



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



20 September – 03 October 2011

DTRA

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

U.S. Taking Multifaceted Approach to Challenges Posed by Infectious Diseases

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 22 September 2011; geneva.usmission.gov

This week President Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly and urged the global community come together to prevent, detect, and fight every kind of biological danger, whether it is a pandemic, terrorist threat, or treatable disease. (486 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

85 Percent of Chemical Weapons Destroyed in Leonidovka Facility

Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 19 September 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Eighty-five percent of the chemical weapons stored at the chemical weapons destruction facility Leonidovka, Penza region. (107 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Edgewood Seeking to Expand its Chemical Weapons Processing

BioPrepWatch, 21 September 2011, www.bioprepwatch.com

The Army's Edgewood Chemical Biological Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, has requested a federal permit for a munitions processing and assessment facility to handle multiple deadly chemical agents, including sarin. (294 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Army Completes Chemical Stockpile Destruction at Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 23 September 2011, www.cma.army.mil

The Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF), located at Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), Alabama, yesterday completed the disposal of the chemical weapons stockpile stored at ANAD. (545 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

OPCW Ambassadors Meet to Discuss Future Priorities

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 23 September 2011, www.opcw.org

On September 22, 2011 Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü hosted an informal retreat attended by Permanent Representatives to the OPCW to discuss the future direction of the Organization. (208 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) (CONT.)

CMA Progress at a Glance

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 23 September 2011, www.cma.army.mil

Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) is in its final chemical agent campaign, HD mustard agent, and the end of chemical agent operations are on pace for mid-November 2011. (611 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

A Rare Journey inside Pueblo Chemical Weapons Igloo

The Pueblo Chieftain, 26 September 2011, www.chieftain.com

Lt. Col. Timothy Greenhaw has been commander of the Pueblo Chemical Depot for several months but still is impressed when he sees the condition of the 780,000 chemical weapons that are his responsibility to protect. (708 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Pueblo Chemical Neutralization Plant almost Finished

Global Security Newswire, 28 September 2011, gsn.nti.org

A facility at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado that will use neutralization technology to destroy a large stockpile of mustard agent is almost finished, the Colorado Springs Gazette reported on Tuesday. (266 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Facility Resumes Chemical Agent Disposal Operations

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 29 September 2011, www.cma.army.mil

Workers at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) today began using specially-designed cutting equipment to assist destruction of Deseret Chemical Depot's (DCD's) remaining explosively configured chemical weapons. (221 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

OPCW's 6th Challenge Inspection Field Exercise

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 03 October 2011, www.opcw.org

From October 31 to November 4, 2011, the Kingdom of Thailand and OPCW will co-organize the 6th challenge inspection field exercise, with the Technical Secretariat's participation funded by contributions from the European Union. (203 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russia Honors CWC Obligations – Foreign Ministry

ITAR-TASS, 03 October 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Russia honors all of its obligations assumed under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Foreign Ministry said on Monday, October 3. (203 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) (CONT.)

United States' Commitment to the Complete Destruction of U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpiles

U.S. Department of State, 03 October 2011, www.state.gov

Press Statement from Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Washington, DC

The United States is committed to the complete elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles in the United States and around the world. To date, we have already destroyed 89 percent of our original chemical weapons stockpile. (195 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

Guinea Ratifies Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

CTBTO, 20 September 2011, www.ctbto.org

Guinea has today become the 155th State to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). (328 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russia to Build Laser Nuclear Explosion Simulation Installation

The Voice of Russia, 20 September 2011, english.ruvr.ru

Russia's Rosatom corporation is developing a laser installation to simulate nuclear explosions in the town of Sarov in the Nizhniy Novgorod region. (464 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CTBT Article XIV Conference

U.S. Department of State, 23 September 2011, www.state.gov

One of our highest priorities is the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. (993 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Time to Translate Words into Action: Statement of Nongovernmental Organization Representatives [EXCERPT]

Arms Control Association, 23 September 2011, www.armscontrol.org

Since the opening for signature of the CTBT fifteen years ago, the vast majority of the world's nations have signed and ratified the Treaty. (1,261 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russia Reaffirms Strong Support for the CTBT

CTBTO, 03 October 2011, www.ctbto.org

The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Tibor Tóth, visited Moscow from September 27-30, 2011. (554 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS (CCM)

New Pledges for Cluster Bomb Convention

The Daily Star (Lebanon), 14 September 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

By the end of the first working day of a Beirut meeting on the banning of cluster bombs, three new countries had either ratified or expressed their intention to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions. (616 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Italy Files Instrument of Ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

States News Service, 21 September 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

By this act Italy becomes a party to all existing international juridical instruments banning weapons with inhuman effects: the [APLC], the [CCW] and its five protocols, and this, the [CCM]. (187 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

Nunn-Lugar Destroys Nuclear Warheads, Deadly Chemical Weapons

Press Release U.S. Senator Dick Lugar, 23 September 2011, lugar.senate.gov

Today, we celebrate destroying more of the world's most deadly weapons, never again having to worry that they will be used against us. (397 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

FISSILE MATERIALS

U.S. Pulls 880 Pounds of Bomb Material from Other Countries

Global Security Newswire, 20 September 2011, gsn.nti.org

The United States has withdrawn roughly 880 pounds of plutonium and highly enriched uranium from multiple nations since Washington hosted the first Global Nuclear Security Summit in 2010. (254 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS

UN Nuclear Body [IAEA] Ends Annual Meeting in Disunity

Reuters, 23 September 2011, www.reuters.com

The United Nations atomic agency ended its annual member state meeting in disunity late on Friday, with delegates unable to adopt a resolution on a policy area central to its work in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. (325 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS (CONT.)

IAEA 2011 General Conference Concludes

International Atomic Energy Agency, 23 September 2011, www.iaea.org

At its 55th regular session, the IAEA General Conference drew together about 3,000 participants for a five-day meeting from September 19-23, 2011. (351 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY (INF)

Russia: Expert Says U.S. Should Be Pressed on BMD-Related Violations of INF Treaty [OPINION]

Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, 16 September 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

While we are preparing all-embracing threat analyses, the Americans, in flagrant violation of key provisions of the unlimited-duration INF Treaty, are conducting successful tests of a European missile defense system involving the interception of shorter-range and medium-range target missiles – the development, production, and testing of which are prohibited by this treaty.

(2,292 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START)

U.S. Weighs Further Strategic Nuke Reductions

Global Security Newswire, 22 September 2011, gsn.nti.org

A U.S. nuclear arsenal assessment now under way is intended to support a bid by President Obama to implement further reductions to the nation's strategic deterrent. (352 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

The New START Treaty and the CTBT: Two Essential Steps

U.S. Department of State, 19 September 2011, www.state.gov

Progress on nuclear issues often seems agonizingly slow. But we cannot and must not shy away from the task of adjusting our nuclear policies to 21st century realities just because it is difficult. (2,104 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Second Yars Missile Regiment to be Put on Combat Duty by Year End

ITAR-TASS, 26 September 2011, www.itar-tass.com

The second missile regiment armed with the land-based mobile missile system Yars will be put on combat duty before the end of 2011 at the Teikovo missile formation. (857 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)



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NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START) (CONT.)

Russian Defense Ministry to Dispose of Typhoon-Class Submarines

BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 04 October 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

The Project 941 (Akula) strategic missile submarines (RPKSN), better known under the name "Typhoon", will be written off before 2014, and will be cut up as scrap metal, Izvestiya has learned at the Ministry of Defense. (619 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

OPEN SKIES TREATY

Russia's Vega Radio Factory Develops, Installs New Instruments for Tu-214ON

Moscow AviaPort in Russian, 05 September 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

As part of the state defense order, OAO [Open Joint Stock Company] Vega Radio Construction Concern has developed a complex [package] of equipment and devices and has installed them on a Tu-214ON aircraft... (1,176 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russian Military Inspectors will Perform an Observation Flight above the United States

Defense and Security (Russia), 28 September 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

A Russian group of inspectors plan to perform an observation flight [in a] Tu-154 Lk-1 airplane above the territory of the United States in the period between September 26 and October 1. (89 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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U.S. Taking Multifaceted Approach to Challenges Posed by Infectious Diseases

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 22 September 2011; geneva.usmission.gov

This week President Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly and urged the global community come together to prevent, detect, and fight every kind of biological danger, whether it is a pandemic, terrorist threat, or treatable disease. The United States is taking a multi-faceted approach to the full spectrum of challenges posed by infectious diseases, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or the result of a deliberate attack.

Through for a such as the UN Security Resolution 1540, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the World Health Organization (WHO), the United States is pursuing a common vision where disease no longer threatens the security and prosperity of nations.

The “Global Health Security” policy framework is derived from the common approaches that shape key U.S. strategies and initiatives: the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, the National Security Strategy, Department of Health and Human Services National Health Security Strategy, and the Global Health Initiative.

Improving capacities to detect, report and respond to infectious diseases quickly and accurately lies at the heart of the global community’s ability to address all infectious disease threats, as reflected in the WHO’s International Health Regulations (IHR).

The United States is committed to assisting countries in developing core capacities to assess, notify, and respond to infectious disease threats and to meet the WHO milestone of having these capacities in place by 2012. Coordinating across its diverse international health programs, the United States is focused on assisting host countries in meeting their IHR obligations.

Commitment to the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations

On September 19th, the United States took an important step by signing an agreement with WHO on “Global Health Security,” affirming our shared commitment to strengthen cooperation on shared health security priorities. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by Health and Human Services Secretary Sebelius, WHO Director-General Chan and establishes a framework for collaboration on common goals in the area of global health security to ensure that the international community effectively manages public health risks. It outlines a number of areas of cooperation, including: global alert and response systems, the International Health Regulations, public health networks, global health leadership, risk management, and preparedness.

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Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

The BWC, which entered into force in 1975, is the first treaty to unequivocally ban the development and stockpiling of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The United States seeks to use an upcoming December Review Conference (RevCon) to advance the goals set forth in President Obama's National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, promulgating the view that effective BWC implementation requires multinational coordination and collaboration on concrete activities to counter biological proliferation and bioterrorism.

The BWC RevCon offers an important opportunity to revitalize international efforts against these threats, helping to build global capacity to combat infectious diseases, prevent biological weapons proliferation and bioterrorism, and bring security, health, and scientific communities together to raise awareness of evolving biological risks and develop practices to manage them.

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85 Percent of Chemical Weapons Destroyed in Leonidovka Facility

Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 19 September 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Eighty-five percent of the chemical weapons stored at the chemical weapons destruction facility [at] Leonidovka, Penza region [have been destroyed], the public relations group of the federal Department for Safe Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons has reported, citing information given at a roundtable meeting addressing chemical weapons destruction in the Penza region held in Penza on Thursday.

"The destruction of chemical weapons began on the object on September 2, 2008. By that time, some 6,885 tonnes of combat toxic substances, or 17.2 percent of the country's chemical arsenal subject to destruction was located there. Eighty-five percent of chemical weapons have already been destroyed in Leonidovka," a report received by Interfax-AVN says.

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Edgewood Seeking to Expand its Chemical Weapons Processing

BioPrepWatch, 21 September 2011, www.bioprepwatch.com

The Army's Edgewood Chemical Biological Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Maryland, has requested a federal permit for a munitions processing and assessment (MAPS) facility to handle multiple deadly chemical agents, including sarin.

At a public presentation last week, Andrew Murphy, a spokesman for APG's environmental division, said that the permit request would add the facility, known as MAPS, to a list of several other hazardous waste processing facilities at the Harford County, Maryland, Army installation licensed under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certification, according to the *Baltimore Sun*.

The MAPS, located in an 11,755-square foot facility built in 2003, processes mustard, phosgene and sarin, which was used in the deadly 1995 terrorist attack in the Tokyo subway system. The permit would allow the plant, which has been in testing mode, to be made fully operational.

APG submitted requests in 2006 and 2007 to add five facilities besides the MAPS to the federal permit. Due to inadequate staffing and workload, however, the original permit expired in 2009. The EPA issued APG its first permit in 1999 for the chemical agent neutralization facility, which processed a mustard agent stockpile, the *Baltimore Sun* reports. Much of the stockpile dated to the end of World War I and was stored on the Edgewood area of APG.

The Army originally wanted to incinerate the mustard agent stored at Edgewood and at other Army sites around the world, but there was public outcry about the process and the prospect for shipments being sent to Edgewood via rail and truck. The Army came up with the alternative of chemically neutralizing the mustard at the sites where it was stockpiled.

The Army has acknowledged that even banned substances like sarin may still be kept in small amounts for identification and testing purposes.

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Army Completes Chemical Stockpile Destruction at Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 23 September 2011, www.cma.army.mil

The Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF), located at Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), Alabama, yesterday completed the disposal of the chemical weapons stockpile stored at ANAD. The ANCDF is a subordinate element of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA). Headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, CMA has the mission to provide safe, secure storage of the nation's chemical weapons and to safely destroy 90 percent of the nation's chemical weapons stockpile.

"This is a great day for the U.S. Army, the people of Alabama and our nation," said CMA Director Conrad Whyne. "Thanks to the steadfast dedication of the Anniston team – the United States Army, its civilian workers and contractors – the Anniston community, the state of Alabama, and our nation are all safer today. I could not be more proud of our workforce."

The ANCDF had the mission to provide safe and environmentally compliant chemical agent destruction operations using incineration and explosive destruction technologies. The Anniston Chemical Activity (ANCA), also a subordinate element of CMA, had the mission to provide the safe and secure maintenance, storage and transport of 7 percent of the original U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and containers, while also ensuring maximum protection of the installation and community population and providing treaty compliance of the chemical weapons stockpile. The original inventory of chemical weapons stored at ANAD included 661,529 nerve agent and mustard agent munitions and 2,254 tons of chemical agent. Destruction operations began August 9, 2003.

"The vast experience of CMA employees and contractors – both at the site and at headquarters – was used to build, operate, and oversee the work to safely accomplish today's destruction milestone. This same cooperation is being demonstrated for the successful operation of CMA storage and disposal facilities across the nation," said Carmen Spencer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for the Elimination of Chemical Weapons.

The ANCA and ANCDF will now begin closure operations, which will continue for approximately 18 – 24 months. Closure operations will be conducted in accordance with facility and storage area end-states as agreed upon with all appropriate stakeholders. The United States established the Chemical Demilitarization Program in 1986 to remove the threat posed by continued storage of outdated chemical weapons; meet international treaty requirements; and inspire a worldwide commitment to the elimination of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

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In April 1997 the United States came under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, thereby requiring the safe destruction of 100 percent of the nation's chemical weapons by April 2007. The United States petitioned to have the original deadline extended to April 2012 (an extension allowed by the treaty) and was granted this five-year extension.

CMA has safely completed disposal operations and closed facilities in Edgewood, Maryland, Newport, Indiana, and Johnston Atoll, located 800 miles southwest of Hawaii. CMA has also completed disposal operations in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and is in the process of closing the chemical agent disposal facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal. CMA continues to safely store and destroy chemical weapons stockpiles in Tooele, Utah, and Umatilla, Oregon. CMA also safely stores the chemical weapons stockpiles in Richmond, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado. The disposal of these munitions falls under the purview of the Program Manager, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA), a separate Department of Defense program.

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OPCW Ambassadors Meet to Discuss Future Priorities

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 23 September 2011, www.opcw.org

On September 22, 2011 Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü hosted an informal retreat attended by Permanent Representatives to the OPCW to discuss the future direction of the Organization. Over 80 ambassadors attended the day-long event, which was held in the town of Noordwijk close to The Hague.

The retreat followed the submission of a report by an advisory panel that was established by the Director-General in late 2010 to deliberate on future OPCW priorities. The panel, chaired by Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, held four meetings before submitting its report in July 2011.

In his opening remarks to the retreat, Director-General Üzümcü said the panel's forward-looking report "provides a good opportunity to consider key strategic questions that are of common interest to all of us over the longer term." Ambassador Ekéus emphasized that the report was adopted by consensus by all 14 panel members.

Participating ambassadors commented on the report and asked questions of Ambassador Ekéus, after which the Director-General led a free-flowing discussions on:

- the full and effective national implementation of the Convention;
- preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons and the misuse of toxic chemicals;
- retaining expertise and preparedness to respond to the use, or threat of use, of chemical weapons; and
- promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry.

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CMA Progress at a Glance

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 23 September 2011, www.cma.army.mil

Anniston Chemical Activity, Alabama: The last chemical munitions stored on Anniston Army Depot were destroyed September 22nd. Contributing to the overall achievement was the Static Detonation Chamber (SDC) team. The team destroyed 2,737 mustard-filled munitions since March 30, 2011. The SDC team handled problematic mustard munitions that could not be easily destroyed by the automated robotic equipment in the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. The past months of SDC operations were filled with many challenges such as decontamination efforts, three emissions tests and emergent maintenance work. All of the experiences have been documented and the data collected to be passed on to the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) sites at Blue Grass, Kentucky and Pueblo, Colorado.

Blue Grass Chemical Activity, Kentucky: Blue Grass Chemical Activity (BGCA) continues to collect data to determine if installing the Igloo Filtration System (IFS) will enhance safe storage. The testing is part of the commitment to provide optimum storage conditions for the munitions and safe working conditions for BGCA personnel, as well as maximum protection to the public and environment. Results from the data collection will be analyzed and released sometime next month. BGCA is involved in monthly speakers' bureau events to educate local communities on safe storage and to build a stronger community relationship. BGCA is now available to view and "like" on Facebook. Please let them hear from you!

Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah: Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility's (TOCDF) operations have resumed as workers began processing the Deseret Chemical Depot's (DCD) remaining stockpile of mustard rounds. These rounds consist of 4.2-inch mortars and 155 mm projectiles – safely stored in overpack containers. TOCDF operators use specially-designed cutting equipment to safely remove the explosive components for destruction. Meanwhile, workers at the Area 10 Liquid Incinerator (ATLIC) are preparing to conduct surrogate trial burns using a simulant chemical to verify the efficiency of the furnace before agent operations begin. DCD's stockpile of GA nerve and Lewisite blister agents will be destroyed in the ATLIC; expected to begin in November.

Pine Bluff Chemical Activity, Arkansas: Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility continues safe and environmentally compliant closure activities – successfully reaching the first closure milestone with the completion of the Bulk Drain Station and Toxic Cubicle decontamination. During the week of September 12, URS conducted a Performance Assessment Review with oversight from CMA headquarters. The site reached 5 million man hours without a lost day away from work case. These safety achievements have been accomplished while the site is performing closure and demolition activities.

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Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado: Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) stores mustard-filled munitions: 105 mm projectiles and cartridges, 155 mm projectiles and 4.2-inch mortar cartridges. PCD provided support and participated in the Ninth Annual Avondale Veteran's Parade on October 1st. Lt. Col. Tim Greenhaw spoke at a brief ceremony prior to the start of the parade, and PCD Security Forces fired the PCD cannon to officially start the festivities.

Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon: Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) is in its final chemical agent campaign, HD mustard agent, and the end of chemical agent operations are on pace for mid-November 2011. The Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) issued a renewal of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Hazardous Waste Permit that governs operations at the UMCDF. The original RCRA permit was issued in February 1997 for a ten year period. An application to renew the permit submitted by the UMCDF in 2006 was accepted as complete by the ODEQ, allowing the facility to continue operating until DEQ took action on the renewal application. Issuance of the renewal permit clears the way for successful completion of Umatilla's chemical demilitarization mission and closure of the UMCDF.

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A Rare Journey inside Chemical Weapons Igloo

The Pueblo Chieftain, 26 September 2011, www.chieftain.com

Lt. Col. Timothy Greenhaw has been commander of the Pueblo Chemical Depot for several months but still is impressed when he sees the condition of the 780,000 chemical weapons that are his responsibility to protect. "It's like they were just made," he said, standing inside one of 102 igloos in the tightly secured G Block.

Last week depot officials took the unprecedented step, at least in decades, of a media tour of G Block. The weapons, 155 mm and 105 mm artillery shells and 4.2-inch mortar rounds, were mostly produced in the 1950s at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and have been stored in Pueblo since.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, an international treaty signed by most world powers that developed chemical weapons, requires that they be destroyed. That process has lagged, but it's expected the United States will be finished by 2021, and according to plans, by 2017 in Pueblo.

In the meantime, the Army's Chemical Materials Agency is responsible for safeguarding the weapons here. Thousands of civilians worked at the depot in its heyday, and there still are more than 320 employees, including highly trained technicians, chemists and environmental officers. Greenway and a sergeant are the only two soldiers assigned to the depot, but he said about two-thirds of the workforce are veterans.

Security is tight at the south entrance of the depot and at the new north entrance to the destruction facility under construction. But it's kicked up a lot of notches at G Block, what the depot calls the Chemical Limited Area. Besides security, safety is a concern. No one goes in without a gas mask or other breathing apparatus and visitors are warned not to touch anything. Igloos are constantly monitored for any vapor and visually checked for leaks.

There have been a few leaks over the years, but Lisabeth Wachuka, quality assurance specialist and ammunition surveillance specialist, said that since 1973, only 101 of 780,000 chemical weapons have been found to leak. "That's 0.013 percent," she said. Finding a leaking weapon is not easy. "It's very much like looking for a needle in a haystack," Wachuka said. "You don't open the door and it's right there."

Igloos are checked weekly and there are sensors in each one that will set off alarms. Lead chemist Beverly Johnson said testing equipment can detect mustard in parts per trillion. Inside the igloos, weapons are on pallets – about 800 weapons to a stack. Workers responding to an

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alarm first test the air inside and put filters in place before opening the door. Then they put on protective gear. “We like to go in with as low a level as possible,” Wachuka said, because the heavier the suits, the greater the strain on the workers. It’s sometimes necessary, though, to don the heavy equipment.

While the igloos don’t get much warmer than 60 or 70 degrees, a person wearing chemical protection undergarments embedded with activated charcoal and a plastic suit and hood can swelter quickly. They also are limited by the capacity of air tanks.

All of that gear also makes work dangerous because the first step is climbing ladders to shroud the weapons stacks with plastic. Each covered stack is monitored and if vapor shows up, the pallets must be taken down and tested under their own shroud until the problem weapon is found.

The whole process can take days or weeks and sometimes the source of the alarm is never found. Weapons sometimes “burp” with no sign of residue and, after filtration, there is no trace of vapor.

If a weapon is leaking, crews bring in steel cylinders. The shell is placed in the tube that is then sealed with a rubber gasket and a bolted on top plate. The overpacked weapon then is taken to an igloo with others that have been overpacked. There are about 400 more overpacked weapons that have been intentionally tapped for testing over the years.

None of the overpacked shells will go through the water neutralization process being installed next door, however, and will have to be destroyed in blast chambers because it is not safe to handle them. Wachuka said that the depot has been using the cylinders since they were developed in 2001 and there never has been a problem.

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Pueblo Chemical Neutralization Plant almost Finished

Global Security Newswire, 28 September 2011, gsn.nti.org

A facility at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado that will use neutralization technology to destroy a large stockpile of mustard agent is almost finished, the Colorado Springs Gazette reported on Tuesday.

The chemical disarmament plant is to employ remotely operated machinery to defuse approximately 780,000 munitions before they are put on an automated line where the weapons' explosives will be removed and their blister agent contents extracted and neutralized through the addition of lye. The slurry produced from that process would next be treated to eliminate all chemicals, after which the resulting water would be recycled back into the facility.

The price tag for the neutralization plant is \$725 million, the newspaper reported. Chemical disarmament work is not slated to begin before 2015 following a required period of system testing, which is expected to start in summer 2012. Testing is to involve tens of thousands of fake chemical munitions that robotic machinery will dismantle.

Once the plant goes online, it is expected to process in excess of 35 munitions every hour and to operate 24 hours per day. If that rate is maintained, the depot will be able to destroy all of the munitions in three years at a final price tag of \$3.5 billion, according to the U.S. Army.

The chemical munitions are not overly complex but can be lethal if improperly handled. "They were designed to be handled by 18-year-old boys in the dark," said Lisabeth Wachuka, who manages storage of the decades-old artillery and mortar shells at the depot. There have been 101 mustard agent leaking incidents documented at the Colorado arsenal.

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Facility Resumes Chemical Agent Disposal Operations

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 29 September 2011, www.cma.army.mil

Workers at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) today began using specially-designed cutting equipment to assist destruction of Deseret Chemical Depot's (DCD's) remaining explosively configured chemical weapons.

The remaining mustard agent-filled 4.2 inch mortar cartridges and 155-millimeter projectiles, currently sealed in larger, air-tight containers, will be processed utilizing a modified disposal process and specially designed equipment that allows TOCDF operators to access the munitions and safely remove explosive components for destruction. Plant furnace systems will destroy the chemical agent and explosive components and decontaminate munition casings for permitted disposal.

A secondary system, which is a type of explosive destruction technology, is scheduled to destroy those mustard projectiles which have sustained the greatest degree of deterioration. This system is referred to by its acronym, DAVINCH, which stands for destruction of ammunition in a vacuum integrated chamber. Preparations for DAVINCH operations are ongoing, with destruction operations expected to begin late this year.

These two separate systems will jointly destroy the remaining stockpile of mustard rounds in an effort to meet the international treaty deadline of April 29, 2012. Disposal operations for the depot's remaining small stockpile of Lewisite blister and GA nerve agents, using the Area Ten Liquid Incinerator (ATLIC), are scheduled to begin later this year. The entire DCD chemical weapons stockpile is expected to be safely eliminated by early 2012.

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OPCW's 6th Challenge Inspection Field Exercise

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 03 October 2011, www.opcw.org

Article IX is a key provision of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It grants each Member State the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location of another Member State in order to resolve questions concerning possible non-compliance with the Convention. Such inspections might be conducted anywhere and without delay by an inspection team designated by the OPCW Director-General in accordance with the Convention's Verification Annex.

No OPCW Member State has requested a Challenge Inspection since the Organization was established in 1997. But the Conference of the States Parties has at various stages requested that the Technical Secretariat maintain a high standard of readiness to conduct such inspections and to report any problems that may arise therein. Accordingly, the Technical Secretariat regularly holds exercises at headquarters level and in the field, as well as table top exercises, and regularly reports on its readiness to the Executive Council.

From October 31 to November 4, 2011, the Kingdom of Thailand and the OPCW will co-organize the 6th challenge inspection field exercise, with the Technical Secretariat's participation funded by contributions from the European Union. This will be the first challenge inspection field exercise held in an Asian country.

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Russia Honors CWC Obligations – Foreign Ministry

ITAR-TASS, 03 October 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

Russia honors all of its obligations assumed under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Foreign Ministry said on Monday, October 3. "The Russian Federation attached paramount significance to disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD]," the ministry said.

"Russia was among the originators of the Chemical Weapons Convention, took an active part in its drafting, and assumed and assumes that the main goal of all Member States is to rid the world of the danger of use of chemical weapons. We regard the Convention as one of the most successful and effective mechanisms that not only bans a whole class of WMD but also ensures international control over their destruction" and "188 states have already given up chemical weapons, and their stockpiles and production facilities continue to be scrapped persistently".

"We confirm our full commitment to the main goals of the Convention and will continue to exert maximum efforts to solve such material and labor-intensive and technically challenging task as destruction of chemical weapons within the shortest time possible," the ministry said. "As before, we are committed to fulfilling our obligations in full and in the spirit of cooperation with all of the Convention Member States within the framework of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons," it said.

"Russia has disposed of half of its chemical weapon stockpiles in strict compliance with proper safety and environmental requirements. At the same time, much work has yet to be done in order to get rid of the remaining chemical weapons. To this end, we are increasing the capacity of chemical weapons disposal facilities, finishing the construction of the last such facility provided for in the relevant plans, and looking for additional means and resources," the ministry said. "Persistent and continuous destruction of chemical weapons in Russia under international control is convincing proof of our commitment to our obligations under the Convention," the ministry said.

Last summer, Maradykovsky finished destroying more than 150 tonnes of yperite-lewisite mixtures and started to dispose of aerial bombs with soman, one of the most dangerous nerve agents. Maradykovsky has already destroyed more than 70 percent of the chemical weapons stored at its depots since the 1950s, including 232,599 kilograms of sarin and 99.4 percent of VX gases. The Maradykovsky chemical weapons disposal plant in the Kirov region is now in Phase Four of the federal chemical disarmament program. By the end of Phase Four, the plant will have disposed of over 6,900 tonnes of toxic agents kept in its arsenals since the middle of the 20th century.

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Maradykovsky is the third Russian facility that began full-scale disposal of chemical weapons in September 2006, and the second-largest by the amount of toxic agents stored in it. Over 40,000 aerial bombs and warheads stuffed with mixtures of toxic agents had been stored in its arsenals since 1953.

Maradykovsky became operational on September 8, 2006 and became Russia's third chemical weapons disposal plant. Over 6,900 combat nerve gases – VX, sarin, soman and mixtures of yperite and lewisite – in over 40,000 aerial bombs and warheads had been kept there since 1953. The plant started destroying VX gases first. The plant should destroy all of the stocks by 2012.

Russia plans to use seven disposal facilities during this process. During the first stage, 400 tonnes of poison substances were eliminated by April 29, 2003, which made up 1 percent of Russia's chemical weapons (40,000 tonnes). In the course of Phase Two, Russia disposed of 8,000 tonnes of chemical weapons. At the facility in the village of Gorny, 1,143 tonnes were eliminated, while the facility in the village of Maradykovsky accounted for 4,500 tonnes of eliminated agents out of the scheduled 7,500 tonnes.

The chemical weapons disposal plant in Kambarka, Udmurtia, has destroyed all 6,400 tonnes of lewisite that were kept at its depots. The plant in Kambarka has been operating without failures since commissioning on March 1, 2006. Kambarka is one of the seven chemical weapons disposal plants built in Russia under a national program of chemical disarmament. It stored 6,400 tonnes of lewisite since the 1940s, which made up 15.9 percent of all toxic agents inherited by Russia from the former Soviet Union.

The Pochep site in the Bryansk region stores over 7,500 tonnes of nerve gases and plays a special role in the final stage of the federal chemical disarmament program. The site contains almost 19 percent of Russia's war gases. All of them have to be disposed of within the period of time prescribed in the Hague Convention.

The facility in the village of Leonidovka, Penza Region, will take part in implementing the program. Its first phase went on line on June 17, 2008. The construction of the facility in the town of Shchuchye, Kurgan region, continues. Its second stage will be launched in 2010.

The final stage of the program envisions the destruction of 100 percent of chemical weapons by December 29, 2012. The plants in the town of Pochep, Bryansk region, and the town of Kizner, Udmurtia, will take part in the implementation of this stage.

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United States' Commitment to the Complete Destruction of U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpiles

U.S. Department of State, 03 October 2011, www.state.gov

Press Statement from Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Washington, DC

At the end of the Cold War, the United States joined together with other nations in the Chemical Weapons Convention to state in unequivocal terms that we will end our chemical weapons programs and destroy existing stockpiles, precursor chemicals, production facilities and weapons delivery systems.

The United States is committed to the complete elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles in the United States and around the world. To date, we have already destroyed 89 percent of our original chemical weapons stockpile. We reaffirm our commitment to finish the job as quickly as possible in accordance with national and treaty requirements that ensure the safety of people and the protection of the environment.

As of today, 188 countries have joined the international community and renounced chemical weapons. Under international verification, stockpiles and production facilities are steadily being eliminated.

The United States will continue to cooperate closely with the other Member States of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and work toward complete elimination in the United States and around the world. The international community must continue to speak with one voice and remain vigilant, so these weapons pose no threat to people here or anywhere.

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Guinea Ratifies Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

CTBTO, 20 September 2011, www.ctbto.org

Guinea has today become the 155th State to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Tibor Tóth, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), hailed the ratification as “a step that further consolidates Africa’s dedication to end nuclear testing and acts as a powerful beacon for the rest of the world.” Last year’s entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, effectively making the entire southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons.

Guinea signed the CTBT on October 3, 1996, just a few days after it opened for signature. Guinea has shown its support for the treaty by regularly voting in favor of the CTBT in the United Nations General Assembly.

Adherence to the treaty is almost universal, with 182 states having signed the treaty to date; 155 of them, including Guinea, have also ratified. Guinea is the second African state to ratify the treaty this year after Ghana’s ratification on June 15, 2011. In Africa, only two countries have yet to sign the CTBT – Mauritius and Somalia – whereas 11 countries have yet to ratify: Angola, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

Among these, ratification by Egypt is mandatory for the treaty to enter into force. Ratifications by eight other nuclear technology holder countries are also outstanding and necessary for entry into force: China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States. [...]

The CTBT bans all nuclear explosions everywhere, by everyone. The CTBTO is building an International Monitoring System (IMS) to make sure that no nuclear explosion goes undetected. There are currently over 280 facilities in 85 countries including 30 in 22 African states. The data registered by the IMS can also be used for disaster mitigation such as earthquake monitoring, tsunami warning, and the tracking of the levels and dispersal of radioactivity from nuclear accidents.

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Russia to Build Laser Nuclear Explosion Simulation Installation

The Voice of Russia, 20 September 2011, english.ruvr.ru

Russia's state-run Rosatom corporation is developing a laser installation to simulate nuclear explosions in the town of Sarov in the Nizhniy Novgorod region. This will be more powerful than a similar complex at the Livermore National Laboratory in the United States, says head of the Rosatom, Sergei Kirienko.

Sarov was specially chosen as the location for the installation. Some time ago, it was a highly secret city and was not marked even on any geographical map and was known as "Arzamas-16" where the nuclear and hydrogen bombs were developed. Russia's federal nuclear center is located there. The security of nuclear weapons is an urgent issue for all nuclear powers.

Meanwhile, the reliability and safety of nuclear arsenals, which have several thousands of warheads, worry the international community. Consequently, the state of these warheads has to be strictly controlled without carrying out nuclear tests. Moreover, even the underground nuclear tests cause irreparable damage to the environment and are health hazardous. Long ago, Russia assessed these risks and has been urging other countries to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

On the eve, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov and Ambassador Tibor Tóth, executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) discussed the issue at their meeting. According to the Russian diplomat, one of the key points in fulfilling the treaty – the development of facilities of the international nuclear-test monitoring system – has already been certified 70 percent.

The new installation in Sarov will pave the way for completely banning underground nuclear tests. Physical simulation of explosions is one of the methods that establish control over nuclear warheads, says director of the Nuclear Safety Institute, Leonid Bolshov.

No nuclear tests have been carried out in the world for a long time. All the nuclear powers are conducting experiments to maintain their nuclear weapons in a state of ability to act and to upgrade them. For one, the United States has persistently implemented a program of simulating physical processes during a nuclear explosion.

The Livermore National Laboratory has been installing powerful lasers with neodymium glass, which emit extremely powerful light. When laser beams converge and concentrate on a microbead for a few billionths of a second, the pressure and temperature conditions in it will make it possible to re-create conditions under which thermonuclear fusion takes place.

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Similar experiments were carried out in the Soviet Union. Russia has revived this work, and this is an important task, says the expert. Russia has started building a similar installation but more powerful than that in the United States. This will pave the way for the Russian scientists to maintain the country's defense capacity and discover new laws in physics. The simulation will help to study the physics of explosion in detail. The installation will be commissioned in 2017.

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CTBT Article XIV Conference

U.S. Department of State, 23 September 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Ellen Tauscher, U.S. Department of State Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, in New York City

I am so pleased to be here representing the United States. When Secretary Clinton came to this conference two years ago, she ended a ten-year absence on the part of our nation. Today, I stand before you proud of the accomplishments that the Obama Administration has made thus far in arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament.

Since entering office, the Administration has achieved entry into force of the New START Treaty, released an updated Nuclear Posture Review, and helped to achieve a consensus Action Plan at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The Administration also convened the successful 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, helped secure and relocate vulnerable nuclear materials, led efforts to establish an international nuclear fuel bank, and increased effective multilateral cooperation to prevent illicit nuclear activities.

For the United States, this is just the beginning. One of our highest priorities is the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The treaty is an essential step toward the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, the vision President Obama articulated in Prague in April 2009.

The CTBT is central to leading nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons and reduced nuclear competition. With a global ban on nuclear explosive tests in place, states interested in pursuing or advancing their nuclear weapons programs would have to either risk deploying weapons uncertain of their effectiveness or face international condemnation, and possible sanctions, for conducting nuclear explosive tests.

A CTBT that has entered into force would benefit national and international security and facilitate greater international cooperation on other arms control and nonproliferation priorities. The United States has observed a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing since 1992 and our policies are already consistent with the central prohibition of the treaty.

It has been 12 years since our Senate failed to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the CTBT. Lack of support stemmed from two concerns: the verifiability of the treaty and the continuing safety and reliability of America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear explosive testing.

Today, there have been dramatic developments on both fronts and we have a much stronger case to make in support of ratification.

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The treaty's verification regime has grown exponentially over the last decade. Today, the International Monitoring System (IMS) is roughly 85 percent complete and when fully completed, there will be IMS facilities in 89 countries spanning the globe. At entry into force, the full body of technical data gathered via the International Monitoring System will be available to all States Parties. In addition, with the recent Fukushima nuclear crisis, we have already seen dramatic proof of the utility of the IMS for non-verification related purposes, such as tsunami warnings and tracking radioactivity from reactor accidents.

We have continued to provide the full costs of operating, maintaining and sustaining 34 certified IMS stations among those assigned by the treaty to the United States. We announced last month a voluntary in-kind contribution of \$8.9 million to support projects that will accelerate development of the CTBT verification regime. This month, we concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the Provisional Technical Secretariat to contribute up to \$25.5 million to underwrite the rebuilding of the hydroacoustic monitoring station on Crozet Island in the southern Indian Ocean.

Together, U.S. extra-budgetary contributions to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization this year total \$34.4 million, more than our annual assessed contribution. Given the tough budget climate in Washington and other capitals, those contributions clearly demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the treaty and the vital importance the United States attaches to completing the verification regime.

With regard to our nuclear deterrent, our extensive surveillance methods and computational modeling developed under the Stockpile Stewardship Program over the last 15 years have allowed our nuclear experts to understand how these weapons work and the effects of aging even better than when nuclear explosive testing was conducted. The United States can maintain a safe and effective nuclear deterrent without conducting nuclear explosive tests.

With these advancements in verification and stockpile stewardship in mind, we have begun the process of engaging the Senate. We like to think of our efforts as an "information exchange" and are working to get these facts out to members and staff, many of whom have never dealt with this Treaty. We know that this is a very technical agreement and we want people to absorb and understand the science behind it. There are no set timeframes and we are going to be patient, but we will also have to be persistent.

Of course, we do not expect people to be in receive-only mode, so we are eager to start a discussion. It is only through discussion and debate that we will work through questions and concerns about the treaty and eventually get it ratified.

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Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentleman, the United States is committed to the CTBT and we intend to see it enter into force, but we cannot do it alone. As we move forward with our process, we call on all governments to declare or reaffirm their commitment not to test. Congratulations to Guinea for becoming the 155th nation to ratify the CTBT just days ago. Also, congratulations to Ghana, Central African Republic, Liberia, Trinidad and Tobago, the Marshall Islands and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, all of whom have ratified the treaty since our last conference. Your example adds important momentum to achieving the goal of ending nuclear explosive testing forever. We call on the remaining Annex 2 states to join us in moving forward toward ratification.

We do not expect that the path remaining to entry into force will be traveled quickly or easily. For our part, we will need the support of the Senate and the American people in order to move ahead, but move ahead we will, because we know that the CTBT will benefit the security of the United States and that of the world. [...]

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Time to Translate Words into Action: Statement of Nongovernmental Organization Representatives [EXCERPT]

Arms Control Association, 23 September 2011, www.armscontrol.org

Distinguished delegates, on behalf of nongovernmental organizations the world over, it is an honor to address you at this important meeting with our views on the path forward on the CTBT. Nongovernmental organizations have been and will continue to be a driving force in the long journey to end nuclear testing.

Recall that some twenty years ago, a popular movement in Soviet-controlled Kazakhstan forced the government in Moscow to halt nuclear weapons testing at proving grounds in their homeland where more than 456 explosions had contaminated the land and damaged the health of its people.

As a result of their efforts and those of other nongovernmental and elected leaders, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev declared a test moratorium on October 5, 1991, prompting U.S. legislators to introduce legislation mandating a 9-month U.S. test moratorium. With strong nongovernmental support, the legislation was approved and a year later was extended. The last U.S. nuclear test explosion was conducted on September 23, 1992.

Just four years later, the world's nations concluded the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to prevent nuclear proliferation and help end the nuclear arms race. Since the opening for signature of the CTBT fifteen years ago, the vast majority of the world's nations have signed and ratified the treaty. They recognize that nuclear testing is a dangerous and unnecessary vestige of the past and understand that the CTBT is a cornerstone of the international security architecture of the 21st century.

By banning all nuclear weapon test explosions, the CTBT can help accomplish the indisputable obligation under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to cease the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The established nuclear-weapon states would be barred from proof-testing new, more sophisticated nuclear warhead designs. Without the option of nuclear explosive testing, newer testing nations cannot perfect smaller, more easily deliverable warheads.

The CTBT also serves to reinforce the nonproliferation system by serving as a confidence-building measure about a state's nuclear intentions and, in this regard, it can help head off and de-escalate regional tensions. And with the CTBT in force, global and national capabilities to detect and deter possible clandestine nuclear testing by other states will be significantly greater.

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Accelerating Entry into Force

Although 182 states have signed the CTBT, the long journey to end testing is not over. The CTBT must still be ratified by the remaining nine “holdout” states before it can formally enter into force.

We are grateful for the strong statements delivered at this conference on the value of the treaty and the need for prompt entry into force. But actions speak louder than words. We call upon every state at this conference, collectively and individually, to act. This conference must help produce a serious diplomatic action plan for getting the remaining holdout states on board. [...]

Addressing the Damage Caused by Nuclear Testing

We must all also rededicate ourselves to addressing the harm caused by the 2,051 nuclear test explosions conducted worldwide. The deadly effects linger at dozens of sites from Lop Nor, to the atolls of the Pacific, to Nevada, to Algeria, to Australia, to Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, across Russia, and beyond.

Exposure to ionizing radiation is harmful to humans. The leaders of the nuclear testing nations have exposed their people – within and outside their territories – to radiation without their informed consent.

While underground nuclear blasts pose a smaller radioactive hazard than atmospheric tests, there has been widespread venting from underground explosions. In addition, underground nuclear blasts leave a legacy of radioactive contamination, which can be transported by groundwater into the surrounding environment.

Our knowledge of the extent of the harm caused by five decades of nuclear test explosions underground, in the atmosphere, and underwater is still incomplete. The governments responsible for the damage have not adequately provided assistance to survivors nor the resources necessary to mitigate the environmental contamination. In fact, the major testing states have been reluctant to recognize the harm inflicted by testing and the rights of those people who have been most affected.

We encourage the states gathered here to support the proposal, advanced by Kazakhstan last year, to establish an international fund – to be managed by the United Nations – to support those seriously affected by nuclear testing. To move this from concept to reality, we call on the UN Secretary-General to organize a conference under the auspices of the United Nations to

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help mobilize resources for the remediation of contamination at nuclear test sites, and health monitoring and rehabilitation of populations most seriously affected by nuclear testing. States responsible for the testing at major test sites should report to the conference – and on an annual basis thereafter – on their current and future efforts and resource allocations to address the health and environmental impacts of nuclear testing and to rehabilitate populations that have been particularly impacted.

Independent nongovernmental experts, and especially members of affected communities, should be invited to help develop a multi-year program of action.

Reinforcing the Test-ban

There are other actions that should be pursued that would reinforce the *de facto* test moratorium and accelerate CTBT entry into force. Specifically:

1. Responsible states should provide in full and without delay their assessed financial contributions to the CTBTO, fully assist with the completion of the [International Monitoring System] (IMS) networks, and continuously and without interruption transmit data from the monitoring stations to provide the most robust capability to detect and deter clandestine nuclear test explosions. Every state should recognize that the Provisional Technical Secretariat to the [Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization] (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission is – for all practical purposes – no longer “provisional.” The CTBTO and the International Monitoring System and International Data Center (IDC) are now an essential part of today’s 21st century international security architecture that enables all states to detect and deter nuclear test explosions;
2. In order to further reinforce the *de facto* global taboo against nuclear testing and deter any state from considering nuclear test explosions in the future, we call upon the UN Security Council to discuss and outline the penalties that could be imposed in the event that any state breaks this taboo;
3. We urge states armed with nuclear weapons to refrain from pursuing new types of nuclear weapons or modifying weapons in ways that create new military capabilities. Such activities may not violate the letter of the CTBT, but they are contrary to one key purpose, which is to halt the qualitative improvement of nuclear arsenals. We urge all of the states armed with nuclear weapons to adopt clear, “no-new-nuclear-weapons” policies;

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4. We urge nuclear armed states to halt activities at the former sites of nuclear test explosions that might raise concerns about compliance with the CTBT or could undermine the purpose of the treaty by facilitating qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons;
5. Finally, with only nine holdout states on the Annex II list remaining, it is time for CTBT Member States to begin consideration of options for provisional entry into force once all five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) have ratified. After the decades-long journey to achieve a permanent, verifiable global ban on all nuclear weapon test explosions, the international community cannot allow one or two states to thwart the will of the vast majority of the world's nations to bring the CTBT into force.

For decades, nongovernmental organizations and ordinary people the world over have prompted action to achieve a permanent, verifiable prohibition on all nuclear test explosions.

We respectfully urge each of the states present here to consider these recommendations and we look forward to working with you on our common goal of prompt CTBT entry into force.

For the full article text and list of Nongovernmental Organizations endorsing this statement, see:
<http://www.armscontrol.org/events/Article-XIV-Conference-on-Facilitating-CTBT-Entry-Into-Force-NGO-Remarks>

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Russia Reaffirms Strong Support for the CTBT

CTBTO, 03 October 2011, www.ctbto.org

The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Tibor Tóth, visited Moscow from September 27-30, 2011. He held talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov and Deputy Head of Rosatom Vitaly Kamenskiy. During his trip, Tóth also gave lectures at the International Life Journal's foreign policy forum, the Russian Center for Policy Studies (PIR Center) and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) University.

Lavrov confirmed “Russia’s principal position in favor of CTBT [the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty]” as “one of the most important international legal instruments.” For his part, Tóth “valued highly Russia’s consistent policy supporting the CTBT and making it universal, as well as the current level of cooperation between Russia and the CTBTO.”

During Tóth’s meeting with Ryabkov, who participated in the conference to promote the CTBT’s entry into force on September 23, 2011, a wide range of issues relating to the CTBT were discussed. These included the prospects for the treaty’s entry into force as well as various aspects of bilateral cooperation between Russia and the CTBTO, such as the build-up of International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities in Russia. Similar issues were discussed at the Ministry of Defense and at Rosatom.

With 32 IMS stations and radionuclide laboratories, Russia is the second-largest host country after the United States, which has 39. The IMS will consist of 337 facilities when complete, of which 85 percent have been established to date, including 23 facilities in Russia. The pace of installation and certification – the formal approval of meeting the CTBTO’s stringent quality requirements – of Russian stations has increased over recent years. The Russian side expressed its aspiration to complete the build-up of IMS facilities on its territory by 2012, which would make it the first nuclear-weapon possessor state to have done so.

Tóth expressed his optimism for these plans and emphasized that “together with Russia’s already completed ratification, this would send a very strong message to the countries that still have to ratify the treaty and still have to install stations.” Some of the IMS stations in Russia are in extremely remote locations, such as the primary seismic station at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy in Russia’s Far East. This makes their operation and maintenance challenging.

In his presentations to the International Life Journal event, the PIR Center and MGIMO University, Tóth reflected on a number of recent anniversaries. He described the first North

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Korean nuclear test five years ago as a “very unfortunate test – but a test for our system” and a reminder that we “need to plug this hole in the edifice” and close the door on nuclear testing.

Regarding the 15th anniversary of the adoption of the CTBT, Tóth highlighted the accomplishments since then – including near-universality of the treaty and the 85 percent build-up of the verification regime – but underlined that continued perseverance will be necessary to further advance the treaty’s entry into force.

Finally, he recalled the breach of the testing moratorium between the United States and the Soviet Union 50 years ago, which resulted in an unprecedented escalation of nuclear testing and political tension.

Tóth concluded, referring to the CTBT’s entry into force: “We can do it, we should do it – these are the lessons of the last 5, 15 and 50 years.”

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New Pledges for Cluster Bomb Convention

The Daily Star (Lebanon), 14 September 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

By the end of the first working day of a Beirut meeting on the banning of cluster bombs, three new countries had either ratified or expressed their intention to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).

Swaziland, which Tuesday became the 63rd country to ratify the convention, announced it had signed and ratified the agreement during the proceedings of the convention's Second Meeting of State Parties. In the late afternoon, representatives from Italy and the Czech Republic, both already signatories, said that they planned to ratify it soon – Italy said it would do so in "a matter of days," and the Czech Republic said it would ratify near the end of the month. Afghanistan recently became the 62nd country to ratify the convention, doing so in the days before the meeting opened Monday evening.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of the weapons. Countries where the convention is in force – this occurs six months after ratification – must clear contaminated areas within 10 years and destroy existing supplies of the bombs in 8 years. They are also required to provide assistance to victims.

More than 100 countries are represented at the conference, in addition to victims, anti-cluster bomb campaigners, and other [non-governmental organizations] NGOs.

Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour spoke at the meeting's first public session, saying that "Lebanon has suffered and still suffers from the contamination of its land by cluster munitions." The UN has said that Israel dropped some four million cluster bombs in Lebanon during the July 2006 war. Lebanon has reported almost 400 deaths and injuries from the bombs dropped in 2006. The Lebanese Army now says that more than half of its contaminated land has been cleared, and Mansour echoed this statistic, saying that Lebanon "did not stand by before its tragic legacy."

In a statement read by a proxy, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called cluster munitions "unreliable, inaccurate and indiscriminate," and said that "long after hostilities have ended, cluster munitions kill, maim and terrorize civilians." Ban specifically praised the action plan adopted at last year's meeting that emphasizes "partnership, victim assistance and international cooperation."

The convention's victim assistance provision, which was mentioned by Mansour and other delegates during their comments throughout the day, also became a topic of discussion at a

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side event entitled "Surviving the Scourge: Post-War Reconstruction and Development in Lebanon."

After presentations by survivors and humanitarian organizations, Nada Ismael of the Nabatieh-based organization Empower to Live with Independence suggested that the survivors who spoke, both of whom said their prosthetics had significantly improved their lives, gave an over-optimistic view of the state of victim assistance in Lebanon.

Since 2006, Ismael said, her organization has been providing prosthetic limbs to victims of cluster munitions, with the assistance of international organizations. But Ismael said that funding from these groups and the Lebanese government often falls short. "We tell the victims that we can provide you with a limb, but we don't know if we will have one in a few years," she said. "The suffering is greater than how it is being portrayed [at the conference], and I hope that we can discuss a deeper strategy" for helping victims. [...]

The United States, Russia and China are among the major powers who have not signed the convention, but China is still taking part in the meeting. Kang Yong, deputy director-general of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament in China's Foreign Affairs Ministry said Tuesday that the country is concerned about the irresponsible use and transfer of cluster munitions, but believes they can be necessary for national defense. He said China is not in a position to join the convention at this time.

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Italy Files Instrument of Ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

States News Service, 21 September 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

The following information was released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy:

Today in New York, Secretary of State Vincenzo Scotti filed Italy's instrument of ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Convention was opened to ratification in Oslo on December 3, 2008 and has been signed by 108 states. With Italy's ratification the States Parties become 64. Italy was an original member of the group of countries promoting the convention, and strongly supports its universal adoption.

Italian ratification was made possible through the joint efforts of the government, the parliament and the civil society. With this ratification Italy confirms its humanitarian commitment, and more specifically, to putting an end to the unacceptable suffering of civilian populations as a result of cluster munitions.

By this act Italy becomes a Party to all existing international juridical instruments banning weapons with inhuman effects: the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Mine Convention (APLC), the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and its five protocols, and this, the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).

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Nunn-Lugar Destroys Nuclear Warheads, Deadly Chemical Weapons

Press Release U.S. Senator Dick Lugar, 23 September 2011, lugar.senate.gov

“Earlier this month, Americans commemorated 10 years since terrorists launched their assault on our way of life. We know that terrorists would use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons if they had them. Today, we celebrate destroying more of the world’s most deadly weapons, never again having to worry that they will be used against us.”

U.S. Senator Dick Lugar announced the following progress in the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program during June and July 2011.

- 2 nuclear warheads deactivated
- 2 ICBM mobile launchers destroyed
- 7 nuclear weapons transport train shipments, and
- 256.36 metric tons of chemical weapons agent neutralized.

The Nunn-Lugar scorecard now totals:

- 7,601 strategic nuclear warheads deactivated
- 791 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) destroyed
- 498 ICBM silos eliminated
- 182 ICBM mobile launchers destroyed
- 155 bombers eliminated
- 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) destroyed
- 492 SLBM launchers eliminated
- 670 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) eliminated
- 33 nuclear submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles destroyed
- 194 nuclear test tunnels eliminated
- 194 nuclear test tunnels/holes sealed
- Destroyed 2247.3 metric tons of Russian and Albanian chemical weapons agent
- 536 nuclear weapons transport train shipments secured
- Upgraded security at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites
- Built and equipped 34 biological threat monitoring stations.

Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are nuclear weapon free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program. Those countries were the third, fourth and eighth largest nuclear weapon powers in the world.

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Senator Lugar makes annual oversight missions to Nunn-Lugar Global sites around the world. During his most recent mission, Lugar led a mission to East Africa to expand efforts to secure deadly biological threats.

In November 1991, Lugar (R-IN) and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) authored the Nunn-Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. This program has provided U.S. support and expertise to help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle its enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, related materials, and delivery systems.

In 2003, Congress adopted Senator Lugar's Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which authorized operators outside the former Soviet Union to address proliferation threats. In 2004, Nunn-Lugar funds were committed for the first time outside of the former Soviet Union to destroy chemical weapons in Albania, under a Lugar-led expansion of the program. In 2007, Lugar announced the complete destruction of Albania's chemical weapons.

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U.S. Pulls 880 Pounds of Bomb Material from Other Countries

Global Security Newswire, 20 September 2011, gsn.nti.org

The United States has withdrawn roughly 880 pounds of plutonium and highly enriched uranium from multiple nations since Washington hosted the first Global Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, Energy Secretary Steven Chu said on Monday.

The quantities of withdrawn substances represent "enough material to make over 15 nuclear weapons," Chu told delegates to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference in Vienna, Austria.

"We've also downblended [1,543 pounds] of highly enriched uranium from civil nuclear programs to low-enriched uranium, making it unsuitable for use in nuclear weapons," an Energy Department press release quoted the official as saying.

Nearly 50 nations that participated in the summit pledged to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world. Another summit is scheduled for March 2012 in Seoul, South Korea.

Yukiya Amano, IAEA secretary general, said his organization bolstered its nuclear security efforts following the events of September 11, 2001, "to help states protect nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities against malicious acts."

"As the Nuclear Security Report 2011 shows, the number of states participating in our Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) program continues to grow. It now stands at 113," Amano said in released remarks.

"In the year to June 2011, 172 incidents were reported to the ITDB. Fourteen involved activities such as unauthorized possession and/or attempts to sell or smuggle nuclear material or radioactive sources. Another 32 incidents involved the theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive material. Incidents of this nature demonstrate that security weaknesses continue to exist and must be addressed," he said.

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UN Nuclear Body [IAEA] Ends Annual Meeting in Disunity

Reuters, 23 September 2011, www.reuters.com

The United Nations atomic agency ended its annual Member State meeting in disunity late on Friday, with delegates unable to adopt a resolution on a policy area central to its work in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Two Western diplomats accused Iran, Cuba and Egypt – the troika representing non-aligned states within the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] – of blocking attempts to find a consensus on a safeguards resolution.

One of them said the outcome would have no concrete impact on the agency's activities in seeking to make sure nuclear material is not diverted for non-peaceful purposes, a crucial task for the UN body under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). But "visually it is a demonstration of division in an important area," he said. There was no immediate comment from the IAEA missions of Iran, Egypt or Cuba.

The annual General Conference of the IAEA's 151 Member States traditionally adopts a number of texts, setting out general and often vaguely worded policy aspirations and guidelines. But this year's meeting failed to agree on a resolution entitled "Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the model additional protocol."

It had been submitted by some 30 Western countries, most of them from Europe. "Egypt, Iran and Cuba refused to accept any resolution on procedural grounds," the diplomat said.

Safeguards refer to measures undertaken by IAEA inspectors to discover any attempt by non-nuclear weapon states to use atomic technology or material for developing weapons – for example regular visits and camera surveillance of sites.

The diplomat said Iran, Cuba and Egypt wanted to include language in the resolution giving the agency a role in nuclear disarmament, apparently reflecting frustration on their part at the lack of fast progress on this issue. Such a role was unacceptable to the five recognized nuclear weapon states – the United States, China, Russia, France and Britain – which believe the IAEA is not the right forum for this, he said. [...]

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IAEA 2011 General Conference Concludes

International Atomic Energy Agency, 23 September 2011, www.iaea.org

At its 55th regular session, the IAEA General Conference drew together about 3,000 participants for a five-day meeting from September 19-23, 2011.

Elections: At its opening, on September 19, Mr. Cornel Feruță of Romania was elected President of the 55th IAEA General Conference. Mr. Feruță is Romania's Ambassador and Resident Representative to the IAEA.

New Member States Applications: The General Conference approved the applications of the Commonwealth of Dominica, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Kingdom of Tonga for membership in the IAEA. Membership will take effect once the appropriate legal instruments are deposited with the Agency.

General Debate: During the course of the general debate, 120 delegates and observers delivered statements.

Water Crisis: Focusing on the water crisis, the IAEA Scientific Forum demonstrated how nuclear techniques are being used by IAEA Member States to improve access to water, as well as to better manage and conserve this precious resource.

Action Plan on Nuclear Safety: On September 22, 2011, the IAEA General Conference unanimously endorsed the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety that Ministers in their Declaration at the IAEA's June Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety requested.

Budget and Resolutions: The General Conference also approved the IAEA's Program and Budget for 2012-2013, as well as a number of resolutions including:

- Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety;
- Nuclear security, including measures to protect against nuclear and radiological terrorism;
- Strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities;
- Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications in both power and non-power nuclear applications;
- Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

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- Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East; and
- Personnel matters including staffing of the Agency's Secretariat and women in the Secretariat.

In addition, the Conference decided that the Director General shall report to the 56th regular session of the General Conference in September 2012 on the implementation of GC(54)/RES/11, *Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol*.

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Russia: Expert Says U.S. Should Be Pressed on BMD-Related Violations of INF Treaty [OPINION]

Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, 16 September 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis
Author: Midykhat Petrovich Vildanov is a major general, professor of the Academy of Military Sciences, candidate of military sciences, honored military specialist of the Russian Federation.

[Translation note: Use hereunder of the term "intermediate-range missile" has been restricted to the actual title and the cited provisions of the INF Treaty. Elsewhere, the terms "medium-range missile" or "MRBM" have been preferred, on the basis of the position expressed by the author at the end of the second paragraph following the "Playing with Terminology and Targets" subheading, and reiterated later in the article.]

According to statements from officials, the negotiations and various consultations involving experts of the Russian Federation and the United States (NATO) to resolve problems associated with a European missile defense have become deadlocked. The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated: "It is not proving possible to reach agreement on the main issue, namely written and legally binding guarantees that the European missile defense is not directed against Russia. NATO, however, is urging that we take its word for it that the missile defense system will not be used against Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces."

Russia's permanent representative at NATO, Dmitriy Rogozin, has stated: "Irrespective of negotiations with the Russian Federation and the European partners, the plans for the creation of a U.S. missile defense will be implemented in full." This is entirely understandable: While we are preparing all-embracing threat analyses, the Americans, in flagrant violation of key provisions of the unlimited-duration INF Treaty (Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles), are conducting successful tests of a European missile defense system involving the interception of shorter-range and medium-range target missiles – the development, production, and testing of which are prohibited by this treaty. The said conclusion is confirmed by the following arguments, which reflect the author's personal position.

Proliferation of MRBM

The INF Treaty was signed in Washington 8 December 1987 and came into force 1 June 1988. Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (BRSD) [MRBM] of the Pioner, R-12, and R-14 type, RK-55 ground-launched cruise missiles (KRNБ) [GLCM], and shorter-range ballistic missiles – the OTR-22 and OTR-23 (Oka) – were subject to elimination by 1991. The United States made provision to eliminate the Pershing-2 MRBM, the BGM-109G GLCM, and Pershing-1A shorter-range missiles (RMD). The outcome was the elimination on the territory of Russia and other former USSR republics of: 1,846 missiles, 825 launchers, and 812 front sections.

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The United States destroyed: 846 missiles, 289 launchers, and 442 front sections. It is essential to point out that the elimination of the Soviet missiles was effected by the explosive demolition method, while 72 Pioneer MRBMs were eliminated via launch from their field positions. The results demonstrated the missile complexes' high level of reliability, the strategic missile-men's excellent standard of training, and the accuracy of delivery to dummy installations on the Kura combat field, thereby eliciting the genuine admiration of the American inspectors. Elimination of the American missiles, though, was conducted by the burning method, with retention of sections housing the control system, which have been utilized in the manufacture of medium-range target missiles.

In October 2007 the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation put forward an initiative to give the INF Treaty global application. The idea was backed by the Americans, and this enabled a Joint Statement to be prepared and circulated at the 62d Session of the UN General Assembly. Washington even expressed the confidence that a universal repudiation of medium-range and shorter-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles with a range of 500-5500 km would contribute to strengthening the international nuclear missile nonproliferation regime.

Encouraged by America's support, the Russian side proposed the conclusion of a multilateral agreement based on the INF Treaty. What was envisaged was this: repudiation of the production of medium-range and shorter-range missiles and of flights tests of their stages and launchers; elimination by an agreed deadline of all medium-range and shorter-range missiles, their launchers, and associated accessory structures and equipment; the establishment of rules to define the type of medium-range and shorter-range missile and GLCM, their stationing deployment, and the procedure for their movement; the implementation of elimination and verification procedures.

At the same time, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, the DPRK, and other countries in possession of MRBMs are not actually thinking of joining the INF Treaty. The leaders of these states are convinced that nuclear-tipped medium-range and shorter-range ballistic missiles are an effective means of deterring potential adversaries. So, China is devoting particular attention to building up the combat strength of its grouping of Dong Feng-31A and Dong Feng-21C ground-mobile missile complexes and testing the advanced ground-mobile Dong Feng-41. It should be mentioned that the majority of strategic and critically important administrative-political and military installations of the Russian Federation's Eastern Region are within reach of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and MRBMs.

It is appropriate to recall that the eastern grouping of Pioneer and upgraded Pioneer-UTTKh ground-mobile missile complexes was destroyed in line with the INF Treaty's so-called zero

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option. It is essential in this connection to specify clearly the system of regional nuclear deterrence of potential adversaries in terms of deployment of the corresponding forces and assets, particularly within the borders of responsibility of the Western and Eastern Military Districts.

Playing with Terminology and Targets

It seems expedient here to recall key provisions of the INF Treaty that the American side is deliberately violating for the purpose of testing elements of a global and European missile defense. So, Article I emphasizes: "Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and not have such systems thereafter."

Point 5 of Article II specifies that "The term 'intermediate-range missile' means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers." Point 6 of this same chapter says that "The term 'shorter-range missile' means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers." It should be emphasized that, without coordination or agreement with the Russian side, the Americans independently introduced and are employing the term "intermediate-range missile" ["raketa promezhutochnoy dalnosti"].

Next, Article VI stipulates that neither Party "shall produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles." And, finally, Point 12 of Article VII – which the Americans deem the most powerful argument and which they use to justify their actions – says: "Each Party has the right to produce and use for booster systems only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster SV stems are not considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves."

It seems apparent that payloads being placed in the upper layers of the atmosphere or being put into space may constitute such objects. The Americans, however, are not conducting any research involving the placement of objects in space within the scope of the INF Treaty. On the other hand, booster stages (Minuteman-2, Trident-1, Castor, and others) are being used as the basis for manufacture of the target missiles Hera (range up to 1200 km), LRALT (up to 2000 km), and MRT (up to 1100 km), which are mobilized for test launches of interceptor missiles, and this does signify a violation of the requirements of the above-cited treaty articles.

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In this connection, January 4, 2001 saw the emergence of the first timid statement from the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The United States has experience in creating, on the basis of Minuteman-2 ICBM second and third stages, the Hera new-type medium-range GLBM target missile in violation of the INF Treaty. The issue of U.S. violations of the START 1 Treaty and INF Treaty has been repeatedly raised by the Russian side at various levels. No satisfactory response has yet ensued from the American side, however."

Inasmuch as the Americans have not actually considered halting tests of elements of the missile defense system, the next Russian Federation Foreign Ministry statement was made August 7, 2010, at the height of the "reset" episode: "The American side is systematically violating the main provisions of the INF Treaty by utilizing Hera-, LRALT-, and MRT-type target missiles simulating medium-range ballistic missiles to develop and perfect elements of a missile defense system. In accordance with the INF Treaty, launches of these missiles are classed as tests of 'new-type' medium-range GLBMs, which is a violation of Article VI."

In the opinion of Academician Yuriy Solomonov, general designer of the unique Topol, Topol-M, and Yars ground-mobile missile complexes and the Bulava missile, "the Americans have essentially created a medium-range missile in violation of the INF Treaty." I think Yuriy Semenovitch has presented Russian officials and experts with an authoritative and convincing argument for the defense of Russia's national security interests in the strategic offensive arms and missile defense spheres.

Hence, the Russian side's indecisive actions have created favorable conditions for the Americans to develop and test a global and European missile defense. Specialists are remarking on the fact that tests of the Standard-3 Block 1A interceptor missile are notable for the high success rate: Of 27 intercept-mission launches, 22 have been described as successful, although the launch of a sea-based interceptor in September this year ended in failure. The flights of target missiles from the moment of launch to their destruction is monitored by two space tracking and surveillance satellites, which are also undergoing testing.

According to information from the U.S. Defense Department's Missile Defense Agency, the most important stage of tests of the European segment of a global missile defense, associated with the interception of medium and so-called intermediate-range missiles, has been completed. Furthermore, the NATO leadership has made the decision to deploy on Turkish territory an AN/TPY-2 mobile radar with a maximum range of ballistic target detection, identification, and tracking of up to 1500 km, including territory of the Southern Military District.

As far as tests and launches of GBI interceptors from silos at the Vandenberg base are concerned, four out of 10 launches have been adjudged successful. According to specialists'

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assessments, the combat capabilities of these interceptors do not yet match the stated tactical and performance requirements. Nevertheless, 30 of them have already been deployed (26 at Fort Greely, Alaska, and four at the Vandenberg base in California), and their modification and upgrading continues. It should be emphasized that the American military are combining the majority of interceptor missile launches with operational and combat training measures for the U.S. strategic defensive forces and with training drills for combat crews of the nuclear missile attack warning system.

It is predicted that tests of elements of a European missile defense system using the sea- and land-based Standard-3 Block 2B missile capable of hitting strategic ballistic missiles will be successfully completed by 2020. In this connection, statements by Russian Federation officials concerning the necessity for us to be provided with written legal commitments and guarantees that the European missile defense system that is being created will not diminish the combat capabilities of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces would appear to be naive. It may be asserted that the Americans and the NATO members will violate their own written guarantees. Experience of the implementation of the ABM, INF, START 1, START 2, SORT, and CFE Treaties provides graphic evidence of this!

Conclusions and Proposals

It is a perplexing situation whereby American violations of the provisions of the INF Treaty have not yet become a matter of concern for the Russian Federation's highest military-political leadership, nor the subject of meetings between leaders of the Russian and U.S. defense and foreign policy departments, or of discussions in the specialist committees of the State Duma and the Federation Council, and so forth. Nor have we heard critical assessments and intelligent proposals from Russian bureaucrats, the "overseers" of the "reset" in Russian-American relations, and the various experts and "wise men."

In this author's opinion, the unlimited-duration INF Treaty has been deliberately forgotten, and there is no mechanism for keeping track of it. Notification procedures, verification and inspection procedures, and minimum quotas for their implementation for an indefinite period have not been elaborated. The results of mutual verification via the national technical means of verification belonging to the Russian Federation and the United States are not being analyzed. It is also unclear if the Conciliation Commission on Verification and Inspections (SKSI) [CCVI] or the Bilateral Consultative Commission (DKK) [BCC], which could settle certain contentious issues, are active within the scope of this treaty. Issues such as, for instance, notification by the Americans of test launches of GBI interceptors from the Vandenberg base silos, which may in the future entail the submission of complaints by Russia and China.

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The formulation and content of individual terms and definitions require urgent clarification. Hence, the outdated definition of cruise missiles (Point 2 of Article II of the INF Treaty) prohibits the Russian Federation and the United States from possessing unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and although the parties are aware of this, they are remaining silent, because UAVs are in service with the armed forces of the Russian Federation, the United States, and other states of the world. For example, buying and selling UAVs involves a breach of the INF Treaty. Furthermore, in the not too distant future the American side will be moving to the stage of testing the European missile defense system for the interception of strategic ballistic missiles. It is entirely reasonable to ask what the nature of these missiles is, whether they are "new-type" or "existing," and how they are presented in the new START Treaty, and so on and so forth.

In conclusion, it is essential to make the point that, given the political will, the Russian side could make intelligent use of American violations of the INF Treaty provisions and demand a halt to testing of a global and European missile defense, prior to the total resolution of contentious issues and the removal of our concerns.

[Description of Source: Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online in Russian – Website of weekly military newspaper published by Remchukov's Nezavisimaya Gazeta; URL: <http://nvo.ng.ru>]

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U.S. Weighs further Strategic Nuke Reductions

Global Security Newswire, 22 September 2011, gsn.nti.org

A U.S. nuclear arsenal assessment now under way is intended to support a bid by President Obama to implement further reductions to the nation's strategic deterrent, the Washington Times on Wednesday quoted government insiders as saying. "The administration has made up its mind that they want to go lower, and the only way to go lower is to change the military requirements for how many weapons are needed," one informed U.S. government source said.

The forthcoming report has been described as a "mini-NPR," in reference to the administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. The new assessment would examine potential additional reductions beyond those mandated in the New START treaty, prompting fears among some public-sector security specialists that U.S. nuclear weapons might eventually prove less useful in containing Russian and Chinese aggression. Moscow and Beijing are updating their own arsenals.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller last month acknowledged the potential for further nuclear reductions, the Times reported. "The United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons," possibly by way of a U.S.-Russian deal addressing both sides' active-duty and reserve arsenals of strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, she said then.

White House point man for arms control and nonproliferation Gary Samore in May confirmed the nuclear arsenal assessment was in progress. "We'll need to do a strategic review of what our force requirements are, and then, based on that, the president will have options available for additional reductions," Samore told Arms Control Today. "That review is ongoing."

The report's preparation has been drawn out because "we've reached the level in our forces where further reductions will raise questions about whether we retain the triad, or whether we go to a system that only is a dyad," Samore said. The "nuclear triad" refers to the nation's land-, air- and sea-based nuclear deterrent; it is uncertain which leg of the deterrent, if any, might be considered for elimination in the forthcoming Pentagon review.

"Even unilateral" arsenal reductions could be an option if no deal on reductions is reached, he said.

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The New START Treaty and the CTBT: Two Essential Steps toward Fulfilling the Prague Agenda

U.S. Department of State, 19 September 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Ellen Tauscher, U.S. Department of State Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, at Women's Action for New Directions (WAND)

Good afternoon. I am pleased to be here with so many successful, motivated, and patriotic women dedicated to making our nation safer and the world more peaceful. [...] I've been asked to speak about two specific steps related to disarmament and nonproliferation: the New START Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The first is a success story in the making, while the second seems like a never-ending story. But this Administration and I are determined to see it through to a happy ending. [...]

New START

[B]y negotiating and ratifying the New START Treaty with Russia...the two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals [are obligated] to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to their lowest levels since the 1950s. Since the treaty entered into force in February, we have...exchanged data, held exhibitions, and notified each other on the status of our strategic forces. Indeed, we have exchanged more than 1,300 notifications.

And we are conducting on-site inspections. To date, the United States has conducted 10 inspections in Russia, while Russia has conducted 9 inspections in the United States. Without the New START Treaty, our inspectors would not have been able to put their boots on the ground at Russian weapons bases. The access and information provided by the New START Treaty enhances predictability and stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. The risks of miscalculation, misunderstanding, and mistrust would be significantly greater without the New START Treaty.

As we implement New START, we are preparing for further nuclear reduction negotiations with Russia and, eventually, other countries. Our overall objective with Russia is to seek future reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons: strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed. Under the President's direction, the U.S. Government is reviewing our nuclear requirements. The Departments of Defense and State and other agencies will consider what forces the United States needs to maintain strategic stability and deterrence. Potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures will be evaluated.

As we consider further reductions, we are making the investments to ensure the United States will retain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal so long as nuclear weapons exist. Our intention over the next 10 years is to invest \$88 billion in the nation's nuclear infrastructure.

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It may seem counterintuitive, but these investments will allow greater reductions because the same infrastructure is used to eliminate warheads. And with greater confidence and capability in our infrastructure and people, we will not have to keep so many warheads in reserve. A healthy and robust infrastructure also means we do not have to test nuclear weapons, which is something that we have not done since 1992. Despite abiding by the CTBT's main obligation – not testing – for nearly 20 years, the CTBT remains politically controversial.

CTBT

Our goal going forward is to leave the politics aside and explain to the Senate and the public why the CTBT will enhance our national security. This is something that I hope all of you can help us do. Our case for treaty ratification consists of three primary arguments:

- One, the United States no longer needs to conduct nuclear explosive tests;
- Two, a CTBT that has entered into force will obligate other states not to test and provide a disincentive for states to conduct such tests; and
- Three, we now have a greater ability to detect testing, a capability that will be enhanced by the CTBT, including its monitoring system and inspection provisions.

Let me take these points one by one.

First, from 1945 to 1992, the United States conducted more than 1,000 nuclear explosive tests – more than all other nations combined. The cumulative data gathered from these tests have provided an impressive foundation of knowledge for us to base the continuing effectiveness of our arsenal. But historical test data alone is insufficient.

Well over a decade ago, we launched an extensive and rigorous Stockpile Stewardship program that has enabled our nuclear weapons laboratories to carry out essential surveillance and warhead life extensions.

Every year for the past 15 years, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy from both Democratic and Republican Administrations, and the directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories have certified that our arsenal is safe, secure, and effective. And each year they have affirmed that we do not need to conduct explosive nuclear tests.

The lab directors tell us that Stockpile Stewardship has provided a deeper understanding of our arsenal than they ever had when testing was commonplace. We know more now about our nuclear weapons than when we used explosive testing. Think about that for a moment.

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Our current efforts go a step beyond explosive testing by enabling the labs to anticipate problems in advance and reduce their potential impact on our arsenal – something that nuclear testing could not do. I, for one, would not trade our successful approach based on world-class science and technology for a return to explosive testing.

Despite the narrative put forward by some, this Administration inherited an underfunded and underappreciated nuclear complex. We have worked tirelessly to fix that situation and ensure our complex has every asset needed to achieve its mission, and to do it without explosive testing.

The President has committed to programs that we believe require an investment of \$88 billion in funding over the next decade. These investments will help maintain a modern nuclear arsenal, retain a modern nuclear weapons production complex, and nurture a highly trained workforce. At a time when every part of the budget is under the microscope, our pledge to pursue these programs demonstrates our commitment and should not be discounted. To those who doubt our commitment, I ask them to put their doubts aside and invest the hard work to support our budget requests in the Congress.

I do not believe that even the most vocal critics of the CTBT want to resume explosive nuclear testing. What they have chosen instead is a status quo where the United States refrains from testing without using that fact to lock in a legally binding global ban that would significantly benefit the United States.

Second, a CTBT that has entered into force will hinder other states from advancing their nuclear weapons capabilities. Were the CTBT to enter into force, states interested in pursuing or advancing a nuclear weapons program would risk either deploying weapons that might not work or incur international condemnation and sanctions for testing.

While states can build a crude first generation nuclear weapon without conducting nuclear explosive tests, they would have trouble going further with any confidence. Without explosive testing, more established nuclear weapons states seeking to deploy advanced nuclear weapon capabilities that deviated significantly from previously tested designs also would have serious doubts about reliability.

Third, we have become very good at detecting explosive testing. If you test, there is a very high risk of getting caught. Upon the treaty's entry into force, the United States would use the International Monitoring System (IMS) to complement our own state of the art national technical means to verify the treaty.

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In 1999 when the Senate first considered the CTBT, not a single certified IMS station or facility existed. We understand why some senators had doubts about its future, untested capabilities. But today the IMS is nearing completion. 286 of 337 monitoring facilities have been installed. They work and provide valuable data all day, every day.

While IMS capabilities continue to grow, our national technical means remain second to none and we continue to improve them. Taken together, these verification tools would make it difficult for any state to conduct nuclear tests that escape detection.

We have a strong case for CTBT ratification. We look forward to objective voices providing their opinions on this important issue. Soon, the National Academy of Sciences, a trusted and unbiased voice on scientific issues, will release an unclassified report examining the treaty from a technical perspective. The report will look at how U.S. ratification would impact our ability to maintain our nuclear arsenal and our ability to detect and verify explosive nuclear tests.

Let me conclude by saying that successful U.S. ratification of the CTBT will help facilitate greater international cooperation on the other elements of the President's Prague Agenda. It will strengthen our leverage with the international community to pressure defiant regimes like those in Iran and North Korea as they engage in illicit nuclear activities. We will have greater credibility when encouraging other states to pursue and enforce nonproliferation objectives.

In short, ratification helps us get more of what we want. We give up nothing by ratifying the CTBT. We recognize that a Senate debate over ratification will be spirited, vigorous, and likely contentious. The debate in 1999, unfortunately, was too short and too politicized. The treaty was brought to the floor without the benefit of extensive Committee hearings or significant input from Administration officials and outside experts. We will not repeat those mistakes. We are committed to taking a bipartisan and fact-based approach with the Senate.

For Republicans who voted against the treaty in 1999 and might feel bound by that vote, we have one message: Don't be. The times have changed. Stockpile Stewardship works. We have made significant advances in our ability to detect nuclear testing. As my good friend George Shultz likes to say, those who opposed the treaty in 1999 can say they were right, but they would be right to vote for the treaty today.

A nuclear test-ban has been sought for more than 50 years. President Obama has said that the elimination of nuclear weapons might not happen in his lifetime. Progress on nuclear issues often seems agonizingly slow. But we cannot and must not shy away from the task of adjusting our nuclear policies to 21st century realities just because it is difficult. As President Obama said, we will get there with your persistence. Thank you. I am happy to answer any questions.

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Second Yars Missile Regiment to be Put on Combat Duty by Year End

ITAR-TASS, 26 September 2011, www.itar-tass.com

The second missile regiment armed with the land-based mobile missile system Yars will be put on combat duty before the end of 2011 at the Teikovo missile formation, Commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) Lieutenant-General Sergei Karakayev told reporters.

He recalled that the Teikovo missile formation (Ivanovo region) completed the transition of the first [Russian Federation] (RF) Armed Forces regiment to this new missile system. "On March 4 the missile regiment took up combat duty in two divisions; and from August 5 in the full staff with three divisions," the commander stressed. At present, he said, "the retraining of personnel of another missile regiment that is planned for rearmament with the Yars system continues."

Compared to its predecessor – the Topol (Poplar) missile system – the Yars land-based mobile missile system is equipped with the RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that has considerably better combat and operational capabilities. Thus, the Yars system is better protected from technical reconnaissance equipment of the potential enemy and their combat equipment is adapted to fulfill the tasks of missile defense.

According to Karakayev, "The adoption for service of the RS-24 missile will strengthen the combat capabilities of the RVSN strike group to overcome missile defense systems that will strengthen the nuclear deterrent potential of the Russian strategic nuclear forces."

The RS-24 missile with separable warhead was designed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT). It was created with the scientific, technical and technological solutions used in the Topol-M missile system, which significantly reduced the time and of the research and development. This missile will replace the RS-18 and RS-20 missiles with multiple warheads. According to the RF Defense Ministry plans, by the end of this year about 30 mobile launchers of the Topol-M and Yars systems will be put on combat duty in the Teikovo force.

The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (Federal State Unitary Enterprise) is a Russian (and former Soviet) scientific research institute that was founded on May 13, 1946. The institute is located in the Otradnoye District in the north of Moscow. Previously, it was primarily focused on developing ballistic missiles and rockets to increase the nation's strategic deterrent capability. Today it is also involved in civilian projects and has modified some of its intercontinental ballistic missiles into launch vehicles to be used for satellites. In July 2009 the institute's General Director and Chief designer Yuri Solomonov resigned after the 11th test launch failure of the Bulava naval-based ICBM designed by MITT. The launch took place on July 15 and Solomonov resigned as General Director 6 days later – on July 21st.

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The RS-24 Yars is a Russian [multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles] (MIRV)-equipped, thermonuclear ICBM first tested on May 29, 2007 after a secret military [research and development] (R&D) project to replace the older R-36 and UR-100N that had been already used almost for 50 years. RS-24 is a missile that is heavier than the current Topol-M (which can carry up to 10 independently targetable warheads). The 2007 tests were publicized as a response to the missile shield the United States was planning to deploy in Europe. RS-24 is deployed operationally since 2010.

Purported by the Russian government as being designed to defeat present and potential anti-missile systems, the ICBM was launched from a mobile launcher at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in north-western Russia and its test warheads landed on target about 5,750 km (3,600 mi) away at the Kura Test Range in Far Eastern Kamchatka Peninsula. The second launch from Plesetsk to Kura Test Range was conducted on December 25, 2007 at 13:10 GMT. It successfully reached its destination. The third successful launch from the Plesetsk space center in northwest Russia was conducted on November 26, 2008 at 13:20 GMT. The missile's multiple re-entry vehicles successfully landed on targets on the Kura testing range.

Neither the development nor deployment of RS-24 is likely to be threatened by the enforcement of the New START treaty.

In June 2008, chief designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology Yuri Solomonov announced that the RS-24 was an enhanced, MIRV development of the Topol-M missile that would finish all testing in 2008 and most likely be deployed in 2009. According to General Nikolai Solovtsov, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, the first RS-24 missiles would be deployed in Teikovo in 2009.

On March 17, 2009 General Solovtsov announced that the first regiment of RS-24 ICBMs would be put into service in December 2009, when START-1 was set to expire. He later repeated that statement on May 7, 2009. According to the Russian missile forces, the first six RS-24 missiles would then be mobile. Further, on October 10, 2009, General Andrei Shvaichenko, the new SRF commander, confirmed the December 2009 deployment of the RS-24 which will support the existing Topol-M (RS-12I2) missile complex. Testing for the new-generation ICBM was completed in mid-July 2010, and the first missiles were deployed shortly after on July 19, 2010.

In December 2010 the missile division in Teikovo received its second delivery of RS-24 missile systems. In total 6 missiles were deployed by the end of 2010. Three more mobile missile systems were deployed in July 2011 and then the first regiment was operational.

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Russian Defense Ministry to Dispose of Typhoon-Class Submarines

BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 04 October 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

The Project 941 (Akula) strategic missile submarines (RPKSN) – better known under the name "Typhoon" – will be written off before 2014, and will be cut up as scrap metal, Izvestia has learned at the Ministry of Defense. Falling under the knife will be all three of those submarines still afloat – the Dmitriy Donskoy, Arkhangelsk, and Severstal.

Those in the military explain that using these submarines for their direct purpose is not possible in connection with [New START] treaty limitations, and reconstructing them would be prohibitively expensive. However, at Sevmash, where the submarines of this class were built, they say that it would be possible to turn the missile submarines into underwater gas tankers or all-season naval freight haulers.

"We are prepared to study other variants for their use – the boats could be used to transport compressed natural gas, oil, or other cargo under the northern ice for ports in the polar region. Such reconstruction would not be very expensive either," the not-disheartened shipbuilders said.

Those in the military explain that the Typhoons' career was spoiled by the Boreys – the new submarines being built at Sevmash for the Bulava missiles. Their successful testing made keeping the much larger and more expensive Typhoon submarines senseless.

"The Borey's crew is one and a half times smaller than the Typhoon's, and the cost of maintaining the boats themselves are also different. Meanwhile, the Borey is a much more modern submarine, which is several times more difficult to detect in the water," those in the military argue.

At the same time, at the Ministry of Defense they explained that any attempt to reconstruct the submarine would cost tens of billions of rubles. "It would be better to spend that money on new ships," a military department representative noted.

The fate of the gigantic submarine was predetermined by the New START treaty, which was signed by the presidents of Russia and the United States in the spring of 2010. [New START] limits the strategic arsenal of each country to 1,550 nuclear warheads, while the new Project 955 Borey-class submarines and the Project 667BDRM Delfin [Delta IV] submarines remaining in the arsenal can accommodate more than 1,100 warheads.

The remaining 400 or so warheads will be held by Long-Range Aviation and the RVSN. There is simply no room left for these Typhoons with these limits. One Typhoon can carry 120-200

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nuclear warheads, and the entire fleet of such submarines could 'eat up' almost one quarter of Russia's allowed nuclear arsenal.

Military expert Reserve Captain First Rank Konstantin Sivkov believes that the Typhoons could very well be kept for other needs. "Their enormous internal capacity would allow for accommodating a variety of weapons and equipment or making them cruise missile platforms. The United States took a similar path, updating four Ohio-class submarines to carry cruise missiles. Now those boats can be used for special operations, as floating bases for military divers and mini-submarines. Such boats would suit us well too," Sivkov told Izvestia.

At the same time, the president of the Institute for Strategic Assessments, Aleksandr Konovalov, noted that the Typhoons' day has gone for good. "It is a gigantic thing, the largest in the world, with three hulls, and it is very expensive to maintain. And on top of all that there are no missiles for them," Konovalov stated. As he put it, disposal of the Typhoons could run several hundred million rubles, which is significantly less than it would cost to re-outfit them for other needs.

[BBC Source: Text of report by the website of pro-government Russian newspaper Izvestiya on September 28; Ilya Kramnik report: "Gigantic 'Typhoons' to be Cut Up for Scrap Metal – The largest submarines in the world did not fit within the limits of the START Treaty."]

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Russia's Vega Radio Factory Develops, Installs New Instruments for Tu-214ON

Moscow AviaPort in Russian, 05 September 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

As part of the state defense order, OAO [Open Joint Stock Company] Vega Radio Construction Concern has developed a complex [package] of equipment and devices and has installed them on a Tu-214ON (Otkrytoye Nebo [Open Skies]) aircraft for the fulfillment of missions included in the Open Skies [Treaty] international program. This [was announced] at the MAKS-2011 [Moscow Air and Space] Expo.

"Flights for monitoring military activity are being performed rather intensively. In 2008 [the 500th flight was flown], and one may assume that in the very near future we will witness the 1,000th flight as part of the [Open Skies] Treaty now in effect. In 2001, Russia ratified the treaty, and on Russia's part An-30B and Tu-154 aircraft have been operating with extremely obsolete aerial photography devices," said Vladimir Verba, the General Director of the Concern.

The Open Skies Treaty was signed by 34 countries of the world, including Russia and Belarus. The composition of the on-board special equipment and devices for performing the monitoring missions is specified by the treaty. The equipment can include aerial photographic devices, TV and [infra-red] (IR) cameras, and a side-looking, synthetic aperture radar. Also defined are the qualitative characteristics of these devices. The resolution must be [no more than] 30 centimeters for the aerial photographic device and the TV camera, 3 meters for the side-looking radar, and 50 centimeters for the IR camera.

The Vega Concern is creating an aviation system for Open Skies monitoring. This system is self-sufficient and it includes everything needed for obtaining information and for checking and exchanging information. The system includes the aircraft, the on-board equipment complex, and two ground systems for processing information, as well as all essential means for verification and training.

Russia has settled on the selection of the Tu-214 aircraft as the airborne platform for the equipment. The equipment developed by the Vega Concern has been installed on a Tu-214 which has been designated as the Tu-214ON. The first Tu-214ON aircraft produced by the Kazan Aviation Production Association (KAPO) was displayed at MAKS-2011. The appearance of the Tu-214ON aircraft in Russia has received great publicity. During the expo the aircraft was visited by representatives of Italy, Norway, Canada, and the United States, who familiarized themselves with the system and gave it very high marks.

The second Tu-214ON aircraft is currently in the component assembly phase at the KAPO final assembly shop. Presently the financing of the construction of the second aircraft for participation in the Open Skies Program is a rather contentious issue.

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The problem is that a certain interruption in the financing of the manufacturing of the second Tu-214ON is linked to the transition from a film aerial photography device to a digital one. Documentation must be redone and certain concurrences must be obtained, and all of this has led to a certain shift of the aircraft's delivery schedule "to the right."

OAO Tupolev has made dozens of modifications to the Tu-214 to fulfill the most varied of missions for not only the armed forces, but also for other armed organizations in the country. There are several special-purpose aircraft projects for the Ministry of Defense. A main customer for KAPO is the President's Administration of Affairs, for whom the aircraft plant has produced three aircraft types (two of which are in operation, and the third aircraft will be built in 2011). KAPO also works with other agencies that need special aircraft. Thanks to OAO Tupolev's groundwork, KAPO has accumulated much experience in building special aircraft, including relay aircraft, airborne command and control posts, communication platforms, etc. In addition, work is being done on the special purpose aircraft in the Fraktsiya [Fraction] program.

At first glance, one may think that KAPO aims at producing one of a kind special aircraft. But today the KAPO is not depending on large-scale series production (such as, for example, the Il-62 and the Tu-154). In discussing future special purpose aircraft based on the Tu-214, one should note the large numbers of special purpose aircraft in use by the RF [Russian Federation] MChS [Ministry of Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of Natural Disasters] and the RF FSB [Federal Security Service] that need to be replaced. It is entirely understandable that such aircraft will not be from Boeing and Airbus. They can only be a product of domestic aviation engineering.

The diversity of the activities of the Vega Concern should be noted. For example, in response to tasking by the Ministry of Defense, the concern's enterprises have been engaged in intensive modernization of the A-50 long-range radar detection, targeting and command and control system. The first modernized A-50U system with digital information processing has already been received into the RF Armed Forces inventory.

The Russian State Armament Program for the Period to 2020 provides for the modernization of these systems and the Concern is "on schedule" to complete the work, and the Ministry of Defense is ensuring their timely financing. In addition, in a joint project with the Israeli Company IAI, an export version of a similar system to India has been successfully implemented. The Vega Concern created the system to meet India's requirements, and three of such aircraft already are located in India. Vega was responsible for the communication, intercept and command and control of this system, and the work of the Vega Concern received high marks on the part of India.

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Today the Vega Concern is working on the creation of the advanced radio-electronics system for replacing the fleet of A-50 and A-50U aircraft. The engineering level of a country and of its defense industry complex is defined by many products, and the creation of such an aircraft system ranks at very top of such a list. Only three states in the world are able to create such systems. "Here we are creating such a new system, and after several years the Concern will offer it for testing. The work is progressing at full speed. The specialists of the Concern have managed to resolve several very difficult engineering tasks at the level of inventions, and they have all been patented in the Russian Federation," noted the General Director of Vega Concern.

A radar which is being installed on the small Kondor-E spacecraft has been created at enterprises of the Concern. The resolution capability of this radar is 1-2 meters. A flying model of the radar has already been delivered to NPO [Science and Production Association] Mashinostroyeniya [Machine Building] at Reutov. For the first time in the history of the [Soviet Union] and Russia a domestic radar for export is being created, and developmental work is continuing on a new radar which will scan the surface of the sea. It must obtain an image with an intercept bandwidth in the thousands of kilometers.

The Vega Concern is also working on the creation of advanced unpiloted aerial reconnaissance and observation systems using unpiloted aerial vehicles (BLA's [UAV's]). It is possible that the first flight will be made this year of the Luch UAV, a new development of the Vega Concern using the engineering groundwork of the piloted Sigma-5 light aircraft.

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Russian Military Inspectors will Perform an Observation Flight above the United States

Defense and Security (Russia), 28 September 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis

[The] official spokesperson of the Russian Defense Ministry reported, "In the framework of the international Open Skies Treaty, a Russian group of inspectors plan to perform an observation flight [in a] Tu-154 Lk-1 airplane above the territory of the United States in the period between September 26 and October 1."

The airplane will depart from [the] American airfield [at] Travis [AFB], California, and will perform a flight 4,200 kilometers long. This will be the 27th flight above the territories of the countries that participate in the treaty this year.

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