



# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



26 July – 08 August 2011

DTRA

## GENERAL ARMS CONTROL

### **Vershbow: Conventional Arms Control Security and Cooperation in Europe**

*CQ Congressional Testimony, 28 July 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

*Statement of Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs, to the Committee on Senate Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*

The OSCE can trace its role in arms control to four pages in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which established a confidence-building mechanism to reduce the chance of conflicts arising from large military maneuvers in Europe. (1,369 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

### **BWC Review Conference Should Not Address Verification, Diplomat Says**

*Global Security Newswire, 02 August 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)*

The Biological Weapons Convention review conference this December is not likely to revive talks on the divisive topic of standing up an international verification regime for the accord, according to a senior U.S. diplomat. (1,387 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

### **CMA Progress at a Glance as of July 25, 2011**

*U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 25 July 2011, [www.cma.army.mil](http://www.cma.army.mil)*

CMA progress at a glance as of July 25, 2011. (579 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Col. Lemondes Assumes Responsibility as New CSE Project Manager**

*U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 27 July 2011, [www.cma.army.mil](http://www.cma.army.mil)*

The Director of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA), Conrad Whyne, hosted the Project Manager for Chemical Stockpile Elimination (PM-CSE) Change of Charter ceremony July 26 at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. (459 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Dummy Ammunition at Pueblo Chemical Depot**

*The Pueblo Chieftain, 28 July 2011, [www.chieftain.com](http://www.chieftain.com)*

One of the nation's last stockpiles of mustard agent weapons – 780,000 of them – has received some company this summer. (389 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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## CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) (CONT.)

### **Pre-Closure Work Begins at Depot**

*Hermiston Herald*, 03 August 2011, [www.hermistonherald.com](http://www.hermistonherald.com)

Work to dismantle one of the furnaces at the Umatilla Chemical Depot is underway, according to Hal McCune, spokesman for URS Corporation, the civilian contractor in charge of chemical weapons destruction at the Depot. (252 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Chemical Facilities Security Measures Extended**

*BioPrepWatch*, 03 August 2011, [www.bioprepwatch.com](http://www.bioprepwatch.com)

Legislation to extend federal security measures that govern America's chemical facilities for three years recently passed through the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. (238 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Russia Delays Opening of Last Chemical Arms Disposal Plant**

*Global Security Newswire*, 09 August 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)

Russia has announced it would delay opening its final chemical warfare materials destruction plant until early 2013, Interfax reported on Monday. (160 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## FISSILE MATERIALS

### **NNSA Announces Plan to Modernize, Consolidate Tritium Facilities at SRS**

*National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)*, 03 August 2011, [nnsa.energy.gov](http://nnsa.energy.gov)

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) today announced a new plan to modernize and consolidate the tritium facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) as part of NNSA's mission to turn a Cold War nuclear weapons complex into a 21st century nuclear security enterprise. (403 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **U.S. Opposes Moving Nuclear Material Talks Out of Geneva: Senior Official**

*Global Security Newswire*, 04 August 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)

The Obama administration now strongly opposes efforts to move negotiations on a proposed fissile material cutoff treaty out of the international Conference on Disarmament, where the matter has been stalled for two years, according to a senior U.S. official. (1,828 words)

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## NEW START TREATY (NST)

### **U.S. Destroys Missile over Pacific in Test**

*Agence France Presse, 27 July 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

The U.S. military on Wednesday destroyed one of its own nuclear-capable intercontinental missiles over the Pacific Ocean after it malfunctioned during a test, officials said. (222 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

### **Minuteman III Test Launch Failure Unlikely to Affect U.S. Modernization Plans – Russian General**

*Moscow Interfax, 01 August 2011, accessed via Open Source Center*

The unsuccessful test launch of a Minuteman III modernized intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 27 will unlikely influence U.S. plans not to develop a new strategic missile before 2020, Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, a former chief of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces Main Staff, said. (267 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **21<sup>st</sup> Century Deterrence Challenges**

*U.S. Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna, 04 August 2011, [vienna.usmission.gov](http://vienna.usmission.gov)*

*Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, at U.S. Strategic Command 2011 Deterrence Symposium in Omaha, Nebraska*

The New START Treaty implementation is so far going well. It's been a bright spot in the U.S.-Russian relationship, and we see it continuing to be an area for positive cooperation.

(1,377 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Sea-Based Strategic Missile Twice as Powerful as Bulava – Makeyev Center**

*Moscow Interfax-AVN Online, 09 August 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

A submarine-launched strategic missile, the "Liner," whose flight testing began with a successful launch on May 20, is capable of carrying 9-12 small-class warheads, which is more than the Bulava missile can carry... (205 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## OPEN SKIES TREATY

### **Russian Inspectors Make Aerial Surveillance Flight over the United States**

*RIA Novosti, 01 July 2011, [en.rian.ru](http://en.rian.ru)*

A group of Russian air inspectors will make an aerial observation flight over the territory of the United States in line with the Open Skies Treaty, Russia's Defense Ministry said on Saturday.

(242 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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## OPEN SKIES TREATY (CONT.)

### **U.S. Military Inspectors to Make Observation Flight in Russia**

*Moscow Interfax-AVN Online, 01 August 2011, accessed via Open Source Center*

A U.S. OC-135B observation aircraft will fly above Russia on August 1-6 in fulfillment of the Open Skies Treaty, a source at the Russian Defense Ministry told Interfax-AVN on Monday. (106 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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## **Vershbow: Conventional Arms Control Security and Cooperation in Europe**

*CQ Congressional Testimony, 28 July 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

*Statement of Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs, to the Committee on Senate Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*

[...] I will address each part of the conventional arms control regime in turn, and note that the United States is fully engaged in the process of modernizing them, in both Vienna and Washington. Last month, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, assisted by Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Russell and my Deputy Assistant Secretary [DASD], Celeste Wallander, attended [the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's] OSCE's Annual Security Review Conference. DASD Wallander represented me in discussions on the Vienna Document 1999, and it is to that instrument that I turn now.

### *Vienna Document 1999*

The OSCE can trace its role in arms control to four pages in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which established a confidence-building mechanism to reduce the chance of conflicts arising from large military maneuvers in Europe. The subsequent talks on military transparency, which eventually resulted in the Vienna Document 1999, formed one of three pillars of the effort to secure peace in Europe during the Cold War. The second pillar was the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, focusing on balancing NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional armaments, which evolved into the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, or CFE. The third pillar was the ongoing bilateral U.S.-Russian strategic arms limitation talks, which eventually led to the START treaty.

The Vienna Document has grown to 60 pages, and comprises a series of confidence- and security-building measures designed to increase the transparency of military affairs on the territory of all participating European and Central Asian States. It includes a conflict-prevention mechanism, visits to military air bases, annual exchanges of military information, on-site inspections and visits to evaluate the information exchanges, and a series of military-to-military contacts. The Vienna Document 1999 applies to all military forces in the OSCE zone of application.

The OSCE is engaged in an intensive effort to update the Vienna Document for the first time since 1999. With the direction provided by our Heads of State in Astana [Kazakhstan], we are approaching the milestone of issuing a new Vienna Document in December in Vilnius [Lithuania]. Delegations have been working in the OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation for the past year to review the Vienna Document comprehensively and update it to meet today's demands.

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Several proposals already have been adopted, and dozens more are under consideration. However, the proposals adopted to date have been administrative in nature, and more needs to be done if this effort is to be judged a success. One proposal to increase military transparency that I would like to highlight would lower the thresholds for notification of military maneuvers – a subject central to the intent of the original document. Adopting this proposal made by the French delegation would send a clear signal that the OSCE is serious about modernizing its approach to military transparency and security.

The dedication all delegations are demonstrating in this effort is encouraging; however, much more needs to be done. I believe the United States needs to have a deeper discussion with other delegations on the future of military transparency and what measures are needed to improve the security of all participating States. Our military budgets are all under pressure, and many participating States are undergoing rapid and radical military transformations. The Vienna Document must continue to evolve to keep pace – and the quality of military advice in Vienna must be equal to the challenge.

## *Open Skies*

The Treaty on Open Skies started with an idea by President Eisenhower – to reduce the need for destabilizing espionage and transform the security environment. The idea was revived in the 1980s, and then, in 2002, the treaty entered into force. To date, the 34 States Parties have flown more than 700 aerial observation flights, providing unprecedented levels of military transparency. The ability of any party to overfly every part of the territory of every other party from Honolulu to Vladivostok is extraordinary. Indeed, the United States and Russia both use the Open Skies Treaty as part of the verification of the New START, highlighting the linkages and reinforcing effects among these agreements.

In June 2010, the parties met for their second Review Conference in Vienna [Austria]. There, they recommitted themselves to addressing the challenges and guiding the way toward improved transparency. These challenges include implementation problems, such as increasing instances of interference with the full exercise of treaty rights; economic issues, such as determining the future of aging airframes; and technological issues, including adapting to digital technology and fully implementing treaty-allowed sensors. Addressing these challenges will require political will and could put strains on increasingly scarce defense budgets.

We are seeking to recommit the United States to the treaty, both by increasing the number of flights we fly and participate in each year, and by taking advantage of the ability to upgrade our sensors from film to digital capability. According to recent media reports, Russia has begun

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flight-testing a new TU-214 airframe with a full suite of digital sensors for use under the treaty – the same airframe as the forthcoming replacement for their equivalent to Air Force One. No other participating State has been able to commit to updating its aircraft. In fact, some, notably the United Kingdom, have eliminated their aircraft due to budgetary pressures.

## *CFE*

The news on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty is less encouraging. However, it is worth noting the treaty's achievements – including the elimination of more than 72,000 battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters; the successful completion of thousands of on-site inspections, and the orderly, verifiable, and peaceful withdrawal of the massed armored forces that typified the Cold War standoff for decades. The CFE treaty succeeded in eliminating the possibility of a large-scale, surprise attack in Central Europe, [but] it has been at an impasse with Russia's "suspension" of implementation of CFE in December 2007, which was further complicated by Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia.

The State Department named Ambassador Victoria Nuland as Special Envoy to engage in modernizing CFE in February 2010. She consulted closely with our NATO allies to launch an effort to reach agreement among the 30 CFE Parties, joined by the six NATO members that are not signatories of the CFE treaty (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, Croatia and Slovenia), on a framework agreement based on three of President Obama's five principles of European security: 1) reciprocal transparency of conventional armed forces; 2) reciprocal restraints on concentrations of heavy forces and permanent basing in sensitive regions; and 3) a renewed insistence on host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces on sovereign territory.

Since June 2010, the United States and our allies have been engaged in an intensive effort to reach agreement on a framework for negotiations to strengthen and modernize conventional arms control in Europe. However, after ten rounds of consultations in Vienna, Russia remains inflexible on two key issues: host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign troops on sovereign territory, and providing appropriate transparency among all parties regarding their current military posture for the period of any negotiation. Currently, the United States is consulting with allies to decide the way forward, while continuing to encourage Moscow to reconsider its position. If Russia will not reconsider, we must look carefully at our options regarding the current unequal situation, whereby 29 Parties implement the treaty and one does not. As the NATO communiqué issued at the Lisbon Summit warned, this situation cannot continue indefinitely.

While the future of CFE remains uncertain and the treaty cannot be replaced by the Vienna Document, we remain committed to conventional arms control and military transparency in

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Europe. We will continue to work through the OSCE to advance these objectives through modernizing the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty. Outside of the OSCE, we are working both bilaterally with Russia and through the NATO-Russia Council to address concerns about missile defense and strategic stability.

At the same time, through the Forum for Security Cooperation, we are seeking to address modern threats, such as transnational crime, nuclear proliferation, Central Asian instability, and unsecured, unsafe stocks of small arms and light weapons. Finally, we are using every opportunity possible, including the OSCE, to address the unresolved conflicts that have contributed to the stalemate on modernizing of the CFE. [...]

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## **BWC Review Conference Should Not Address Verification, Diplomat Says**

*Global Security Newswire, 02 August 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)*

The Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] review conference this December is not likely to revive talks on the divisive topic of standing up an international verification regime for the accord, according to a senior U.S. diplomat.

"I don't personally think that the [review conference] is going to serve as a referendum on whether to return to negotiations which were abandoned a decade ago," Laura Kennedy, the Obama administration's special representative for the convention, told Global Security Newswire last week in a telephone interview from Geneva, Switzerland.

"I'd say that, from my perspective, discussions with member states have focused more on seeking to make progress in areas where there is general agreement, rather than reviving these past areas where there were stark differences," she added. Member states should look for "pragmatic" steps to reduce concerns about compliance with the pact, such as revising its confidence-building measures; finding new uses for the convention's consultative provision; and undertaking voluntary measures such as inviting BWC officials to visit select facilities to increase transparency about biodefense activities, the envoy said.

The [BWC] prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of weaponized pathogens such as anthrax, smallpox and plague. Review conferences, held every five years, evaluate the pact's performance and can recommend updates to the nonproliferation regime. The seventh such meeting is scheduled for December at the United Nations in Geneva.

Unlike the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, there is no organization to monitor whether the pact's 164 member nations are adhering to their biological nonproliferation commitments and, more generally, no verification system. Attempts to establish a verification regime failed after the United States in 2001 withdrew from nearly seven years of talks aimed at creating an inspections protocol. White House officials at the time claimed such a system would not increase confidence in the agreement and would prove financially burdensome to U.S. disease research and the biotechnology industry. The Obama administration reaffirmed U.S. opposition to a verification regime when it unveiled its approach to the convention in 2009.

The president-designate for the upcoming review conference, Dutch Ambassador Paul van den Ijssel, said recently there appears to be increasing support for reopening the verification debate at the event. "The issue is not off the table and there are many countries who want to keep it on the table in some form or the other."

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Kennedy emphasized that the White House broadly does not oppose verification systems. However, she noted that arms control pacts traditionally require being able to clearly identify facilities, activities or materials that are being misused; indicators for when prohibited operations are taking place; and the ability to feasibly provide access to those facilities or items in a fashion that could discriminate between permitted and forbidden behavior without unacceptable risk to sensitive commercial or national security information.

"Unfortunately, we see in the BWC context that none of these requirements are met," the diplomat told GSN. "Most steps involved in the acquisition and production of biological weapons also have legitimate, peaceful applications. The dual-use aspect permeates virtually every aspect of this field." In addition, such a regime is likely to be geared toward state-run biological programs, not nonstate actors or potential bioterrorists, according to Kennedy, who also serves as Washington's ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament.

"We do feel that bioterrorism is a very real threat in today's world. That said, none of this means we should not be concerned about compliance with the convention or we should not look for ways to address such concerns," she said. "It just means we need to think about the problem very differently, look at specific pragmatic steps we can take to reduce levels of concern."

Barry Kellman, president of the International Security and Biopolicy Institute, agreed with the objections Kennedy laid out, saying he would be even "more emphatic" on the verification question. "I would put it in terms of compliance. It's not about verification, it's about compliance. I don't think we're going to live in a world where we can verify compliance. It's an oxymoron." ... "Verification in any arms control setting is not the goal. It's compliance that's the goal. In other contexts verification has been the means to achieve that goal but since you can't make the technology be something other than what it is we're going to have to think of other mechanisms to talk effectively," Kellman said.

Washington's posture is not necessarily accepted across the spectrum of BWC states. In the past, Russia and members of the Nonaligned Movement, including Iran, have made repeated demands for a compulsory framework to monitor compliance with the treaty's requirements.

Kennedy said the United States is trying to bolster the confidence of member states by examining ways to revamp the confidence-building measures nations are required to submit annually to show adherence to the tenets of the agreement. The declarations, originally written in 1986 and last updated in 1991, offer data on topics such as infectious diseases outbreaks and information on vaccine production facilities to demonstrate they are not being used for prohibited purposes. Van den Ijssel has indicated refurbishment of the forms likely will be on the agenda in December.

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"The idea behind the CBMs was to exchange information that would reduce doubt and ambiguities about compliance," Kennedy said. "It's also essential to look at whether there are new questions to ask – legislation enforcement, how to make better use of the information being provided, how to increase participation." In 2010 only 72 of the convention's then-163 members submitted the annual accounting, the website for the BWC Implementation Support Unit shows.

Another way to address questions or concerns about compliance might be to make greater use of Article 5 of the pact, according to Kennedy. The provision allows for bilateral or multilateral consultations between member states to tackle concerns about violations and clarify any ambiguities, such as the intent of a disease research program. "It is not very detailed but that can be a virtue in that it's flexible. Governments can approach such consultations in a wide variety of ways," she told GSN.

The multilateral cooperative mechanism calls for convening a formal meeting of all interested states parties to discuss an alleged BWC breach. The only such meeting to date was held in 1997 to discuss Cuba's accusation that a U.S. aircraft had released an insect over the island in a deliberate effort to harm Cuban agriculture. Though the findings of the consultative meeting were inconclusive, it was widely viewed as a useful and constructive fact-finding process that could be developed further.

"Now some folks have suggested this means we need to develop more detailed procedures. We can certainly look at that," Kennedy said without citing specific member states. "However, I suspect the focus should be more on the political aspect i.e. how do we take the sting, one might say, out of consultations and make them more politically palatable?" "Given the dual-use nature of biological work it seems reasonable that questions will arise from time to time and finding better ways to discuss them in a collegial and cooperative way would help," she said.

Kellman said it remain "unclear" what Kennedy ultimately hopes to achieve with such discussions. "Just talking about [Article 5] doesn't mean much but I'm glad to see that we are continuing to put emphasis on it," he said.

There is also role for "voluntary, proactive" steps member states can take to "demonstrate transparency and reduce potential concerns about their activities," according to Kennedy. She noted that the United States last year made its CBM submission available online for the first time. In addition, the administration invited van den Ijssel and officials from the Implementation Support Unit to visit U.S. biodefense facilities, including the National Interagency Biodefense Campus at Fort Detrick in Maryland, for "familiarization," the diplomat said.

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"It's not in our interest for others to misread our intentions and activities in this area, and so it follows that it is in our interest to be as transparent as we can possibly be," Kennedy said.

Despite the "reasonable" U.S. approach, Kellman predicted Washington might still encounter resistance from other member states. "There's not enormous support either for talking about bioterrorism or for talking about Article 5," he said. "The U.S. is saying positive things but I think they're markers for another day" beyond the December review conference.

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## CMA Progress at a Glance as of July 25, 2011

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 25 July 2011, [www.cma.army.mil](http://www.cma.army.mil)

Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF), in Alabama, has eight years of safe destruction operations on the Anniston Army Depot, with less than 0.3 percent of the original stockpile remaining. The majority of the Anniston Chemical Activity's remaining stockpile is mortars and artillery shells, which will be destroyed in the Static Detonation Chamber (SDC). The SDC "kettle" heats munitions to 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit and a controlled explosion safely destroys the munitions and the mustard agent. The SDC has safely destroyed more than 1,360 mustard-filled munitions. Site managers believe stockpile destruction operations are on pace to conclude next month or sooner.

Blue Grass Chemical Activity (BGCA), in Kentucky, is preparing to conduct tests to determine if installing the Igloo Filtration System (IFS) will contribute to safe storage. Testing the IFS as a consideration for BGCA igloos is part of the commitment to provide optimum storage conditions for the munitions and safe working conditions for BGCA personnel, as well as maximum protection to the public and the environment. IFS systemization testing has begun and data collection is scheduled to begin early this month. BGCA is now available to view and friend on Facebook. Please let them hear from you!

Deseret Chemical Depot, in Utah, the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) Environmental Management System (EMS) had a two-week evaluation, and an independent audit team announced its recommendation will be for ISO 14001 certification. An EMS is a set of "green" practices aimed at reducing water, fuel and power usage, while minimizing waste and increasing recycling and conservation efforts. The TOCDF's EMS has been ISO 14001 self-certified by U.S. Army agencies since 2005, but TOCDF's employee-led Environmental Leadership Committee wanted an independent certification to demonstrate and validate their commitment and that EMS is operating under stringent standards.

Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, in Arkansas, continues safe and compliant closure operations. Pine Bluff Chemical Activity had a Reduction in Force, eliminating 79 positions as a result of safe destruction of the Pine Bluff chemical weapons stockpile. The 78 remaining positions will support the closure mission which involves activities such as transferring property, closing permits, archiving records and tearing down and cleaning up the disposal facility.

Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD), in Colorado stores mustard-filled munitions: 105 mm projectiles and cartridges, 155 mm projectiles and 4.2-inch mortar cartridges. The Chemical Stockpile Propellant Sampling Operations on 4.2-inch mortars postponed earlier in the year has been rescheduled for this month. These are standard random samples taken to test the stability of the propellant in the munitions.

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Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF), in Oregon, has processed 2,082 ton containers of mustard and destroyed 87 percent of the Umatilla stockpile. On July 20, the twelfth and final shipment of sulfur-impregnated Carbon (SIC) used in Umatilla's Pollution Abatement System Filter System (PFS) since the start of the mustard campaign, left the depot's permitted storage area for off-site treatment and disposal in Utah. All of the shipments – totaling 560 containers and 273,000 pounds of SIC – were completed in accordance with the UMCDF Hazardous Waste Permit. About 1,250 additional containers of PFS carbon from GB and VX agent campaigns await characterization and shipment in coming months.

On July 21, the Oregon Court of Appeals granted a summary judgment for the State of Oregon, Washington Demilitarization Corp and the Army in the "GASP VI" litigation. The decision would more than likely end 14 years of nearly continuous litigation by GASP and others to stop incineration of Umatilla's chemical agent stockpile.

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## Col. Lemondes Assumes Responsibility as New CSE Project Manager

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 27 July 2011, [www.cma.army.mil](http://www.cma.army.mil)

The Director of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA), Conrad Whyne, hosted the Project Manager for Chemical Stockpile Elimination (PM-CSE) Change of Charter ceremony July 26 at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The PM-CSE is responsible for the safe, efficient destruction of the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons that fall under CMA's disposal mission. The ceremony ... officially denotes the transfer of responsibility for the project from the outgoing commander to the incoming commander.[...]

The ceremony included remarks from the CMA Director, the outgoing PM-CSE, Col. Robert Billington, and the incoming PM-CSE, Col. John Lemondes. Since 2007, Billington oversaw daily operations of the chemical demilitarization sites at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah; Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon; and the now closed Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana. [...]

Prior to joining CMA, Lemondes was the Director of the Soldier and Maneuver Systems Directorate on the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)) staff. Additional acquisition assignments included service in the Army Research Office, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical & Biological Defense, the Acquisition Support Center, the ASA(ALT) staff and the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research. He served as Product Manager for Clothing and Individual Equipment (PM CIE) from May 2005 – July 2008 and followed that assignment with a year on the Army Staff (G8/PAE).

His awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (4th Oak Leaf Cluster), Army Commendation Medal (1 OLC), Army Achievement Medal (1 OLC), National Defense Service Medal (2nd award), South West Asia Campaign Medal (3 service stars), Army Superior Unit Award, DA Staff Badge, Ranger Tab, Parachutist Badge and Order of Saint Maurice (Centurion). Lemondes earned a bachelor's degree from Pennsylvania State University and received a master's of business administration from Syracuse University.

As the PM-CSE, Lemondes has responsibility for the three remaining CMA disposal sites currently in operation at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah; and Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon, where chemical weapons continue to be destroyed. As of July 24, 2011, CMA has safely destroyed more than 72 percent of the chemical agent munitions and more than 87 percent – 52.5 million pounds – of the nerve and blister agent that comprised the U.S. stockpile at entry-into-force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997.

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In addition, Lemondes has responsibility for the safe closure of the CMA disposal facility at the Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, which successfully completed agent destruction operations in November 2010. CMA also safely manages the chemical weapon stockpile sites near Richmond, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado. The Kentucky and Colorado stockpiles will be destroyed by the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA], a separate U.S. Army element.

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## Dummy Ammunition at Pueblo Chemical Depot

*The Pueblo Chieftain*, 28 July 2011, [www.chieftain.com](http://www.chieftain.com)

One of the nation's last stockpiles of mustard agent weapons – 780,000 of them – has received some company this summer. More than 27,000 rounds of dummy ammunition, designed to test equipment and train workers who will be destroying the real thing in a few years are at the Pueblo Chemical Depot. Another 94,000 components also were delivered.

The Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA] program has posted a new video on youtube.com that describes in detail the work involved in bringing the weapons here and how they'll be used. Called ACWA Test Equipment or ATE, they'll be used to develop the systems involved in removing explosives and then draining the mustard agent from the real weapons, a process that is expected to begin in 2015.

Besides not having explosives or mustard agent in them, there is another big difference between the ATE weapons and the real ones: The real ones have been aging in the depot's igloos for decades and could be corroded or offer other challenges to the technicians opening them.

Bob Kennemer, who heads ACWA's outreach office, said that was taken into consideration. "They purposely try to make some of them that are a little odd, so they can practice. They'll say, 'Wow, why can't we get this fuze off?' It's going to happen in real life."

According to Tim Messersmith, systemization manager, the dummy rounds won't be brought inside the plant until early 2013 to support equipment testing. In early 2014, they should begin practicing moving munitions from igloos to the destruction plant.

ACWA engineer Scott Susman, said that the dummy rounds were made to match the real ones, "especially the munitions bodies." "Those metal bodies must be exact in their weight and dimensions to test the various robotics in the plant. Some of the other components are close copies but do not have to be exact replicas for our training purposes. And just like the actual rounds in the depot's stockpiles, we will come across problem rounds.

"For example, we might find a round that has the fuze screwed on too tight and we can't remove it robotically. Although these problem rounds were not intentionally made that way, they do provide us with similar challenges as the real rounds. That is beneficial because we know that we will come across anomalies so this helps us prepare for that."

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## Pre-Closure Work Begins at Depot

*Hermiston Herald*, 03 August 2011, [www.hermistonherald.com](http://www.hermistonherald.com)

Work to dismantle one of the furnaces at the Umatilla Chemical Depot is underway, according to Hal McCune, spokesman for URS Corporation, the civilian contractor in charge of chemical weapons destruction at the Depot.

According to McCune, a subcontractor began staging materials last week in preparation to remove brick from the deactivation furnace system [DFS], one of three furnace types on the Depot. "It's kind of the first step in deactivating the furnace," McCune said of the brick removal. "We don't need the DFS anymore, is what it boils down to."

According to McCune, the furnace, which could reach temperatures of 1,500 degrees, was used to destroy explosives in weapons. When the company began destroying mustard agent, they no longer needed the furnace. Three other furnaces are still in use at the Depot: two liquid incinerators for destroying mustard agent and one metal-parts furnace for the ton containers the agent is stored in.

According to McCune, the brick from the deactivation furnace should be removed within six weeks. "There's still a lot of work to be done," McCune said. "(Brick removal) gives us a jump start on getting this work done. The goal is to speed it up if we can." URS already removed parts of the brine reduction area last year.

McCune said the Depot is on schedule to meet its estimated November timeline for destroying the last of the mustard agent, with 87.7 percent of total agent stockpiles already destroyed. "We expect closure to take three to four years," McCune said.

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## Chemical Facilities Security Measures Extended

*BioPrepWatch*, 03 August 2011, [www.bioprepwatch.com](http://www.bioprepwatch.com)

Legislation to extend federal security measures that govern America's chemical facilities for three years recently passed through the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee.

Ranking Member Susan Collins (R-Maine), along with Senators Mary Landrieu (D-Louisiana), Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Mark Pryor (D-Arkansas), co-sponsored the bill that extends the Department of Homeland Security program requiring high-risk chemical facilities to comply with strict federal standards.

The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program sets 18 risk-based performance standards that chemical facilities are required to meet in order to continue operations. They cover a wide-range of potential vulnerabilities, including perimeter security, access control, theft, internal sabotage and cyber security.

"Chemical facilities understand they are a ripe target for terrorists, and this program has enabled them to address security vulnerabilities that may exist," Senator Pryor said. "This bipartisan legislation lets DHS and chemical plants continue to build on a successful program."

The law, seen as a landmark in collaboration between the federal government and chemical plants partners, has been in effect for four years so far, and has been viewed as largely successful.

"Simply put, the program works and should be extended and I am pleased the committee agreed," Senator Collins said. "Chemical facilities are tempting targets for terrorists. The Department of Homeland Security has done a good job developing a comprehensive chemical security program. It has yielded a successful collaborative, risk-based security framework – providing a model for other security-related programs."

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## Russia Delays Opening of Last Chemical Arms Disposal Plant

*Global Security Newswire, 09 August 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)*

Russia has announced it would delay opening its final chemical warfare materials destruction plant until early 2013, Interfax reported on Monday.

The disposal facility at Kizner in the Russian republic of Udmurtia had been previously estimated to open in the latter half of 2012.

"The first complex [of the Kizner plant] is to be put into service in the first quarter of 2013," according to a statement from the Udmurtia Construction, Architecture and Housing Policy Ministry.

The ministry, though, said all chemical warfare agents held at Kizner would be eliminated prior to December 31, 2015. The demilitarization facility is intended to destroy 5,743 metric tons of lewisite, soman, sarin and VX agents carried in more than 2 million munitions.

The Udmurtia disposal plant is the seventh to be built in Russia.

The Chemical Weapons Convention requires Russia to complete disposal of banned warfare agents by April 2012; Moscow has already acknowledged that demilitarization operations would not be completed before 2015.

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## **NNSA Announces Plan to Modernize, Consolidate Tritium Facilities at SRS**

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 03 August 2011, [nnsa.energy.gov](http://nnsa.energy.gov)

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) today announced a new plan to modernize and consolidate the tritium facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) as part of NNSA's mission to turn a Cold War nuclear weapons complex into a 21<sup>st</sup> century nuclear security enterprise. The plan will lead to a combined cost savings and cost avoidance of hundreds of millions of dollars over the next two decades.

NNSA has initiated a disciplined modernization program plan called the Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modifications (TRIM). Similar to the strategy at Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, it includes consolidation of existing facilities, deployment of new technology and process equipment, and demolition and removal of the old buildings. The initial activities of the TRIM plan focus on the next 10 years of improvements and consolidation of enduring infrastructure, processes and resources. Implementation of this effort will result in an overall lifecycle cost reduction and assurance of a safe and secure national security tritium mission at SRS.

“The TRIM plan cuts costs and reduces the number of facilities needed to process tritium while still ensuring that the nation's stockpile is safe, secure and effective,” said Don Cook, NNSA's Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. “TRIM is a clear example of NNSA's commitment to being good stewards of the taxpayers' money. Modernizing our nuclear security enterprise is vital to implementing President Obama's nuclear security agenda.”

The TRIM plan has two goals: first, consolidate and modernize the tritium production processes; and second, reduce the cost of the business processes within tritium programs. “Our tritium production mission plays a critically important role in our country's efforts to maintain a nuclear deterrent,” said Doug Dearolph, manager of the Savannah River Site Office. “However, at the same time, we have an obligation to every American citizen to ensure all our SRS operations are managed towards continuous improvement and cost efficiencies.”

Tritium is a heavy isotope of hydrogen and a key component of nuclear weapons, but it decays radioactively at the rate of 5.5 percent each year and must be replenished periodically. This is accomplished by recycling tritium from existing warheads and by extracting tritium from target rods irradiated in nuclear reactors that are operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority. Recycled and extracted gases are purified to produce tritium that is suitable for use. The SRS Tritium Facilities occupy approximately 29 acres in the northwest portion of H Area. Operations began in 1955.

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## U.S. Opposes Moving Nuclear Material Talks Out of Geneva: Senior Official

*Global Security Newswire, 04 August 2011, [gsn.nti.org](http://gsn.nti.org)*

The Obama administration now strongly opposes efforts to move negotiations on a proposed fissile material cutoff treaty [FMCT] out of the international Conference on Disarmament [CD], where the matter has been stalled for two years, according to a senior U.S. official. The development follows initial indications that Washington might be open to finding a new venue for formal FMCT talks.

Under such an accord, nations would pledge not to produce new weapon-grade uranium or plutonium, but could continue to generate fissile material for nonmilitary energy needs. The matter has been on the United Nations' agenda for more than five decades. The international body convened a high-level meeting last week in New York to discuss ways to break the longstanding deadlock in Geneva.

Pakistan has blocked talks on a fissile materials agreement on the basis that neighboring rival India has been given what Islamabad sees as an unfair leg up in its ability to bolster its atomic stockpile, even after a ban on producing new fissile material is implemented. Islamabad in 2009 accepted a CD work plan that included fissile material negotiations, but changed its position soon thereafter.

"We've told them that everyone has concerns, but that's what negotiations are for," the senior Obama administration official last month told Global Security Newswire in an interview. The individual spoke on condition of not being named, citing diplomatic sensitivities. The senior official said that as a forum that makes decisions based on consensus, the Conference on Disarmament is the only appropriate venue for fissile material cutoff talks because any such ban must be global and comprehensive.

Like Washington, Islamabad would like to see the FMCT issue remain at the Conference on Disarmament, but for different reasons. Pakistan has a better chance of blocking progress on the treaty there, given its veto power at the Switzerland setting.

One widely bandied alternative – moving the talks to UN headquarters in New York – would leave Islamabad as just one among few anticipated votes against such a treaty and the accord might then go forward without Pakistan and others. If the South Asian nation continued to produce fissile material to further build its stockpile, it could then find itself flouting an international regime – an outcome it seeks to avoid, or at least forestall.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has suggested that such a move might be necessary. "If the CD remains deadlocked, the General Assembly has a responsibility to step in," he said on

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July 28. "The CD should not be held perpetually hostage by one or two members. ... Let us put an end to this long cycle of stagnation."

Speaking at a CD meeting early this year, Pakistani diplomat Zamir Akram said the recent lifting of nuclear trade restrictions on India "will further accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan's security interests."

The 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 signed off on atomic commerce with India, even though several of the nation's military-related nuclear facilities remain outside of UN safeguards and thus are capable of producing unmonitored, warhead-usable material. More recently, the United States and others have lobbied for India to become an NSG member. Pakistan is not represented at the organization.

Islamabad has argued that "because India now has access to the international nuclear market, it can purchase foreign uranium for its nuclear power reactors and therefore keep its domestic uranium reserves for its military program, potentially allowing it to field a larger nuclear arsenal," according to a March report by Peter Crail, a research analyst at the Arms Control Association. An NSG move last month, though, appears to restrict India, Pakistan and other nations that have not joined the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] from receiving nuclear fuel technologies or equipment from other nations.

Islamabad was recently estimated to have 90 to 110 nuclear warheads, and is projected to build up to as many as 200 over the next decade. These appear to be unassembled weapons and they are normally stored apart from delivery vehicles, according to nuclear experts Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen. Meanwhile, India last year was said to have stockpiled 60 to 80 assembled warheads – with just half of those operational – but New Delhi's arsenal is also expected to grow in coming years.

Obama administration officials in January said they wanted to see negotiations commence at the Conference on Disarmament, but also appeared to signal a willingness to consider alternative venues for the FMCT talks if unanimity could not be achieved in Geneva. "No other world body of sovereign states is better suited to negotiate an FMCT," Rose Gottemoeller, the assistant secretary of State for arms control issues, said on January 27. However, she added: "If we cannot find a way to begin these negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, then we will need to consider other options."

By April, frustration among some of President Obama's national security and arms control team was mounting. "Our preference is to negotiate the FMCT within the Conference on Disarmament, but it is becoming increasingly doubtful that the conference can achieve consensus

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to begin such negotiations," Thomas Donilon, the president's national security adviser, said at a nuclear policy conference. "As a consequence, we will begin consultations with our allies and partners to consider an alternative means to begin FMCT negotiations," he said. "To be successful, we will encourage all permanent members of the Security Council and other relevant parties to participate in this effort."

The 65-nation Conference on Disarmament was established in 1979 as the international community's multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Accords produced by the conference or its predecessor organization include the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention. France, the United Kingdom and others have warned over the past several months that a shift in the FMCT negotiations venue could irreparably weaken the conference, according to issue experts.

The Obama administration is now increasingly reflecting that view. So-called "forum shopping" is not a good idea for FMCT negotiations, the senior U.S. official said in last month's interview. In keeping with that policy approach, Gottemoeller last week announced U.S. support for revamping the Conference on Disarmament's procedural rules in a manner that could deny Pakistan or others the simplest methods for blocking progress on the forum's basic agenda.

A revised approach in Geneva might involve new efforts "to reflect the current international security environment"; a review of procedures that "could recommend changes that would encourage greater continuity and focus"; an exploration of "how to provide for continuity on an agreed CD work [plan] from year to year, such as automatic rollover of an agreed program of work"; and an assessment of "how to protect national security interests while preventing abuse of the consensus rule," Gottemoeller said.

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, a Kazakh representative to Geneva currently serving as conference secretary general, last week endorsed a similar set of procedural changes. "The proposed reforms themselves would eliminate most of the tricks Pakistan has employed over the past few years," said Jeffrey Lewis, who directs the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "The mere threat of procedural reform might be enough to push Pakistan into a more cooperative position."

Cultivating Chinese support for FMCT negotiations appears to be a central consideration for Washington, Lewis said. China strongly supports the Conference on Disarmament as a consensus setting, but a fissile material treaty is not a high priority for Beijing, he said. Threatening to walk away altogether from the Geneva setting, though, might help Washington enlist Beijing's assistance in bringing Pakistan into fissile materials talks, Lewis said. "China has traditionally been the main opponent within the P-5 to taking the FMCT out of Geneva and could

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be an important source of pressure on Pakistan," Lewis told GSN, referring to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council.

Still, Washington remains somewhat divided over whether that is the best way to ultimately achieve a treaty, according to U.S. sources and experts. "There are different views within the administration about whether there is any hope in the CD," Lewis said. "Some people want to let the process play out in Geneva before moving elsewhere, while others think that it will be easier to modify the consensus rule, or bring Pakistan to heel, than to convince China to take the FMCT outside the CD."

Allowing official FMCT negotiations to remain subject to unanimity at the Conference on Disarmament, though, would not preclude making initial progress on related matters in settings outside of Switzerland, the senior U.S. official said. At a two-day meeting in Paris that concluded on July 1, the world's five recognized nuclear powers agreed to keep the fissile material treaty idea alive until the Conference on Disarmament can achieve consensus on launching formal negotiations, the senior U.S. official said. In this type of "conservator role," the P-5 states plan to create a "contact group" that would support future negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament via initial technical discussions apart from that venue, the official said.

The preliminary discussions might explore such matters as a general framework for the treaty, its governing authority and how it could enter into force, GSN has learned. This group could build on an earlier effort – sponsored by Australia and Japan early this year on the sidelines of the Conference on Disarmament – to address definitions under a future accord, such as what would constitute the types of fissile material to be banned, sources said.

The new P-5 sponsored forum likely would include a number of other states with nuclear energy technology, such as Germany, Japan and Brazil, according to Crail, the Arms Control Association analyst. Ideally three remaining nuclear-armed states – Israel, India and Pakistan – would also be represented at the P-5 contact group, though convincing them remains an uphill battle, Crail said. North Korea, with its unknown military nuclear capability, is a special case, he noted. Pyongyang is "legally obligated to give up its fissile material production capability and its nuclear weapons, so it's not in the same category as the others," Crail said.

Washington is expected to assure Pakistan and others that fissile material production would be allowed to continue throughout a years-long period during which the P-5 talks and potential CD negotiations are conducted, which should prove of some reassurance to Islamabad, Crail said.

However, a Pakistani envoy last week appeared to rule out his nation's involvement even in preliminary discussions. "Pakistan will not join any such process nor would it consider accession

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to the outcome of any such process," said Raza Bashir Tarar, acting Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations. He attributed "dysfunction" at the Conference on Disarmament to a failure by world powers to pursue negotiations in a fair way.

"The problems faced by the Conference on Disarmament are not of an organizational or procedural nature," he said, adding that world's major nuclear powers are pursuing a fissile material cutoff only after having built "huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons."

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## U.S. Destroys Missile over Pacific in Test

*Agence France Presse, 27 July 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

The U.S. military on Wednesday [July 27] destroyed one of its own nuclear-capable intercontinental missiles over the Pacific Ocean after it malfunctioned during a test, officials said. The Minuteman III missile – which was unarmed for the test – was aborted five minutes after takeoff from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California as a safety precaution after a "flight anomaly," a military statement said.

The military had hoped to fire the missile some 4,200 miles (6,750 kilometers) to Kwajalein Atoll in a six-hour flight that would provide data for the U.S. intercontinental ballistic program. "Established parameters were exceeded and controllers sent destruct commands," said Colonel Matthew Carroll, chief of safety for the 30<sup>th</sup> Space Wing.

The military said it would provide more details later on the problem. "The air force ... is going to investigate this particular anomaly and see if they can determine what caused it," Pentagon spokesman Colonel Dave Lapan said. "These are extremely complex missions that they're undertaking," he said. [...]

The United States, while committing to reduce nuclear weapons in its [New] START treaty with Russia, maintains 450 Minutemen III missiles in its active force at bases in the Plains states of Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming.

The Marshall Islands, which gained independence from the United States in 1986, recently agreed to keep renting the missile testing range until 2066. [...]

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## **Minuteman III Test Launch Failure Unlikely to Affect U.S. Modernization Plans – Russian General**

*Moscow Interfax, 01 August 2011, accessed via Open Source Center*

The unsuccessful test launch of a Minuteman III modernized intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 27 will unlikely influence U.S. plans not to develop a new strategic missile before 2020, Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, a former chief of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces Main Staff, said.

"The United States plans to develop a new missile after 2020. They will now continue implementing a program to modernize Minuteman III missiles. The last unsuccessful test launch of this missile will unlikely impact these plans," he said.

The Minuteman III upgrade project has been under way for a long period of time, the general said. "Indeed, they are facing certain difficulties mostly because the structure of the missile remains practically the same, but its new stages, control system and other elements have been designed at a different technological level," Yesin said.

He described test launches that preceded the latest failure as "more or less successful". "As for the modernized missile's tactical and technological features, its reliability should be within 0.95. It means that the probability that some individual launches can be unsuccessful cannot be ruled out," he said.

"The United States has been modernizing the Minuteman ICBM on a permanent basis. They think that this structure is very successful. Except for the main elements of the structure, all the rest has been replaced in the latest samples of this missile, ranging from propulsion stages to automatic equipment and guidance systems," Yesin said.

The new Russian-U.S. START treaty does not place any restrictions on the development of new missiles, but the sides need to notify each other of such projects, the general said.

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## 21<sup>st</sup> Century Deterrence Challenges

*U.S. Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna, 04 August 2011, [vienna.usmission.gov](http://vienna.usmission.gov)*

*Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, at U.S. Strategic Command 2011 Deterrence Symposium in Omaha, Nebraska*

[...]As you all know, the New START treaty entered into force on February 5<sup>th</sup> of this year. The New START treaty implementation is so far going well. It's been a bright spot in the U.S.-Russian relationship, and we see it continuing to be an area for positive cooperation.

So far, the process of treaty implementation has been very pragmatic, business-like and positive – a continuation of the working relationship we established during the negotiations in Geneva. We are constantly in communication with our Russian colleagues and the implementation process has been precise and efficient.

Negotiators worked hard to find innovative new mechanisms to aid in the verification of this treaty and the results of that work are already evident. The regime is simpler and safer to implement and, at the same time, it lessens disruptions to the day-to-day operations of both sides' strategic forces.

On-site inspections have begun and, as of today, the United States and Russia together have conducted eight inspections. We are keeping par with each other.

For the first time, we are receiving data about actual re-entry vehicle (warhead) loadings on Russia's missiles and they receive the same data from us; on-site inspection procedures under New START allow the United States to confirm the actual number of warheads on any randomly selected Russian ICBM and SLBM. This verification task and inspection right did not exist under the START treaty.

Last March, the United States conducted exhibitions of its B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers and the Russian Federation conducted an exhibition of its RS-24 ICBM and associated mobile launcher. That was the first time we had a chance to see the RS-24, the new Russian mobile missile with multiple warheads.

Just two weeks ago, we passed the 1,000<sup>th</sup> notification between the United States and the Russian Federation under the New START treaty. These notifications help to track movements and changes in the status of systems, including, for example, the notification of every time a heavy bomber is moved out of its home country for more than 24 hours.

In addition, every six months we exchange a comprehensive database. This gives us a full accounting of exactly where weapons systems are located, whether they are out of their

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deployment or operational bases and gone to maintenance, or have been retired. This semi-annual exchange, along with the continuous updates and mandatory treaty notifications provided, create a “living document,” a comprehensive look into each other’s strategic nuclear forces.

The New START treaty data exchanges are providing us with a more detailed picture of Russian strategic forces than we were able to obtain from earlier exchanges, and the inspections will give us crucial opportunities to confirm the validity of that data. Of course, reciprocal rights apply to the Russian side. Finally, both of us back up the verification regime with our own national technical means of verification, our satellites and other monitoring platforms.

We’ve found that concerns regarding New START verification measures during the Senate ratification debate are being assuaged. Our experience so far is demonstrating that the New START treaty’s verification regime works, and will help to push the door open to new, more intrusive inspections involving warheads or other smaller items of account. Such inspections will be crucial to any future nuclear reduction plans. Now let’s look to the next steps.

## *Next Steps in U.S.-Russian Reductions*

You’ve heard from my colleagues about the Defense Department’s assessment effort and the DDP: We obviously are in the midst of some important homework exercises. I won’t repeat what others have said, but I will add a few thoughts. While we still have much homework to do, we and the Russians can begin talking about some big concepts, important ideas and the definitions that go with them. We are not ready for the negotiating table, but we are ready for a productive conversation.

The United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia for broad reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed. [...]

Indeed, the preamble to the New START treaty called upon both the United States and Russia to pursue further reductions. As part of this process, the President supports the Senate’s call in the New START Resolution of Ratification to seek to initiate follow-on negotiations with Russia that include non-strategic nuclear weapons within one year of the treaty’s entry into force.

In addition to the conceptual conversation I mentioned above, we would also like to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with Russia. We are in the process of thinking through how

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this and other such transparency measures might be implemented. This involves thinking through issues and questions. Exactly what kinds of information do we think would be useful and appropriate to share and to seek from each other? How much detail are we prepared to share regarding numbers, types, and locations of weapons and related infrastructure? What classes and types of nuclear weapons should be included? What transparency measures should we consider for the total stockpile, in addition to non-strategic nuclear weapons? For the United States, what is the best way to consult with allies on their views to the extent any transparency measures would involve items located on their territories? What are the legal mechanisms necessary to permit the sharing of sensitive information?

We will consult with our NATO allies and invite Russia to join with us to develop an initiative, including examination of potential reciprocal actions that could be taken in parallel by the United States and Russia. Our conversation with Russia must include defining what exactly constitutes a non-strategic nuclear weapon and whether or not a single overall limit on all nuclear weapons would be possible. We have a lot of very complicated issues to consider, so the more creative and innovative ideas we have to work with, the better off we will be. For that reason, we are grateful to the community of experts, both government and nongovernment, American, Russian, and international, who are contributing to our work.

## *Beyond U.S. and Russian Reductions*

While the United States and Russia have more steps to pursue bilaterally, it is also time to begin a multilateral dialogue within the P5, as well. I travelled to Paris last month for a conference where the P5 discussed transparency, verification, and confidence-building measures. The conference was a constructive step in the process of nuclear weapon states' engagement on disarmament and related issues, and demonstrated the P5's commitment to the implementation of the Action Plan that was adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

All the P5 states recognized the fundamental importance of transparency in building mutual understanding and confidence. We exchanged information on nuclear doctrine and capabilities and considered possible voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures. To this end, we approved the creation of a working group on Nuclear Definitions and Terminology. We will also hold technical consultations on verification issues later this year in London.

In order to ensure that these conferences evolve into a regular process of P5 dialogue, we agreed to hold a third conference in the context of the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee to continue our discussions.

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The United States is proud to be at the leading edge of transparency efforts – publically declaring our nuclear stockpile numbers; participating in voluntary and treaty-based inspections measures; and working with other nations on military to military, scientific and lab exchanges, and site visits. We hope that all countries will join in the common effort to increase transparency and build mutual confidence. Confidence-building, at its very core, is a shared effort.

## *Conclusion*

This entire process of next steps in arms control will require some big ideas and some out-of-the-box thinking and we are glad to be engaging the STRATCOM community in this process. We have seen an evolution in nuclear policy thinking over the past sixty-five years, from policies of massive retaliation to strategies of nuclear war-fighting to our current conversations on strategic stability and predictability.

It is absolutely imperative that we continue to adapt and evolve our thinking to match the circumstances around us. Anticipating and preparing for changes in deterrence will be necessary for the continued security of our nation.

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## Sea-Based Strategic Missile Twice as Powerful as Bulava – Makeyev Center

*Moscow Interfax-AVN Online, 09 August 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis*

A submarine-launched strategic missile, the "Liner," whose flight testing began with a successful launch on May 20, is capable of carrying 9-12 small-class warheads, which is more than the Bulava missile can carry, the Makeyev State Missile Center has reported.

"The Liner can carry 1.5-2 times more small-class warheads than the Bulava missile," the company said in a press release. "The Bulava can only be equipped with six small-class warheads," the press release says. The Liner can be equipped with a mixed load of warheads of various yields, according to the Makeyev Center, based in Miass in the Chelyabinsk region.

"In terms of the ratio between the mission load and its launch weight per flight range, the new missile surpasses all modern solid-fuel strategic missiles in Britain, China, Russia, the United States and France, while in terms of combat load (four medium-class warheads) it is not inferior to the American Trident II (four warheads under the New START treaty)."

The Sineva and Liner missile systems, developed by the Makeyev Center, ensure the maintenance of the Northwestern Grouping of the Project 667BDRM submarines for 35-40 years, or until 2025-2030.

"Its diversified combat load guarantees a prompt reaction to changes in the military-political circumstances," the press release says.

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## Russian Inspectors Make Aerial Surveillance Flight over the United States

RIA Novosti, 01 July 2011, [en.rian.ru](http://en.rian.ru)

A group of Russian air inspectors will make an aerial observation flight over the territory of the United States in line with the Open Skies Treaty, Russia's Defense Ministry said on Saturday. It would be the 20<sup>th</sup> observation flight of the Russian inspectors in the member states of the Open Skies Treaty in 2011.

"The Tupolev Tu-154M Lk-1 aircraft with a group of Russian inspectors on board will make an observation flight over the territory of the United States under the international Open Skies Treaty from July 31 to August 8," the ministry said in a statement.

According to the ministry, the Russian aircraft will take off from the Travis Air Force Base, located in California, while the maximum range of the flight will total 4,250 kilometers. The ministry added that both the Russian and the U.S. inspectors would be on board and would control the use of the equipment and surveillance systems in accordance to the existing agreements.

The Open Skies Treaty, signed in 1992 at the initiative of U.S. President George H.W. Bush, established a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the territories of its 34 member states to promote openness and the transparency of military forces and activities.

The treaty entered into force on January 1, 2002 and its regime covers the national territories (land, islands, and internal and territorial waters) of all the treaty signatory states. It is an important element of the European security structure.

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## **U.S. Military Inspectors to Make Observation Flight in Russia**

*Moscow Interfax-AVN Online, 01 August 2011, accessed via Open Source Center*

A U.S. OC-135B observation aircraft will fly above Russia on August 1-6 in fulfillment of the Open Skies Treaty, a source at the Russian Defense Ministry told Interfax-AVN on Monday.

"The route and monitoring instruments have been coordinated with the Russian side," the ministry said.

The OC-135B does not belong to the category of warplanes, the ministry noted.

"Photographic equipment the plane is carrying has passed international certification, which involved Russian experts," the ministry said.

The Open Skies Treaty was signed in Helsinki in 1992 to verify statements of the amounts of weaponry and locations of forces. It involves 35 states of Europe and North America.

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