



BI-WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW



17 January 2013 – 30 January 2013

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ARMS CONTROL (GENERAL)

Biden and Donilon Preparing for New Nuclear Discussions with Russia

The Cable at Foreign Policy, 30 January 2013, <http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com>

Vice President Joe Biden will meet Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov this weekend in Munich and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon will travel to Moscow next month to try to kick-start a new round of U.S.-Russia nuclear reduction negotiations. (653 words)

[Click here for full text.](#)

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon Urges End to Stalemate in CD

UN News Center, 22 January 2013, <http://www.un.org>

As the 2013 session of the world's sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations opened in Geneva today, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged the body, which has failed to agree on its work program for the past several years, to revive substantive talks without delay. (431 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Ambassador Kennedy's Statement at the Conference on Disarmament

U.S. Mission at Geneva, 22 January 2013; <http://geneva.usmission.gov>

Remarks by Ambassador Laura E. Kennedy, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament and U.S. Special Representative for Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Issues.

Thank you Mr. President ... for the message from [United Nations Secretary-General] Ban Ki-moon [stating] that "another year of stalemate in the [Conference on Disarmament (CD)] is unacceptable." We agree. I would like to extend my congratulations to you Ambassador Dekany for Hungary's assumption of the CD Presidency at the outset of the 2013 CD session. (1,299 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

DEQ Approves Closure Plan for UMCDF

U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA), 17 January 2013, <http://www.cma.army.mil>

The Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMDF) has taken another step towards successful project completion and establishing a legacy of environmental responsibility in northeast Oregon. On Thursday, January 17, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) issued its final approval of the UMCDF Closure Plan permit modification request, allowing the closure of the UMCDF according to industrial performance standards.

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COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

Obama Calls on Russia to Renew CTR Pact

Bioprepwatch, 22 January 2013; www.bioprepwatch.com

Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, the men behind the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] program, were recently honored by President Barack Obama, who marked the occasion by calling on the Russians to renew the pact. Russia, however, declared an intention to end the pact in October, DefenseNews.com reports. (241 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NST)

USAF Requests Proposals for a Next-Generation ICBM

IHS Janes, 28 January 2013, <http://www.janes.com>

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) Nuclear Weapons Center, Intelligence, Program Development & Integration Directorate (AFNWC/XZ) is soliciting white papers and proposals for concepts that could modernize or replace the ground-based leg of the existing U.S. nuclear triad. (1,193 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russia Revitalizes Its Submarine Deterrent

World Politics Review, 15 January 2013, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com>

Russia's next-generation nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN), equipped with the new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), officially entered service with the Russian navy's Northern Fleet on Jan. 10. (1,025 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

Russia to Start Building Two Nuclear Borey Super-Subs in 2013

Russian Times, 12 January 2013, <http://www.rt.com>

Russia is to start building two new advanced nuclear-powered Borey class submarines before year's end. Once complete, they will be lurking under the sea with 20 Bulava nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles each. (318 words) [Click here for full text.](#)

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Vice President Joe Biden will meet Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov this weekend in Munich and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon will travel to Moscow next month to try to kick-start a new round of U.S.-Russia nuclear reduction negotiations, *The Cable* has learned.

It was four years ago at the Munich Security Conference that Biden first spoke about the Obama administration's desire to "reset" U.S.-Russian relations Now, at the beginning of Obama's second term, Biden and Donilon are leading the charge to reinvigorate that reset [...]

Some in Congress are concerned that Biden and Donilon, in their upcoming meetings with Russian leaders, will ... propose unilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear stockpiles or alterations to U.S. missile-defense plans as an enticement for Russia to sit down for new talks. [...]

Russia experts acknowledge that a new arms control agreement with Moscow will be difficult but say that the White House is committed to exploring whether it is possible. Obama is personally driving this policy and sees nuclear weapons reductions, as spelled out in his 2009 speech in Prague, as part of his legacy.

"The Donilon visit seems to be all about the next round [of nuclear reduction negotiations]," said Samuel Charap, a fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies who until recently worked in the arms control office at the State Department. "The president is serious about the whole Prague agenda thing. He wasn't making that up."

There is no clarity on which types of weapons might be included in the next round of U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations, but the administration is said to be open to including strategic deployed nukes, strategic non-deployed nukes, tactical nukes, and missile defense in the talks.

"The question is what kind of package you can put together with those four pieces to make a deal and what's the point of the deal," Charap said. "It's harder to make a compelling case to arms control skeptics here and there about why you need another agreement now. There's going to have to be a three-way balancing act between the interagency, Congress, and the Russians – if the administration decides to pursue a new treaty."

Stephen Pifer of the Brookings Institution recently released a report and an article spelling out some ideas for how a deal could be done outside the framework of a formal treaty that would have to be ratified by the U.S. Senate. The crux of the deal would be a cooperative agreement

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between [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)] and Russia on missile defense, Pifer argued.

"Experts from the Pentagon and Russian Defense Ministry reportedly held productive exchanges in early 2011 regarding what a cooperative missile defense arrangement would entail... Progress slowed in spring 2011, when Russia took the position that it required a 'legal guarantee' that U.S. missile defenses would not be directed against Russian strategic forces," he wrote.

"If Moscow is prepared to move off of its requirement for a legal guarantee, and Washington and NATO are prepared to show some greater transparency and flexibility in their approach, one can see the elements of a compromise that would allow agreement on a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement." If the missile-defense issue were removed as an obstacle, a path toward an agreement on further nuclear weapons reductions would open up, the theory goes.

The State Department's International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), which reports to Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control [and International Security] Rose Gottemoeller, issued a report last November spelling out how further nuclear reductions might be achieved [...]

The ISAB presented options for three scenarios: "completing the New START Treaty reductions early; working with Russia on transparency and verification of nonstrategic nuclear weapons; and engaging in parallel nuclear arms reductions to levels below New START, if Russia is willing to reciprocate."

"Unilateral and coordinated reductions can be quicker and less politically costly ... relative to treaties with adversarial negotiations and difficult ratification processes," the report stated.

[...]



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As the 2013 session of the world's sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations opened in Geneva today, United Nations [UN] Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged the body, which has failed to agree on its work program for the past several years, to revive substantive talks without delay.

“The world today remains over-armed. Peace is under-funded. We cannot afford to lose yet another year”, Mr. Ban said in a message delivered on his behalf to the UN Conference on Disarmament. It is essential to end this continued stalemate to avoid jeopardizing the credibility of the Conference and the machinery of disarmament, he said, stressing that the items on its agenda, which focus mainly on weapons of mass destruction, transcend the narrow national interests of any one state and have significant implications for international peace and security.

Established in 1979 and with a current membership of 65 countries, the conference has produced landmark disarmament instruments such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC], and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, it has been plagued in recent years by an inability to overcome differences among its members and start its substantive work towards advancing those goals.

Strengthening the rule of law in global disarmament needs a single multilateral negotiating forum, Mr. Ban said in his message. I remain committed to the Conference on Disarmament, but it must fulfill its role. For that purpose, he urged the Conference to build on positive developments of recent years, including the action plan resulting from the 2010 review conference of the NPT, which garnered strong international support. He also strongly encouraged the Conference to engage more closely with civil society, noting that there is strong support for nuclear disarmament among this sector.

Meanwhile, he noted that last year, the 67th Session of the General Assembly agreed to establish an open-ended working group to examine ways of taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. It also established a group of governmental experts that will begin work in 2014 to make recommendations that could contribute to an eventual fissile material cut-off treaty, consideration of which had been stalled, in the Conference, by the current deadlock.

Although these processes will take place outside the Conference on Disarmament, they constitute a new impetus that I hope will facilitate your agreement on a viable program of work, the Secretary-General said. We need flexibility and a spirit of compromise. Affirming that the Conference still has the potential to play the central role in disarmament negotiations, he called on delegations to let us ensure it lives up to its responsibility.

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Thank you Mr. President ... for the message from [United Nations Secretary-General] Ban Ki-moon [stating] that “another year of stalemate in the [Conference on Disarmament (CD)] is unacceptable.” We agree. I would like to extend my congratulations to you Ambassador Dekany for Hungary's assumption of the CD Presidency at the outset of the 2013 CD session.

This is indeed a challenging time for the conference, and the United States is fully confident that you and your delegation will rise to the challenges ahead, although I must say, I do not envy you. Let me assure you Mr. President of the full support of the United States as you undertake this difficult task.

We begin the New Year with a renewed commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons – a goal which my President has made a hallmark of his international security agenda. In his inaugural address on January 21, President Obama spoke broadly of the importance of “collective action” in dealing with new challenges, and of the value of engagement. He talked of “the obligation to shape the debates of our time ... with common effort and common purpose.” In speaking to Americans, he stated that no nation “has a greater stake in a peaceful world.”

Turning to the CD, we cannot discount the fundamental challenges the conference is facing, nor treat 2013 as just another year and today as just another CD opening session. We cannot see 2013 as “no different” from 2012 or any other year since 1996 when the CD last fulfilled its negotiating mandate upon conclusion of the [Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)].

The reality is very different. The 2012 [United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)] First Committee reflected the cumulative frustration among many in the international community with years of CD deadlock and the steady attrition of its credibility. The UNGA adopted two resolutions, on [a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)] and on nuclear disarmament, which mandate UNGA mechanisms to address these respective “core” CD issues.

While not enthusiastic about growing UNGA involvement, the United States assessed that the Canadian-sponsored FMCT resolution establishing a Group of Government Experts (GGE) – a standard practice based on consensus decision making – included sufficient safeguards that would not undermine prospects for the CD to engage on this vital objective. Indeed, the GGE could complement CD efforts to make progress on [beginning negotiations on an] FMCT in a manner that the CD can – we hope – take up. We did not find this to be the case with the



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Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament, which is not consensus based, [and which] circumvents the conference and re-directs its resources.

Despite the challenges facing this body, the goals which this conference was designed to tackle are worth fighting for. There are those who think the CD can survive in its current immobilized state and there are those who think the CD is a failed experiment, beyond saving. Both of these views reinforce the status quo of inaction, which will most certainly destroy the conference.

The United States does not share either view. We continue to value the conference as the preferred forum for negotiation of an FMCT, the next practical step for multilateral nuclear disarmament. The CD is uniquely situated to negotiate an FMCT as it operates by consensus, which ensures equitable protection of national security interests during negotiations, and includes the key states affected by such an agreement. That said, “uniqueness” is not a substitute for results. For as we witnessed last fall in New York, the multilateral arms control and disarmament vacuum created by the CD’s inaction is starting to be filled by other processes and mechanisms. Regarding the CD’s future, the often used phrase “time is running out” may be more accurate than ever.

An overwhelming majority of this conference supports the early commencement of FMCT negotiations as iterated as far back as 1978 in the first Special Session on Disarmament. The United States continues to consult with key partners to find a way to reach consensus in the CD and move forward on an FMCT. As Secretary of State Clinton said when addressing the CD in 2011, we believe that an FMCT is “too important a matter to be left in a deadlock forever.” It is now 2013 and past time to advance this core international goal, which must be integral to any CD program of work.

We do not discount the importance of other core issues on the CD’s agenda: nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances (NSAs), and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). We are willing to engage in substantive discussions on each of these issues in the CD as part of a consensus Program of Work. In the meantime, the United States has taken practical steps to advance each of these issues.

In the area of space security, we continue to pursue pragmatic bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures in this regard, and support the work of the UN GGE under the distinguished chairmanship of our Russian colleague, as well as the negotiation of an International Code of Conduct.

The United States also continues to support the extension of negative security assurances through protocols to nuclear weapons free zone treaties. We remain committed to signing the



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Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) as soon as possible and are prepared to consult with the parties to the Central Asian zone on resolving outstanding issues.

Let me take this opportunity to assure you that the United States continues to work with our partners, the “co-conveners,” and Ambassador Laajava – for whose wise and tireless leadership we must all be indebted – to create the conditions for a meaningful conference on a Middle East [weapons of mass destruction (WMD)]-free zone. We regret that it was necessary to postpone – I must stress “postpone” not “cancel” – the conference despite our best efforts. We stand by our commitment to hold a meaningful conference that includes all states of the region. To get us to this goal at the earliest possible date, we urge the states of the region to engage directly with each other to bridge the conceptual differences on approaches toward regional security and arms control arrangements.

Finally, with respect to nuclear disarmament, the U.S. record speaks for itself. Working with our partner, Russia, no country has taken deeper and broader reductions to its nuclear arsenal. The United States is continuing to work toward further, deeper reductions. Since 2009, we have worked with our P-5 [the five nuclear weapon states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council] partners to advance a regular dialogue on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, confidence-building measures and verification.

We were pleased to host the June 2012 P-5 Conference on [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)] implementation in Washington and are delighted that Russia will host the next P-5 Conference, in Geneva in April in the context of the NPT [Preparatory Commission (PrepCom)]. I note there has also been a very active P-5 intercessional agenda, including a working group on nuclear definitions led by China and other efforts by the United Kingdom and France related to transparency and verification. The dynamic that has developed among the five nuclear-weapon states within the P5 Conference process is important for establishing a firm foundation to build a broader multilateral approach to arms control.

We hope to see this broader multilateral approach reflected in the work of the CD and trust that you, Mr. President will help guide the work of the Conference toward this end. Finally, a warm welcome to our new colleagues. I am also delighted to see with us today our 2013 Chair for the [Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)], Ms. Judit Kromi of Hungary, we look forward to her leadership along with our distinguished vice chairs from Malaysia and Switzerland. Thank you Mr. President.

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“Approval of the UMCDF Closure Plan permit modification request was the result of hard work, tough negotiations, and perseverance,” said Gary Anderson, UMCDF Site Project Manager [from URS]. “The public should be confident that the closure of the UMCDF facility will be conducted efficiently, and, most importantly, safely. My thanks to everyone who played a critical role in the successful completion of the permit modification.”

Originally submitted to the DEQ in 2009, the closure plan is the culmination of significant effort between the URS, the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity [CMA], and external stakeholders, such as the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

“Getting approval on the UMCDF Closure Plan today is the culmination of hard work on the part of many folks at UMCDF, within our URS business unit, and within CMA, not to mention our many stakeholders,” said Julia Hamrick, Project General Manager for URS, which built and operates UMCDF. “Now that we have the plan, the task is to execute it with distinction, to be safe, compliant and finish the closure mission as promised to the public.

The closure plan allows for industrial closure performance standards in designated portions of the facility, retention of specific buildings identified for future use, and establishes performance standards for areas outside of the designated industrial zone.

Since the completion of chemical agent destruction operations in October 2011, the UMCDF team has worked diligently to decontaminate and decommission the Munitions Demilitarization Building, where chemical agent and chemical weapons were processed. Each portion of the Munitions Demilitarization Building will be cleaned and monitored with state-of-the-art equipment to assure the chemical agent hazard has been alleviated before final demolition of the building.

To date, the facility’s Deactivation Furnace System and both Liquid Incinerators have been taken out of service and decommissioned. The final furnace, the Metal Parts Furnace, is planned to be shut down in March [2013].

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Both nations could benefit by a renewal of the pact as threat reduction becomes a broader and more compelling matter. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program was behind the removal of nuclear weapons from former Soviet republics. As a result of the removal, thousands of strategic nuclear warheads were deactivated and huge stockpiles of chemical weapons were eliminated.

At the time, critics noted that the program cost taxpayers billions of dollars, but in the post-September 11 world, such expenditures could prevent nuclear weapons, materials and technology from being acquired by terrorists. The Department of Defense spends approximately \$500 million on the CTR program annually, or less than 0.1 percent of the defense budget, but increasing that amount by an additional \$500 million dollars could provide an exponential rate of return, according to DefenseNews.com.

While Russia mulls renewing the CTR, Pakistan, Afghanistan and countries in Africa and Southeast Asia are helping it to expand. Additionally, the future of the CTR is not limited to [weapons of mass destruction (WMD)]. Iraq and Afghanistan are dealing with the pervasive use of improvised explosive devices, which have also become prevalent in Colombia and are emerging in Mexico.

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IHS Janes, 28 January 2013, <http://www.janes.com>

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) Nuclear Weapons Center, Intelligence, Program Development and Integration Directorate (AFNWC/XZ) is soliciting white papers and proposals for concepts that could modernize or replace the ground-based leg of the existing U.S. nuclear triad. These concepts are intended to address identified and validated gaps or shortfalls based on conditions in which a future land-based strategic system will need to operate.

A Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) released on January 7 and updated a week later in response to questions submitted by U.S. industry called for submissions to be made by February 8. Companies responding to the BAA are expected to adopt a “system-of-systems” approach, covering areas such as the payload delivery vehicle, warhead integration, basing, and nuclear command, control and communications.

A modular, open-systems architecture is requested, offering commonality with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), any Prompt Global Strike/Conventional Strike Missile that may enter service, and space launch vehicles. An operational life covering the 2025-2075 timeframe is anticipated.

In December 2011 AFNWC issued a request for information (RFI) to industry soliciting inputs covering six mission focus areas: propulsion; guidance; basing; nuclear command, control and communications (NC3); warhead and re-entry vehicle (RV); and "plug-and-play" technology. Responses were received in March 2012, and AFNWC personnel visited [a number of industries] in May and June that year to obtain further information on these.

Based on the information gathered from the responses, industry visits and subject-matter experts, AFNWC drew up five concept characterization and technical descriptions (CCTDs):

- continued use of the current Minuteman III until 2075 with no deliberate attempt to close identified gaps;
- incremental changes to the current Minuteman III intended to close these gaps;
- a new fixed-site missile system;
- a new mobile missile system; and
- a new tunnel-based missile system.

The new BAA requests industry assistance in further defining technical, cost, and management inputs for each concept. This will help to provide a basis for differentiating between these

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concepts and selecting one or more optimum concepts for a subsequent technology development (TD) phase.

The first two options would continue to use the existing Minuteman III silo infrastructure, with some modernization in the areas of guidance; propulsion; re-entry vehicles and re-entry systems; nuclear command, control and communications (NC3); and ground infrastructure. Industry is asked to look at methods of reducing the overall cost to sustain the system by proposing refinements to the security and maintenance operating concepts.

The new fixed-site concept envisions using a new, super-hardened silo able to meet survivability requirements by withstanding high levels of overpressure. It also involves using a canisterized missile able to withstand specified levels of ground shock. This concept will also explore techniques for raising the canister to a desired level above ground to overcome the likely debris loads over the launch enclosure.

A new ICBM carried on a transporter erector launcher (TEL) is proposed under the mobile concept. As envisaged, a mobile missile must be capable of delivering up to two Mk12A or two Mk21 re-entry vehicles. Although these systems would be located on government land, the TEL must have the capability to leave its original deployment area and operate on- or off-road in order to provide increased survivability. The latter is seen as a function of system hardness and system mobility, so the speed at which the TEL can depart from its operating base when required will be a key feature. The proposed guidance system will have to be designed to cope with the demands of off-based deployment.

The weapon control system is expected to consist of some combination of fixed and mobile control systems. A fixed launch-control center could be located at the main operating base (MOB), while a mobile launch-control center able to be deployed off-base during higher readiness states will provide a more survivable backup capability. Studies will have to be done on the primary mode of communication to and from higher authority.

In some respects, the tunnel concept mode is similar to one of the schemes studied during the early 1980s for what was then the [missile-experimental (MX)] ICBM. This was finally deployed as the LGM-118 Peacekeeper between 1986 and 2005 in 50 former Minuteman silos.

Each tunnel would contain a single unmanned transporter/launcher and missile. These would be self-propelled, moving either via rail or in a trackless configuration. Random movements along the length of the tunnel would deny an aim point to the enemy, while the design of the vehicle would protect the missile from ground shock.



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Launch portals would be located at regular intervals along the tunnel. These would allow the transporter's strongback to be raised and the missile launched. A suitable communications system would have to be provided to allow higher authorities to be linked to mobile Launch Control Centers. The latter would in turn have to be able to communicate with the vehicle operating within each tunnel.

A package of studies and evaluations is linked to each of the four concepts. In the area of propulsion, companies will be expected to evaluate alternative case materials; methods of nozzle configuration and control; and propellant ageing and health-monitoring capabilities. In all concepts requiring a new missile, they will evaluate the number of stages needed and their expected diameters, and study the advantages of using thrust termination (TT), a generalized energy management system (GEMS), or a liquid-propellant final stage.

In the area of guidance, companies will be expected to evaluate new inertial measurement unit (IMU) and accelerometer technologies; the advantages, disadvantages and technical risks of strapdown and semi-strapdown configurations; methods of increasing mean time between failure (MTBF); and the capabilities and vulnerabilities associated with external aiding.

Studies should quantify the manufacturing and operational risk in using existing RVs, evaluate multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities, and evaluate materials that could increase operational effectiveness. For all but the first concept, they will also evaluate the adaptability of trajectory shaping vehicles (TSV) and trajectory correcting vehicles (TCV)

An evaluation will be made of the hardness of the current Minuteman III Launch Facility (LF) to identify what modifications might be required should the system be retained in service. For all the other concepts, an evaluation of proposed basing hardness level and potential vulnerabilities will be made, and the companies will be expected to identify all ground support equipment necessary, indicating any upgrades that may be needed.

The current Nuclear Command, Control and Communication (NC3) facilities associated with Minuteman III are to be evaluated, existing vulnerabilities identified, and further work done to define the technologies needed to increase the bandwidth of the current hardened intersite cable system (HICS). For the concepts that require an all-new missile, companies will be expected to clearly define NC3 architecture and identify potential vulnerabilities, and to define the timelines for processing emergency action messages (EAM) and sending out critical commands.

An assessment is to be made of the operational effectiveness of the existing airborne launch control system (ALCS), and recommendations are to be made on possible modifications and



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improvements. Companies are being invited to provide responses to one or more of the five proposed future ICBM concepts. Those which propose novel technologies in individual areas could be awarded AFNWC contacts to further define these technologies.

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Russia Revitalizes Its Submarine Deterrent

World Politics Review, 15 January 2013, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com>

Russia's next-generation nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN), equipped with the new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), officially entered service with the Russian navy's Northern Fleet on January 10.

Christened the Yuri Dolgoruky, this first Borey-class sub was under construction at the Sevmash shipbuilding company from 1996 to 2008. The ship had originally been intended to carry the much larger Bark SLBM. When the Bark's development problems led the Russian government to abandon it in favor of the smaller Bulava, Russian shipbuilders had to redesign the entire Borey class to accommodate the Bulava – before the missile had even moved beyond the drawing board.

The Russian military intends the Borey-Bulava combination to serve as the sea-based foundation of its nuclear triad through at least the 2040s. The cost of researching, designing and developing this new SSBN-SLBM combination represents perhaps the most expensive item in recent Russian defense budgets. Estimates are that the Borey-Bulava combination at one point consumed more than one-third of Russia's defense budget. The Russian government has allocated \$132 billion to construct many new submarines and other warships by 2020.

This high spending reflects the importance of the Borey-Bulava systems to Russian policymakers. At the ceremony marking the Yuri Dolgoruky's entry into service, President Vladimir Putin boasted that, "submarines of that class will become an important element of sea-based strategic forces, a guarantor of global balance and security [for] Russia and its allies."

The Borey-class subs have a 130-member crew and are equipped with advanced sonar, navigation, communications and fire-control systems as well as fourth-generation "stealthy" characteristics. Each ship has a length of 185 feet and a width of 15 feet, can dive to 500 feet and has a submerged speed of 29 knots.

The first three Borey-class SSBNs will carry 16 Bulava-30 SLBMs and six SS-N-15 cruise missiles each. The second of these ships, the Aleksandr Nevsky, is currently undergoing sea trials, while the third, Vladimir Monomakh, was floated out at the end of last year.

Subsequent Borey vessels will carry 20 rather than 16 Bulava SLBMs. The Knyaz Vladimir, the first submarine of this improved Borey-A class, was laid down in July 2012. The construction of the Alexander Suvorov, the fifth in the series, will begin in July 2013, while the sixth submarine, the Mikhail Kutuzov, will be laid down before the end of this year. The Russian navy aims to

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have two more Borey-A class SSBNs by 2020. Combined, the eight Borey- and Borey-A-class subs will carry a total of 148 Bulava missiles.

The Bulava, which means “mace” in English, represents one of the few major Russian weapons systems developed since the Soviet Union’s collapse. It is designed to carry 10 maneuverable and independently targeted (MIRVed) nuclear warheads, with a destructive power of some 100-150 kilotons each and a maximum range of some 5,000 miles. On paper, the Bulava’s advanced missile defense countermeasures, solid-fuel propellant, small size, light weight, rapid speed, maneuverability and other capabilities make it a superior deterrent to anything in Russia’s existing SLBM arsenal.

Nevertheless, only in recent years has the Bulava performed well enough in testing for Russian leaders to feel sufficiently confident to commit to its near-term deployment. Originally scheduled to enter into service in 2006, the Bulava’s terrible test record resulted in its remaining a paper system until December 2011, when two successful launches formally ended its test-launching program. Prior to that, about half of the missile’s test launches had failed, sometimes spectacularly. The repeated setbacks embarrassed the Russian defense industry at a time when the Russian government was trying to re-establish Moscow’s claims to great-power status.

The Bulava’s problems resulted from two primary factors. The first was the Russian government’s decision to award the original contract to the wrong design firm and then follow its bad advice. The second was the continuing weaknesses in Russia’s military-industrial complex, especially problems related to production, quality control and systems integration. In particular, the failure to effectively coordinate the input of the dozens of independent subcontractors involved in the program was a major reason for the Bulava’s difficulties. However, the Russian government felt it had to persist with the Bulava because the weapon has been designed to work with the Borey-class SSBN, which is the only new strategic submarine under production in Russia.

The Russian navy has been waiting impatiently for these boats, as Russia’s existing fleet of subs consists of Soviet-era vessels, all built before 1990. These vessels have been renewed with new SLBMs and other components, but are well past their intended service lives. As a result, only a few Russian SSBNs are available for deployment at any one time, with the remaining vessels either undergoing maintenance or modernization, or in training.

Last February, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, the commander-in-chief of the Russian navy, declared that Russia’s SSBNs would resume regular deterrent patrols on or shortly after the date the Yuri Dolgoruky entered into service. This change in deployment posture would mean

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that at least one Russian strategic submarine would be at sea at any time. For the past decade, Russian SSBN patrols have occurred intermittently, with lengthy gaps in coverage. Whereas during the Cold War the Soviet navy would conduct a few hundred deterrent patrols a year, last year the Russian navy managed only five.

Although Russian designers may finally have gotten the Borey-Bulava combination to work, this success may prove exceptional. The Russian government devoted enormous sums to this very important project and cannot undertake a comparable effort with all its desired military systems. Russian officials have had to announce repeated delays in plans to build new aircraft carriers, for instance. Russian defense companies, having not yet recovered from the traumatic breakup of the Soviet-era military-industrial complex, are still incapable of building such complex weapons systems in a timely manner.

The priority Russian policymakers have accorded the Borey-Bulava combination reflects their determination for Russia to remain a great power with the capacity to deter a U.S. nuclear attack. Although such an attack would never occur in any case, the renewal of Russia's strategic deterrent might have a positive impact on relations by reducing Russian prickliness over U.S. missile defenses and other sources of tension in the relationship.

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Russia to Start Building Two Nuclear Borey Super-Subs in 2013

Russian Times, 12 January 2013, <http://www.rt.com>

Russia is to start building two new advanced nuclear-powered Borey class submarines before year's end. Once complete, they will be lurking under the sea with 20 Bulava nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs] each.

One of the submarines may be named Aleksandr Suvorov after one of the most decorated generals of the Russian Empire, a source in the defense industry told the media. Its construction is expected to start on July 28, which is Russian Navy Day. The second vessel is likely to be named after Mikhail Kutuzov, the iconic Russian general of the Napoleonic Wars. Its keel is to be laid down in November.

The vessels are to be built by the shipbuilder Sevmash in Severodvinsk in the north of Russia. Both submarines are of the Borey class, the most modern strategic nuclear-powered submarines in the Russian Navy. The lead vessel of the class, Yury Dolgoruky, officially entered service on Thursday, with two of his sister-ships currently afloat and undergoing trials.

The two new vessels are distinct from those three, being of an advanced Borey-A version of the same design. They will carry 20 nuclear ICBMs each, as opposed to 16 on the older submarines. They will also have improved maneuverability and better weapon control systems and will generate less noise.

Russia plans to build five Borey-A submarines. The first of them, Knyaz Vladimir, is already in construction. Earlier this week Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said the five ships may be complete by 2018. This would be ahead of the schedule, since the initial plan was to launch the last of the submarines by 2020.

Apart from Borey class submarines, the Navy wants to purchase seven Yasen class attack nuclear powered submarines before 2020. The design is comparable to the U.S. Seawolf class submarine in terms of purpose and characteristics. The lead ship of the series, Severodvinsk, was launched in 2010, while another submarine, Kazan, is currently under construction.



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