



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



22 March – 05 April 2010

DTRA

GENERAL ARMS CONTROL

U.S. Unveiling New, more Restrictive Nuclear Policy

Associated Press, 06 April 2010, <http://www.ap.org/>

The Obama administration is unveiling a new nuclear weapons policy that seeks to narrow the circumstances under which the United States would use such weapons while preserving long-standing assurances of nuclear protection for allies, U.S. officials said. (11,197 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Anniston Tests New Equipment for Pueblo Project

Chemical Materials Agency, 25 March 2010, <http://www.cma.army.mil/>

A new operation here is expected to have a big impact on future chemical munition disposal operations in Pueblo, Colorado. (655 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Maradykovsky Chemical Weapons Disposal Plant Not Harmful to Health

ITAR-TASS, 31 March 2010, <http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/index.html>

The Maradykovsky chemical weapons disposal plant has no negative impact on the health of the people in the Kirov region where it is located, experts from Moscow and St. Petersburg said. (1,135 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS (CCM)

UK Outlaws Cluster Bombs, Calls for Global Ban

CNN, 25 March 2010, accessed via Lexis Nexis

A law banning the use, production, and stockpiling of cluster munitions came into effect Thursday in Britain. (446 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS

Russia-IAEA Agree on Uranium Reserve for Member States

Moscow Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2010, accessed via Open Source Center

The signing ceremony of an Agreement between Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium (LEU) on Russian territory took place on March 29 at the Vienna International Center. (212 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

The NPT Review Conference as Viewed from Vienna

The State Department, 24 March 2010, <http://www.state.gov/>

Ambassador Susan F. Burk, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation

President Obama has put a strengthened NPT at the center of American diplomacy, and the United States is taking a series of steps to help achieve that goal. (1,671 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)

Key Facts about the New START Treaty

The White House, 26 March 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>

The new START treaty is organized in three tiers of increasing level of detail. The first tier is the treaty text itself. The second tier consists of a protocol to the treaty, which contains additional rights and obligations associated with treaty provisions. ...The third tier consists of technical annexes to the protocol. All three tiers will be legally binding. (484 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

"New START" Technical Annexes to Be Completed after Treaty is Signed

Global Security Newswire, 30 March 2010, <http://gsn.nti.org/>

A set of technical annexes to the new U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction treaty is to be completed only after the accord is signed next week, a senior Obama administration official said yesterday. (744 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)(CONT.)

Moscow Dispels Doubts over Russia-U.S. Arms Deal Ratification

RIA Novosti, 05 April 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/>

Moscow is convinced that the new Russia-U.S. strategic arms reduction deal to be signed in Prague on April 8 will be ratified by both countries, a Russian presidential aide said on Monday. (268 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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U.S. Unveiling New, more Restrictive Nuclear Policy

Associated Press, 06 April 2010, <http://www.ap.org/>

The Obama administration is unveiling a new nuclear weapons policy that seeks to narrow the circumstances under which the United States would use such weapons while preserving long-standing assurances of nuclear protection for allies, U.S. officials said.

It is a delicate balance that the administration will describe in a policy document, called a nuclear posture review, to be released Tuesday [April 6] following a full year of deliberation led by the Pentagon in consultation with allied governments.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and Joint Chiefs chairman Adm. Mike Mullen planned to unveil the new policy at a noon Pentagon briefing.

The document is expected to include language reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons for its national defense by narrowing potential U.S. nuclear targets. That reflects President Barack Obama's pledge to move toward a nuclear-free world, and could strengthen U.S. arguments that other countries should either reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons or forgo developing them.

The review of nuclear weapons policy is the first since 2001 and only the third since the end of the Cold War two decades ago.

The White House also planned to urge Russia to begin talks on adopting first-ever limits on shorter-range nuclear weapons, an arena in which Russia holds an advantage, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss details of the nuclear policy review prior to its release.

These would be follow-on negotiations to the newly completed "New START" treaty reducing long-range nuclear weapons—to be signed by Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Prague on Thursday.

On Tuesday, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia reserves the right to withdraw from the new treaty if it decides a U.S. missile defense shield, now planned for Romania, threatens its security.

He also said Moscow shares Obama's goal of a nuclear-free world, but other nations must join the disarmament process.

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The U.S. officials said the administration's new policy would stop short of declaring that the United States would never be the first to launch a nuclear attack, as many arms control advocates had recommended. But it would describe the weapons' purpose as "primarily" or "fundamentally" to deter or respond to a nuclear attack.

The officials said the document would say it is a U.S. goal to move toward a policy in which the "sole purpose" of nuclear weapons is to deter or respond to nuclear attack. That wording would all but rule out the use of such weapons to respond to an attack by conventional, biological, or chemical weapons. Previous U.S. policy was more ambiguous.

In an interview with The New York Times on Monday, Obama said his administration was explicitly committing not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, even if they attacked the United States with biological or chemical weapons. Those threats, he told the newspaper, could be deterred with "a series of graded options"—a combination of old and newly designed conventional weapons.

The Obama administration plans to urge Russia to return to the bargaining table following Senate ratification of the new START treaty.

The White House hopes to overcome Russia's expressed reluctance to move beyond START, especially if it means cutting Moscow's arsenal of tactical, or short-range, nuclear arms.

These so-called theater nuclear weapons play a key role in Russia's overall defense strategy and are regarded in Moscow as an important bargaining chip on security issues.

The timing of a planned U.S. push for new, broader arms talks with Russia is uncertain. But officials said the proposal would only come after U.S. and Russian legislative approval of the new START pact, which isn't expected until the end of this year.

The Russian parliament is almost certain to sign off on any deal negotiated by the Kremlin, but the U.S. Senate's ratification of the new START treaty is far from a sure thing.

Ellen Tauscher, the under secretary of state for arms control, told reporters March 29 that the administration has a "big agenda" for the next set of nuclear arms talks, and that it includes limiting short-range weapons.

Obama is hosting dozens of world leaders in a nuclear security summit in Washington next week.

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One senior administration official said the U.S. wants another round of talks between the White House and the Kremlin that would include not only short-range weapons but also so-called "non-deployed" nuclear weapons—the thousands of warheads, long-range and short-range, on both sides that are held in reserve and not ready for immediate use.

George Perkovich, a nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the Russians have a strong incentive to limit reserve weaponry because the U.S. could, in theory, quickly mount its stored warheads back onto missiles.

Russia's struggling military forces would have a harder time preparing their reserve warheads for use in the event of war.

U.S. officials believe talks on reducing stockpiled warheads could persuade Russia to negotiate limits on short-range weapons—a category of arms in which the Russians hold a large numerical advantage.

Reducing the short-range bombs and stored warheads would involve more intrusive inspections than agreed in the [new START] treaty Obama and Medvedev will sign this week. But new technologies for verifying and counting warheads could ease concerns on both sides about protecting the secrecy of their weapons designs, the officials said.

These technologies allow inspectors to verify narrow characteristics of warheads without revealing details of their structure.

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Anniston Tests New Equipment for Pueblo Project

Chemical Materials Agency, 25 March 2010, <http://www.cma.army.mil/>

A new operation here is expected to have a big impact on future chemical munition disposal operations in Pueblo, Colorado.

Monday [March 22], Anniston Chemical Activity (ANCA) employees started delivering mustard-filled 4.2-inch mortars to a building on Anniston Army Depot laid out to resemble an area of the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) under construction at Pueblo Chemical Depot, Pueblo, Colorado. At the Anniston building, a team of specially trained Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) employees started using the Linear Projectile Mortar Disassembly (LPMD) machine Tuesday [March 23] to remove explosives (fuzes and bursters) from the munitions ANCA is delivering to them.

The Anniston-based employees will collect LPMD reliability and maintenance data associated with the removal of the explosives over the course of several months. The data collected in Anniston will be analyzed and used by Pueblo-based counterparts to safely demilitarize the chemical munition stockpile in Colorado.

“We can do this important job to help our sister site in Colorado while also conducting safe operations at the ANCDF. But it is also important to know the LPMD project does not involve the transportation of any mustard-filled munitions to or from either the Alabama site or the Colorado site,” said Timothy K. Garrett, ANCDF government site project manager. He also said, “Since the Anniston mustard-filled munitions are similar to the Pueblo stockpile, the lessons learned here will be instrumental in helping the Colorado team prepare for future safe disposal operations at Pueblo Chemical Depot.”

ANCA employees are now moving mustard-filled munitions from storage igloos to the ANCDF and to the LPMD building in support of operations at both facilities. They use large, vault-like containers to safely and securely move the munitions. To date, ANCA’s Army civilian employees have made more than 8,500 safe deliveries using the containers since the first trip to the ANCDF in August 2003.

Lt. Col. Andrew M. Herbst, ANCA commander, said, “I’m excited to see the LPMD project under way. ANCA employees are eager to approach this project as an opportunity to assist our sister site, Pueblo Chemical Depot, in preparing for the start of their own munition disposal campaign.”

While ANCA employees are responsible for storing and moving chemical munitions at Anniston Army Depot, Westinghouse Anniston contractor employees are operating the ANCDF and the new LPMD. Steve Bragg is the LPMD Project Manager.

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He said, “A large number of people have worked very hard to begin operations at the LPMD and I am very thankful for their efforts. We have worked as a team to begin safe, compliant operations.”

A key component of the LPMD is a yellow, six-axis robot that is remotely operated by Bragg’s team from a nearby control room. After other employees carefully place mustard munitions on a conveyor system, the robotic machine picks up the munitions one at a time and places them at munition handling stations like those used in the older PMDs. The use of the robotic LPMD, rather than older, flat, rotary tables, is expected to improve PCAPP operations.

Locally, the explosives removed by the Alabama crew will be destroyed on Anniston Army Depot at a later date. The munitions, on the other hand, will be repackaged and returned to safe ANCA storage igloos for future disposal at the ANCDF.

Anniston LPMD operations are expected to remove the munition's energetic components, including the fuze and burster, from thousands of 4.2-inch mortars and 105mm and 155mm artillery shells during the next several months. The project does not involve the draining of any mustard agent. This week, only a relatively few mortars have been processed as local managers have scheduled a slow and deliberate ramp up of operations to ensure safe operations.

Since disposal operations began at the ANCDF in August 2003, more than 467,700 nerve agent and mustard-filled munitions (70.6 percent) have been safely demilitarized. More than 346,000 gallons (68.7 percent) of liquid nerve and mustard agents have also been processed during operations at the ANCDF.

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Maradykovsky Chemical Weapons Disposal Plant Not Harmful to Health

ITAR-TASS, 31 March 2010, <http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/index.html>

The Maradykovsky chemical weapons disposal plant has no negative impact on the health of the people in the Kirov region where it is located, experts from Moscow and St. Petersburg said.

For a year medics and environmentalists from the Federal Medial and Biological Agency and the St. Petersburg Research Institute of Hygiene, occupational Pathology, and Human Ecology monitored the environment and the health of adults and children in two districts of the Kirov region that are within the area covered by the chemical weapons disposal plant's protection measures.

"The study did not expose any impact of the facility on the environment or the health of people from different age groups. The condition of the environment in the area of the facility is satisfactory," Yelizaveta Oleinikova, a leading researcher from the St. Petersburg Research Institute of Hygiene, occupational Pathology, and Human Ecology, said.

She said the level of pollution in the area did not exceed the maximum permissible ones, which means that "the technologies used for destroying hazardous toxic agents provided for in the design fulfill the task of minimizing air pollution".

The head of the Department of Ecological Paediatrics at the Federal Medial and Biological Agency, Professor Nurali Zakirov, shared this conclusion. His specialists started working in the area in 2004, two years before the plant was commissioned. Medics travelled to the region every year to examine children and invited them to come to Moscow for examination.

"In 2005-2009, a total of 2,374 children were examined. A comparative comprehensive study before and after the commissioning of the facility did not reveal any negative changes in the illness incidence rate among children, which confirms the absence of a cause-effect connection between sickness and the operation of the Maradykovsky facility," he said.

The Maradykovsky chemical weapons disposal plant in the Kirov region is now in Phase Four of the federal chemical disarmament program. By the end of November 2009, during Phase Three, Russia had destroyed 45 percent (18,000 tonnes) of its lethal arsenals 35 days ahead of schedule. The plant then had completed the disposal of sarin and had begun disposing of yperite and lewisite mixtures.

As part of Phase Four, the plant has already destroyed 16 of 277 pieces of ammunition filled with this mixture and kept at its depots. The plant will also dispose of 266 shells filled with VX gases.

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Since its commissioning, the plant has destroyed over 4,800 tonnes of toxic agents, which make up 70 percent of chemical weapons stored at the facility. By the end of Phase Four, the plant will have disposed of over 6,900 tonnes of toxic agents kept in its arsenals since the middle of the 20th century.

"The plant is working normally in compliance with all international and Russian safety norms. Environmental monitoring data received by the regional government indicate that no specific and general industrial emissions exceeding the established levels have been registered," the head of the department of conventional problems in the regional government, Mikhail Manin, told Itar-Tass earlier.

Maradykovsky is the third Russian facility that began full-scale disposal of chemical weapons in September 2006, and the second-largest by the amount of toxic agents stored in it. Over 40,000 aerial bombs and warheads stuffed with mixtures of toxic agents had been stored in its arsenals since 1953. As of the end of 2008, the Maradykovsky facility had destroyed 4,546 tonnes of toxic agents contained in 23,473 aerial bombs, which is over 60 percent of all chemical weapons stored at the facility.

Maradykovsky became operational on September 8, 2006 and became Russia's third chemical weapons disposal plant. Over 6,900 combat nerve gases—VX, sarin, soman, and mixtures of yperite and lewisite—in over 40,000 aerial bombs and warheads had been kept there since 1953. The plant started destroying VX gases first. In accordance with international safety requirements, the bodies of 5,633 pieces of ammunition were deformed and another 1,662 shells are going through the detoxification process.

"The plant has been operating smoothly and without problems for two years. No emergencies have been reported. The safety of people and the environment is ensured by technology," the Deputy Head of the Federal Department for the Safe Storage and Disposal of Chemical Weapons, Nikolai Khlebnikov, said.

In his opinion, the work of the plant has made a significant contribution to the process of chemical disarmament and allowed Russia to complete the second stage of the federal program nine days ahead of schedule.

The plant should destroy all of the stocks by 2012. Russia plans to use seven disposal facilities during this process.

During the first stage, 400 tonnes of poison substances were eliminated by April 29, 2003, which made up 1 percent of Russia's chemical weapons (40,000 tonnes).

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In the course of Phase Two, Russia disposed of 8,000 tonnes of chemical weapons. At the facility in the village of Gorny, 1,143 tonnes were eliminated, while the facility in the village of Maradykovsky accounted for 4,500 tonnes of eliminated agents out of the scheduled 7,500 tonnes.

The chemical weapons disposal plant in Kambarka, Udmurtia, has destroyed all 6,400 tonnes of lewisite that were kept at its depots. The plant in Kambarka has been operating without failures since commissioning on March 1, 2006. Kambarka is one of the seven chemical weapons disposal plants built in Russia under a national program of chemical disarmament. It stored 6,400 tonnes of lewisite since the 1940s, which made up 15.9 percent of all toxic agents inherited by Russia from the former Soviet Union.

The Pochep site in the Bryansk region stores over 7,500 tonnes of nerve gases and plays a special role in the final stage of the federal chemical disarmament program. The site contains almost 19 percent of Russia's war gases. All of them have to be disposed of within the period of time prescribed in the Hague Convention.

The facility in the village of Leonidovka, Penza Region, will take part in implementing the program. Its first phase went on line on June 17, 2008.

The construction of the facility in the town of Shchuchye, Kurgan region, continues. Its second stage will be launched in 2010, head of the Federal Department for Safe Storage and Disposal of Chemical Weapons Valery Kapashin said.

"The Shchuchye facility is unique in terms of technology and security. It costs 19 billion rubles. The federal budget has provided 56 percent of the funds, the United States has disbursed 42 percent, and 14 Russian partners in the Global Partnership program, the European Union, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative have covered the rest," he said.

The final stage of the program envisions the destruction of 100 percent of chemical weapons by December 29, 2012. The plants in the town of Pochep, Bryansk region, and the town of Kizner, Udmurtia, will take part in the implementation of this stage.

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UK Outlaws Cluster Bombs, Calls for Global Ban

CNN, 25 March 2010, accessed via Lexis Nexis

A law banning the use, production, and stockpiling of cluster munitions came into effect Thursday in Britain. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown urged other countries to enact similar legislation, saying a global ban is needed to fight such "cruel and indiscriminate weaponry." The Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act received royal assent Thursday after it passed through both houses of Parliament.

"Cluster munitions cause immense suffering to civilians caught in conflict zones, and leave a deadly post-conflict legacy for future generations," Brown said in a statement. "I am hugely proud that with this bill receiving royal assent, Britain is leading the world in banning the use of these munitions and moving to end the harm they cause."

The act also bans direct financing of cluster munitions production. The British government has already said it plans to work with the financial sector, non-governmental organizations, and others on a voluntary code of conduct to prevent indirect financing of the weapons.

Cluster munitions, which break apart in flight to scatter hundreds of smaller bomblets, are described by the International Committee of the Red Cross as a "persistent humanitarian problem." Most of a device's bomblets are meant to explode on impact, but many do not.

Credible estimates show the weapons fail between 10 percent and 40 percent of the time, leaving civilians at risk of harm from unexploded ordnance, the ICRC says. ...In more than 20 countries, according to the ICRC, cluster bombs have created lasting "no-go" areas, rendering them as dangerous as minefields.

Britain is among 104 nations that have agreed to a treaty banning all cluster bombs. Thirty of those nations have ratified it, and Brown said he hoped passage of the new law would pave the way to U.K. ratification of the ban.

Four of the world's biggest cluster bomb makers—Russia, China, Israel, and the United States—have not signed the ban, claiming the devices are a vital part of their defense strategy.

"We want all other users and producers of these munitions around the world to follow in our footsteps," said Brown. "We want nothing less than a full global ban on cluster munitions, with all countries signing up to the international convention. There can be no place in the international community for cruel and indiscriminate weaponry such as cluster bombs."

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In addition to calling for a total, immediate ban of the weapons, the treaty calls for strong standards to protect those injured. It urges that contaminated areas be cleaned up quickly and weapons immediately destroyed, the Cluster Munition Coalition has said. The agreement, due to come into force in August, also requires the destruction of stockpiles of the weapons within eight years, the coalition has said.

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Russia-IAEA Agree on Uranium Reserve for Member States

Moscow Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2010, accessed via Open Source Center

The signing ceremony of an Agreement between Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium (LEU) on Russian territory took place on March 29 at the Vienna International Center.

The document was signed by the director general of the state atomic energy corporation Rosatom, Sergey Kiriyyenko, and IAEA director general Yukiya Amano.

The LEU reserve of 120 tons to be located as per agreement at the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk “sufficient to produce fuel for two full loads for a typical 1,000 megawatt pressurized water reactor” will be available to potential buyers in just a few months.

Those eligible will be member states of the IAEA having an agreement with the agency for the application of its safeguards to all of their peaceful nuclear activities and observing their nonproliferation undertakings.

The agreement opens the way for the establishment of an IAEA system of providing nuclear fuel supply guarantees, giving confidence to its member states in the practicability and stability of their plans to expand nuclear energy use for peaceful purposes.

Its conclusion ahead of the NPT Review Conference opening in May [in New York City] will contribute to the successful holding of this major international forum and facilitate strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

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The NPT Review Conference as Viewed from Vienna

The State Department, 24 March 2010, <http://www.state.gov/>

Ambassador Susan F. Burk, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation

At the outset, I would like to stress that the United States is not approaching the impending Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] Review Conference in any “business as usual” spirit. President Obama has put a strengthened NPT at the center of American diplomacy, and as I will note later in my comments, the United States is taking a series of steps to help achieve that goal.

I use the word “help” here very deliberately. The United States cannot realize the NPT vision on its own—it takes all of us working together, all of us setting aside stale debates and perspectives that have too often led to gridlock. As a long-time veteran of NPT debates, I firmly believe that now is the moment to rise to the challenge and opportunity placed before us by the Obama Administration’s posture on the NPT.

Toward this end, I have been very busy engaging NPT Parties to find out exactly how to do that. In the past several months I have heard a broad range of views on the NPT and on the upcoming Review Conference. Since I assumed my present position last year, my colleagues in Washington and I have met with representatives of more than 80 NPT Parties, many of which we met multiple times.

All of the meetings have been valuable in gauging the priorities and concerns of other Parties, and, of course, the meetings have also enabled us to share our government’s perspectives. One common view expressed to us that transcends whatever differences may exist among Parties is the firm conviction that the NPT is critical to the maintenance of regional and international peace and security. This, certainly, is a view that the United States strongly shares.

The Review Conference will be the occasion for all NPT Parties to focus on our common goals and reinvigorate our commitment to the core principles of the treaty. The core principles of the NPT are embedded in the treaty’s three, mutually reinforcing pillars—nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is critically important to two of the three pillars, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nonproliferation, and I want to begin by commenting on these two pillars. From the time of President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address at the United Nations in 1953, the United States has supported international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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The IAEA's core mission, from its founding in 1957, is to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity.” The United States supports the IAEA in that mission and remains the largest contributor over the history of the agency to IAEA technical cooperation. For example, ... [w]e ... take an active role in sharing our know-how on peaceful uses of nuclear techniques with scientists from all over the world who come to the United States for training.

The NPT addresses international cooperation on peaceful uses in two ways. First, Article IV acknowledges the right of NPT Parties to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes...” and goes on to state that, “[a]ll of the Parties to the treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

Second, Article IV requires the Parties to exercise that right in conformity with their NPT nonproliferation obligations, thereby reducing the risk that the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes could also be accompanied by the spread of nuclear weapons. Without a strong nonproliferation commitment, the spread of nuclear technology would be imprudent and pose a threat to international peace and security. As the treaty is phrased, however, the two pillars of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nonproliferation are inextricably linked.

The United States believes that one constructive way of addressing both of these facets of Article IV is through the development of mechanisms to assure nuclear fuel supply, such as international fuel banks. By offering additional confidence of supply beyond that provided by the market, international fuel banks have the potential to facilitate access to civil nuclear power by eliminating the need for states to invest in costly and complex fuel cycle technologies.

As President Obama said in Prague last year, “we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risk of proliferation. That must be the right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially developing countries embarking on peaceful programs.”

The United States strongly supports the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors at its November 2009 meeting to establish the first international LEU reserve at Angarsk, Russia. There will now be a guaranteed supplier of low enriched uranium for nuclear fuel available at the request of the IAEA and located in an IAEA-safeguarded facility. We look forward to further engagement with fellow Member States and the Secretariat to establish a complementary IAEA fuel bank.

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Nuclear energy as a means of generating electricity has grown over many decades. There has been even greater expansion in the applications of nuclear energy and radioactive materials in medicine, agriculture, and industry. Altogether, the advance of nuclear energy for peaceful uses has been singularly beneficial to humankind.

Interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has grown remarkably even since the last NPT Review Conference in 2005. In the past few years, more than 60 countries have signaled to the IAEA their interest in launching new nuclear power programs in the decades to come. At least a dozen states are taking concrete steps towards new nuclear energy programs. ... Today, the benefits described in Article IV are being exercised to a degree not seen in decades, if ever before.

These benefits, however, carry with them the added burden of responsibility. Newcomer states increasingly turn to the IAEA for support in training, standards and guidance to secure their facilities against all types of risks, both natural and man-made. As the IAEA lends its services in support of these newcomer states, it then becomes our responsibility as Member States to ensure the IAEA is sufficiently prepared—and sufficiently financed—to fulfill the tasks we ask it to perform.

... Institutional strength is ... key to the IAEA's role in verification. Through its safeguards mission, the IAEA carries the increasingly heavy burden of assuring the international community that nuclear energy programs are, in fact, solely peaceful. All NPT non-nuclear weapon states are required to have in force comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA. Under these agreements, the IAEA is asked to verify that states' declarations of their nuclear material in peaceful uses are both correct and complete.

We stand with Director General Amano in his appeal to the twenty-two NPT signatory states without a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force to conclude, sign, ratify, and implement their CSAs as soon as possible.

To give the IAEA the information and access it needs in order to provide real assurances about the completeness of declarations—that is, that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in a state—the IAEA developed the Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements. The model Additional Protocol gives the IAEA more tools for assuring the absence of undeclared activities.

The Additional Protocol is especially important in cases of demonstrated or suspected noncompliance, but its fundamental value is that it serves as a confidence-building measure for

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all states that have accepted it, thereby reinforcing the international cooperation in peaceful uses that the NPT is intended to enable.

Thus, the United States believes that all NPT Parties should conclude and bring into force the Additional Protocol [AP] and that the Protocol should be considered an essential international standard for IAEA safeguards. The United States brought its Additional Protocol into force in January 2009 and now is fully implementing the agreement.

Here again, the Director General has set a milestone toward which to strive—reaching 100 APs in force by the time of the Review Conference, from the current count of 95 Member States implementing the Additional Protocol. ...

I noted that the NPT pillars of nonproliferation and peaceful uses are inextricably linked, and President Obama's support to the IAEA's safeguards regime should be seen in this light. Without a robust safeguards system we would face a choice between two bad options: either restraint on international cooperation in the absence of the necessary verification assurances, or accepting a heightened risk of spreading technology that could lead to more nuclear weapons around the world.

Instead, and in robust fulfillment of the NPT's vision, [w]e are now in the late stages of negotiating ... a new START agreement [with Russia, which effects] a significant reduction in warheads on each side. Our government is preparing to seek the consent of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. In the meantime, the United States is continuing its nuclear testing moratorium, in place since 1992, and we call on other states publicly to declare moratoria of their own.

The United States also is committed to pursuing a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for use in weapons, an FMCT. The IAEA will have a key role to play in implementing FMCT verification. Last year the Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed on a program of work that included a negotiating mandate for an FMCT, but the CD remains unable to move forward. The United States is working with others in the CD to move toward FMCT negotiations on the basis agreed last year, and we are returning an Ambassador to Geneva to lead our efforts there. In the interim, we are continuing our decades-long moratorium on production of fissile material for use in weapons, and we call on others to join us in this moratorium. ...

The United States will continue to work with our treaty partners to revalidate the [NPT] treaty's vital contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. Thank you.

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Key Facts about the New START Treaty

The White House, 26 March 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>

Treaty Structure

The new START treaty is organized in three tiers of increasing level of detail. The first tier is the treaty text itself. The second tier consists of a protocol to the treaty, which contains additional rights and obligations associated with treaty provisions. The basic rights and obligations are contained in these two documents. The third tier consists of technical annexes to the protocol. All three tiers will be legally binding. The protocol and annexes will be integral parts of the treaty and thus submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Strategic Offensive Reductions

Under the treaty, the United States and Russia will be limited to significantly fewer strategic arms within seven years from the date the treaty enters into force. Each Party has the flexibility to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the treaty. These limits are based on a rigorous analysis conducted by Department of Defense planners in support of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

Aggregate Limits

- 1,550 warheads. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as one warhead toward this limit.
 - *This limit is 74 percent lower than the limit of the 1991 START treaty and 30 percent lower than the deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.*
- A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
- A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
 - *This limit is less than half the corresponding strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit of the [1991] START treaty.*



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Verification and Transparency

The treaty has a verification regime that combines the appropriate elements of the 1991 START treaty with new elements tailored to the limitations of the treaty. Measures under the treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase confidence and transparency, the treaty also provides for the exchange of telemetry.

Treaty Terms

The treaty's duration will be ten years, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement. The Parties may agree to extend the treaty for a period of no more than five years. The treaty includes a withdrawal clause that is standard in arms control agreements. The 2002 Moscow Treaty terminates upon entry into force of the new START treaty. The U.S. Senate and the Russian legislature must approve the treaty before it can enter into force.

No Constraints on Missile Defense and Conventional Strike

The treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development, or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs or current or planned U.S. long-range conventional strike capabilities.

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"New START" Technical Annexes to Be Completed after Treaty Is Signed

Global Security Newswire, 30 March 2010, <http://gsn.nti.org/>

A set of technical annexes to the new U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction treaty is to be completed only after the accord is signed next week, a senior Obama administration official said yesterday.

Further negotiation between the two nations over the annexes—which are expected to include key details about covered hardware and verification procedures—should be finished by the end of next month, Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher said at a State Department press conference.

Before then, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev intend to hold an April 8 treaty-signing event in Prague, where Obama a year ago delivered a major speech laying out his arms control and nonproliferation agenda.

Under the successor to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, each side would cap its strategic nuclear arsenal to 1,550 deployed warheads, according to a White House fact sheet released Friday. That represents a nearly 30 percent reduction from a 2,200-weapon limit the states were to meet by the end of 2012 under the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

The two nations also agreed to limit their total fielded and reserve strategic delivery vehicles to 800, a reduction from an earlier discussed ceiling of 1,100 bombers, missiles, and submarines. Each nation can keep on deployment no more than 700 of the systems, the Obama administration said last week.

Tauscher yesterday described the treaty as containing three parts: the main agreement, a protocol, and annexes. Typically, the main text of such a pact lays out the reductions to be taken, and the White House said last week the protocol would contain "additional rights and obligations associated with treaty provisions."

"Both the treaty and the protocol are finished. They're being conformed ... and being scrubbed," said Tauscher, referring to an exacting process in which officials comb the English- and Russian-language versions of the agreement to ensure they are equivalent in meaning.

"Our goal," she said, "is to submit the treaty in the late spring and to seek ratification by the end of the year."

An arms control agreement's technical annexes normally define systems that are limited by the treaty and detail how compliance with the accord can be verified. In the past, the process of

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hashing out such details has been time-consuming, and some experts have wondered if this might delay the pact's submission to the Senate for ratification.

However, Tauscher played down the significance of the work yet to be done on the so-called "New START" agreement's annexes, which she described as "very technical in nature."

For example, she said, "in the inspection regime—the verification regime—if the decision is made that there are going to be inspections, the annexes talk about how many people arrive on Tuesday, who's going to buy them lunch, how long they can stay, what their duties are, and how they leave."

The hope is to "have them completed soon after signing but certainly by the end of the month," Tauscher said. She also signaled an intent to publicly release at least some treaty language in the coming days.

"Various part of the treaty will become public and be part of the debate," Tauscher said, without offering further specifics.

For now, she declined to elaborate on a number of details about the accord, including why the agreement counts each bomber aircraft as one warhead despite a capacity to carry multiple weapons, or specifically how Washington would monitor Moscow's deployed mobile ICBMs.

Tracking Russian mobile missiles became a little bit more challenging when the START agreement expired on December 5, according to arms control experts. At that time, a treaty initiative allowing U.S. inspectors to continuously monitor nuclear-capable missiles leaving a Russian production facility at Votkinsk came to an end.

Although no such production monitoring appears to be part of New START, Tauscher yesterday alluded to last week's White House statement that verification protocols would comprise a number of methods, including displays of hardware covered by the treaty and the use of spy satellites, referred to in treaties as "national technical means."

"We do not have the same kind over oversight over Votkinsk as we did in the original START treaty," she told reporters. "But, at the same time, we believe that we have enough enhanced transparency and supplemental verification that will give us everything that we need."

Under New START, Tauscher added, "there are a number of different data exchanges, exhibitions, and inspections that will be part of it, and national technical means will be part of it."

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Moscow Dispels Doubts over Russia-U.S. Arms Deal Ratification

RIA Novosti, 05 April 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/>

Moscow is convinced that the new Russia-U.S. strategic arms reduction deal to be signed in Prague on April 8 will be ratified by both countries, a Russian presidential aide said on Monday.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama will sign the pact on Thursday in Prague. The pact will replace the START 1 treaty, which expired on December 5.

The new treaty is broadly viewed as an important step in efforts by Medvedev and Obama to "reset" thorny relations between the United States and Russia.

Russian daily Kommersant said on Monday that the new Russian-U.S. arms reduction pact would face problems on its way to ratification.

"It is not a tragedy if the pact is not ratified [by the countries] at the same time. It is not a political issue," Sergei Prikhodko said.

Prikhodko added that both countries had demonstrated political will by drafting the document.

"We agreed through very difficult but sincere joint work. We have no doubts that the Russian State Duma and the U.S. parliamentarians [senators] will ratify it," Prikhodko said.

Russia and the United States began negotiating a strategic arms control pact after the two countries' presidents met in April last year, but the work on the document dragged on, with U.S. plans for missile defense in Europe a particular sticking point.

After the pact is signed, it has to be ratified by the U.S. Senate and both houses of the Russian parliament to come into effect.

A working group of Russia's Federation Council and the U.S. Senate is due to meet in Washington on April 19-21 to discuss the document's ratification.

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