



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



23 April 2012—07 May 2012

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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

Scientists Publish H5N1 Research

Time Healthland, 03 May 2012, <http://healthland.time.com>

After an epic debate over whether to release research detailing how scientists created H5N1 in the lab, *Nature* finally published one of the two controversial papers on Wednesday.

(1,142 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Libya Chemical Weapons Destruction Moving Ahead

Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 April 2012, <http://www.nti.org/>

Libya is pressing ahead with preparations to finish off a stockpile of chemical warfare materials left behind by the deposed Muammar Qadhafi regime, a spokesman for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said on Tuesday. (704 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Pentagon Pushes Back Chemical Weapons Disposal Schedule

Global Security Newswire, 17 April 2012, <http://www.nti.org>

The U.S. Defense Department on Tuesday said it had pushed back by two years the estimated schedule for complete elimination of the nation's stockpile of chemical warfare materials.

(498 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction above 60 Percent Completion

Global Security Newswire, 22 March 2012, <http://www.nti.org>

Russia on Wednesday said it had destroyed slightly more than 60 percent of its 40,000-metric-ton stockpile of chemical warfare materials, ITAR-Tass reported. (370 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

National Academy of Sciences Supports CTBT Ratification

Arms Control Association, 30 March 2012, <http://www.armscontrol.org>

Today, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released its long-awaited report on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). (1,156 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)



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COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM (CTR)

Senator Lugar Announces Status of WMD Elimination under CTR

Senator Lugar Official Website, 01 May 2012, <http://lugar.senate.gov>

Today, U.S. Senator Dick Lugar announced continued progress in the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] Program (450 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Unspectacular Future of the IAEA Additional Protocol [OPINION]

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26 April 2012, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org>

Next week, the parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will meet in Vienna to begin preparations for a five-year treaty Review Conference in 2015. One topic of discussion will be how best to universalize the Additional Protocol for safeguards among the 185 non-nuclear-weapon states Party to the treaty. (2,161 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms

U.S. Department of State, 06 April 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

This fact sheet provides the numbers of strategic offensive arms reported by the United States and Russia in the March 1, 2012 exchange of data. (69 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

U.S. Participating in NPT PrepCom Meeting in Vienna

Mission of the United States in Geneva, 30 April 2012, <http://geneva.usmission.gov>

The United States will participate in a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting of Parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be held in Vienna, April 30 – May 11. (163 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

DOE Delegation Visits Russian Civilian Nuclear Facilities

Embassy of the United States in Moscow, 24 April 2012, <http://moscow.usembassy.gov>

A delegation from the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] and national laboratory personnel, led by Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy Dr. Peter Lyons, visited several Russian nuclear facilities and research institutes from April 10-19, 2012. The visit was the second part of an exchange between DOE and the Russian State Corporation for Atomic Energy “Rosatom,” under the auspices of the Bilateral Presidential Commission’s Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group. (325 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

World Leaders Vow to Secure Loose Nuclear Material by 2014

Bloomberg Businessweek, 27 March 2012, <http://www.businessweek.org>

World leaders pledged to secure all vulnerable nuclear material by 2014 and to boost security to keep the ingredients for atomic weapons out of the hands of terrorists. (787 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

OPEN SKIES TREATY

Open Skies over Russia and NATO Countries: How to Get Rid of Fears

The Voice of Russia, 11 April 2012, <http://english.ruvr.ru>

The Treaty on Open Skies has celebrated its 20th anniversary. The military of Russia, NATO countries, and other countries continue to carry out reconnaissance flights over the territories of participating countries ... [and] the treaty remains one of the most effective means of maintaining peace. (529 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russian Inspectors Begin Surveillance Flight over U.S.

Ria Novosti, 08 April 2012, <http://en.rian.ru>

A group of Russian military observers begin on Sunday a nine-day inspection mission in the skies of the United States under the Treaty on Open Skies. (178 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

20th Anniversary of the Treaty on Open Skies

U.S. Department of State, 23 March 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

The Department of State welcomes the 20th Anniversary of the signature of the Treaty on Open Skies on March 24, 1992. (1,051 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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VIENNA DOCUMENT

Arms Control Inspectors Conduct Verification at Military Units of Azerbaijan

U.S. Defense Professionals, 12 April 2012, <https://www.defpro.com>

From April 11 to 15 inspectors of the Arms Control Section of the Lithuanian Armed Forces together with colleagues from Turkey and Hungary paid a visit to military units of Azerbaijan where inspection of a designated area was conducted under the regulations of the Vienna Document 2011 of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

(271 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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Time Healthland, 03 May 2012, <http://healthland.time.com>

After an epic debate over whether to release research detailing how scientists created H5N1 in the lab, *Nature* finally published one of the two controversial papers on Wednesday.

You might not have noticed, but the influenza world has been in a bit of an uproar since late last year, when news leaked out that two teams of researchers had purposefully tweaked H5N1 bird flu in the lab to potentially make it more transmissible among human beings. (H5N1 spreads like wildfire among birds – and usually kills them – but the virus only rarely seems to jump to human beings, though when it does the infections are often fatal.)

The two scientists – Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison and TIME 100 honoree Ron Fouchier of Erasmus University in the Netherlands – had submitted their research to *Nature* and *Science*, respectively, with the expectation of swift publication. In December, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) did something unprecedented: they ruled that the two papers should be censored if published, that they should be scrubbed of the complete methods and viral mutations that the researchers studied, in order to head off the risk that terror groups could use the information to craft a deadly bioweapon.

That led to intense fighting within the scientific community. Some researchers wanted the papers published in full, both because they believed the work could help arm us against a future flu pandemic, and because they worried about the chill of government censorship on science. Other scientists were against publication and even the experiments themselves, believing that nothing gleaned from the work could be important enough to offset the risk of creating a potentially deadly flu virus.

In the end, Fouchier explained that his man-made flu virus wasn't the merciless killer that early media reports had made it out to be – Kawaoka's man-made virus was always believed to be less dangerous – and in March the NSABB took a look at revised papers submitted by the two research teams and voted to recommend that they be published.

On Wednesday, *Nature* finally published Kawaoka's research. (We're still waiting for the Fouchier paper, though the Dutch scientist was recently granted an export license for his work, so it should appear soon.) The sobering takeaway: avian H5N1 flu viruses in nature may be only one mutation away from spreading effectively between mammals, likely including human beings. If that happens – and if H5N1 retains its apparently sky-high mortality rate – we could be in for serious trouble.

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For all the controversy, the research itself is actually quite fascinating. Kawaoka and his team mutated H5N1's hemagglutinin (HA) gene – the H in H5N1 – which produces the protein the virus needs to attach itself to host cells. They produced millions of genes, mimicking the effect of random mutation in nature, and found one version of H5N1 hemagglutinin that seems particularly effective at invading human cells.

The genes for that protein contained four new mutations, three of which altered the shape of the gene, while the fourth one changed the pH level at which the protein attaches to the cell and injects the virus's genetic material inside. (It's a bit reminiscent of Alien, if the virus is the face-hugger and this poor guy's face is the cell.) The team combined the mutated HA gene with seven other genes – flu viruses have eight genes in all – from the highly transmissible if not highly deadly H1N1 strain, which caused the 2009 flu pandemic. The result was an H1N1 virus with mutant H5N1 hemagglutinin proteins on the outside.

Kawaoka and co. then introduced the hybrid flu virus into the noses of ferrets – an animal that has long been used in flu research as stand-ins for human beings – and the bug replicated within the test subjects. Later the researchers discovered that the mutant flu also spread from ferret to ferret relatively easily, something the real-world H5N1 isn't yet able to do. It's not clear whether the mutant virus would spread as easily among human beings as it does between ferrets, however, and the new virus remained vulnerable both to the antiviral Tamiflu and a prototype vaccine against H5N1.

Still, it's possible that the H5N1 bird flu might naturally be able to hit upon the same mutations that Kawaoka created in the lab, while still retaining its current virulence. In any case, as the virologist Jeremy Farrar of the Oxford University Clinical Research Unit in Vietnam told Ed Yong for Nature News: "This work reminds us just how vulnerable we potentially are to relatively small changes." It didn't take much for this virus to change completely.

Bigger news will likely be made when Fouchier's paper comes out. That's because Fouchier introduced mutations directly into an H5N1 virus, then let the new strain spread and evolve inside the ferrets. Those changes eventually turned what had been a bird flu into a mammal flu, albeit one that ended up not to be deadly to the ferrets. But Fouchier's work would provide a much more direct formula for terrorists to alter H5N1 viruses themselves.

That's still not terribly likely, though – it would require a lot of work on the part of any terrorists, and there's no guarantee they'd even be able to create anything particularly dangerous. (A bigger threat, in mine and other people's views, is the possibility of an accidental release of a mutated virus from the lab – something that has happened in the past.) But the debate goes

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beyond security concerns. The Nature paper marks a new era in science, as Carl Zimmer wrote on Wednesday for Discover: “This episode is just the start of something much bigger.”

Roger Brent, a biologist at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, put it into history of modern biology. In the 1970s, biologists discovered how to move individual genes from one organism to another. The power to rewrite the book of life caused a lot of consternation, and led to a gathering called Asilomar in 1975, where scientists tried to work out a system for ensuring that no monstrous new creatures would escape a lab and wreak havoc on the world. At the time, just about everyone on Earth who had the wherewithal to perform genetic engineering could get together at Asilomar. Over the past 37 years, these manipulations have become democratized. A far broader group of researchers now have far more power than anyone did in 1975.

All of the furor over Kawaoka and Fouchier’s research came well after the research had already been completed, the mutant flus created and cooling in the lab. Our ability to manipulate life – even those sub-microscopic, sometimes deadly forms of life known as viruses – grows by the day, but there’s been no concurrent development in how we, as a world, should govern those abilities. It turns out that may be an even bigger challenge than inventing a killer flu from scratch.

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Libya Chemical Weapons Destruction Moving Ahead

Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 April 2012, <http://www.nti.org/>

Libya is pressing ahead with preparations to finish off a stockpile of chemical warfare materials left behind by the deposed Muammar Qadhafi regime, a spokesman for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) said on Tuesday. The [OPCW] also announced that Canada has provided slightly more than \$6 million to support chemical weapons disposal by the new government in Tripoli.

The Qadhafi government declared holding roughly 25 metric tons of sulfur mustard agent and close to 1,400 metric tons of precursor materials upon joining the convention in 2004. The nation moved quickly to destroy about 3,500 empty aerial munitions that could have been used to deliver offensive chemicals.

Disposal of the blister agent began in October 2010 and was suspended due to technical difficulties at a mobile neutralization facility in February 2011, shortly before the beginning of the uprising that ultimately led to Qadhafi's death last October. About 45 percent of the declared mustard stockpile remained, along with roughly 60 percent of precursor materials.

A limited amount of undeclared mustard agent was identified last year in the wake of Qadhafi's fall. "Libya has now declared a total of about 13 metric tons of sulfur mustard agent," OPCW spokesman Michael Luhan told Global Security Newswire.

That could suggest that the November declaration from Tripoli covers about 1.5 metric tons of mustard agent never acknowledged by the Qadhafi government alongside the 11.5 tons of previously known material that remained when disposal operations were suspended early last year. The organization has also determined that a number of empty Libyan munitions should be declared as chemical armaments and eliminated.

All of the materials are now awaiting destruction at the Ruwagha depot in southeastern Libya. Elimination of the mustard agent is expected to take no more than six months after work resumes, according to an OPCW press release. It was not immediately known when operations would begin again.

"The main unit of the mobile destruction [plant] has been repaired by Libyan authorities with Italian assistance. But before destruction operations can be resumed and OPCW inspectors deployed on-site, the new government in Tripoli must make needed infrastructure and security arrangements at Ruwagha," Luhan stated by e-mail. "The OPCW will continue working closely with the authorities to enable operations to resume as soon as possible." Precursor materials

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would be destroyed following the mustard agent and munitions, according to the spokesman. Five to six OPCW inspectors would oversee the disposal project at all times.

After receiving multiple extensions, Libya's final deadline for eliminating the banned materials under the convention is next Monday. Having acknowledged that it cannot meet that schedule, Tripoli was required by April 29 to submit a detailed plan for completing demilitarization operations. Corresponding documents are also required from Russia and the United States, which are years away from completely eradicating their own stocks of chemical warfare agents.

The Libyan report, which offers specific dates for completion of demilitarization activities, has been delivered to OPCW headquarters and is being reviewed, Luhan said. Further details were not immediately available about the paper, which would be delivered to the 41-nation OPCW Executive Council at a meeting next week.

The \$6 million in Canadian support is being directed to the organization. "OPCW will use the funds for three main activities: 1) project management and training of personnel to operate the destruction facility, 2) purchase of equipment and related materials for destroying sulfur mustard agent and chemical weapons munitions stored at the Ruwagha depot, and 3) provision of support services for OPCW on-site inspectors at Ruwagha," according to the press release.

The contribution is part of security assistance for the new Libyan government announced last fall by Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird. It is the largest donation ever delivered to the OPCW by a member state.

"This historic donation reflects the spirit of solidarity and mutual aid that has exemplified the OPCW from its beginning, and which is vital to achieve our goal of ridding the world of all chemical weapons," OPCW Director General Ahmet Üzümcü said in provided comments. "I commend the government of Canada for its generous support, and we look forward to working closely with Libya to eliminate the last of its chemical weapons as soon as possible."

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Pentagon Pushes Back Chemical Weapons Disposal Schedule

Global Security Newswire, 17 April 2012, <http://www.nti.org>

The U.S. Defense Department on Tuesday said it had pushed back by two years the estimated schedule for complete elimination of the nation's stockpile of chemical warfare materials. An additional \$2 billion in projected costs are also being added to the full operations of the Army's Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA] program, bring the total estimate to \$10.6 billion, according to a press release.

The agency is assigned to destroy roughly 2,600 tons of mustard agent held at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and 523 tons of blister and nerve agents at the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky. Those installations store the last 10 percent of the U.S. chemical stockpile; a separate Army agency completed disposal of the other 90 percent earlier this year.

Construction continues on chemical neutralization plants at the Colorado and Kentucky depots. Anticipated completion of demilitarization operations at Pueblo has now been delayed from 2017 to 2019, while the schedule for finishing off the Blue Grass stockpile has moved from 2021 to 2023.

The United States is a member nation to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which requires full disposal of banned materials by April 29, 2012. The Pentagon has long acknowledged it would not meet that deadline. Member states to the accord late last year demanded a program of heightened reporting and transparency for disposal efforts in the United States and two other nations set to breach the disposal schedule – Libya and Russia.

“The United States is unwavering in its commitment to achieving 100 percent destruction of its chemical weapons as soon as possible, consistent with the Chemical Weapons Convention’s imperatives of public safety, environmental protection, and international transparency,” ACWA chief Conrad Whyne said in provided comments. “Part of that transparency is being open about the need to identify potential uncertainties in our planning. By doing so, we can acquire the appropriate resources and apply them to minimize or mitigate impact.”

According to the release, “the new estimates represent a conservative planning approach based on experience with earlier chemical destruction facilities and include the time necessary to resolve problems as an element of prudent management.”

Added Whyne: “Estimating costs and schedules for large, complex construction projects which will use new processes and handle aging and dangerous materials and are subject to comprehensive regulation, involves a great deal of uncertainty, which we’ve now taken into

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account. This may include anything from hiring qualified personnel, testing or equipment issues, to acquiring supplies and materials. If these issues are not encountered, the schedules can be shortened and destruction operations completed sooner. It is our continuous objective to shorten the estimated schedule, consistent with safety and environmental compliance considerations.”

The nongovernmental Chemical Weapons Working Group described the new figures as the “worst-case estimate.” “We don’t expect the projects to take this long or cost this much,” Craig Williams, head of the Kentucky-based organization, said in a release, “but in order to ensure the funds are there, just in case they are needed, the elongated schedule was brought forward.”

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Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction above 60 Percent Completion

Global Security Newswire, 22 March 2012, <http://www.nti.org>

Russia on Wednesday said it had destroyed slightly more than 60 percent of its 40,000-metric-ton stockpile of chemical warfare materials, ITAR-Tass reported. In excess of 24,157 metric tons of chemical agents have been eliminated to date, according to Mikhail Babich, chairman of the State Commission on Chemical Disarmament.

"We are taking maximum effort to complete this process within the shortest time possible," said Babich, who met with top officials from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], the organization dedicated to monitoring compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The accord required member nations by 2007 to eliminate arsenals of banned materials such as mustard blister agent and the nerve agents VX and sarin. Several states received deadline extensions, with Russia and the United States being given five extra years to finish off their stockpiles. Moscow and Washington have both acknowledged that they cannot meet the extended deadline.

"We needed additional time, and an agreement has been reached that we shall complete this process by late 2015," Interfax quoted Russian Federation Council Defense and Security Committee head Viktor Ozerov as saying on Wednesday. "We are increasing the capacities of the current disposal facilities, completing the construction of the last such enterprise as planned, and searching for additional funding and resources," Ozerov said.

The United States expects to complete chemical demilitarization operations in 2021. Member states to [the OPCW] in December decided against penalizing Russia, the United States and Libya for their anticipated failure to keep to the April 2012 deadline. The three nations instead are subject to a regime of increased reporting and transparency regarding their disposal programs.

The OPCW delegation that traveled to Russia this week included the organization's director general, Ahmet Üzümcü, and representatives of its Executive Council. The team made a visit to a destruction facility being built at Kizner in Udmurtia. Two Russian chemical weapons disposal plants have already finished operations, while work continues at another four sites.

"We are very pleased to commend the Russian government for its continuing strong commitment to the convention, and to have this timely opportunity to review the progress it is making toward the elimination of Russia's remaining chemical weapons," Executive Council Chairman Peter Goosens said in provided comments.

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National Academy of Sciences Supports CTBT Ratification

Arms Control Association, 30 March 2012, <http://www.armscontrol.org>

Today, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released its long-awaited report on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The independent panel of senior scientific and military experts was charged in 2009 with reviewing technical developments related to the U.S. nuclear stockpile and to nuclear explosion test monitoring that have occurred since the 2002 NAS report on the CTBT and the Senate's brief debate and rejection of the treaty in 1999.

The new NAS report, *The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Technical Issues for the United States*, reaffirms that the United States no longer needs – and would not benefit from – nuclear explosive testing. Renewed nuclear testing would only help improve other nations' nuclear capabilities and reduce U.S. security. And the report documents why U.S. ratification and entry into force of the CTBT would significantly improve our ability to detect and deter nuclear testing by others.

The NAS report lays out a stronger case than ever before for supporting the CTBT:

The 2012 NAS report documents that significant technical advances have resolved earlier concerns about the treaty.

The panel concluded that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)'s nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program “has been more successful than was anticipated in 1999,” when the Senate last considered the CTBT. Maintaining an effective nuclear stockpile will require continued diligence, but it does not require nuclear test explosions.

“Similarly,” the panel said, “the status of U.S. national monitoring and the International Monitoring System has improved to levels better than predicted in 1999.”

The new study cites substantial advances in the U.S. national monitoring and the International Monitoring System capabilities across all of the key verification technologies deployed worldwide to detect and deter nuclear test explosions—seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, radionuclide, and satellite monitoring.

More is known today than ever before about the U.S. nuclear arsenal and there is no technical or military reason to resume testing.

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As former NNSA administrator and NAS panel member Linton Brooks said in December 2011, "as a practical matter, it is almost certain that the United States will not test again... in recent years I never met anybody who advocated that we seek authorization to return to testing."

Similar to the 2002 NAS report, the new study finds that if sufficient resources are dedicated to the task the United States has the technical ability to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without resuming nuclear test explosions.

The nuclear weapons labs have more resources than ever before to perform core stockpile stewardship work. Since 2009, funding for the NNSA nuclear weapons complex has increased by 13 percent. The Obama administration's \$7.6 billion budget request for fiscal year 2013 would boost NNSA weapons programs funding even more-by 5 percent over last year's appropriation of \$7.2 billion.

As Senator Dianne Feinstein noted at a March 21, 2012 appropriations committee hearing, "Regarding nuclear weapons activities, I believe the fiscal year 2013 budget request provides more than sufficient funding to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile."

National and international test-ban monitoring and verification capabilities have improved immensely.

With the combined capabilities of the International Monitoring System (IMS), national technical means (NTM), and civilian seismic networks, no potential CTBT violator could be confident that a nuclear explosion of any military utility would escape detection.

The panel's detailed report also concludes that "[c]onstraints placed on nuclear-explosion testing by the monitoring capabilities of the IMS and ... U.S. NTM, will reduce the likelihood of successful clandestine nuclear-explosion testing, and inhibit the development of new types of strategic nuclear weapons."

The report found that "[o]ther states intent on acquiring and deploying modern, two-stage thermonuclear weapons would not be able to have confidence in their performance without multi-kiloton testing. Such tests would likely be detectable (even with evasion measures) by appropriately resourced U.S. national technical means and a completed IMS network."

The study noted that on-site inspections as allowed under the treaty once it enters into force, "would have a high likelihood of detecting evidence of a nuclear explosion with a yield greater

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than 0.1 kilotons, provided that the event could be located with sufficient precision ... and conducted without hindrance." The panel noted that an on-site inspection "constitutes a deterrent to treaty violation whether or not an inspection actually takes place...."

The security value of the CTBT is greater than ever.

U.S. ratification and entry into force of the treaty would improve our ability to detect and deter nuclear testing that could allow others to improve their arsenals. The NAS report documents how the CTBT constrains the ability of the established nuclear-weapon states, including Russia and China, to build new types of more sophisticated nuclear warhead designs.

The report also documents why, without the option of nuclear explosive testing, newer testing nations, including potentially Iran, could not perfect sophisticated two-stage thermonuclear warheads that can be delivered on long-range ballistic missiles.

The report found that "the development of weapons with lower capabilities ... is possible with or without the CTBT for countries of different levels of nuclear sophistication, but such developments would not require the United States to return to nuclear testing in order to respond because it already has-or could produce-weapons of equal or greater capability based on its own nuclear-explosion test history."

The United States has detonated 1,030 nuclear test explosions – more than all other nations combined – the last of which was in September 1992. Russia has conducted 715 nuclear tests; China 45; North Korea 2; Iran 0.

Time for a thorough, thoughtful review

The Senate has not seriously examined these issues in years. In the decade since the Senate last considered the CTBT, 59 Senators have left office; only 41 Senators who debated and voted on the CTBT in 1999 remain.

Good policy depends on good information. Senators and their staff need to take a serious look at the merits of the CTBT in light of the new NAS findings and not rush to judgment on the basis of old information, misconceptions, or partisan politics.

President Obama has repeatedly expressed his commitment to the CTBT, most recently in a March 26 speech in Seoul. But he and his team must provide stronger leadership to ensure the

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Senate's questions on the CTBT are fully addressed and to create the necessary climate and support for a successful vote in 2013.

The bipartisan approval of New START in 2010 shows that a successful treaty approval process requires months of hearings, answers to thousands of questions, and a serious commitment to building understanding for the national security issues at stake.

U.S. ratification of the CTBT is essential for entry into force and would very likely prompt other states, including China, India, and Pakistan, to follow suit.

The American people expect their leaders to take action to reduce the threats posed by nuclear weapons and proliferation. U.S. ratification of the CTBT would advance American national security interests by helping to reduce nuclear threats and enhancing our ability to detect, deter, and confront proliferators.

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Senator Lugar Announces Status of WMD Elimination under CTR

Senator Lugar Official Website, 01 May 2012, <http://lugar.senate.gov>

Today, U.S. Senator Dick Lugar announced continued progress in the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] Program:

- 3 nuclear weapons train transport shipments secured in March 2012;
- 51.11 metric tons of chemical weapons nerve agent destroyed in March 2012; and
- 109 Russian SS-25 Inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) destroyed.

The 109 ICBMs had been destroyed through Nunn-Lugar between 2005 and 2009 but had not previously been disclosed as part of the Nunn-Lugar Scorecard. Also in March, Lugar commended operations to secure deadly nuclear materials in Kazakhstan in operations that previously had been classified.

On February 1, 2012, Lugar was awarded the 2012 Minute Man of the Year award by the Reserves Officer Association for his contributions to national security and U.S. military personnel.

On Veteran's Day 2011, Lugar delivered a speech at Indiana University in which he called for increased efforts to stop threats of weapons of mass destruction. He heralded the future of Nunn-Lugar Global "to protect Americans at home and our service personnel overseas."

"Achieving this mission requires constant vigilance. I will continue my efforts to bolster Nunn-Lugar activities that eliminate threats to U.S. security before they reach our shores," Lugar said.

The Nunn-Lugar scorecard now totals:

- 7,619 strategic nuclear warheads deactivated;
- 902 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) destroyed;
- 498 ICBM silos eliminated;
- 191 ICBM mobile launchers destroyed;
- 155 bombers eliminated;
- 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) destroyed;
- 492 SLBM launchers eliminated;
- 680 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) eliminated;
- 33 nuclear submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles destroyed;
- 194 nuclear test tunnels eliminated;
- 2854.622 metric tons of Russian and Albanian chemical weapons agent destroyed;

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- 565 nuclear weapons transport train shipments secured;
- 24 nuclear weapons storage sites have had their security upgraded; and
- 38 biological threat monitoring stations built and equipped.

Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program. Those countries were the third, fourth and eighth largest nuclear weapons powers in the world.

Lugar makes regular oversight missions to Nunn-Lugar Global sites around the world. During his most recent mission, Lugar led a mission to East Africa to expand efforts to secure deadly biological threats.

In November 1991, Lugar (R-Indiana) and [then] Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) authored the Nunn-Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. This program has provided U.S. support and expertise to help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle its enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, related materials, and delivery systems.

In 2003, Congress adopted Senator Lugar's Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which authorized operations outside the former Soviet Union to address proliferation threats. In 2004, Nunn-Lugar funds were committed for the first time outside of the former Soviet Union to destroy chemical weapons in Albania.

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Unspectacular Future of the IAEA Additional Protocol [OPINION]

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26 April 2012, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org>

Next week, the Parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will meet in Vienna to begin preparations for a five-year treaty Review Conference in 2015. One topic of discussion will be how best to universalize the Additional Protocol for safeguards among the 185 non-nuclear-weapon states Party to the treaty.

It has been fifteen years since the Additional Protocol was approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to rectify serious deficits in IAEA inspections and verification by improving the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. But NPT Parties still have not reached a consensus that the protocol should be an essential component of their long-standing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. In 2015, they will likely remain divided.

The reason is that getting countries nowadays to agree on new common norms and standards governing their nuclear behavior is tough. That lesson was underscored by the two Nuclear Security Summits held in 2010 and this March, as well as the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety held last June after the Fukushima accident. At these events, governments showed that they are not willing to give the IAEA greater blanket authority to peek inside their civilian nuclear energy programs in matters of nuclear security and nuclear safety. Some states are similarly averse to strengthening the IAEA's authority to enhance nonproliferation.

But there is a way forward on the Additional Protocol. The IAEA and committed member states should provide resources and support to enable the 66 countries still without a protocol – mostly developing nations with few or no declared nuclear activities – to conclude and implement the measure. Efforts should also continue to engage the half-dozen states with nuclear assets that oppose the Additional Protocol, recognizing however that they may not sign on the dotted line without a change in leadership.

As in nuclear safety and security, in nonproliferation only an incremental approach will be feasible for the foreseeable future. After all but a tiny number of states have implemented the Additional Protocol, it will then be possible to subject the remaining holdouts to diplomatic pressure to encourage their participation.

Evolving Threat Assessment

[...] A considerable number of these 115 states also now believe that the Additional Protocol, instead of being voluntary, should become mandatory, but many of the NPT's States Parties do

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not agree. Most of the countries that object are developing nations with limited nuclear activities. An outspoken number say they will not accept any new nonproliferation burdens, especially since the United States and other nuclear weapon states will not give up their nuclear arms. And in their view, they are not sufficiently benefitting from the NPT's "grand bargain," under which they should get access to the developed world's nuclear technology in exchange for their willingness to forego nuclear arms.

Only a small number of states with significant nuclear activities have not concluded an Additional Protocol, including Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. The IAEA and some member states have tried at length to get these countries to conclude an Additional Protocol because these states have reactors, nuclear materials, and research and development centers with nuclear-material-processing infrastructure. Their efforts have failed because of political objections made by the states' leaders.

2010 NPT Action Plan

NPT states have debated the question of whether the Additional Protocol should be a requirement during NPT Review Conferences that take place every five years. Still, in 2015 there will likely be no consensus that the Additional Protocol should be a requirement for NPT States Parties.

In 2000, states told the Netherlands and Sweden, which proposed the requirement, that the step was premature. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, many states remained opposed, and the conference's final document reiterated a 2009 IAEA General Conference resolution that referred to "measures contained in both" the 1971 Model Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol as together "represent[ing] the enhanced verification standard."

But the IAEA has prioritized progress in universalizing the Additional Protocol and achieving the goal of getting all states with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements to conclude an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. An Action Plan, agreed to by consensus on the final day of the 2010 Review Conference, "encourage[d] all States Parties which have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible." It also "encourage[d] the IAEA to further facilitate and assist States Parties in the conclusion and entry into force of . . . additional protocols." The IAEA also wants states with Small Quantities Protocols to update those agreements to permit the IAEA to carry out safeguards inspections should it have reason to believe that there are undeclared nuclear activities taking place.

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Next week the cycle for the 2015 NPT Review Conference begins. From April 30 through May 11, NPT Parties will convene in Vienna for the first of three annual preparatory meetings. They will review progress in implementing the 2010 Action Plan, including progress on the Additional Protocol. The IAEA will spell out that its effort to universalize the Additional Protocol is now squarely focused on the group of states that have few nuclear materials and activities – not the more vocal and more developed ones which, in some cases, have full-blown nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. Currently, the IAEA's outreach activities are focused on the Asia-Pacific and Caribbean regions, where most countries have Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements but many are not members of the IAEA.

The IAEA's rationale for doing this is sound: There are no grounds to expect that Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, and Syria will agree to more IAEA access to their nuclear programs. Argentina may not conclude an Additional Protocol without Brazil taking that step in tandem. Brazil – most recently during a bilateral discussion with the United States – is digging in its heels over disarmament and global nuclear equity issues. Egypt is described by some diplomats as opposed in principle to making any additional nuclear verification commitments; sometimes Egyptians, and Syrians, say that they won't accept the Additional Protocol without Israel's nuclear disarmament. In 2003, Iran, cited by the IAEA for not having declared nuclear activities for eighteen years, agreed to apply the Additional Protocol without making a legal commitment to adhere to the regulations, then three years later suspended implementation of it. Syria is in turmoil.

Since 1997, some of these states, joined by a few others such as Cuba and Venezuela, have asserted that they speak for developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement in championing a balance of NPT parties' obligations and rights. That is, without nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon powers and without receiving nuclear technology from the developed world, they will not commit to more transparency in their own nuclear programs. During the 2010 conference, a few developing countries and Non-Aligned Movement members – Chile, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates – broke ranks with the rest on this issue. And outside the multilateral political theater, since 1997 many developing countries – including 75 Non-Aligned Movement members – have, one by one, concluded an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Most of these agreements have entered into force.

Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, fourteen more states – Albania, Andorra, Bahrain, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Gambia, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, [United Arab Emirates] UAE, and Swaziland – have concluded an Additional Protocol, with nine of them members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Most of these states have limited nuclear activities, but a few are noteworthy: Mexico has power reactors and

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has objected in multinational fora to additional safeguards burdens, and Namibia produces about 10 percent of the world's uranium. Progress is being made, however slowly.

Safeguards Compliance and the Additional Protocol

In June 2011, the 46 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the most important multilateral nuclear-trade rule-making body, amended their guidelines for exports of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing items to mandate members to require an Additional Protocol in recipient states. In light of objections raised by a few countries – particularly Brazil – the new guidelines afford access to sensitive items if a regional safeguards system is in place, such as the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

Before these new guidelines on sensitive trade were negotiated, the Nuclear Suppliers Group had planned to consider requiring an Additional Protocol as a condition of supply for all nuclear trade. But officials from objecting countries argued that, were the Nuclear Suppliers Group – and beyond that, the NPT Review Conference – to require all states to have an Additional Protocol, resentful governments would not implement it, damaging the overall credibility of the Additional Protocol as a verification instrument.

This argument, however, is not valid, because the credibility of the Additional Protocol rests on the same legal foundation as the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Should the IAEA conclude that a state is not complying with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, it can report that conclusion to its Board of Governors. The same holds if the IAEA concludes that a state is not in compliance with its obligations under an Additional Protocol.

During the last decade some misunderstandings arose about the scope of the Additional Protocol. It does not give the IAEA carte blanche to conduct “anytime, anywhere” inspections in a country. Nor does it exclude the IAEA from access to military or other defense-related locations. In fact, in some cases, the IAEA has requested, and was afforded, access to military sites, providing it assurance that firewalls are in place between nuclear-related installations and adjacent defense-related locations.

In the course of ongoing safeguards activities, the IAEA may request access to a range of locations which would, in effect, put a state's willingness to cooperate to the test. Separately, the IAEA may receive intelligence about the state's nuclear activities – provided to the IAEA by other member states under Article VIII of the IAEA statute – which may prompt the IAEA to attempt to obtain radiation or environmental monitoring data from the state in question. If the

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state refuses access – or otherwise does not provide information in lieu of providing access – the IAEA may report that development to the Board of Governors as noncompliance.

There is every reason to believe that the IAEA would pursue states that do not cooperate in implementing the Additional Protocol. There is no indication that it would consider such a lack of cooperation less serious than failure to comply with the terms of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. And there is no question that the IAEA would have the right to expect compliance. The 2010 NPT Review Conference, for example, explicitly underscored that, once a state concludes and brings into force an Additional Protocol, implementing it is a legal requirement.

[...] Anticipating that the IAEA would rigorously implement the Additional Protocol once it was concluded, states that in the past had carried out nuclear activities not previously reported under their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, such as Canada and Sweden, disclosed legacy activities and worked closely with the IAEA to account for them. [...]

The Self-Interest of States

Yet, if the legally binding Additional Protocol imposes more duties on states to provide information and access to the IAEA, why should states agree? Ultimately, they do so out of consideration of their national self-interest. So far, 115 states “want assurance that their neighbors’ nuclear programs are transparent and not clandestinely organized to develop nuclear weapons,” according to John Carlson, Australia’s former director general for safeguards. These states, Carlson said, also want to assure others that they have no secret nuclear agendas. [...]

In the meantime, the IAEA’s incremental approach is the correct one. The number of states with an Additional Protocol has gradually but steadily increased since 1997 and more states can be encouraged to join them. Focused outreach by the IAEA and member states will advance this development. Japan, the UK, and the United States have set up programs to assist states in making expanded declarations and to involve their nuclear regulators in the process. In some countries targeted by the IAEA beginning in 2010, the IAEA has found that governments were not opposed to the Additional Protocol but had little information about it.

Argentine officials have suggested to their U.S. counterparts that the biggest obstacle to the Additional Protocol for Buenos Aires may not be politics but the amount of work needed to comply with the expanded declaration. For a country like Argentina, with a complex nuclear fuel cycle, the requirements are considerable. Successful implementation in other such states took five years or more. For the 60-plus NPT states with few nuclear activities or materials and

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without an Additional Protocol, the workload will be far less. However, many of these countries will need help because they have few resources to spare.

Beginning at next week's NPT review preparatory meeting, and over the course of the next three years, the IAEA and committed member states should systematically address and resolve the financial and infrastructural problems standing in the way of the conclusion of an Additional Protocol with each of the remaining states. And they should do so by designing a well-defined road map to secure blanket participation by 2020.

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New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms

U.S. Department of State, 06 April 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

This fact sheet provides the numbers of strategic offensive arms reported by the United States and Russia in the March 1, 2012 exchange of data.

Category of Data	United States of America	Russian Federation
Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers	812	494
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers	1737	1492
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers	1040	881

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U.S. Participating in NPT PrepCom Meeting in Vienna

Mission of the United States in Geneva, 30 April 2012, <http://geneva.usmission.gov>

The United States will participate in a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting of Parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be held in Vienna, April 30 – May 11. This is the first of three PrepCom meetings in the current NPT review cycle, which will culminate in the next Review Conference in 2015.

The U.S. interagency delegation will be led by Ambassador Susan Burk, the President's Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, and will include Thomas Countryman, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation; Ambassador Laura Kennedy, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva; and Robert Wood, Acting U.S. Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna.

The PrepCom will cover all aspects of the NPT, including disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will be the first meeting of the treaty Parties since the successful 2010 Review Conference, which adopted by consensus a forward-looking agenda that outlines steps to strengthen the treaty and the international nonproliferation regime.

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DOE Delegation Visits Russian Civilian Nuclear Facilities

Embassy of the United States in Moscow, 24 April 2012, <http://moscow.usembassy.gov>

A delegation from the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] and national laboratory personnel, led by Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy Dr. Peter Lyons, visited several Russian nuclear facilities and research institutes from April 10-19, 2012. The visit was the second part of an exchange between DOE and the Russian State Corporation for Atomic Energy “Rosatom,” under the auspices of the Bilateral Presidential Commission’s Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group.

In August 2011, Rosatom officials conducted a similar visit to several DOE facilities and universities in the United States. Over the course of these visits, the two sides have identified many new areas that would complement and deepen existing cooperation.

Dr. Lyons and his delegation visited the following institutes and sites:

- Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) in Zarechny, location of the operating BN-600 fast-breeder reactor and the BN-800 construction site. The BN-800 is intended to be used for disposing of excess Russian weapons-grade plutonium, in accordance with the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement;
- Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (RIAR) in Dmitrovgrad. This institute has several research reactors assisting in development of advanced reactor fuel, materials testing and radio-chemical processing;
- Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC) in Zheleznogorsk. Since the shutdown of the plutonium production reactors located there, MCC’s mission is evolving to serve as a back-end center for the Russian nuclear complex. It has both wet and dry storage sites for nuclear fuel, and is in the process of constructing a pilot spent fuel reprocessing facility. MCC has also been designated as the site for fabricating mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for the BN-800 reactor.
- Afrikantov Experimental Design Bureau for Mechanical Engineering (OKBM) in Nizhny Novgorod. OKBM is a major reactor design and institute, which has been involved in fast-reactor design, including the BN-800 reactor and a floating nuclear power plant. In addition, they are involved in the development of small modular reactors, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, and advanced simulation codes for licensing and design.

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World Leaders Vow to Secure Loose Nuclear Material by 2014

Bloomberg Businessweek, 27 March 2012, <http://www.businessweek.org>

World leaders pledged to secure all vulnerable nuclear material by 2014 and to boost security to keep the ingredients for atomic weapons out of the hands of terrorists. U.S. President Barack Obama, his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev and leaders from more than 40 nations set out the goals in a communiqué at the conclusion of a two-day nuclear security summit in Seoul.

Countries will accelerate swapping out high-enriched uranium, the key ingredient in nuclear bombs, for low-enriched uranium at research facilities vulnerable to sabotage or attack, according to the non-binding document. The leaders promised to share more information on smuggling and atomic stockpiles. They first pledged to clean up loose material in 2010.

“I would not characterize these as small steps,” U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu said today at a press briefing in the South Korean capital. “We are working very aggressively. There’s actually a lot of action happening. The world is actually becoming a more secure place.”

The six-page communiqué, drafted over the course of a year by nuclear envoys from participating countries, focuses on steps that countries can take to secure nuclear material. Early drafts of the document showed that some nations wanted to recognize international legal agreements, like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as essential to the fight against terrorism. That language was scotched in the week before the summit convened.

The communiqué called on countries to “maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control, and to prevent non-state actors from acquiring such materials and from obtaining information or technology required to use them for malicious purposes.”

“I would have liked to hear an overall plan for improving nuclear-material security worldwide in a uniform way,” said Kenneth Luongo, who with the Department of Energy helped secure atomic material in Russia after the Soviet Union disintegrated. “We need something that’s a lot better across the board.”

Kazakhstan, Russia, and the United States said in a statement at the summit that they would finish cleaning up nuclear-weapons material from the former Soviet Union’s Semipalatinsk nuclear-bomb test site. Belgium, France, South Korea, and the United States said in a separate statement that they’re working to create new low-enriched uranium fuel.

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“The downside of multilateral negotiation is that you’re always going to devolve to the lowest common denominator,” said Miles Pomper, a senior researcher at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, in an interview today in Seoul. “The countries with the least incentive to make progress have an effective veto.”

Obama said today at the summit that there are “still too many bad actors” in the world trying to get their hands on nuclear material, which could result in a terror attack that kills large numbers of people. The U.S. leader inaugurated the first nuclear security summit in Washington DC in 2010. “These dangerous materials are still vulnerable in too many places,” he said. “It would not take much, just a handful or so of these materials, to kill hundreds of thousands of innocent people and that’s not an exaggeration, that’s the reality that we face.”

The legacy of the Soviet Union’s breakup, inadequate atomic stockpile controls and the proliferation of nuclear-fuel technology mean the world has lost precise count of atomic material, which could be used to make a weapon.

There are at least 2 million kilograms (4.4 million pounds) of stockpiled weapons-grade nuclear material left over from decommissioned bombs and atomic-fuel plants, according to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, a nonprofit Princeton, New Jersey research institute that tracks nuclear material. That’s enough to make at least 100,000 new nuclear weapons on top of the 20,000 bombs already in weapon-state stockpiles.

Some nations wanted the summit to “affirm that full and effective implementation” of nuclear treaties “has a vital role in promoting international peace and security,” according to a previous draft of the statement, which was written on February 21 and obtained by Bloomberg News.

North Korea dropped out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003 while Iran has been accused of violating its statutes by seeking an atomic-weapons capability. They didn’t attend the summit. Other nations like India, Israel and Pakistan aren’t members of the treaty and did attend.

“The scope that was agreed in this summit is a bit small,” Chang Sang Ku, president of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, who is a Korean delegate to the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, said in an interview. “But considering that security issues should be approached in collaboration with global partners, we can say that we have achieved meaningful outcomes on technical matters.”

The next summit on nuclear security will be held in the Netherlands in 2014.

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Open Skies over Russia and the NATO Countries: How to Get Rid of Fears

The Voice of Russia, 11 April 2012, <http://english.ruvr.ru>

The Treaty on Open Skies has celebrated its 20th anniversary. The military of Russia, NATO countries, and other countries continue to carry out reconnaissance flights over the territories of participating countries ... [and] the treaty remains one of the most effective means of maintaining peace.

From April 9 – 14, the U.S. reconnaissance plane OC-135B – a version of the well-known spy plane RC-135 specially adapted for optical reconnaissance, converted from a transport version of the liner Boeing B -707 – will make several flights over the territory of Russia. The plane will take off from the airfield Kubinka near Moscow, and the maximum length of its route, agreed with the Russian side, will be 5,500 km.

Almost at the same time, until April 16, Russian inspectors on board the reconnaissance plane Tu-154M Lk-1 will make several flights over the territory of the United States. The Travis airbase in California will become a temporary home for the Russian aircraft.

The next visit to the United States of the Russian aircraft is planned for the summer of 2012, and apparently, this series of flights will be the debut of a new plane Tu-214ON, the first out of two aircrafts of this type ordered by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

In the course of these operations American inspectors will be on board of Russian planes supervising the use of the equipment and surveillance systems in accordance with the existing agreements. Similarly, Russian specialists control the flights of American and other foreign planes over the territory of Russia in the framework of the Treaty on Open Skies.

This procedure has been in effect for 20 years now; the treaty was signed in March 1992; however, Russia joined the treaty only in 2001. The idea of an official exchange of reconnaissance aircrafts' visits between the [then] USSR and the United States first occurred to the U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955. According to one of the best generals of the Second World War, such an exchange would eliminate the likelihood of sudden aggression from either side.

At that time, this proposal did not meet with understanding and fell into oblivion. And the American reconnaissance aircrafts continued to fly over the territory of the USSR without any invitations until 1960, when the flight of the aircraft U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers was interrupted by the latest anti-aircraft missile complex C-75 in the sky over Sverdlovsk.

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In such circumstances it would have been strange to hope for any military agreements, and it was almost thirty years later that the talks about Open Skies began again. On March 24, 1992 27 member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) signed the Treaty on Open Skies. Later, the number of countries that have signed and ratified the treaty grew up to 34. [...]

The essence of the Treaty on Open Skies (though it is not expressed in the open) is that regular flights over the territories of one or another country make it possible to trace the development trends and to evaluate the degree of readiness of the troops. In these circumstances no movements can remain unnoticed, that permits to prevent a possible aggression. [...]

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Russian Inspectors Begin Surveillance Flight over U.S.

Ria Novosti, 08 April 2012, <http://en.rian.ru>

A group of Russian military observers begin on Sunday a nine-day inspection mission in the skies of the United States under the Treaty on Open Skies.

According to the Russian Defense Ministry, Russia's Tupolev Tu-154 LK-1 will take off on Sunday from the Travis Air Force Base, located in California, while the maximum range of the flight will total 4,250 kilometers (2,640 miles).

"Russian and U.S. experts on board the plane will monitor the implementation of agreements on the use of technical equipment for the observation," the ministry said in a statement earlier this week.

The Treaty on Open Skies, signed in 1992 at the initiative of U.S. President George H.W. Bush, established a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the territories of its 34 member states to promote openness and the transparency of military forces and activities.

The treaty entered into force on January 1, 2002 and its regime covers the national territories (land, islands, and internal and territorial waters) of all the treaty signatory states. It is an important element of the European security structure.

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20th Anniversary of Treaty on Open Skies

U.S. Department of State, 23 March 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

The Department of State welcomes the 20th anniversary of the signature of the Treaty on Open Skies on March 24, 1992.

Origin and Purpose

The Treaty on Open Skies entered into force on January 1, 2002, and currently has 34 States Parties. The treaty establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its participants. The treaty is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information about areas of concern to them. Open Skies is one of the most wide-ranging international efforts to date to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities.

The original concept of mutual aerial observation was proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955 and the treaty concept was re-introduced as a multilateral initiative of President George H.W. Bush in 1989. The treaty was negotiated by the then-members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and was signed in Helsinki, Finland, on March 24, 1992. The treaty has been in effect for a decade, following an extended provisional period of application. Since 2002, States Parties have successfully conducted over 840 observation flights over each other's territory.

Since signature of the Open Skies Treaty in 1992, the security environment in Europe has changed significantly. The Open Skies Treaty continues to contribute to European security by enhancing openness and transparency among the Parties.

Membership

The 34 States Parties to the Open Skies Treaty are: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and United States. Kyrgyzstan has signed but not yet ratified. The treaty depositaries are Canada and Hungary.

The treaty is of unlimited duration and is open to accession by other States. States of the former Soviet Union which have not already become States Parties to the treaty may accede to it at any time. Applications from other interested States are subject to a consensus decision by the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC), the Vienna-based organization charged with



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facilitating implementation of the treaty, to which all States Parties belong. Eight states have acceded to the treaty since entry into force: Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Estonia, and Lithuania. One application for accession is pending before the OSCE.

Basic Elements of the Treaty

Territory: The Open Skies regime covers the territory over which the State Party exercises sovereignty, including land, islands, and internal and territorial waters. The treaty specifies that the entire territory of a State Party is open to observation. Observation flights may only be restricted for reasons of flight safety, not for reasons of national security.

Aircraft: Observation aircraft may be provided by either the observing Party or by the observed Party (the "taxi option"), at the latter's choice. All Open Skies aircraft and sensors must pass specific certification and preflight inspection procedures to ensure that they are compliant with treaty standards. Certified Open Skies aircraft include:

- Bulgaria An-30
- Hungary An-26
- POD Group C-130 (Benelux, Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain)
- Romania An-30
- Russian Federation An-30 and TU-154
- Sweden Saab-340
- Turkey Casa CN-235
- Ukraine An-30
- United States OC-135B

Sensors: Open Skies aircraft may have video, optical panoramic and framing cameras for daylight photography, infrared sensors for a day/night capability, and synthetic aperture radar for a day/night, all weather capability. Photographic image quality will permit recognition of major military equipment (e.g., permit a State Party to distinguish between a tank and a truck), thus allowing significant transparency of military forces and activities.

Technology advancements have made film cameras increasingly obsolete and, consequently, the United States is actively preparing for the transition to digital electro-optical sensors. Sensor categories may be added and capabilities improved by agreement among States Parties. All equipment used in Open Skies must be commercially available to all participants in the regime.

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Quotas: Each State Party is obligated to receive a certain number of observation flights, i.e., its passive quota. Each State Party may conduct as many observation flights – i.e., its active quota – as its passive quota. The Russian Federation and the United States each have an annual passive quota of 42, while the other States Parties have quotas of 12 or fewer. The Parties negotiate the annual distribution of the active quotas each October for the following calendar year. Around 100 observation flights are conducted each year. Typically, the United States receives 6-8 observation flights from Russia each year, while we conduct 14-16 flights in Russia.

Data Sharing/Availability: Imagery collected from Open Skies missions is available to any State Party upon request, with the cost being covered by the requesting party. As a result, each State Party may obtain more data than it actually collects under the treaty quota system.

Implementation of the Treaty

In June 2010, the United States chaired the Second Review Conference for the treaty, at which all States Parties confirmed their commitment to full treaty implementation. The United States considers the Open Skies Treaty to be a key element of our Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The broad cooperation by all treaty Parties, especially in sharing observation flights, is but one hallmark of the treaty's success. Future implementation depends on the sustainability of the aircraft fleet and transition to digital sensors. Enhanced cooperation among States in this area is under consideration in the OSCC.

The OSCC continues to address modalities for conducting observation missions and other implementation issues. The OSCC has monthly plenary meetings during three several-month sessions each year. The OSCC has several informal working groups that take up technical issues related to sensors, notification formats, aircraft certification and rules and procedures.

The OSCC main functions are to:

- consider questions relating to compliance with the treaty;
- seek to resolve ambiguities and differences of interpretation that emerge during treaty implementation;
- consider and decide on applications for accession to the treaty; and
- review the distribution of active quotas annually.

The OSCC was established by Article X and Annex L of the treaty, and has been in session since treaty signature in March 1992. The OSCC takes decisions by consensus, and has adopted 160 Decisions since its inception. OSCC Decisions enter into force with the treaty and have the same duration as the treaty.

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Arms Control Inspectors Conduct Verification at Military Units of Azerbaijan

U.S. Defense Professionals, 12 April 2012, <https://www.defpro.com>

From April 11 – 15 inspectors of the Arms Control Section of the Lithuanian Armed Forces together with colleagues from Turkey and Hungary paid a visit to military units of Azerbaijan where inspection of a designated area was conducted under the regulations of the Vienna Document 2011 of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The military experts group under Lithuanian lead will be responsible for inspecting Azerbaijan's military units.

On the basis of last year's update of the Vienna Document, each OSCE member has a right to verify if another member does not undertake illegitimate military activities that should be subject to prior notification, and does not maintain undeclared military capabilities.

The Vienna Document binds parties to the agreement to render information on an annual basis about their national armed forces, plans of developing defense capabilities and defense budget as well as to notify in advance on the planned military activities. The parties also commit to receive in their territories a set number of inspections and visits from other countries' military experts to national military units.

As it was asserted by arms control experts of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, familiarization with the reform of Azerbaijan's armed forces, modernization of weaponry and a chance to assess changes ongoing in the country is useful.

This year this will be the second Lithuania's inspection according to the 2011 November update of the Vienna Document where the essential change embedded is the form of information exchange among OSCE countries. This year arms control inspector of the Lithuanian Armed Forces took part in an evaluation visit with A Canadian inspectors' team in Kazakhstan.

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