



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



19 April – 02 May 2011

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GENERAL ARMS CONTROL

Security Council Extends Mandate of UN Committee on Weapons of Mass Destruction

United Nations News Centre, 20 April 2011, www.un.org

The Security Council today extended for 10 years the mandate of a committee tasked with monitoring a United Nations resolution on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and requested it to carry out a comprehensive review of the implementation of the text. (332 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

Lack of Global Security Rules for Biodefense Labs Worries Experts

Global Security Newswire, 29 April 2011; www.globalsecuritynewswire.org

The proliferation of laboratories around the world that study potentially lethal disease materials has not been accompanied by widespread institution of security rules and safeguards against accidents or terrorist threats, Miller-McCune magazine reported on Wednesday. (564 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Bioweapons Convention Useful in Preventing Pandemic Disease

U.S. Mission to Geneva, 02 May 2011, geneva.usmission.gov

Ambassador Laura Kennedy, U.S. permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament and U.S. special representative for BWC issues, said April 29 that the treaty has special significance to countries that are concerned with the threat from pandemic diseases. (834 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Begins Using Rinsate Collection System

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 18 April 2011, www.cma.army.mil

On Saturday, April 16, the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility began use of the Rinsate Collection System, an improved process that allows for more efficient use of facility incinerators for the destruction of the Umatilla stockpile of HD mustard agent. (332 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)



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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) (CONT.)

OPCW Completes 2,000th Inspection

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 21 April 2011, www.opcw.org

On April 21, 2011, the OPCW reached a significant milestone in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention with the completion of the 2,000th inspection of a declared chemical facility under Article VI of the treaty. (208 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

OPCW Graduates 13th Group of Inspectors

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 26 April 2011, www.opcw.org

The OPCW held a ceremony at its Headquarters in The Hague Tuesday to mark the graduation of new trainee inspectors from a number of countries. (196 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Number of Problem Pueblo Chemical Depot Weapons Scaled Back

The Pueblo Chieftain, 28 April 2011, www.chieftain.com

The Army agency charged with destroying Pueblo's stockpile of chemical weapons will use a high-end estimate that as many as 13,000 of those artillery shells and mortar rounds will have to be destroyed separately from the rest of the weapons due to go through a water neutralization process as it prepares a new environmental assessment. (786 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

One Year to U.S, Russian Chemical Weapons Disposal Deadline

Global Security Newswire, 29 April 2011; www.globalsecuritynewswire.org

The United States and Russia are required to have eliminated their respective stockpiles of chemical warfare materials exactly one year from Friday; however, those familiar with each side's destruction efforts have long known that neither country will meet the deadline. (2,047 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

House Bill Includes Spate of New Nonproliferation Measures

Global Security Newswire, 29 April 2011; www.globalsecuritynewswire.org

House legislation that would heighten congressional oversight of U.S. nuclear trade agreements also contains a number of other new provisions aimed at strengthening the nation's nonproliferation policies. (566 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Meeting, 13-15 April 2011

U.S. Department of State, 11 April 2011, www.state.gov

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 25th Plenary Meeting in Buenos Aires from April 11-15, 2011 to review and evaluate its activities and to further intensify its efforts to prevent missile programs and their proliferation. (667 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NEW START TREATY (NST)

Remarks at the United States Naval Academy

U.S. Department of State, 20 April 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in Annapolis, Maryland

Arms control issues cross the interagency and there is a role for all ranks to play, from senior policy advisors to inspectors of Russian strategic force facilities. (1,092 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

10 States Call for More Action on Nonproliferation

Global Security Newswire, 02 May 2011; www.globalsecuritynewswire.org

A group of 10 nations on Saturday called on the rest of the world to do more to halt the spread of nuclear-weapon materials and technology, the Associated Press reported. (468 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

OPEN SKIES TREATY

Kazan Flight Trials of Air Survey Plane to Start Soon

Moscow Interfax, 15 April 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

Flight trials of the Tupolev Tu-214-OS, the first airplane designed for air survey operations as part of the Open Skies agreement will be launched by Kazan's Gorbunov Aircraft Production Association (KAPO) in the near future. (226 words) [Click here for full text.](#)



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OPEN SKIES TREATY (CONT.)

U.S., Turkey to Perform Surveillance Flights over Russia – Defense Ministry

Moscow Interfax-AVN, 26 April 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

This week the Russian territory will be surveyed from the air by a group of international inspectors under the international Treaty on Open Skies, the Russian Defense Ministry said. (173 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Canadian Observation Plane to Fly over Russia – Defense Ministry

Moscow Interfax-AVN, 03 May 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

A C-130 observation airplane carrying a team of Canadian inspectors will perform a flight over Russia's territory one of the days between May 3 and May 7 as part of the Open Skies Treaty. (136 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION AGREEMENT (PMDA)

Russia-U.S. Plutonium Disposal Program May Suffer As Result of Fukushima Disaster

Moskovskiye Novosti in Russian, 21 April 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

The catastrophe at the Japanese Fukushima NPP [nuclear power plant] may disrupt the Russian-American agreement on disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. (836 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

FULL TEXT OF BI-WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:



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United Nations News Centre, 20 April 2011, www.un.org

The Security Council today extended for 10 years the mandate of a committee tasked with monitoring a United Nations resolution on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and requested it to carry out a comprehensive review of the implementation of the text.

The Committee was created under Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004, which imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery and by establishing appropriate controls over related materials.

In a unanimous decision, the Council adopted a resolution extending the Committee's mandate until April 25, 2021.

Widely known as the 1540 Committee, the body also encourages greater international cooperation on issues related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to promote universal adherence to existing non-proliferation treaties.

In requesting the committee to conduct a comprehensive review on the status of implementation of resolution 1540, both after five years and prior to the renewal of its mandate, the Security Council stated that it should, if necessary, recommend adjustments to its mandate and report on the conclusions of those reviews. The first review should be held before December 2016.

The Council requested the Secretary-General "to establish, in consultation with the 1540 Committee, a group of up to eight experts...acting under the direction and purview of the committee, composed of individuals with the appropriate experience and knowledge to provide the committee with expertise, to assist the committee in carrying out its mandate," it said in the resolution extending the mandate.

Resolution 1540 obliges States to refrain from supporting, by any means, non-State actors [working toward] developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems.

The committee does not act as an international policing body to pursue those who buy or sell weapons of mass destruction or their materials, but rather deals with the legal framework and export and customs controls that countries can use to help stop proliferation.

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Lack of Global Security Rules for Biodefense Labs Worries Experts

Global Security Newswire, 29 April 2011; www.globalsecuritynewswire.org

The proliferation of laboratories around the world that study potentially lethal disease materials has not been accompanied by widespread institution of security rules and safeguards against accidents or terrorist threats, Miller-McCune magazine reported on Wednesday.

The United States responded to the September 11 terrorist assaults and the subsequent anthrax mailings by curtailing domestic access to biological warfare materials under the 2001 Patriot Act and by augmenting U.S. biodefense capabilities through the 2002 Bioterrorism Act. New protocols were also established that standardized the types of institutional safeguards and defenses mandated for facilities working with various biological agents.

In other parts of the world, however, there are no set guidelines for how a disease laboratory must be built or operated, or for ensuring a facility is kept safe and secure, according to Sandia National Laboratory biodefense expert Ren Salerno.

In practice, there are no international regulations or certification programs for biological science facilities. What does exist is a World Health Organization [WHO] guide on scientific facility safety suggestions. Some recommendations in the 120-page document include "Labels must not be licked" and "Children should not be authorized or allowed to enter laboratory working areas."

"That 100-page document is just woefully inadequate," Salerno said.

Global biosecurity guidelines would reduce the chances of a bioterrorism incident and also lessen the likelihood of an accidental disease outbreak from a laboratory. Nine incidents of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome [SARS] in 2004 were traced to safety failures at China's National Institute of Virology. A Texas A&M University laboratory technician was infected with animal-borne brucellosis in 2006 while cleansing a room that contained the pathogen.

"An outbreak anywhere, deliberate or natural, is a threat everywhere," Assistant Defense Secretary Andrew Weber said. "It's not something we can just deal with within our own borders."

Biological sciences experts primarily from Europe and North America in 2006 initiated consultations on the necessity of global standards for biodefense laboratories. The European Committee for Standardization in 2008 released a set of protocols that were created with input from 24 nations. The non-mandatory bio-risk management standards contain recommendations

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on limiting access to dangerous pathogens as well as advice on monitoring and eliminating biological materials.

"It represented an evolution in thought," said Salerno, who helped develop the guidelines. "The previously distinct fields of biosafety and biosecurity came together."

Salerno participated in the development of a WHO-sponsored two-week practical training course on reducing security risks at biodefense facilities. Laboratory managers in Ecuador, Jordan, Kenya, the Maldives, Sweden and Thailand have already received the training. They in turn are expected to train their own staff in biosecurity protocols.

Rafiq Saleh, who leads a state laboratory in Amman, Jordan, participated in the WHO course and has passed the training on to more than 30 laboratory personnel in his country. "We really feel that it's been useful to our country," Saleh said.

Thus far, the WHO program has educated 60 individuals, only some of whom have passed on the training to additional scientific personnel, according to Salerno.

"If (the course) is a one-time extravaganza, it won't mean very much because we've touched so very few people," Salerno said. "On the other hand, if the powers that be can recognize it as a precedent-setting, paradigm-shifting event, and can leverage it and build from it explicitly, then I think hopefully five or 10 years from now, we'll look back on it and say, 'Wow, that was really formative'."

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Bioweapons Convention Useful in Preventing Pandemic Disease

U.S. Mission to Geneva, 02 May 2011, geneva.usmission.gov

The Obama administration is working to make the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) universal by encouraging countries that have not joined the treaty to appreciate its benefits, not only in preventing acquisition and use of biological weapons, but also in promoting international cooperation to prevent and mitigate disease, spread deliberately or otherwise.

Ambassador Laura Kennedy, U.S. permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament and U.S. special representative for Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention issues, said April 29 that the treaty has special significance to countries that are concerned with the threat from pandemic diseases.

The United States is trying to “illustrate the benefits on a broad basis beyond the confines of traditional arms control” and why it’s good for all countries to join the BWC and be active participants, she said. “It has real health and science benefits.”

Kennedy participated in the April 13-14 Preparatory Committee meetings for the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC, which will be held in Geneva in December. She said that the meetings had gone very well, with a “commitment to make progress and not get distracted ... in areas where we don’t agree.”

She also described the gathering as pragmatic and “results-oriented.” “Our hope is that the Preparatory Committee meeting is a harbinger of a successful year ahead,” she said.

She said she was especially encouraged that the Preparatory Committee meeting had taken place on a “community basis,” with “cross-fertilization of ideas” rather than being subject to normal global rivalries, such as those between nonaligned and Western countries or between northern and southern countries.

In the run-up to the December Review Conference, Kennedy said the 163 states that are party to the BWC will be engaging in “intellectual brainstorming” and sharing specific proposals and papers for consideration at the conference.

There will also be regional conferences hosted by the Philippines, Germany and Kenya and Brazil in the coming months to identify and discuss important issues likely to arise at the review conference.

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In the interest of encouraging openness and sharing information on potential global biohazards, the United States took the step of making its confidence-building measures (CBMs) public in 2010 and wants to see others do the same.

The CBMs provide data on a country's research centers and laboratories and its national biological defense research and development programs, along with information on any outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins; current legislation and regulations regarding biological materials; and declarations of any past activities in developing or researching offensive and/or defensive biological programs, as well as vaccine production facilities.

"You can submit them in confidential form. There is a protected site on the BWC where this information is collected, but we took the step of making it all public," Kennedy said.

To encourage disclosure and compliance with the CBMs, Kennedy said, there are ways to make it easier for states to share information, such as by allowing them to update their information online, or to provide assistance programs for those who never before submitted their disclosures.

"It's conceivable that at the [December] conference we could agree on certain changes to the confidence-building measures, or we might just establish a process to review them and come up with recommendations in the subsequent period. It could be both," she said.

Kennedy acknowledged that differences remain between the United States and other countries over the issue of agreeing on a legally binding verification regime.

Kennedy said the Obama administration conducted a "thorough top-to-bottom review" of U.S. BWC policy and determined that, unlike their chemical or nuclear counterparts, verification measures in the biological arena would be meaningless and impossible to develop.

"You don't need elaborate infrastructure to develop a biological agent," as you would with a nuclear device, she said. "A high school laboratory is all you need. Things occur in nature. It can be engineered. It can be grown, and the stuff that you need for vaccines for everyday use can be the very same stuff that can produce deadly agents."

A normal verification regime would require inspections, but given the many possible places to develop a lethal agent, "what would you inspect?" Kennedy asked.

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“We hope we have set this aside and instead are working on practical measures” such as CBMs, which encourage openness and transparency, leading to confidence and compliance “without resurrecting the old divisive debate on whether it might be possible to negotiate a verification regime,” she said.

Kennedy said she is pleased with the increased amount of international cooperation on the BWC and singled out recent efforts by Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Philippines, China, Kenya, Nigeria, Mexico, and the European Union in strengthening the BWC by developing their capacities to deal with biological risks and sharing best practices to enhance international norms.

There are “lots of really good, solid partners out there to work with in the year ahead,” Kennedy said. “The BWC is really uniquely configured to showcase the benefits of working internationally on cross-cutting health security issues and on a cross-regional basis.”

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Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Begins Using Rinsate Collection System

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, 18 April 2011, www.cma.army.mil

On Saturday, April 16, the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility [UMCDF] began use of the Rinsate Collection System, an improved process that allows for more efficient use of facility incinerators for the destruction of the Umatilla stockpile of HD mustard agent.

“We are one step closer to fulfilling our Chemical Weapons Convention treaty obligations well ahead of the April 2012 deadline,” said Gary Anderson, site project manager for the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. “The successful implementation of this unique system is the result of outstanding efforts on the part of our design, installation and operations teams.”

The HD ton containers [TCs] typically have a solidified residue that remains after draining the liquid agent. This residue is removed by using high pressure hot water. This mixture is called rinsate. This rinsate has been fed to the metal parts furnace in previously used TCs, which reduces the throughput of stockpile ton containers that could be treated in that furnace each day.

“Our workers are eager to begin operation of the rinsate system, which will safely speed up the process of getting rid of the remaining ton containers of mustard at Umatilla,” said Steve Warren, project general manager for URS, the company that built and operates the plant. “The safety of our workers and the public remains our top priority.”

The Rinsate Collection System is a series of self-cleaning filters, pumps, valves and piping, and storage tanks that allows rinsate to be processed in one of the two available liquid incinerators. This reduces the amount of material treated in the metal parts furnace.

In March, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality [DEQ] granted a modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit to allow rinsate to be processed through a liquid incinerator. Installation began in October 2010 following a temporary authorization request approved by the Oregon DEQ.

UMCDF is in its 13th and final campaign of destroying chemical agent and has destroyed 1,536 TCs, leaving 1,099 to process. UMCDF anticipates destroying the last mustard agent by November.

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Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 21 April 2011, www.opcw.org

On April 21, 2011, the OPCW reached a significant milestone in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] with the completion of the 2,000th inspection of a declared chemical facility under Article VI of the treaty. The inspection was carried out at an industrial plant in the Republic of Korea.

Industry inspections have so far covered over 1,500 facilities in more than 80 countries. In all cases, the OPCW has been able to verify the activities declared by the States Parties.

“Industry inspections constitute a key element of the chemical weapons convention and an essential supplement to States Parties’ own measures to monitor their chemical industries” said OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü. “This milestone achievement is a tribute to the dedication of our inspectors, and to the active collaboration of our States Parties and their chemical industries.”

The Director-General added that “OPCW inspections are today accepted as a norm in the global chemical industry, and this contributes significantly to the confidence among States Parties in our verification regime. They also help raise awareness about the potential security risks involved.”

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Young-won Kim, welcomed the announcement and underlined the value of the continuing cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the OPCW.

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OPCW Graduates 13th Group of Inspectors

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 26 April 2011, www.opcw.org

The OPCW held a ceremony at its Headquarters in The Hague Tuesday to mark the graduation of new trainee inspectors from a number of countries. The 15-week training was supported by the governments of Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, and United States of America.

“I am most grateful to all of the States Parties that provided support to the training of OPCW inspectors,” said the OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, in his remarks at the ceremony. “The importance of inspector training for the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is paramount, and your efforts have contributed significantly to assuring the quality of inspections over the coming years.”

The trainees of Group L were from Australia, Brazil, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe, and the graduates will join an international team of more than 160 OPCW inspectors.

Since entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997 the Organization has devoted over 230,000 inspector-days to conducting some 4,450 inspections of mainly chemical weapons destruction facilities and industrial sites around the world that States Parties have declared to the OPCW in fulfillment of their obligations under the Convention.

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Number of Problem Pueblo Chemical Depot Weapons Scaled Back

The Pueblo Chieftain, 28 April 2011, www.chieftain.com

The Army agency charged with destroying Pueblo's stockpile of chemical weapons will use a high-end estimate that as many as 13,000 of those artillery shells and mortar rounds will have to be destroyed separately from the rest of the weapons due to go through a water neutralization process as it prepares a new environmental assessment.

The low-end, and more likely estimate, is closer to 3,900 if things go well when robotic equipment starts taking the weapons apart in 2015. Those figures were presented Wednesday to the Colorado Chemical Demilitarization Citizens Advisory Commission, which held this month's meeting in Avondale.

Scott Susman, lead engineer for the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA] program, also told the commission that about 400,000 explosive components also may be destroyed here instead of being shipped off-site as originally planned. That was something the commission had favored but did not fight when ACWA chose off-site destruction. ACWA was set up to oversee water neutralization programs here and at the Bluegrass Army Depot in Kentucky.

The new estimate of weapons expected to bypass water neutralization is down significantly from the 125,000 officials of the ACWA program suggested two years ago should be destroyed in explosion chambers. The idea then was that in addition to leaking and rejected weapons, many more would be blown up in order to speed up the demilitarization timeline. That plan was scrapped after the agency's environmental assessment, predicting no significant impact, came under fire.

The stockpile here contains 780,000 weapons holding a total of 2,611 tons of mustard agent. The agency is working on a new assessment of what the effect would be to blow up only those weapons that cannot go through water neutralization. Susman said that ACWA officials looked at a number of methods of destroying the problem weapons, including freezing them with liquid nitrogen until they crack, cutting them open with water jets, a very risky manual disassembly process and finally, explosive destruction, settling on the last one.

There are four different explosive technology methods being studied, all of them already in use to destroy ordinance at sites around the world and all using confinement chambers in which the weapons would be blown up and the residue safely disposed of.

The estimate of problem weapons came from a number of sources. There are 547 overpacked munitions, Susman said, weapons that were found to be leaking or intentionally breached for

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sampling over the years. They're stored in steel tubes and would be a safety threat if opened. Susman said that between 100 and 200 more weapons may be tapped by chemical weapons treaty officials as they make sure that the stockpile does indeed contain mustard agent. He said that the treaty samples could go through the water processing system but that was still uncertain.

The biggest number comes from estimated rejects and that is based on tests at another location.

Last year, the weapons destruction plant at the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama used robotic equipment that will be used in Pueblo to help get a head start on developing systems here and testing the equipment. The linear projectile mortar disassembly equipment at Anniston ran into some problems starting out, and the percentage early on indicated that as many as 13,000 of the weapons here could be rejects, Susman said.

But he said that those problems were addressed. "We worked through a lot of those problems but every stockpile is unique," he said, adding that the 13,000 figure was "really to make sure that we don't underestimate and do our environmental assessment based on a low number."

Finally, after Anniston processed 48,470 weapons, there were only 242 rejects, most of them 4.2-inch mortar rounds (200) and the rest divided almost evenly between 105 mm and 155 mm artillery shells. That's what led to the lower-end reject estimate of between 1,200 and 3,200, plus the overpacks and samples.

Susman told the commission that the new environmental assessment will be much more detailed than usual. There will be a health risk assessment and even an environmental justice component and it will include comments from the previous assessment.

While the commission has expected for some time that rejects and leakers would bypass water neutralization, this was the first time they'd heard many of the fuzes and bursters would be destroyed here, too. Susman said that fuzes and bursters in 100,000 mortars are attached and would have to be separated, adding a risk factor "and that's an additional step to the process that we'd rather not go through." In addition, he said, the bursters in 300,000 155 mm artillery shells are too big to transport. All 400,000 would be fed into an explosive detonation system and the rest sent off-site.

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One Year to U.S, Russian Chemical Weapons Disposal Deadline

Global Security Newswire, 29 April 2011; www.globalsecuritynewswire.org

The United States and Russia are required to have eliminated their respective stockpiles of chemical warfare materials exactly one year from Friday; however, those familiar with each side's destruction efforts have long known that neither country will meet the deadline.

Despite breaching that mandate, it is highly unlikely either nation will face sanctions or other disciplinary actions when the Chemical Weapons Convention member states meet in Geneva this December, experts predict. Addressing the matter ahead of time would avoid complications when the final deadline passes and eliminate a drawn-out follow-up process, they said.

"I don't see any room here for punitive measures, for sanctions," said Serguei Batsanov, who served as Moscow's chief negotiator on the convention in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The philosophy behind the treaty is to first try to understand why violations occur, then decide what steps are necessary to "redress" the situation within a certain time frame, Batsanov, director of the Geneva office for the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, told Global Security Newswire in a telephone interview this week.

"Both countries have stated publicly they will not be able to [meet the deadline]. The question is not will they, the question really is what is the schedule afterwards" and how the convention's implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, handles the situation, according to Ralf Trapp, a France-based consultant on chemical and biological arms control.

"But the delay, at this stage, is essentially unavoidable," he added.

The convention, which entered into force in 1997, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or use of lethal chemical materials such as mustard blister agent and the nerve agents VX and sarin. The pact originally demanded that all member states destroy any stockpiles of banned substances by April 29, 2007. However, countries could ask for extensions of up to five years, pushing the end date to 2012.

At one time the United States and Russia possessed 90 percent of the world's known chemical weapons. Both states received the full five-year deadline delays in December 2006. Washington does not anticipate disposal operations wrapping up before 2021, while Moscow claims it needs until at least 2015 to completely destroy its stockpile.

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Albania, India and [a State Party] have all eliminated their declared stockpiles of chemical warfare materials. The only two other CWC "possessor" member states are Libya and Iraq. Angola, Egypt, North Korea, Somalia and Syria have yet to sign the pact while Israel and Myanmar have signed on but not yet ratified.

In December 2009, the OPCW Executive Council asked its then-chairman, Ambassador Jorge Lomónaco Tonda of Mexico, to start informal consultations with the United States and Russia on issues related to meeting the final extended deadline, according to Michael Luhan, spokesman for The Hague, Netherlands-based organization.

The council stressed that the guidelines resulting from those meetings "should not undermine [the convention] or lead to rewriting or reinterpreting its provisions," he told GSN this week by e-mail. A report on the consultations will be presented when the 41-member Executive Council meets next week, Luhan added.

Details on the deadline issues and guidelines were not immediately available.

As of April 27, the United States had destroyed nearly 86 percent of the 29,918 tons of warfare agents it held when the treaty entered into force in 1997, according to Greg Mahall, spokesman for the U.S. Army's Chemical Materials Agency. The service is responsible for destroying 90 percent of the total U.S. stockpile of chemical warfare materials.

The Army branch "remains committed to fulfilling its destruction mission of the declared chemical weapons stockpile by 2012," Mahall stated this week in an e-mail message to GSN.

The remaining 10 percent of the U.S. stockpile is due to be eliminated at two still-unfinished chemical neutralization plants at the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky and the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado.

Construction of the Colorado facility is approximately 77 percent finished, while its Kentucky counterpart is roughly 32 percent complete, Miguel Monteverde, a spokesman for the Defense Department's Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA] program, said this week by e-mail.

Meanwhile, Russia had destroyed about 49 percent of its stockpile as of February, according to Paul Walker, security and sustainability chief at the environmental organization Global Green USA. He noted that the country's chemical arsenal constituted roughly 40,000 metric tons of materials at its peak.

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"Ironically, we see that the Americans may pull their schedule back a bit from 2021 and the Russians may extend theirs out beyond 2015, so the two programs, somewhat separate from each other, are converging on schedule the closer we get to 2012," Walker told GSN last week in a telephone interview.

A spokesman for the U.S. State Department's Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Bureau, which has policy oversight for the Chemical Weapons Convention, declined to comment for this article. The Russian Embassy in Washington also did not respond to a request for comment.

In recent years some CWC states parties...have issued strong statements condemning the United States for missing the 2012 deadline, which "have really not been helpful in any way," Walker said. [...]

Convention member nations could pursue punishments such as stripping Washington and Moscow of their voting rights within the organization or cutting off trade of dual-use industrial chemicals listed in the pact.

Most interested parties, though, understand that neither Washington nor Moscow intentionally violated the international treaty, making it unlikely that the former Cold War rivals will face punitive measures this year or afterward, experts said.

"I think, in the end, everybody except those with ulterior political motives within the states parties are really accepting of that fact that that it's been difficult," according to Walker.

"No one back in [1992 or 1993] really understood how complicated and expensive and contentious and dangerous the demilitarization process would really be," he told GSN, alluding to the multitude of local and regional requirements the Pentagon had to satisfy in constructing its chemical disposal sites.

Walker noted that Albania unintentionally breached its 2007 deadline for disposal of about 16 tons of chemical warfare materials by a few months after its high-temperature incinerator burned out. In that instance, the treaty organization accepted that the violation was beyond the nation's control and asked to receive weekly progress updates, he said.

"The reason why the U.S. and Russia couldn't ... make it by April 2012 is not bad will," according to Batsanov, who last year was appointed to an OPCW advisory committee to look at

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the future evolution of the treaty. "Simply, the process turned out to be much more complicated, much more resource-intensive."

Trapp said that while some of the 188 member states to international organization are deeply concerned about the upcoming violation others see the delay as simply "unfortunate." He did not name specific nations.

"I hope it will very much remain an internal problem of the OPCW," Trapp said. He stressed that the paramount concern is to maintain the commitment to destroy chemical materials as quickly as possible.

Possible Solutions

Under the terms of the 1997 convention, the OPCW Executive Council and the full membership can take measures to "redress" a violation and ensure compliance. If the breach remains unresolved, the organization can ultimately refer a specific case to the UN Security Council.

The document does not spell out what specific steps member nations can take to achieve compliance, leaving the decisions to the governing bodies. Walker predicted that the Executive Council would begin to coalesce around a strategy to address the pending violations by the United States and Russia at its session next week in The Hague.

He said one option would be to maintain the "status quo." Or rather, "do nothing and accept the facts the Russians and American are working and hope for the best," he said, before dismissing it as "unrealistic" because it would denigrate the importance of the destruction deadlines.

Another alternative would be for the member states to hold an amendment conference that would open up the pact for another possible extension of the final deadline. "I would suggest that going down the amendment track is very unlikely," Trapp told GSN.

Batsanov, too, said he doubted an amendment conference would take place as it could allow member nations to pursue rules that would weaken the convention, such as limiting inspections of chemical industry sites.

Instead, according to Walker, the [OPCW] is likely to require additional confidence-building measures such as on-site inspections of chemical disposal sites every six months by OCPW officials, including Director General Ahmet Üzümcü and the present Executive Council chairman, Ambassador Jean Francois Blarel of France, as well as visits to Washington and Moscow.



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In addition, OPCW officials might ask for increased reporting of each country's chemical destruction figures, according to Walker. Right now both the United States and Russia submit data every three months, he said.

Trapp agreed that continued strict OPCW verification and visits to destruction facilities by officials from the Executive Council would help to increase transparency and confidence that both nations are genuinely committed to completing their destruction operations.

However, "there's only so much you can do by reporting," he told GSN, adding that the Colorado and Kentucky disposal plants are not yet online and therefore not generating data.

Trapp also presumed that the Executive Council would establish "targets and goals," short of renewed formal deadlines, for the complete elimination of Washington and Moscow's chemical warfare materials.

Batsanov said the Conference of States Parties might set a date by which the violation should be successfully redressed. In the meantime, both countries should issue "authoritative statements" that they will wrap up their efforts as soon as possible, he said in a telephone interview this week.

While all three experts are confident the 2012 deadline issue will be resolved before the end of the calendar year, none would say when destruction operations might cease. "Any prediction I've ever seen in the past about the progress of chemical weapons destruction operations, in the end, has turned out to be wrong," Trapp added.

Other 2012 Issues

In addition to the United States, there are other member states and special projects under the treaty's purview that are also inching closer to their respective completion dates.

Most urgent is Libya, which this year faces deadlines of May 15 to destroy its cache of mustard gas and December 31 to eliminate its precursor agents. [...] The regime is estimated to possess 9.5 metric tons of mustard blister agent and a quantity of chemical warfare precursor materials.

Tripoli has not requested or been granted any extension beyond its present deadlines, according to OPCW spokesman Luhan. Walker said that next week's Executive Council meeting would focus primarily on Libya. [...]



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Another project that is required to be completed one year from today is the disposal of chemical munitions Japan's military left behind in China at the close of World War II. "That deadline remains unchanged and in place," Luhan told GSN.

Under a 1999 deal with Beijing, Tokyo agreed to supply the funds, equipment and structures needed to dispose of the abandoned chemical munitions. Estimates for the total number of weapons left underground or discarded in lakes and rivers varies from hundreds of thousands to millions, according to Walker.

A third project that is not bound by the April 2012 deadline is the elimination of several hundred abandoned chemical weapons found in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. The materials are believed to have been produced before 1991 and deteriorated to the point of being unusable.

The Persian Gulf state is not subject to the deadline next year because it joined the convention in 2009 and "because of the circumstances of its remnant stockpiles the council has not yet decided on its destruction deadline," according to Luhan.

Trapp argued that the OPCW Executive Council and the Conference of States Parties should treat the completion of the China and Iraq projects separately from the United States and Russia because they do not represent traditional stockpiles.

"I would separate these issues because they're really qualitatively different," he told GSN. "You're talking about in one case operation destruction programs which got delayed, and in the other case you're talking about programs that hadn't yet started until recently."

"They're not really comparable to that extent," he said.

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House Bill Includes Spate of New Nonproliferation Measures

Global Security Newswire, 29 April 2011; www.globalsecuritynewswire.org

House legislation that would heighten congressional oversight of U.S. nuclear trade agreements also contains a number of other new provisions aimed at strengthening the nation's nonproliferation policies. [...]

One new feature in the bill would for the first time require the State Department to draw up a list of "state sponsors of proliferation," akin to a designation that Washington already uses to identify international backers of terrorism. Such a list of rogues could step up public awareness and increase pressure on suspect nations to change course by blocking their access to U.S. foreign assistance, according to experts. [...]

The bill also dictates new ways in which U.S. policy could encourage other nations to accept comprehensive UN inspections of their nuclear facilities, helping ensure there is no secret diversion of sensitive materials for military use.

The measure passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by a 34-0 vote on April 14. It remains unclear when H.R. 1280 might go to a floor vote or potentially be considered by the Senate. Similar legislation was filed in the Senate in January. However, that chamber's Foreign Relations Committee has not yet acted on it, and the bill's sponsor – Senator John Ensign (R-Nev.) – recently announced that he is resigning office as of early next month.

The House measure is primarily focused on raising the bar for so-called "Section 123 agreements." These pacts allow Washington to share technologies and know-how for civil nuclear power with selected nations. If passed by Congress, the bill would require that all nuclear trade pacts meet a longer list of nonproliferation conditions before being submitted to Capitol Hill.

Under existing law, these criteria have included guarantees of safeguards on transferred nuclear material and equipment; a U.S. right to demand the return of materials and equipment if a recipient nation detonates an atomic device; and a block on the transfer of any sensitive items to third-party nations without Washington's consent.

The new legislation adds three new criteria before Congress will consider such an agreement. These new conditions limit individuals from third-party nations from entering facilities participating in the deal; make all "subsequent arrangements" to a 123 agreement – documents that facilitate implementation – subject to a joint congressional resolution of approval; and require the president to keep Congress informed of new nuclear trade pact negotiations. [...]

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"One of the most important provisions in the bill is the proposal to make the Additional Protocol a condition of supply for the United States," [Peter Crail, a research analyst at the Arms Control Association] said.... "If we are to prevent civil nuclear programs from being used for weapons purposes, the United States needs to mandate tougher safeguards for future civil nuclear cooperation agreements."

The Additional Protocol provision in the bill and other features are "in support [of] a noble and worthy cause – to get other nuclear suppliers that the U.S. does business with to adopt the 'gold standard' or risk forfeiting U.S. loan guarantees," Energy Department contracts or Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses, said [Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center]....

"The bill is a great start," [Sokolski] said.... "What's missing is a clear incentive to get other nuclear suppliers to follow the standards that Congress wants our government to follow [...]"

The administration should "redouble its efforts to achieve consensus at the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in June on more rigorous criteria for the supply of such technologies," Crail said.

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Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Meeting, Buenos Aires, 13-15 April 2011

U.S. Department of State, 11 April 2011, www.state.gov

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 25th Plenary Meeting in Buenos Aires from April 11-15, 2011 to review and evaluate its activities and to further intensify its efforts to prevent missile programs and their proliferation. The Plenary was inaugurated by H. E. Ambassador Alberto D'Alotto, Secretary of Foreign Relations of Argentina, and chaired by H.E. Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritán until the next Plenary session.

MTCR partners discussed proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery that constitute a threat to international peace and security and reaffirmed the importance of addressing these challenges and the role the MTCR serves in this regard. MTCR guidelines and controls list constitute an international export control standard which is increasingly adhered to by non-members of the MTCR. Therefore, Partners agreed to redouble their efforts to encourage and assist, upon request, non-partners countries that are supportive of the objectives and purposes of the MTCR Regime, to contribute to the efforts of missile non proliferation.

Partners conducted extensive discussions on missile proliferation-related activities worldwide, to include developments in missile programs and their proliferation; procurement activities and techniques in support of such programs; rapid technological change; the role of intangible technology, brokering, and transshipment in facilitating proliferation; and key technology trends in proliferation missile programs. These discussions showed that additional export control efforts by MTCR countries could have an even greater impact. They also underlined the importance of addressing transit and transshipment issues and, in this context, the proliferation risk posed by countries with weak export controls.

Partners exchanged information on concerns about the ongoing missile programs in Middle East, Northeast Asia and South Asia, including Iran and North Korea, which could contribute to regional instability and supply missile proliferation activities elsewhere.

Partners noted the direct relevance of UN Security Council Resolutions, inter alia, 1874 and 1929, to MTCR export controls and expressed their determination to implement these resolutions and to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to WMD missile programs of proliferation concern, in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law.

Partners agreed to continue exchanging views on missile program developments.

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Partners reaffirmed the critical importance of the MTCR's ongoing technical work. They noted the rapid evolution of relevant technologies and the related need to take forward looking action to address these developments. They expressed their appreciation for the work of the Licensing and Enforcement Expert Meeting (LEEM), the Information Exchange Meeting (IEM) and the Technical Expert Meeting (TEM) in particular the decision adopted on amendments to the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

Over the past year, the outgoing MTCR Chair (Brazil) conducted outreach with Belarus, China, India, Kazakhstan, and Thailand. The incoming MTCR Chair (Argentina) intends to conduct further outreach, including with additional countries, in order to increase transparency about the Regime and promote its objectives. Partners expressed their willingness to continue extensive outreach by individual MTCR Partners to a wide range of countries. Non Partners activities in support of the objectives and purposes of the MTCR would also be welcome.

Partners agreed to continue their individual and collective efforts to assist interested countries in implementing the missile-related export controls mandated under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and to work with the 1540 Committee.

Partners also reviewed a number of key aspects of the internal functioning of the Regime, including issues related to future membership. Partners exchanged views on their overall approaches, interalia, membership evaluation. Individual applications for membership also were thoroughly discussed, with no consensus being reached on the admission of new members at this time. The membership issue will continue to be discussed.

The MTCR has 34 members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

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Remarks at the United States Naval Academy [Excerpt]

U.S. Department of State, 20 April 2011, www.state.gov

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in Annapolis, Maryland

[...] Implementation of the [New START] Treaty is well underway. We have exchanged data on our strategic nuclear facilities and forces. This information forms the foundation of the treaty's database, which will be updated by the Parties continuously through the notification process and exchanged anew every six months throughout the life of the treaty.

The United States conducted exhibitions of its B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers and the Russian Federation conducted an exhibition of its RS-24 ICBM and associated mobile launcher. As of April 6, the Parties could begin to conduct on-site inspections, which enable each Party to have "boots on the ground" and inspect the other Party's treaty-related facilities.

The United States began its first on-site inspection in Russia last week.

The New START Treaty sets the stage for further limits on and reductions in nuclear arms. When President Obama signed the New START Treaty, he said "the United States intends to pursue with Russia additional and broader reductions in our strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, including non-deployed nuclear weapons." For its part, the U.S. Senate made clear its strong interest in addressing the numerical disparity in non-strategic, or tactical nuclear weapons, between the United States and Russia.

Consistent with the President's agenda to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons, and the Senate's call for pursuing negotiations with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons, we are working intensively throughout our government on these issues while also consulting with our NATO allies.

Under the President's direction, the Department of Defense will conduct a strategic force analysis to develop options for potential future reductions in our nuclear arsenal. This work will be guided by the policies set forth in the [Nuclear Posture Review] NPR, including strengthening deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and assurance of our allies and partners.

At the same time, NATO is conducting a Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) to determine how to translate NATO's new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon NATO Summit in 2010 into practical steps designed to strengthen NATO's collective security and defense in this evolving security environment.

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The NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration makes clear that the Alliance will seek to create the conditions needed to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons assigned to NATO. As part of this effort, we will be working with NATO to shape an approach to reduce the role and number of forward-based U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, as Russia takes reciprocal steps to reduce its non-strategic nuclear weapons and relocate them away from NATO's borders.

At the end of last week, Secretary Clinton joined her NATO Foreign Ministerial counterparts in Berlin where she discussed how NATO's ongoing Deterrence and Defense Posture Review [DDPR] can be used to advance these efforts, building on the five principles that she first outlined in Tallinn a year ago. These principles are as follows:

- First, we should recognize that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance;
- Second, as a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental;
- Third, our broad aim is to continue to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons. Of course, we recognize that in the years since the Cold War ended, NATO has already dramatically reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons;
- Fourth, allies must broaden deterrence against the range of 21st century threats, including by pursuing territorial missile defense, conducting Article 5 training and exercises, and drafting additional contingency plans to counter new threats to the alliance;
- And fifth, in any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members, and include non-strategic nuclear weapons in the next round of U.S.-Russian arms control discussions alongside strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons.

Through the DDPR, NATO will determine the appropriate mix of capabilities needed to deter and defend against existing and emerging threats to the Alliance. The mix of capabilities will include conventional, nuclear and missile defense.

In Berlin, Secretary Clinton reiterated the U.S. commitment to addressing the disparity in non-strategic weapons between the United States and Russia in the next arms control negotiation. As a first step, the United States would like to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with

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Russia, including on the numbers, locations, and types of non-strategic weapons in Europe. We will consult with NATO Allies on such reciprocal actions that could be taken by each side and invite Russia to join with us to develop this initiative.

The United States is also interested in conducting a broad policy discussion with Russia on issues of stability, security, and confidence-building, which can help lay the groundwork for eventual further nuclear arms reductions.

Another major challenge with regard to next steps is verification. As the numbers go lower, as the items to be limited and verified get smaller (e.g., warheads instead of delivery vehicles), the verification challenge becomes more complex and the margins for error become smaller. When we think about monitoring weapons in storage, or eliminating nuclear weapons, we must tackle verification tasks that have not been addressed before. So while we look at the policy issues surrounding the next agreement, we must also be equally focused on the technical issues. Addressing the technical challenges must be integrally linked to the negotiation of future agreements.

We also are seeking cooperation with Russia on ballistic missile defense. Such cooperation can provide assurances to Russia that our missile defenses will not undercut strategic stability, while enhancing the ability of both nations to defend against emerging missile threats.

We believe that military transparency builds confidence and lays a foundation for effective cooperation in other areas as well. For this reason, the United States and our NATO Allies have been working hard with Russia and other partners to find a way forward on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty with the aim of launching new negotiations to strengthen and modernize conventional arms control in Europe for the 21st century.

Negotiated nuclear reductions to date have been dominated by bilateral U.S. and Russian negotiations. However, as we advance toward the vision of a safe, secure world without nuclear weapons we will increasingly need to strengthen cooperation on WMD issues of concern to both nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states.

Much work lies ahead on these issues.... [...]

Arms control issues cross the interagency and there is a role for all ranks to play, from senior policy advisors to inspectors of Russian strategic force facilities.

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10 States Call for More Action on Nonproliferation

Global Security Newswire, 02 May 2011; www.globalsecuritynewswire.org

A group of 10 nations on Saturday called on the rest of the world to do more to halt the spread of nuclear-weapon materials and technology, the Associated Press reported.

The aim of the so-called Friends of the Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] is to "work toward achieving nuclear disarmament and a strengthening of the of the international nonproliferation regime," the chief diplomats of the 10 nations said in a combined declaration. The countries – Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates – met in Berlin over the weekend to brainstorm ways to enhance the nonproliferation regime. The group was formed following the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference.

Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd criticized the lack of progress nearly one year since the month-long gathering in New York: "We have seen very little practical work done." Rudd and his counterparts said it remains crucial to address the "danger to humanity posed by the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons" and to take concrete steps toward global nuclear disarmament.

The generation of weapon-usable nuclear material should be prohibited on a global scale "to curb the risk of future nuclear arms races and reduce the danger of nonstate actors getting such material into their hands," according to their joint statement.

After a decade-long impasse, the international Conference on Disarmament [CD] in 2009 agreed to a work plan that would focus on a fissile material cutoff treaty [FMCT] and three other issues: nuclear disarmament, a ban against space-based armaments, and an agreement by nuclear-armed states not to use such weapons against nations that do not have atomic arsenals of their own. While Pakistan at first agreed to the work plan, it later canceled its consent and demanded further consideration of the program. Decisions at the 65-member nation conference are made by consensus.

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said the coalition also concurred that the Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test-Ban Treaty [CTBT] should be ratified by all nations in short order and that nuclear-armed states should increase openness regarding their stockpiles.

The global prohibition on nuclear test blasts is awaiting ratification by nine specific states – China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States – before it can enter into force.

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"We call on all states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT," the 10 foreign ministers said. "We believe that an effective end to nuclear testing will enhance and not weaken our national as well as global security and would significantly bolster the global nonproliferation and disarmament regime," they added.

The coalition also emphasized the crucial work done by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in ensuring that nations meet their commitments as member states to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. International antinuclear requirements should be additionally enhanced, they said.

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Kazan Flight Trials of Air Survey Plane to Start Soon

Moscow Interfax-AVN Online, 15 April 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

Flight trials of the Tupolev Tu-214-OS, the first airplane designed for air survey operations as part of the Open Skies agreement will be launched by Kazan's Gorbunov Aircraft Production Association (KAPO) in the near future, a Russian defense industry spokesman told Interfax-AVN.

"Ground-based tests are currently under way at KAPO ahead of the Tu-214-OS plane's maiden flight. This modified version is fitted with various special purpose equipment, including aerial photography equipment intended for monitoring missions as part of the Open Skies international program," the spokesman said.

The equipment installed in the new airplane's cabin differs from that used on board the base model, he said. "That is why it will undergo all kinds of trials – flight, certification and state commissioned trials," he said.

The state commissioned tests will focus on the airplane's special purpose equipment, the spokesman said.

"All of the trials are expected to finish in 2012," he said.

The Tu-214-OS was developed on orders from the Russian Defense Ministry, the spokesman said. KAPO has signed a contract on the delivery of two such planes.

"In the next few years KAPO will manufacture the Tu-214-OS in various modifications for the Defense Ministry," he said.

The spokesman said he did not rule out that the first Tu-214-OS could be demonstrated at the MAKS 2011 air show in the town of Zhukovsky outside Moscow in August.

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U.S., Turkey to Perform Surveillance Flights over Russia – Defense Ministry

Moscow Interfax-AVN, 26 April 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

This week the Russian territory will be surveyed from the air by a group of international inspectors under the international Treaty on Open Skies, the Russian Defense Ministry said.

"On April 25-29, 2011, a group of Turkish and U.S. inspectors will perform a surveillance flight over the Russian Federation territory on board the Turkish CHN-235 surveillance aircraft under the Open Skies Treaty," the ministry said in a statement on Monday.

"During the flight, the itinerary of which has been agreed upon, Russian specialists will be on board the surveillance aircraft to make sure that surveillance equipment is used in accordance with the treaty provisions," the statement said.

"The CHN-235 surveillance aircraft and surveillance equipment mounted on it underwent an international certification process that involved Russian specialists. This excludes the use of any equipment other than as provided by the treaty," the statement said.

The Open Skies Treaty, signed in 1992 and effective as of 2002, includes 34 nations that are members of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).

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Canadian Observation Plane to Fly over Russia – Defense Ministry

Moscow Interfax-AVN, 03 May 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

A C-130 observation airplane carrying a team of Canadian inspectors will perform a flight over Russia's territory one of the days between May 3 and May 7 as part of the Open Skies Treaty, the Russian Defense Ministry said in a press release received by Interfax-AVN.

"The flight will proceed along an itinerary approved of by Russian specialists, who will also be present on board the plane in order to control the observation of agreements regulating the use of technical monitoring means," the ministry said.

The airplane and its equipment "have already undergone all of the necessary international certification procedures, which involved representatives of Russia as well," it said.

The Open Skies Treaty was signed by 34 member states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE] in 1992. It came into force in 2002.

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Russia-U.S. Plutonium Disposal Program May Suffer as Result of Fukushima Disaster

Moskovskiye Novosti in Russian, 21 April 2011, accessed via Open Source Center

The catastrophe at the Japanese Fukushima NPP [nuclear power plant] may disrupt the Russian-American agreement on disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Experts believe that Russia would only win out from this.

The [Plutonium Management and] Disposition Agreement [PMDA] signed in 2000 by Russia and the U.S. was aimed at seeing to it that the major nuclear powers would start getting rid of their weapons-grade plutonium – one of the most toxic radioactive substances. The problem began to emerge as Moscow and Washington began reducing their nuclear arsenals after the parties signed the START treaties in 1991 and 1993.

The countries dismantled thousands of nuclear warheads, from which weapons-grade plutonium remained. It could not be burned in nuclear reactors, and so the substance was warehoused in special storage facilities. At the present moment, each country has accumulated on the order of 50 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium, and millions of dollars are spent each year on its storage.

In the late 1990's, Russia and the U.S. developed a technology for processing weapons-grade plutonium into so-called [mixed oxide] MOX-fuel, which may be used in the power industry. The fuel, as Center for Energy and Security Director Anton Khlopkov explained to *Moskovskiye Novosti*, is obtained by means of mixing the weapons-grade plutonium with uranium. "At the current rate of world consumption, the present-day reserves of uranium – the main fuel for NPPs – will be enough to last for 50-100 years," Khlopkov added. "But the technology of mixing uranium and plutonium will increase this tens of times. This is specifically why transformation of weapons-grade plutonium into MOX is becoming an ever more current topic."

Last year, Moscow and Washington coordinated a protocol, which established the terms and quantity of the disposed substance. As the first step, in 2018 the parties each promised to process 34 tonnes of the substance.

However, the Japanese tsunami in March, which led to explosions at the Fukushima NPP, may significantly delay the development of MOX-fuel technologies. The U.S. has all chances of disrupting the timetable of the protocol for disposition of the weapons-grade plutonium.

As *The New York Times* reports, construction of a reactor for processing weapons-grade plutonium at the Savannah River nuclear complex in South Carolina has been suspended.

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Congressmen are afraid that, in case of a catastrophe similar to the one in Japan, the facilities for disposal of the weapons-grade plutonium would become a big problem. The government is planning to hold broad general discussions on nuclear safety, which will greatly push back the times of construction of the Savannah River project, and the U.S. will simply not have time to begin disposal of plutonium by 2018.

"There was a small amount of MOX at Fukushima – about 6 percent," an expert from the U.S. Department of Energy, Josh McConaughy, told *Moskovskiy Novosti*. "And although there is no direct proof that this substance increased the detriment from the explosions at one of the six Japanese reactors, U.S. President Barack Obama has sanctioned the start of a comprehensive analysis of our nuclear program, including the project for burning of MOX-fuel."

Work on the reactor at Savannah River will be renewed in full measure only after this audit. In accordance with Obama's directive, there is a special commission working on this analysis, consisting of the country's leading nuclear physicists. The development of the methodology alone will be completed by the end of 2011. And the audit itself will last several years.

Initially, the Savannah River complex had been planned for completion by October of 2016. It is half ready, and on the order of \$5 billion have already been spent on its construction.

In the opinion of an expert on nuclear disarmament from RAN IMEMO [Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations], Aleksey Arbatov, the disruption of the American-Russian uranium disposition agreement plays in Moscow's favor.

"Treaties which stipulate the volume and procedure of disposition of weapons-grade plutonium are necessary for the U.S. in order to control the process of Russian nuclear disarmament – including tactical – which was not limited in any of the START Treaties," the expert told *Moskovskiy Novosti*.

According to various estimates, Russia has on the order of 3,800 units of tactical nuclear weapons, while the US has fewer than 500. Up until now, Moscow had refused to discuss reduction of these arms, while Washington had made it clear that further steps in the direction of disarmament are impossible without reduction of the tactical arsenals.

According to Arbatov, the current [New] START Treaty, which was concluded in April of last year, imposes limitations primarily on the means of delivery – that is, on strategic missiles. "However, the U.S. is especially concerned about Russian tactical weapons – medium-range

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nuclear missiles," the expert added. "But Russia does not intend to hold negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons until the U.S. withdraws its missile defense system from Europe."

Arbatov believes that the agreement on disposal of weapons-grade plutonium allows the U.S. to control the process of liquidation not of missiles, but of the warheads themselves, which may be used on strategic, as well as tactical Russian missiles.

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