth.

The nuclear arms race began on 29 August 1949 when the Soviet Union followed the United States and detonated its first nuclear device on the steppes of Kazakhstan at the Semipalatinsk test site, also known as the Polygon. The event came four years after the explosion of the first nuclear bomb by the United States.

The site was shut down at the order of Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev on 29 August 1991, after over 450 nuclear bombs had been tested. From 1945 to 1996, over 2,000 nuclear devices were detonated by the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and China.

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After testing ended at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan also returned to Russia the huge nuclear arsenal it had inherited from the break-up of the Soviet Union. The 1,400 strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems amounted to the world's fourth largest nuclear stockpile.

Kazakhstan has demonstrated that the security of the modern state has no need to be invested in nuclear weapons, said Tóth. It shares the achievement with South Africa, Belarus and Ukraine, which also relinquished their nuclear arsenals.

The declaration of 29 August as the International Day against Nuclear Tests was agreed to following a proposal from Kazakhstan.

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The 12th Main Directorate is responsible for the storage and transportation of nuclear weapons and for monitoring nuclear tests in other countries.

"The 12th Main Directorate has the Special Control Service. Since creation and up to now, the service has been constantly monitoring nuclear arms tests in the world," Verkhovtsev said in an interview with the military daily *Krasnaya Zvezda* in connection with Nuclear Security Specialists' Day celebrated on Saturday, September 4.

"Over the years of its existence, while fulfilling a governmental task, the Special Control Service has registered more than 730 nuclear tests at testing ranges in the United States, China, France, India and Pakistan, including small-yield nuclear weapons in North Korea on October 9, 2006 and May 25, 2009. Data obtained by the Special Control Service made it possible to register nuclear tests and confirm the existence of nuclear weapons in North Korea with a high degree of probability," the general said.

"The range of tasks today is much broader due to the fact that the Special Control Service participates in the monitoring system that is provided for in international agreements. In accordance with a key document, the CTBT, the main instrument of control is the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes stations and laboratories in different countries. Data from the IMS go to the international data center that gathers, processes, archives them and then shares with the CTBT member states," Verkhovtsev said.

"Under the treaty, each member state has to create a national body to act as a coordinating center for relations with other members. In Russia, these functions are performed by the 12th Main Directorate. The Special Control Service is in charge of all work to create and operate Russian IMS stations subordinated to the Defense Ministry. In accordance with the treaty, 32 facilities of the International Monitoring System will be located in the Russian Federation. Practically, all stations within the IMS will be created at the facilities overseen by the Special Control Service," he said.

"Presently, we are finishing creating the Russian segment of the IMS. We have arranged for information and technical cooperation for data exchange with the international data center. The

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participation of the service in the treaty verification mechanism is one of the forms of fulfilling the obligations of the Russian Federation and necessitates special requirements for the service personnel in terms of improving their skills and equipment," Verkhovtsev said.

"As of now, 182 of 194 countries have signed the treaty. India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have not signed it. The treaty has been ratified by 153 countries. Of the nuclear powers, the United States and China have not ratified the treaty, thus preventing it from entering into force," he said.

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CTBTO: Noble Gas Detection System Reaches Maturity

Network Weekly News, 06 September 2010, accessed via Lexis Nexis

The set-up looks rather unimposing to the uninitiated eye: a container, a satellite dish, a generator. Yet this container in the midst of lush green scenery some kilometers to the southeast of Charlottesville, Virginia, United States, houses a highly sensitive apparatus.

It's a fine summer day in 2010, and a group of scientists and engineers put the finishing touches to an unusual installation. The ordinary looking container is home to a monitoring station, part of a global network to watch over the planet. Practically an artificial nose, it can sniff out the tiniest amounts of radioactive material in the air and provide evidence of a recently conducted nuclear explosion.

Radionuclide station RN75 in Charlottesville is one of 80 stations worldwide that can detect radioactive particles in the air that may originate from a nuclear blast. The Charlottesville station has been up and running for over eight years. So, what's new then?

The station is one of 40 that are being equipped with additional detectors that can sniff radioactive gases in the air – another residue of a nuclear explosion. With its certification on August 19, 2010, the Charlottesville station is the first radionuclide station with noble gas detection capabilities to be formally integrated into a global verification regime, designed under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to detect nuclear explosions anywhere on Earth. The regime encompasses a worldwide network of over 300 monitoring stations, a data analysis center and on-site inspections.

Noble Gases Provide "Smoking Gun" Evidence

A nuclear explosion ejects radioactive material – solid and gaseous – into the environment. These substances provide the ultimate evidence that a nuclear detonation has taken place. Their detection depends on many factors, most of all on the setting in which the blast occurred. A well-contained underground nuclear explosion will not release solid radioactive residues into the air. But there is another way to detect such blasts – by finding their gaseous releases, radioactive noble gases, in particular xenon.

What are noble gases? They are chemical elements that very rarely react with other elements to form larger compounds. Their inertia is responsible for the "noble" label. Noble gas atoms are very small and pass easily through rock and sediment. Once in the atmosphere, the gas is dispersed by the winds and can be caught by detection installations such as the one in Charlottesville, providing the "smoking gun" evidence of a nuclear explosion.

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Developing a Detection System – the INGE Experiment

When the CTBT was opened for signature in 1996, noble gas detection technology hardly existed. Matthias Auer is a nuclear physicist working at the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna, Austria, and is in charge of the establishment of the radionuclide monitoring network. "Some ten years ago, the noble gas measuring equipment that existed was only used in laboratories and was not really suitable for CTBT monitoring purposes," he says.

That is when INGE was introduced – the International Noble Gas Experiment, which brought together experts from CTBT Member States and the CTBTO. "A major part of the experiment was to enable a smooth transition in adapting the equipment from the laboratory systems to its use under field conditions," says Auer. Several countries set out to develop a tool to trap and measure xenon.

All current systems work in a similar way. Xenon is isolated from the air by a charcoal-containing purification device resulting in higher concentrations of the gas in its stable and unstable, i.e. radioactive, forms. The isolated xenon is then measured for its level of radioactivity which helps to quantify the radioactive xenon contained in the sample.

The station in Charlottesville uses the SAUNA system, the Swedish Unattended Noble Gas Analyzer, as do the other three radionuclide monitoring stations in the United States that are also equipped with noble gas detection installations. The CTBTO uses two other systems in its network: the Russian ARIX (Analyzer of Xenon Radioisotopes) and the French SPALAX (Système de Prelevements et d'Analyse en Ligne d'Air pour quantifier le Xenon).

North Korea Blast Confidently Detected

Four years ago, the noble gas detection network at the CTBTO was still in its infancy. Only ten of the planned 40 stations tested the new xenon measuring equipment under the INGE framework. Unexpectedly, they had to tackle a real nuclear explosion scenario – the first nuclear blast set off by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on October 9, 2006.

None of the ten stations in test-mode at the time were anywhere near North Korea. But the system demonstrated its potential when a station in the north of Canada registered radioactive xenon, two weeks after the detonation shook the mountains in the DPRK's North Hamgyong province.

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Experts at the CTBTO had predicted the arrival of the telling gaseous debris at the Canadian station in Yellowknife using their in-house developed atmospheric transport model, ATM.

The amounts needed to make a detection are astonishingly small. "The system can detect a concentration of 0.1 g of radioactive xenon evenly distributed within the Earth's atmosphere," explains Auer.

Thirty Stations by End of 2010

The impressive performance of the noble gas detection technology in October 2006 gave an additional boost to the installation of the outstanding stations. As of August 2010, 26 of the planned 40 stations had been set up. By the end of the year, there will be up to 30 stations, tripling the number that existed at the time of the 2006 explosion in North Korea.

Certification – End of a Process

Following the facility in Charlottesville, five more radionuclide stations are planned to have their noble gas measurement systems certified this year. Certification is the formal end of a process. It recognizes that a station meets certain requirements to become part of the CTBT verification regime's international monitoring network.

These requirements cover technical functionality, detection sensitivity, communication and data availability. Radionuclide noble gas stations are a specific case – they are built at an already existing station. And while the measurement processes for radionuclide particles and radionuclide noble gases are not only different but also separate, they share the station's logistics and the Treaty-defined station name.

Certification is preceded by a period of several months during which the station runs through a final test phase, already transmitting data to the International Data Center in Vienna. Once the formal step of certification has been completed, monitoring data sent from the station will join the bulk of digital information arriving at the CTBTO in Vienna every day. They will also be shared with Member States.

The certification of the Charlottesville facility is a real milestone in the establishment of the CTBT verification regime. "After 12 years of development, the radionuclide noble gas monitoring system has reached a state of maturity," concludes Auer. It adds a crucial element to the global system that monitors the planet to ensure that no nuclear explosion goes unnoticed.

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Second 2010 Session of Group of Governmental Experts of States Parties to CCW Opens Meeting

States News Service, 30 August 2010, <http://www.unog.ch/>

The Second 2010 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the States parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, mandated to continue negotiations to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, opens its week-long meeting today at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

Minister Jesus S. Domingo of the Philippines will preside over the work of the Group that expects to conclude its negotiations as rapidly as possible and report to the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties which will take place in November.

The latest version of the Chair's paper submitted to the Group at the end of the First 2010 Session in April will be the basis for the negotiations. In preparation for the Second Session delegations met informally in Geneva from June 28 to July 1.

The 2009 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) decided that the Group of Governmental Experts should "continue its negotiations, informed by the Chairperson's consolidated text dated August 26, 2009 (document CCW/MSP/2009/WP.1, titled "Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions"), and taking into account document CCW/GGE/2009-II/2, Annex I (titled "Cluster Munitions"), and other past, present and future proposals by delegations, to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations."

The humanitarian impact of cluster munitions has been discussed within the CCW since 2001, first – under a broader theme of explosive remnants of war, and since 2007 – as the main item of the agenda of the Group of Governmental Experts. The Group has invested much effort during the last three years in drafting a new protocol on prohibitions and restrictions on the use of cluster munitions, but there is still considerable controversy over its possible content. In his closing remarks, the Chair emphasized that this represented a considerable challenge.

"Cooperation, common efforts, flexibility and political will," he stressed were important elements to overcome such challenge.

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U.S. Remarks to CCW Group of Governmental Experts Meeting

Federal News Service, 30 August 2010, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Remarks by Melanie Khanna, Legal Adviser, Head of Delegation, U.S. Mission to the U.N. and Other International Organizations, in an Opening Statement for the U.S. Delegation to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts Meeting

I would like to begin by offering our thanks to you for your continuing efforts to lead us toward consensus in these difficult negotiations. We also extend our thanks to all of the Friends of the Chair for their good work to date.

Mr. Chairman, the United States remains committed to reaching an agreement on a legally binding protocol on Cluster Munitions in the CCW to address their humanitarian impact on civilian populations. In our many rounds of negotiations in Geneva, we have made important progress towards achieving such an agreement—much difficult work has been done, many compromises have been found, and significant areas for further compromise have been identified.

We recognize, especially with the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, that some delegations and NGOs may view these negotiations as having no value or even as counterproductive. Some have argued that an agreement on cluster munitions in the CCW that is different from the standard set by the Oslo Convention is not worthwhile. We strongly disagree. A CCW Protocol that imposes meaningful requirements on the countries that are the major users and producers of cluster munitions would be a very important step forward from a humanitarian standpoint.

We realize the work this week will be difficult and that significant differences remain, but our delegation has been giving our outstanding issues a good deal of thought intersessionally and is prepared to actively engage with other interested delegations to find the compromises that will be necessary to reach consensus as soon as possible.

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Y-12 Removes Nuclear Materials from Two Facilities to Reduce Site's Nuclear Footprint

NNSA, 02 September 2010, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/>

The Y-12 National Security Complex has completed the removal of nuclear materials from two more facilities, significantly reducing its classified storage area and the cost of securing nuclear materials at the site. The 613,642-square-foot Alpha 5 Building (also known as 9201-5) and the 7,700-square-foot 9720-38 storage facility no longer carry nuclear designations, resulting in significant cost savings for operations.

Shedding the nuclear facility status at Alpha 5 equals a savings of \$220,000 annually in surveillance and maintenance expenditures alone. Add in the savings associated with utilities and environmental costs, and the benefit to taxpayers grows.

“This is an important milestone as we continue to transform NNSA’s Cold War-era nuclear weapons complex into a 21st century nuclear security enterprise,” said NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Don Cook. “Congratulations to Y-12 on this achievement, which will result in permanent cost savings and reduce our nuclear footprint.”

Built in 1945 to house the calutrons that enriched uranium for the Manhattan Project, Alpha 5 played a central role in nuclear component production through the Cold War. Building 9720–38 was a classified storage area. Also, last year, the 313,771-square-foot Beta 4 building (also known as 9204-4) received its non-nuclear designation.

The collaborative work of B&W Y-12, the contractor operating the Y-12 National Security Complex for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and NNSA’s Y-12 Site Office to remove hazardous materials from the facilities resulted in the safety basis requirements being lifted. That means the building is no longer considered a nuclear facility.

“The effort to remove 555 metric tons of material from these facilities surpassed expectations and has been a tremendous success,” said Ted Sherry, manager of the NNSA’s Y-12 Site Office. “This task took a multi-disciplinary team of contractor personnel for a complex and difficult job well done well. Removal of nuclear materials in Alpha 5 is a major step toward the eventual cleanup, decontamination and decommissioning of the facility.”

“By eliminating the need for a safety basis for Alpha 5, we can accelerate cleanup and facilitate NNSA’s vision for Y 12 transformation,” said Darrel Kohlhorst, B&W Y-12 president and general manager. “This emphasis on Alpha 5 reduces operations risks at Y-12.”

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New START: Security through 21st-Century Verification

Arms Control Association, 07 September 2010, <http://www.armscontrol.org/>

By Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation

On July 1, 1988, a U.S. inspection team flew to the Soviet Union to inspect one of its intermediate-range-missile operating bases. Upon arrival in Moscow, the team announced to the Soviet escorts that it would inspect Rechitsa, an SS-20 missile base located in present-day Belarus. The visit to Rechitsa marked the first time a U.S. inspection team had the opportunity to inspect a Soviet operating base for nuclear-armed intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

On the same day, a Soviet team of inspectors arrived at Travis Air Force Base in California to inspect intermediate-range missile facilities there and at bases in Arizona, Utah, and Colorado. In the 22 years since these first inspections occurred under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, on-site inspections have been a vital means of verifying compliance with arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet successor states, and now the Russian Federation.

With the December 2009 expiration of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the United States is unable, for the first time in more than 20 years, to conduct nuclear arms inspections inside Russia. [...]

There is no substitute for on-site inspections. They provide not only the “boots on the ground” presence to confirm Russian data declarations, thus helping to verify compliance with treaty obligations, but also insights into Russian strategic forces located at those facilities. Simply put, the United States is more secure and safer when our country is able to gain a better understanding of the Russian strategic arsenal.

New START is a continuation of the international arms control and nonproliferation framework that the United States has worked hard to foster and strengthen for the last 50 years. It will provide ongoing transparency and predictability regarding the world’s two largest strategic arsenals, while preserving the United States’ ability to maintain the strong, credible nuclear deterrent that is a key element of U.S. national security and the security of U.S. allies and friends.

Building on a Legacy

[...] Conducting on-site inspections under the INF Treaty was a major breakthrough during the Cold War, signaling that the perestroika and glasnost’ policies of Mikhail Gorbachev were truly beginning to affect the Soviet Union and how it did business. The on-site inspection concept was further developed and refined under START.

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During the 15-year span of START, U.S. and Russian inspectors visited each other's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) bases, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) bases, heavy bombers bases, missile test ranges, and storage facilities, among others. The first inspections under START began in March 1995 when, during the 120-day period after entry into force of the treaty, U.S. and Russian inspection teams conducted baseline inspections at all of the sites the treaty covered. Because much territory had to be covered in a very short period of time, the U.S. inspection teams were organized according to weapons systems covered by the treaty: silo-based ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, or mobile ICBMs.

These baseline inspections began at the close of a very cold winter in Russia. U.S. inspectors often stood knee deep in snow while conducting three- to four-hour-long discussions with their Russian escorts on the nuances of inspection procedures. For many Russian and U.S. personnel, this was their first encounter with their counterparts from the other country, so initially the relationship was impersonal, formal, and sometimes adversarial. During the succeeding years of conducting START inspections, the demeanor on both sides developed into one of mutual respect as each side recognized that the other's inspection team members or in-country escorts were doing their jobs with competence, professionalism, and fairness while ensuring the exercise of their full and reciprocal rights under the treaty.

Over the life of START, the atmosphere during inspections continued to improve. "It's not personal, it's about the treaty" became the mantra of the inspectors on both sides. Each side learned a great deal about the other's strategic forces during those on-site inspections. Thus, both sides gained a strong body of knowledge and experience about conducting on-site inspections efficiently and effectively under START and the INF Treaty; they also learned how to improve on them.

Verification in New START

[...] The Soviet Union declared 70 facilities to be subject to inspection at the entry into force of START, but many of these have been shut down. Moreover, some were located in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which are not parties to New START and no longer deploy strategic offensive arms. As a result of these changes, Russia provided site diagrams for only 35 facilities that will be subject to inspection under New START. Finally, Russia will likely choose to close down some of these remaining facilities over the life of the treaty.

The new treaty provides for the conduct of up to 18 on-site inspections annually, while START provided for 28 annual inspections. As noted above, however, there are only 35 facilities that will be subject to inspection at the beginning of New START—half the number that was subject

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to inspection at the beginning of START. In addition, the inspections under New START combine elements of the most commonly used types of inspections and exhibitions under START. Furthermore, some New START inspections may be longer than their predecessors. Conducting fewer and longer inspections and combining inspection tasks mean fewer disruptions to U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear force operations, which is highly desired by military commanders.

Experienced inspectors and weapons system operators served on the U.S. and Russian negotiating delegations for New START. These experts made important contributions that helped us develop a simple, safe, and cost-effective inspection regime for the new treaty. We also worked to develop measures unique to the requirements of this treaty, in particular on-site inspection procedures that will allow the United States to confirm the actual number of re-entry vehicles on each designated Russian ICBM and SLBM. This verification task and inspection right did not exist under START.

The United States will have the right to select, for purposes of inspection, from all of Russia's treaty-limited deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles and launchers over the life of New START. It is also important to note that each deployed and nondeployed ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber will have assigned to it an alphanumeric code, or unique identifier. The unique identifier will be included in notifications any time the ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber is moved or changes status. The treaty establishes procedures to allow inspectors to confirm the unique identifier during the inspection process. The notification of changes in weapons systems, for example, movement in and out of deployed status, will provide more information on the status of Russian strategic forces under this treaty than was available under START. Information provided in notifications will complement and be checked by on-site inspection as well as by imagery from satellites and other assets that collectively make up each side's national technical means of verification.

The combination of national technical means, a comprehensive database that is constantly updated through notification of weapons system movements and changes in status, short-notice on-site inspections, and exhibitions will enable the United States to continue to gain insight into the Russian strategic forces as was the case under the verification regimes for START and the INF Treaty.

Conducting Inspections

The new treaty provides that, within one hour of a base being designated for inspection by an inspection team, which will occur within four hours of the team's arrival at the point of entry,

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pre-inspection movement restrictions begin, and items of inspection (e.g., missiles, mobile launchers, and heavy bombers) present at that base must not be removed from the inspection site. This same requirement existed under START.

Once U.S. inspectors arrive at a base, they will receive a pre-inspection briefing from the Russian side. The briefing will provide much of the same information as those conducted under START, but for an inspection involving deployed missiles and warheads, it also must include:

- the number of re-entry vehicles emplaced on each deployed ICBM or SLBM located at the base;
- a breakdown of deployed and nondeployed launchers at the base, i.e. those that have missiles in or on them (deployed) and those that do not (nondeployed);
- the number of deployed heavy bombers based and located at the base; and
- the number of nuclear armaments loaded on deployed heavy bombers at the base.

This information was not provided under START. New START not only makes all launchers or heavy bombers located at the base at the time of the inspection eligible for inspection, but requires updates on their declared status. The new treaty also requires updates on the number of re-entry vehicles or nuclear armaments emplaced on each deployed ICBM, SLBM, or nuclear-capable heavy bomber located at the base.

At ICBM or SLBM bases, the inspectors will designate for inspection one deployed ICBM or SLBM as well as a nondeployed ICBM or SLBM launcher, if there are any nondeployed launchers at the base. The designated deployed ICBM or SLBM will be placed under continuous observation by the inspection team and then prepared for inspection by the host country. Preparation will include a display of the re-entry vehicle covers that will be used during the inspection so that they are fully visible to inspectors; in some cases, inspectors will measure them. For inspections conducted at air bases, three deployed heavy bombers will be designated for nuclear armaments inspection. [...]

Just as under START, each side will have the right to confirm that covered objects on the front section of ICBMs or SLBMs that are declared not to be nuclear re-entry vehicles are, in fact, not nuclear. This provision is beneficial to both sides because it ensures that additional objects declared by the inspected party (e.g., penetration aids and inert ballast) will not count toward the treaty's warhead limit.

Radiation detection equipment may be used to confirm that the additional objects are not nuclear. Under New START, the two sides may agree in the treaty's Bilateral Consultative

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Commission (BCC) on new technologies for radiation detection that will be lighter and easier for inspectors to use than those that were available 15 years ago, when START entered into force.

We worked throughout the negotiations to preserve the key verification principle that short-notice inspections must be structured so that the side conducting an inspection has access to the forces present at a facility at the time the facility is designated for inspection. This principle, among others, deters cheating.

If the United States sees an anomaly during inspections that raises concerns about compliance, the U.S. side will raise its concerns first in the treaty's BCC and then, if necessary, at higher political levels. The U.S. government will treat very seriously any act that appears to violate the obligations of New START, just as it has with respect to the obligations of other treaties.

Telemetry Exchange

The purpose of the exchange of telemetry information under New START is different than it was under START. New START's telemetry provisions are intended to encourage transparency and predictability. Unlike START, telemetric information is not needed to verify a party's compliance with the provisions of New START. For example, there is no treaty requirement to ascertain the number of warheads tested on a missile to determine the warhead attribution for that type of missile, because New START counts the actual number of re-entry vehicles emplaced on each missile.

Therefore, the telemetry provisions are transparency rather than verification measures. Such a need was clearly recognized at the time SORT [Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty or Moscow Treaty] was negotiated. The verification regime of START was still in place, but [former U.S. President] Bush and [former Russian President] Putin called for additional transparency measures to be developed to bolster it. New START has an effective verification regime, which is complemented by an annual telemetry exchange for purposes of transparency regarding strategic missile testing, as agreed by the parties.

The United States and Russia agreed to allow for the annual exchange of telemetric information on an agreed equal number (up to five) of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, with the testing party determining the launches for which it will provide information. The specifics of the annual telemetry exchanges will be worked out in the BCC.

The U.S. government believes that exchanging telemetric information will prove valuable to both sides. Although such information is not required to verify the specific provisions of the new

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treaty, it could be helpful in providing information about currently deployed missiles and new missiles under development on both sides.

Conclusion

New START contains mechanisms that will enable the United States to monitor and inspect Russian strategic nuclear forces. U.S. knowledge of Russian nuclear forces will substantially erode over time if the treaty is not ratified and brought into force, increasing the risk of misunderstandings, mistrust, and worst-case analysis and policymaking. [...]

Rose Gottemoeller is assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance, and implementation and was chief U.S. negotiator for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

[Full article text: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_09/Gottemoeller]

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