



# BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



22 May – 05 June 2012

**DTRA**

## ARMS CONTROL (GENERAL)

### **Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller at Arms Control Association Annual Meeting**

*U.S. Department of State, 05 June 2012, <http://www.state.gov>*

I don't want to sing the same old song today or list the standard metaphors about setting a stage, building a foundation or taking the first steps. In the simplest terms, what I would like to make clear is that the President set an agenda in Prague and we have made progress, achieving some great successes along the way. (2,417 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Remarks by Special Envoy Tauscher at Missile Defense Conference**

*U.S. Department of State, 30 May 2012, <http://www.state.gov>*

I am honored to be back here, at [the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)], speaking about my favorite topic, missile defense. I would like to discuss some of the areas where we still need to make progress on missile defense. Let me start with the recent announcement at Chicago of an "interim missile defense capability." (1,404 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **Russia Successfully Tests New Missile to Counter U.S. Shield**

*The New York Times, 23 May 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com>*

Russia's military reported a successful test on Wednesday of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile that generals said was designed to overpower the American missile defense system. (669 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

### **Libya Sets Schedule for Eliminating Chemical Weapons**

*Global Security Newswire, 31 May 2012, <http://www.nti.org/gsn>*

Libya expects to resume chemical weapons disposal next year and to finish off its remaining stockpile of mustard agent and precursor materials by 2016, a spokesman for a key international arms control organization said on Thursday. (508 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **74 Percent of Declared Chemical Weapons Destroyed**

*Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 22 May 2012, <http://www.opcw.org>*

OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü visited Glasgow on May 21-22, 2012 where he attended the 15th and final international Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference. (376 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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## CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) (CONT'D)

### **Blue Grass Army Depot 50 Percent Complete**

*The Richmond Register*, 21 May 2012, <http://www.richmondregister.com>

The chemical weapons destruction plant being built at the Blue Grass Army Depot is more than 51 percent complete, project officials said Monday. (410 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

### **New START Aggregate Numbers**

*U.S. Department of State*, 01 June 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Data in this fact sheet comes from the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty. It contains data declared current as of March 1, 2012. Data will be updated each six month period after entry into force of the Treaty. (228 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

### **U.S. Conducts Five more Nuclear Audits in Russia under New START**

*Global Security Newswire*, 22 May 2012, <http://www.nti.org/gsn>

The head of the Russian strategic missile forces said units under his management have undergone five U.S. audits since last December, Interfax reported on Monday. (184 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

## FULL TEXT OF BI-WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:



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## Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller at Arms Control Association Annual Meeting

U.S. Department of State, 05 June 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, at the Arms Control Association, June 4, 2012

I know many of you have heard me speak at least a few times since I joined the Administration. I don't want to sing the same old song today or list the standard metaphors about setting a stage, building a foundation or taking the first steps. In the simplest terms, what I would like to make clear is that the President set an agenda in Prague and we have made progress, achieving some great successes along the way. We are approaching the lowest levels of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age. This coming fall will mark the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis. We have come so far since then and we are now doing the work that will lead to the next set of accomplishments.

### New START

I understand the subject of New START came up in the first panel this morning, so you are familiar with the basics. The implementation of New START is going very well. In particular, our experience during the first year of treaty implementation demonstrates that the treaty's verification regime works, and is providing the predictability and mutual confidence that it promised. Mutual trust and confidence will be crucial to any future nuclear reduction plans.

We are now working on the next steps along the path we set out on in Prague. As part of the implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. government is reviewing our nuclear deterrence requirements and nuclear plans to ensure that they are aligned to address today's threats. We are considering what forces the United States needs to maintain for strategic stability and deterrence, including extended deterrence and assurance to U.S. allies and partners. Based on this analysis, we will develop proposals for potential further reductions in our nuclear stockpile, which currently stands at approximately 5,000 total warheads.

As the President said recently at the second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, "we can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need." Once complete, this study of our deterrence requirements will help shape our negotiating approach to the next agreement with Russia.

Regardless of numbers, the President has stressed that the next nuclear reductions agreement between the United States and Russia should include strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. Of course, no previous arms control agreement has limited or monitored

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these kinds of weapons and the lower the numbers go, the more important it will be that we have confidence in declared numbers. We are going to need new, more demanding approaches to verification and monitoring, but I am confident we can find ways to overcome these challenges.

Beyond responsibly reducing the number of nuclear weapons, this Administration has been committed to reducing their role in our national security strategy as well. We are not developing new nuclear weapons; we are not pursuing new nuclear missions; we are working toward creating the conditions to make deterring nuclear use the sole purpose of our nuclear weapons; and we have clearly stated that it is in our interest and the interest of all other states that the more than 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever.

### *Deterrence and Defense Posture Review*

Recently, we worked through nuclear policy issues with our NATO allies. At the NATO Summit, allies approved the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) which identified the appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces that NATO will need to deter and defend against future threats to the alliance.

Focusing on the nuclear elements of the DDPR, the allies reaffirmed their commitment to seek to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, while remaining a nuclear Alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. The review found that the Alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture, and that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons may be contemplated are extremely remote. The Alliance acknowledged the importance the independent and unilateral U.S., British, and French Negative Security Assurances in discouraging nuclear proliferation.

Looking to the future, allies reiterated that NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia. Leaders agreed that the NAC should issue two related taskings to appropriate NATO committees: 1) to develop concepts for ensuring the broadest possible burden-sharing, including in the event NATO decides to further reduce its reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe; and 2) to further consider what NATO would expect to see in the way of reciprocal Russian actions to allow for significant reductions in forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.



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NATO expressed its support for continued mutual efforts by the United States and Russia to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their nuclear weapons. The allies also reiterated their interest in developing and exchanging transparency and confidence-building ideas with Russia with the goal of developing detailed proposals on, and increasing mutual understanding of, NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.

The DDPD clearly reaffirmed the important role that arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation play in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The allies acknowledged that both the success and failure of such efforts can have a direct impact on the threat environment of NATO and therefore affect the Alliance's deterrence and defense posture.

### *Conventional Arms Control*

We are also spending a lot of time focused on conventional arms control and its role in enhancing European security. There are three conventional regimes that play key roles in European security: the Open Skies Treaty, the Vienna Document (2011) and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Each regime is important and contributes to security and stability in a unique way. When they work in harmony, the result is greater confidence for all of Europe.

Today, the conventional arms control regime is facing challenges. Unfortunately, Russia ceased implementation of its CFE obligations in December 2007, refusing to accept inspections or provide information to other CFE parties on its military forces as required by the treaty. After trying for several years to overcome the obstacles and encourage Russia to resume implementation, we concluded we can no longer implement the treaty with Russia while it shirks its obligations. In late 2011, the United States, joined by the 21 NATO allies that are party to the treaty, as well as Georgia and Moldova, ceased carrying out certain obligations under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia.

The cessation of implementation of CFE with regard to Russia by 24 of 30 States-Parties gives us an opportunity to consider the current security architecture, our future needs and the types of arms control measures that will help achieve our security goals. NATO allies reaffirmed in the Chicago Summit Declaration our determination "to preserve, strengthen and modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, and continue to explore ideas to this end." We must modernize conventional arms control to take account of current security concerns. I have been meeting with my European counterparts,



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soliciting their views on key objectives and basic principles for the way ahead, with the goal of informing our own review of these issues in Washington. Moving forward together, we can arrive at solutions that best serve the security interests of the United States and our NATO allies, and indeed of all the countries of Europe.

## *Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty*

Let's turn now to multilateral treaties. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the Administration and a key element of the President's Prague agenda. As we continue laying the groundwork for U.S. ratification, we remain optimistic about the prospects for the CTBT's entry into force, albeit mindful that achieving that goal will require considerable effort from us and from all of us.

An effectively verified CTBT is central to leading towards a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons and reduced nuclear competition. As such, the United States remains committed to the completion of the treaty's monitoring regime. The International Monitoring System (IMS) is now more than 85 percent complete and, once completed, will provide global coverage to detect and identify nuclear explosive tests conducted in violation of the treaty. Development of the on-site inspection component is a priority task of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and we will be assessing its progress during the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise.

Since 2011, in addition to our annual assessment, our extra-budgetary contributions to the CTBTO have totaled over \$40 million. Given the tough budget climate in Washington, those contributions clearly demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the treaty and the vital importance the United States attaches to completing the verification regime.

## *FMCT*

We are also continuing our fight to launch the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Such a treaty is considered to be, by the majority of the international community, the next step in the process of multilateral nuclear disarmament. We have worked closely with a number of countries to achieve the start of FMCT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Creative and insightful ideas on how to move forward have been deployed in Geneva, to no avail. We are very disappointed in the results so far. The current blockage over FMCT is a formidable one. Each attempt to overcome the impasse makes this clearer. Certain countries must engage substantively, constructively and frequently on FMCT. Without that, no



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process – be it in the CD, on its margins or outside of it – can make real progress. This is a leadership requirement, as well as a practical one. Countries most affected by an FMCT are the key stakeholders, the countries that need to be the most active, the most determined in an effort to achieve such a regime.

Although we will continue our efforts in the CD, we are also continuing to consult among the P5 and with other key stakeholders on ways forward for FMCT. Our most recent meeting was in London in April, and we're making plans to meet this summer. We are not making headlines right now, but the states participating are invested in the process, which is a good sign, and gradually we are making progress.

## *P5 Process*

In addition to working on the FMCT, the P5 have been meeting regularly to review our progress toward fulfilling our commitments under the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference's Action Plan. This process is a venue to bolster the long-standing U.S.-Russia nuclear disarmament interaction with an ongoing process of P5 engagement on issues related to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

During P5 conferences and ongoing P5 meetings, we have covered verification, transparency, confidence-building, and nonproliferation, which are important for establishing a firm foundation for further disarmament efforts. For example, at the 2011 Paris P5 Conference, the P5 reaffirmed their unconditional support for the NPT, reaffirmed the commitments set out in the 2010 NPT Action Plan, stressed the need to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and worked in pursuit of their shared goal of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.

Following up on the 2009 London and 2011 Paris P5 conferences, the United States will host a P5 conference in Washington June 27 to 29. The United States looks forward to having in-depth and candid discussions on a variety of issues with our P5 counterparts during the conference.

We also look forward to hosting a public event as part of the Washington Conference. It is titled "Three Pillars for Peace and Security: Implementing the NPT." The event will focus on the mutually reinforcing nature of the three NPT pillars and examine how all three are essential to create the conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons.



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## *Needs Document*

As we move ahead on all these fronts, we will need your help. It is not just on the advocacy level; we also need your creativity and your ideas. As I mentioned before, reducing to lower levels of all kinds of weapons will require that we push past the current limits of our verification and monitoring capabilities.

Whether we're trying to monitor missile launches, count nuclear warheads, or detect and characterize an unexplained biological "event", we need ever-improving tools and technologies. State's Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC) works very hard to be on the cutting edge of new technology – not merely for the sake of being on the cutting edge, but because we know that is where we can best leverage the small budget we have for developing these capabilities. It is because of this need for new technology that I am particularly proud to announce that we have for the first time made available to the public our Verification Technology Research and Development Needs document.

This document is a catalog of sorts, telling the R&D community what we believe are our most pressing technology needs to answer the arms control questions of the future. Now, with the publicly available document, we can expand our community of developers beyond the "usual suspects" of the military and national laboratories. To a certain extent, the needs document is a think piece – we hope it will stimulate some thinking out there. It's easy to find, too. Simply go to the AVC Bureau's VTT page or go to the FedBizOps website and type "V Fund" as your search term: it should pop right up for you.

## *Conclusion*

I also encourage all of you and your organizations to pursue opportunities for Track 1.5 and Track 2 engagement policies. We should not undervalue the results of this approach. Many of the ideas that went into New START came out of such efforts in the years preceding the actual negotiations. And I have appreciated the role of ACA and many of the organizations represented here as we prepare for negotiation in July of an Arms Trade Treaty, to regulate international trade in conventional arms.

Now I want to leave you with a final thought. It is not every day that you think about President Calvin Coolidge as a source of inspiration, but there is one quote that always sticks in my mind:



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Nothing in the world can take the place of Persistence. Talent will not; nothing is more common than unsuccessful men with talent. Genius will not; unrewarded genius is almost a proverb. Education will not; the world is full of educated derelicts. Persistence and determination alone are omnipotent. The slogan "Press On" has solved and always will solve the problems of the human race.

We have no easy task ahead of us, but we must press on. We have far to go and there are problems that we cannot anticipate, but make no mistake, the arc of nuclear history is bending towards zero. Thanks again and I look forward to your questions.

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## Remarks by Special Envoy Tauscher at Missile Defense Conference

U.S. Department of State, 30 May 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Remarks by Ellen Tauscher, Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defense, at the 2012 RUSI Missile Defense Conference, London, United Kingdom

I am honored to be back here, at [the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)], speaking about my favorite topic, missile defense. [...] Let me acknowledge some of my colleagues that are in attendance today. Without their support and cooperation, much of the progress we have made on these issues would not have been possible. I want to acknowledge Bogdan Aurescu, who will speak to this group a little later. It was a tremendous honor to work with him so closely in Romania. I also want to mention Ambassador Daalder and Madelyn Creedon. Madelyn and I did a similar routine at the Moscow missile defense conference earlier this month.

This conference is particularly well timed, coming just one week after the NATO summit in Chicago. Instead of just giving my typical ... missile defense speech, I would like to discuss some of the areas where we still need to make progress on missile defense. Let me start with the recent announcement at Chicago of an “interim missile defense capability.”

The progress on missile defense is remarkable given that NATO only made its decision to develop a territorial ballistic missile defense capability 18 months ago. In that year-and-a-half period, the United States and our NATO allies have achieved an operationally significant peacetime ballistic missile defense capability.

That means that NATO now has its first missile defense radar, its first interceptors, a single commander, and a NATO command and control system for ballistic missile defense. This progress was only possible because our NATO allies embraced President Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is focused on protecting our European allies and deployed U.S. forces against the existing ballistic missile threats.

It has been a great privilege for me to have worked so closely with all of our allies over the last couple of years to reach this point, especially my colleagues in Poland, Romania, Spain, and Turkey. Because of their support and leadership, for which we are incredibly grateful, we were able to reach agreement on the basing of our missile defense assets in Europe.

As you know, last September, we made three big announcements. First, Turkey agreed to host the Phase 1 ANTPY-2 radar. Second, we signed the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement [BMDA] with Romania to host the Phase 2 land-based SM-3 site. Third, the U.S.-Poland agreement for the Phase 3 land-based site entered into force as well. And then a few weeks



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later in early October, Spain agreed to serve as a home port for four Aegis destroyers. As we like to say in the United States....

We also appreciate the other contributions by our NATO allies to this effort. Our NATO allies will contribute more than \$1 billion dollars in NATO Common Funding to the ALTBMD command and control system. The Netherlands has indicated that it will spend close to 250 million Euros to modify the radars on its frigates to detect and track ballistic missiles at long ranges and contribute its Patriot missiles to NATO missile defense.

Germany is also exploring developing an airborne infrared sensor. France has proposed a concept for a shared early warning satellite. There is much that our allies can contribute to NATO's developing missile defense system.

Of course, the announcement in Chicago is just an initial but important step in implementing NATO's territorial ballistic missile defense capability. The Obama administration is committed to working with NATO on these efforts and deploying all four phases of the EPAA as our voluntary national contribution. For our part, much work remains to be done on the systems that the United States will deploy as potential contributions to NATO missile defense, but considerable work has already begun.

Just look at the President's budget request for fiscal year 2013. Even in a constrained budget environment, the United States has protected the funding for the European Phased Adaptive Approach. These actions are a clear demonstration of the United States' continued commitment to European security and our Article 5 obligations.

At the same time as we are working with our NATO allies, there is a tremendous opportunity to develop a meaningful strategic partnership with Russia in the area of missile defense cooperation. Missile defense cooperation can achieve two very important objectives. First, it would allow Russia to see with its own eyes what we are doing on missile defense and it will give us time to demonstrate how our systems operate. It will allow Russia to see that the European Phased Adaptive Approach is not directed against Russia, but limited regional threats from outside of Europe... not Russia. Second, it could give the United States, NATO, and Russia the opportunity to forge a true strategic partnership that enhances security for all.

I realize it takes time to build confidence. But, we have that time. There are six years before we deploy Phase 3 in the 2018 timeframe. We should use that time positively on cooperation and not confrontation. Russia should come inside the missile defense cooperation tent and see what



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we are doing. During that time, we will be testing an Aegis BMD site in Hawaii. We will be developing and testing the SM-3 Block IIA interceptors. Russia has also observed our intercept tests in the past and the invitation to observe a future test still stands.

We will also be working with our NATO allies to ensure how to best protect NATO European populations and territory. At the same time, the U.S., NATO and Russia can work together on a broad range of cooperation: Sharing sensor data, working on developing common pre-planned responses, conducting a joint analysis of missile defense systems, and working together on missile defense exercises.

The United States and NATO have been transparent about our missile defense programs. We have provided Russia with a number of ideas and approaches for transparency and we are also committed to discussing other approaches to building confidence between our two countries.

At Chicago, NATO allies made a very clear statement of our intent. NATO declared in the Chicago Summit Declaration "...the NATO missile defense in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO missile defense is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities."

And, as I have told my Russian colleagues, if Russia doesn't like what it has learned throughout this period of cooperation, then it can terminate cooperation at any point. But that means getting Russia inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the U.S. and NATO, while we are in the initial phases of deploying this capability. It will take time and effort to build the trust that is currently lacking on this issue.

But let me be clear. While we can work cooperatively together, we cannot agree to the pre-conditions outlined by the Russian government. We are committed to deploying effective missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland and our allies and partners around the world from the proliferation of ballistic missiles. We will not agree to limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense systems. We cannot agree to any "criteria," that would, in effect, limit our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems that will protect us against regional threats such as Iran and North Korea.

If we can work together on European missile defense, and make this a subject for cooperation rather than competition, that would be a game-changer for our security relationship. We understand that there are risks involved, and it takes courage to move away from decades long default positions and long-held positions. We believe those risks are manageable.



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The alternative is competition, something none of us can afford or want. So we will keep working to see if we can come up with a plan for cooperation. We will continue to press in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Joint Staff channels. We will keep moving forward in the run up to the June G-20 meeting between Presidents Obama and Putin, and we will keep going long after that. Thank you again for the opportunity to speak here at this impressive gathering of experts. I look forward to answering any questions you might have.

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## Russia Successfully Tests New Missile to Counter U.S. Shield

*The New York Times*, 23 May 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com>

Russia's military reported a successful test on Wednesday of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile that generals said was designed to overpower the American missile defense system.

Russian generals told news agencies that the missile's development was a direct response to the American plans for a shield. The rocket, one unidentified military source told Interfax, uses a new type of fuel to shorten the time it needs to launch into space, increasing its ability to evade interceptors. One Russian news portal said the rocket was called the "Avant-garde."

Whatever its military significance, the launching, as with other prominently announced tests, seemed intended as much to deliver a political message as show the rocket's ability to streak across Russia and hit a target on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

Gen. Viktor Yesin, a retired rocket forces commander, told Interfax that the rocket was emblematic of the type of arms race Russia was ready to embark on if the United States went through with plans to put missile interceptors in Europe.

"This is one of the technical means Russia's political and military leadership designed to answer America's global system of missile defense," General Yesin said. Russian officials have threatened for years that they would bulk up on new intercontinental ballistic missiles, within the limits of arms control treaties, in an effort to overpower the American system, and that it could look like a new arms race.

Russia launched the missile four days after leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, meeting in Chicago, confirmed their commitment to building the European missile shield, rendering the blastoff something of a Russian retort.

In Washington, Jamie F. Mannina, a State Department spokesman, said Russia had complied with its treaty obligations to notify the United States of the launching.

"Russia is currently testing a new ICBM as permitted under the New Start treaty," he said. "Russia's development of such systems that employ countermeasures would not trigger any arms race with the United States since the U.S. missile defense systems are not being developed or deployed to counter or undermine Russia's strategic nuclear forces."



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The test on Wednesday took on added political significance coming two weeks after Vladimir V. Putin assumed the presidency for a third term. In another worrying sign for relations between Russia and the United States, Mr. Putin canceled a visit to the United States for a summit meeting of the Group of 8 nations last weekend at Camp David in Maryland.

Russia's objection to the missile defense plan has touched the American presidential race. Mitt Romney, the presumptive Republican candidate, has criticized Mr. Obama as trying to soothe Russia's concerns through the détente known as the reset.

Like the Bush administration before it, the Obama administration insists that the defensive system is not directed against Russia, but instead at emerging threats from Iran or North Korea. American officials under both presidents have noted that Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, now estimated at more than 2,400 warheads, could easily overcome the planned system with its limited number of interceptors.

Russian officials say they remain unconvinced by the American assurances, and Mr. Putin has called for the production of new missile systems to be doubled in 2013. But development of weapons designed to be able to overcome defense systems has been slow and has faced costly failures. Russia's civilian space rockets have also crashed recently. Analysts cite overall post-Soviet decay in the aerospace supply chain, as small factories making specialized parts have closed.

The missile launched on Wednesday is not entirely new, the Gazeta.ru news Web site and other Russian media reported. It is an upgrade of an existing model of land-based rocket the Russian military has been testing for years, called the Topol, or Poplar.

In 2007, during an earlier period of tension between Russia and the United States over American plans to set up antimissile sites in Eastern Europe, the Russian military also announced the launching of the Yars missile, an upgrade to the Topol, also said to be designed to penetrate missile defenses.

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## Libya Sets Schedule for Eliminating Chemical Weapons

*Global Security Newswire*, 31 May 2012, <http://www.nti.org/gsn>

Libya expects to resume chemical weapons disposal next year and to finish off its remaining stockpile of mustard agent and precursor materials by 2016, a spokesman for a key international arms control organization said on Thursday.

The 41-state Executive Council to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) approved Tripoli's detailed demilitarization plan earlier this month, according to OPCW spokesman Michael Luhan. The document was demanded last year when it became clear Libya would not meet the April 29, 2012, deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention for eliminating the arsenal.

The government of former dictator Muammar Qadhafi joined the convention in 2004. The accord prohibits member nations from developing, manufacturing, storing or using chemical warfare materials, and requires destruction of any existing arsenals.

Libya had neutralized 54 percent of its declared holding of roughly 25 metric tons of sulfur mustard agent, and 40 percent of nearly 1,400 metric tons of precursor chemicals, when technical difficulties halted disposal operations in February 2011.

The uprising that ultimately toppled Qadhafi began a short time later, while the malfunctioning mobile neutralization facility at the Ruwagha installation in southeastern Libya remained inactive. The nation's new leadership quickly pledged upon taking power last year to complete the work started by its predecessor.

"The destruction facility in Libya has been repaired, but additional infrastructure work and security arrangements must be completed by the Libyan authorities before OPCW inspectors can be deployed on-site and destruction operations resumed," Luhan told *Global Security Newswire* by e-mail.

Hundreds of previously unknown munitions filled with mustard agent were found in the wake of Qadhafi's fall, along with a limited amount of the blistering substance held in storage.

"In November 2011 and February 2012, the new Libyan government declared additional quantities of Category 1 and Category 3 chemical weapons to the OPCW. The newly declared weapons include several hundred munitions loaded with sulfur mustard agent, together with a few hundred kilograms of sulfur mustard stored in plastic containers," according to Luhan.



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"Altogether, this brings to about 13 metric tons the quantity of Category 1 chemical weapons that remain to be destroyed, a process we estimate should be completed within six months after destruction activities resume."

Ahmet Üzümcü, OPCW director general, was in Tripoli on Sunday and Monday for talks with officials including Libyan Foreign Minister Ashour Saad Ben Khaia and Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Muhammad Abdul Aziz.

"The meetings were marked by productive discussions on Libya's planning and preparations to complete the destruction of its remaining stockpile of chemical weapons," according to an OPCW release issued on Wednesday. "The director general praised the transparency and openness demonstrated by the Libyan government and welcomed their constructive and cooperative approach."

"The Libyan authorities have reaffirmed their commitment to eradicate the remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons in the shortest possible time, and expressed appreciation for the support of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and assistance provided by some OPCW states parties," according to the release. "Both sides agreed to continue to coordinate closely on these operations and to work with other OPCW states parties."

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## 74 Percent of Declared Chemical Weapons Destroyed

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 22 May 2012, <http://www.opcw.org>  
OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü visited Glasgow on May 21-22, 2012 where he attended the 15th and final international Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation (CWD) Conference, hosted by the UK's Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL).

The CWD conferences have been held annually around the world since 1998. This year's final event marked the passing of the April 29, 2012 deadline for possessors of chemical weapons to eliminate their stockpiles, and celebrated the global progress in chemical weapons destruction. The conference attracted more than 170 delegates from 16 countries and featured more than 90 prominent speakers, including the UK Minister of State for Armed Forces, Mr. Nick Harvey.

Discussions in the conference included a long-term review of the progress made by national CWD programs, focusing on successes, lessons learned and an exchange of best practices. Participants also looked at explosive detonation technology – given that many countries' plans are now to acquire such equipment – as well as at chemical safety and security, recovery of chemical weapons from rivers and seas, and innovative technologies

In his address to the conference, Director-General Üzümcü reported that nearly three-quarters of all declared chemical weapons have now been destroyed under OPCW verification since entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. Although this fell short of the final extended deadline, he said the decision of the States Parties on this issue fully preserved the integrity of the Convention and that the three concerned possessor states have submitted detailed plans to the OPCW for destroying their remaining arsenals, together with planned completion dates. In the specific case of Libya, he stated that a number of States Parties have considered providing assistance to enable the government to destroy its remaining stockpile, and that Canada has provided a large sum for this purpose under the Global Partnership Program.

The Director-General also reported that of the 70 former chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) that have been declared in total by 13 States Parties, 43 have been irreversibly destroyed and 21 converted for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. He added that all converted production facilities remain under systematic verification by the OPCW for a 10-year period following conversion to ensure they are fully consistent with the approved conversion requests.

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## Blue Grass Army Depot 50 Percent Complete

*The Richmond Register*, 21 May 2012, <http://www.richmondregister.com>

The chemical weapons destruction plant being built at the Blue Grass Army Depot is more than 51 percent complete, project officials said Monday. And, one of the plant's key components, called the rocket-cutting machine, recently was approved for shipment to the depot from its fabrication site in Pasco, Washington.

"This is a significant milestone," said Tom McKinney, project manager for Bechtel Parsons Blue Grass, the contractor building and eventually operating the destruction plant. "The rocket-cutting machine is specifically designed for this project," McKinney said. "Successfully demonstrating the machine's capabilities during factory testing provides confidence the machine will perform during plant operations."

The remotely controlled cutting machine will separate rocket motors from their warheads during plant operations. The rocket warhead, which contains the agent and explosive components (energetics), will be further processed to destroy the chemical agent and energetics, McKinney explained.

The machine will reside inside one of the plant's munitions demilitarization building's blast-proof rooms behind steel-laced concrete walls that measure more than two-feet thick. An automated process will remove the weapons' energetics and chemical agents for destruction in separate processes in the building.

"This achievement is another indication that we are steadily moving forward to safely destroy the Blue Grass chemical weapons stockpile," said Jeff Brubaker, the Defense Department's site manager for the project.

"The agent and energetics neutralization equipment and the equipment to thermally decontaminate the remaining metal parts have already been successfully installed in the plant. The rocket-cutting machine is the first large machine built specifically designed to take the munitions apart so that their energetics and agent can be safely removed for neutralization."

Approval for the machine's shipment came after what officials called a rigorous two-year long fabrication and testing period. The testing involved having the machine disassemble more than 2,600 mock rockets. The cutting machine is made of more than 12,000 customized components designed and fabricated by Bechtel Parsons Blue Grass, McKinney said.



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The rocket-cutting machine is the seventh of 11 large pieces of equipment specifically designed, fabricated, and successfully tested as components for the plant that will neutralize chemical agents and then break down the resulting hydrolysate via a process called supercritical water oxidation.

The remaining four large components are at different stages of fabrication or testing at facilities in Pasco, Washington, and San Diego, California, McKinney said. The weapons destruction plant is being built to safely and efficiently destroy the 523-ton stockpile of chemical weapons – blister and nerve agent – stored at the Army depot.

*More details about the project can be obtained from the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA] website, [www.pmacwa.army.mil](http://www.pmacwa.army.mil).*

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## New START Aggregate Numbers

U.S. Department of State, 01 June 2012, <http://www.state.gov>

Data in this fact sheet comes from the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty. It contains data declared current as of March 1, 2012. Data will be updated each six month period after entry into force of the Treaty.

Category of Data	United States of America	Russian Federation
Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers	812	494
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers	1737	1492
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers	1040	881

### United States of America Data

Effective Date: March 1, 2012

ICBMs and ICBM Launchers	MM-III	PK	Total
Deployed ICBMs	449	0	449
Non-deployed ICBMs	266	58	324
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs	506	51	557
Deployed Launchers of ICBMs	449	0	449
Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs	57	51	108
Test Launchers	6	1	7



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## United States of America Data Effective Date: March 1, 2012

SLBMs and SLBM Launchers	Trident II	Total
Deployed SLBMs	241	241
Non-deployed SLBMs	181	181
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs	336	336
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	241	241
Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs	95	95
Test Launchers	0	0

Heavy Bombers	B-2A	B-52G	B-52H	Total
Deployed Heavy Bombers	11	36	75	122
Non-deployed Heavy Bombers	9	0	16	25
Test Heavy Bombers	1	0	2	3
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-nuclear Armaments	0	0	0	0

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## **U.S. Conducts Five more Nuclear Audits in Russia under New START**

*Global Security Newswire*, 22 May 2012, <http://www.nti.org/gsn>

The head of the Russian strategic missile forces said units under his management have undergone five U.S. audits since last December, Interfax reported on Monday.

"The United States has done five inspections of the Russian strategic [missile] forces from December 2011 through May 2012; the inspectors have been to the Yasny (Orenburg region), Yoshkar-Ola, Teikovo (Ivanovo region) and Irkutsk missile divisions and the Serpukhov branch of the Peter the Great Academy of the Russian strategic [missile] forces," Lt. Gen. Sergei Karakayev said on Monday.

The New START treaty permits Russia and the United States to each conduct 18 audits every year of nuclear facilities operated by the other country.

The pact, which entered into force last year, requires the sides by 2018 to each reduce deployment of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, down from a cap of 2,200 mandated by this year under an older treaty. It also limits the number of fielded warhead delivery platforms to 700, with an additional 100 strategic systems permitted in reserve.

The treaty calls for the nations to regularly share quantities, siting and schematics of armament equipment and sites.

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