

NEXT STEP

INSPECTION PREPARATION



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This pamphlet is part of a series about preparing U.S. facilities for the potential security impacts associated with hosting on-site inspections and other arms control treaty compliance verification activities. The pamphlet was prepared by the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) to increase **Readiness Through Awareness** within the U.S. Government and defense contractor community. Additional copies of this pamphlet, as well as other educational materials on arms control security topics, are available through the DTIRP Outreach Program.

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INTRODUCTION

A number of the arms control treaties and agreements to which the United States is a State Party allow our treaty partners to verify U.S. compliance by conducting on-site inspections and observation overflights at U.S. facilities at home and abroad. Other compliance verification activities may include periodic exchanges of specific, detailed information, data declarations, and the potential for short-notice challenge inspections. Of these activities, on-site inspections pose the greatest risk to national security, proprietary, or other sensitive information. They also have the greatest potential to impact a facility's daily operations and resources.

With advance planning, often with the assistance of U.S. Government treaty and arms control security experts, facility staff can be prepared to manage and reduce the risks and impacts associated with hosting an on-site inspection. This pamphlet outlines a number of important "steps" in the inspection preparation process and recommends specific actions that potentially affected facilities should take to be prepared for possible on-site inspection activities.¹

¹ Treaty-specific preparation procedures are addressed in other DTIRP outreach products.

BACKGROUND

The United States is party to a number of arms control treaties and agreements which impact a broad range of U.S. Government, government contractor, and commercial facilities. Some of these agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Treaty on Open Skies, and the U.S.-International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol² (U.S.-IAEA AP) contain provisions that could allow foreign inspection teams to enter, or fly over, U.S. facilities for the purpose of gathering information to support compliance verification decisions.

The United States negotiates and enters into such agreements for a number of reasons. Most importantly, these arms control agreements support U.S. national security objectives and reduce the threat to U.S. interests from armed conflict at home and abroad. By providing States Parties with the means to verify treaty compliance, on-site inspections and overflights increase global confidence and security. These activities also provide the United States with the opportunity to demonstrate its full compliance with arms control treaty obligations and to set a positive example for the rest of the world.

Despite these benefits, treaty compliance verification activities pose additional security and operational challenges for many affected sites. Past experience has demonstrated that advance preparation is essential for enabling U.S. personnel and facility staff to successfully host on-site inspections. Facilities should work closely with their military sponsor and, upon request, DTIRP representatives, in order to strike an appropriate balance between being sufficiently prepared and exercising fiscal constraint. This pamphlet explains the steps facilities should consider when conducting inspection preparation efforts.

² Formal title: Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America. The U.S. Senate provided its advice and consent to ratify the U.S.-IAEA AP in March 2004; entry-into-force is pending.

DETERMINE WHICH TREATIES COULD AFFECT YOUR FACILITY

Treaty	Purpose	Compliance Verification Activities/Affected Sites
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	Prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining biological agents or toxins and weapons and equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins.	No mandatory compliance verification provisions; however, the United States voluntarily submits annual data declarations regarding certain biological activities.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	Prohibits States Parties from developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, transferring directly or indirectly, and using chemical weapons.	Extensive on-site verification measures including both routine and challenge inspections. Affects chemical manufacturing, production, and destruction facilities.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)	Prevents the spread of nuclear weapons and their technologies, fosters peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and furthers the goal of achieving general and complete nuclear disarmament.	Periodic inspections at facilities containing nuclear materials.
Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA)	Prohibits the resumption of operations at specific U.S. and Russian plutonium production reactors that have been shutdown.	Monitoring visits three times per year at three sites in Russia and once per year at two sites in the United States. Applies to shutdown plutonium production reactors and plutonium storage facilities.
SORT (The Moscow Treaty)	Further reduces strategic offensive arms from the levels of the START Treaty.	No on-site inspection provisions.
START	Reduces the number of deployed strategic offensive arms.	Current on-site inspections at facilities in the United States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)	Establishes lower levels for five categories of offensive conventional armaments—battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.	On-site inspections to verify compliance with numerical limits. Affects mainly military facilities located throughout Europe.
Treaty on Open Skies	Provides for strengthening peace, stability, and security through overflights of States Parties and promotes greater transparency and openness.	Any facility along a predetermined flight path is subject to imaging by treaty-specified equipment.
U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement	Imposes safeguards by the IAEA to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.	All U.S. declared facilities selected by the IAEA are required to submit design information, receive IAEA inspectors to verify the information, maintain safeguard records, and submit safeguard reports.
U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol	Strengthens existing safeguards through more intrusive and extensive monitoring of peaceful nuclear activities.	Provides IAEA inspectors with the right to access all declared nuclear fuel cycle-related activities, not just end-of-fuel-cycle activities.

Table 1

Before beginning to prepare for on-site inspections, or other compliance verification activities, it is important to identify which treaties, if any, could affect your facility. Facility personnel are generally not expected to have detailed knowledge of the full range of arms control treaties and their provisions or of U.S. rights and obligations. However, it is important for certain facility staff members to have a basic understanding of the purpose of these treaties, the types of compliance verification measures that may be conducted, and the types of sites that can be affected. A very brief overview of the arms control treaties and agreements to which the United States is a State Party is provided in Table 1. This table can help you determine which treaties could affect your facility.



ASSESS YOUR VULNERABILITY

NEXT STEPS

Once facility staff have determined which arms control treaties and compliance verification activities could affect their facility, it is time to conduct a vulnerability assessment to identify and evaluate potential risks. Conducting an accurate vulnerability assessment will require facility staff and arms control security experts to work together to evaluate each site, system, technology, operation, or program. It will then be possible to estimate the level of susceptibility each of these assets has to being observed, or otherwise detected, during compliance verification activities.

To conduct an effective vulnerability assessment, it will be essential for facility staff to have a thorough understanding of their facility's operations. It will also be essential for members of the vulnerability assessment team to have a thorough understanding of the rights and obligations of the inspection team, as well as those of the United States as the inspected State Party. The required expertise with regard to relevant arms control treaty verification provisions can be provided through the DTIRP Program and is available upon request.

Vulnerability assessments coordinated through the DTIRP Program are conducted using the five-phase approach outlined below:³

- Phase I:** Coordination
- Phase II:** Open source data search and assessment team training
- Phase III:** Pre-assessments
- Phase IV:** Assessments
- Phase V:** Reporting

Experience has shown that early preparation is the key to successfully hosting on-site inspections. For this reason, the following steps are recommended when facilities have determined they are vulnerable to arms control inspections.

STEP – Prepare an Inspection Readiness Plan (IRP)

Once the vulnerability assessment has been completed, facility personnel should prepare a comprehensive IRP. This plan will specify staff assignments and detail all activities and logistical arrangements required to accommodate the inspection team from the time they arrive at the facility until they depart. The IRP will include all information necessary to instruct all facility staff involved in preparing for and hosting the inspection.

To prepare the IRP, facility staff will need to consider how to present the site to the inspection team. This includes determining how and where facility staff would prefer the inspection team conduct their activities to prevent the loss of sensitive information. A careful review of facility operations should be conducted to determine which operations may need to be reduced or suspended during the inspection period. In addition, facility staff will need to carefully plan appropriate routes for the inspection team to follow during inspection activities to minimize susceptibilities.

STEP – Review and Expand Visitor Procedures

Many facilities have hosted both U.S. and foreign visitors. The preparations and arrangements made for these visits are frequently similar to those that will be required to host an inspection team and the accompanying U.S. escorts.

Reviewing, refining, and expanding these procedures will provide a good starting point when planning how to accommodate the needs of the inspection team when they are on site. For example, logistical arrangements will need to be made to support activities such as welcoming the inspection team; presenting the pre-inspection briefing; and providing occasional meals, on-site transportation, communications, administrative support, and emergency medical care.

³ Additional information on conducting vulnerability assessments is available from the DTIRP Program Coordinator or may be downloaded from the Products section of the DTIRP website. One recommended article is titled the "Arms Control Security Vulnerability Assessment Process," Order Number 947A.

Due to the intrusive nature of inspection activities, advance preparation will naturally focus on how to protect sensitive information and the facility's proprietary processes. Controlling access to certain areas of a facility works well in limiting who may observe sensitive information, processes, or technologies. However, treaty compliance verification activities generally allow inspectors to have access to a number of areas where visitors are normally prohibited. Expanding the facility's existing visitor control procedures to include occasional on-site inspection activities, will not only prepare facility personnel for these events but will reduce any problems that might otherwise occur after the inspection team arrives.

STEP – Expand Employee Awareness

Facility commanders and managers will need to expand employees' awareness and knowledge of the treaties that could impact the facility. This does not require employees to become "treaty experts." However, employees should have a general understanding of the types of arms control-related activities that could occur and their associated timelines. Depending on their level of involvement in these activities, facilities may need to provide regular orientation briefings to raise employees' awareness of inspection-related treaty provisions, site security procedures, and other inspection preparation and planning requirements.

Some facilities conduct recurring arms control security training sessions and mock inspections to ensure that facility personnel remain ready and aware of any procedural changes to the inspection process.

Training courses, multimedia, and other types of educational materials are available from the DTIRP Outreach Program. Many of these materials can be obtained, reproduced, and distributed via newsletters, email, or websites to help facility employees be prepared for the challenges associated with conducting on-site inspections and other arms control treaty compliance verification activities.

STEP – Assign Responsibilities

Next, facilities need to assign arms control security planning responsibilities to a particular individual or office. It is important to select facility personnel who have a detailed understanding of the facility's operations and are able to answer the many questions that could arise when planning for and conducting compliance verification activities.

Because arms control inspections impact facility security, many facilities designate the facility security officer for this task. Other facilities designate a treaty compliance officer or assign these duties to an entire office, such as their security or public affairs office. Having a central point of contact for arms control issues facilitates the flow of information. The designated individual or office should be involved in all inspection activities.

In addition to key managerial and operational representatives, other personnel may be selected to serve on the site-support team for the duration of the inspection. This team will be needed to support a number of essential activities, such as preparing and presenting briefings, conducting research, and gathering information relevant to the inspection. Facility personnel will also need to work with U.S. escorts; for example, guiding them through the facility and its structures, and answering questions, as necessary. Site and building escorts will then help facility personnel implement appropriate security countermeasures and conduct other preparation activities prior to the arrival of the inspection team.

Other considerations when hosting on-site inspection activities include providing the amenities required by the inspection team, the U.S. escorts, and the government assistance team members. U.S. escorts will make arrangements for many of these requirements to be met off site. These arrangements usually include lodging and most meals. To facilitate the inspection process, however, many facilities provide one meal each day. In some cases, facilities provide all on-site meals and lodging. Each facility has unique conditions, circumstances, and resources and will need to coordinate their on-site support with the U.S. escort team accordingly.

Finally, hosting an arms control inspection will require administrative support. Facility staff may be required to prepare, redact, and duplicate documents, records, and diagrams which need to be provided to the inspection team. Facility staff may also be required to support challenging communications needs. These may include providing access to outside telephone lines from temporary work areas set up for the inspection team and the U.S. escorts. In addition, during the inspection, escorts may require access to handheld or portable communications devices to support inspection team subgroups and to coordinate inspection management activities and transportation requirements.

STEP – Create and Maintain a List of Key Points of Contact

It is very important for facilities to create and maintain a list of key points of contact—including each building and program manager—that contains home, business, and mobile phone numbers. This list will facilitate and improve the facility's ability to quickly notify affected employees, day or night, of imminent observation overflights or on-site inspection activities. Other key personnel include facility security officers; program managers; administrative, contract, and logistics personnel; legal counsel; and a public affairs representative or facility spokesperson. If applicable, this list should also include tenants and subcontractors located on site.

STEP – Establish a Notification System

Once a comprehensive list of key contacts has been created, a notification system should be established that can be activated quickly when notified of an impending inspection or observation overflight. An effective notification system ensures that facilities have the maximum amount of time available for site preparation activities before the arrival of the inspection team or observation aircraft.

STEP – Prepare a Site Diagram

It is important to prepare and maintain a current and complete site diagram that depicts each building and its identification number or other designator. This site diagram is a key resource when preparing a comprehensive inspection preparation plan and when managing actual inspection activities.

STEP – Prepare a Pre-Inspection Briefing

When the inspection team arrives, facility staff will be required to conduct a pre-inspection briefing. It will be important for facility staff to coordinate this briefing with the U.S. escort team chief prior to presenting it to the inspection team. The purpose of the pre-inspection briefing is to acquaint the inspection team with the facility's layout and activities. Modifying and updating an existing welcome briefing is a good place to start. The safety briefing can be given as part of the pre-inspection briefing.

It is recommended that facility staff take this opportunity to directly address the purpose of the inspection. In addition, any inconsistencies or ambiguities that may exist and are likely to draw questions from the inspection team, should be addressed. This pro-active approach will help to establish an atmosphere of trust and cooperation with the inspection team, which will facilitate the inspection process. Finally, and of key importance, facility staff should propose a schedule for inspection activities. This allows the facility to guide these activities to better protect sensitive information and minimize disruptions to normal operations.

STEP – Identify Open-Source Information

Being prepared for on-site inspections includes determining what information has been published about a facility and its programs. This can help facility staff determine what, if any, sensitive information the inspection team may have collected from newsletters, websites, and other publicly accessible sources.

Assessing public information provides valuable insight about how a facility and its activities are viewed by the rest of the world—including another State Party, an international treaty implementation organization, or an inspection team. Internet searches yield vast amounts of information, which allows inspection teams to focus their objectives without wasting valuable inspection time.

STEP – Conduct Cost-Effective Site Preparation Activities

When conducting inspection preparation activities, facilities need to consider the possibility of industrial espionage. The inspection team's purpose is to collect only the specific data needed to facilitate a judgment about U.S. compliance with treaty provisions. However, many States Parties are also economic competitors. Therefore, the potential for the loss or transfer of key technologies cannot be disregarded. Allowing foreign inspection teams to have access to areas where sensitive production or processing activities occur without employing appropriate security countermeasures could contribute to the loss of national security, proprietary, or other sensitive information. In some cases, such a loss could impact national security interests as well as the facility's economic well-being and competitive position.

There are many steps a facility can take to become better prepared for on-site inspection activities. First, security countermeasures should be cost-effective. If the cost of employing a countermeasure exceeds the value of the information being protected, there is no recognizable benefit. Second, countermeasures should be as transparent as possible to avoid drawing attention to the item being protected. Finally, suitable countermeasures will allow the inspection team to have access to the areas and information needed to verify treaty compliance, while still protecting sensitive items from industrial espionage.

STEP – Seek Assistance

Assistance is available to help facilities identify their level of risk under various arms control treaties and agreements. Expert assistance, including a variety of multimedia educational materials, is available from the DTIRP Outreach Program. These materials can be shared among facility personnel to help them prepare for all types of treaty compliance verification activities. Assistance is also available from government sponsors and Defense Security Service (DSS) Industrial Security Representatives.

Although arms control activities can impact facilities in unforeseen ways, experience has demonstrated that the keys to successfully hosting an on-site inspection are advance preparation, communication, and treaty knowledge. Since 1988, the Department of Defense (DoD), with other Executive Branch agencies, has assisted facilities with preparing for and hosting hundreds of foreign inspection teams. As a result of this experience, the U.S. Government is well prepared to help facilities understand the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party, as well as those of the inspecting State Party, as specified in the compliance verification provisions of relevant arms control treaties and agreements.

DTIRP is able to draw from the resources available throughout the U.S. Government to provide arms control treaty, security, intelligence, and counterintelligence experts. When requested, DTIRP representatives will help facilities identify and assess their vulnerabilities and develop appropriate, cost-effective security countermeasures. Facility staff designated to conduct these inspection preparation activities need to have the necessary authority and knowledge of the facility and its programs to be able to identify sensitivities and implement countermeasures. In this way, facility and U.S. Government representatives can work together to ensure that facilities are prepared to successfully demonstrate compliance with U.S. arms control treaty obligations, while protecting national security, proprietary, and other sensitive information.

To obtain additional information about the recommended steps for hosting an arms control inspection, contact the DTIRP Outreach Program Coordinator at **1-800-419-2899** or by email at **dtirpoutreach@dtra.mil**, your local DSS Industrial Security Representative, or your government sponsor.



RELATED MATERIALS

407C Arms Control Treaties Information
CD

408P Arms Control Agreements Synopses
Pamphlet

907P DTIRP Arms Control Outreach Catalog
Pamphlet

908V or W Facility Protection Through Shrouding
Video - Windows Media CD

930C The Arms Control OPSEC Process
Automated CD

931A Arms Control Security Countermeasure Considerations
Article

934P Cross-Treaty Synergy—An Arms Control OPSEC Challenge
Pamphlet

936V or W Verification Provisions—Point and Counterpoint
Video - Windows Media CD

942C DTIRP Outreach Products on CD
CD

943P Arms Control OPSEC—Preparing U.S. Facilities for
On-Site Inspections
Pamphlet

947A Arms Control Security Vulnerability Assessment Process
Article

951V or W Site Vulnerability Assessments
Video - Windows Media CD

952V or W Security Countermeasures—Selection and Application
Video - Windows Media CD

953V or W Inspection and Building Preparation
Video - Windows Media CD



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