Arms Control OPSEC

Preparing U.S. Facilities for On-Site Inspections



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READINESS THROUGH AWARENESS
DTIRP

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This pamphlet is part of a series about preparing U.S. facilities for the potential security impacts associated with hosting on-site inspections and other arms control treaty compliance verification activities. The pamphlet was prepared by the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) to increase ***Readiness Through Awareness*** within the U.S. Government and defense contractor community. Additional copies of this pamphlet, as well as other educational materials on arms control security topics, are available through the DTIRP Outreach Program.

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INTRODUCTION

Measure of Success
Demonstrate treaty compliance while protecting national security, proprietary, and other sensitive information.

International arms control treaties and agreements are important tools for reducing the threats posed by conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Many of these agreements contain provisions allowing the States Parties to verify compliance. Compliance verification activities often include:

- submitting data declarations to other States Parties or to an international treaty implementation organization; and/or
- hosting and conducting on-site inspections, monitoring missions, and observation overflights.

A wide range of Department of Defense (DoD) facilities, as well as defense contractor and commercial sites are impacted by these activities. Clearly, the physical presence of a foreign inspection team during an on-site inspection creates unique security challenges that cannot be met by traditional operations security (OPSEC) measures alone. For this reason, the U.S. Government has developed the arms control OPSEC process, which augments traditional OPSEC measures.

As shown in the text box below, two new steps have been added to the traditional OPSEC process: susceptibility and probability.

Arms Control OPSEC Process

1. **Identify sensitive information**
2. **Determine susceptibility***
3. **Understand the threat**
4. **Determine vulnerability**
5. **Assess risk of compromise**
6. **Assess probability***
7. **Develop and implement countermeasures**

*Arms control OPSEC step

ORGANIZATION

Chain of Command
A responsible and authoritative chain of command is an indispensable asset when preparing facilities to successfully manage on-site inspections.

On-site inspection activities are primarily conducted at declared sites located at facilities, geographic areas, military installations, factories, and plants. These sites are declared by the U.S. Government in accordance with the provisions of a number of arms control treaties and agreements to which the United States is a State Party. In addition to declared sites, it is important to note that some treaties, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), contain provisions for challenge inspections, which could occur at non-declared as well as declared sites. DoD, DoD Components, and other government agencies have developed special guidance and procedures for ensuring that effective inspection plans could be implemented on short notice in the event of a challenge inspection.

Beginning in 1988, affected DoD Components established treaty management offices within the normal chain of command to ensure that potentially impacted facilities were properly prepared. Arms control treaty planning and preparation activities were implemented through the existing chain of command. Standardized procedures and the arms control OPSEC process were developed for identifying and resolving inspection-related security issues. In addition, during actual inspection activities, the DoD chain of command will be able to utilize the full resources of the U.S. Government to quickly resolve unexpected issues at the appropriate decision-making level. A responsible and authoritative chain of command is an indispensable asset for helping facility personnel successfully manage the security challenges associated with hosting on-site inspections, and possibly even a challenge inspection.

The On-Site Inspection Directorate[1] of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA/OS) is the DoD organization responsible for carrying out arms control treaty compliance verification activities. In addition to conducting on-site inspections, monitoring missions, and observation flights in other States Parties, DTRA/OS representatives escort all foreign inspection teams during their entire in-country stay or when these teams are present at U.S. facilities overseas. Additionally, arms control security and treaty experts from DTRA/OS are available to assist facility personnel with inspection planning and training activities, as requested. By drawing on their knowledge of the lessons learned during the many years the United States has both conducted and hosted on-site inspections, DTRA/OS representatives are able to conduct vulnerability assessments and provide valuable insights to help facility personnel plan for and manage the inspection process.

[1] Formerly the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)

THE ARMS CONTROL OPSEC PROCESS

Arms Control OPSEC
Arms control OPSEC is a systematic 7-step process for identifying sensitive information and unclassified indicators, assessing risks, and developing appropriate and cost-effective security countermeasures to protect national security, proprietary, and other sensitive information.

The arms control OPSEC process augments traditional OPSEC methods to help facility staff and U.S. Government personnel evaluate and prepare for the unique security challenges associated with conducting on-site inspection activities. As illustrated in the following diagrams, traditional methods primarily rely on a layered system of security fences and procedures. These methods restrict access and keep potential threats out of, and away from, sensitive information and areas. However, during on-site inspection activities, the inspection team will generally have access to a number of areas and have the right to obtain certain types of information.

The first diagram illustrates how traditional methods are used to protect sensitive information. In this illustration, the sensitive information, or target, is stored inside a safe located in a secure room. The room is located in a building that requires an access badge for entry. The building itself is located inside a restricted access facility on a secure compound. This layered approach generally provides the necessary level of security required to protect sensitive information.



Figure1: Traditional OPSEC method for protecting sensitive information.

During on-site inspection activities, however, treaty provisions allow the inspection team to have access and to collect information for the purpose of verifying compliance. Under these circumstances, traditional measures may not be sufficient to protect national security, proprietary, and other sensitive information from inadvertent disclosure.



Figure 2: Impact of on-site inspection activities on traditional OPSEC measures.

To effectively manage the unique security challenges associated with on-site inspection activities, the arms control OPSEC process adds two steps to traditional OPSEC—susceptibility and probability—and refocuses several traditional OPSEC steps. The seven steps of the arms control OPSEC process are:

1. Identify sensitive information to be protected—a traditional OPSEC step.

2. Determine the susceptibility of sensitive information—an arms control OPSEC step for determining exactly how an arms control agreement's provisions could be used to allow or deny access and opportunity to an inspection team to collect information about a sensitive equity (treaty knowledge required).

3. Understand the threat—a traditional OPSEC step, but in arms control OPSEC this step focuses on the individual members of the inspection team, specific treaty provisions, and the equipment used to collect information during inspection activities.

4. Determine vulnerability—a traditional OPSEC step for assessing whether the inspection team could have access to areas where sensitive indicators are observable.

5. Assess the risk of compromise—a traditional OPSEC step for determining the level of risk associated with each sensitive indicator based on the degree of access likely to be granted to the inspection team. If vulnerabilities are great and the inspection team is capable of collecting sensitive indicators, exploitation can be expected.

6. Assess probability—an arms control OPSEC step for determining how likely it is that an area containing sensitive information will be visited during inspection activities.

7. Develop and implement security countermeasures—a traditional OPSEC step. Once countermeasure recommendations have been developed, risk management can begin.

Effective implementation of these seven steps will enable facility and U.S. Government personnel to anticipate the level of access an inspection team is likely to require and request. In addition, facility staff should be aware that the inspectors will retain everything they see, hear, smell, or otherwise sense during the course of the inspection. For this reason, the arms control OPSEC process focuses on identifying the unprotected elements associated with sensitive programs, activities, technologies, and other sensitive equities. Elements such as waste handling systems, feed stocks, protective clothing, vehicles, schedules, processes, and security systems could serve as "sensitive indicators," revealing information about equities that need to be protected.

Once sensitive indicators have been identified, an assessment is made about their susceptibility to arms control activities. This includes assessing the probability of an inspector actually observing or otherwise detecting the indicator, and assessing the level of risk such observation could pose to the equity. Part of this risk assessment is to analyze the inspection team members' interests and backgrounds, as well as the areas where inspection activities are likely to occur. Based on these analyses, appropriate security countermeasures can be developed.

When selecting security countermeasures, it is important to consider a number of factors. First, security countermeasures should be cost-effective—if the cost of implementing a countermeasure is greater than the value of the information being protected, the countermeasure provides no benefit. Countermeasures should also be as transparent as possible to avoid attracting unwelcome attention from the inspection team. Finally, appropriate countermeasures should be able to protect sensitive information while also allowing the inspection team to verify that the item being protected is not a compliance concern.

DTRA/OS representatives have extensive experience in managing site preparation and on-site inspection activities. They include individuals who have a thorough understanding of the objectives and verification provisions of arms control treaties and agreements, and understand how treaty rights and obligations apply to the inspection team, as well as to the inspected State Party. When requested, DTRA/OS representatives can provide this essential expertise to help facility personnel assess the risks posed by on-site inspections, and select appropriate security countermeasures to protect national security, proprietary, and other sensitive information.

Training
Training exercises help DoD Components standardize procedures and share lessons learned.

Specialized training is conducted on a number of different levels, and through a number of different methods, to ensure that facility staff and U.S. Government personnel are prepared to host on-site inspections and other arms control treaty compliance verification activities. Training exercises also help DoD Components test and further refine treaty implementation operations and compliance plans.

Representatives from DTRA/OS, DoD, and other U.S. Government agencies receive training on a number of treaty implementation activities, such as general treaty provisions, inspection notification procedures, the timeline for inspection activities, the rights and obligations of the inspection team, and the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party. Training is also provided on the selection and application of appropriate security countermeasures, and on assigning and implementing site-specific inspection preparation procedures and responsibilities.

Personnel responsible for hosting on-site inspection activities participate in a number of training exercises. Tabletop exercises simulate inspection-related activities and follow an accelerated timeline. Site diagrams and other data may be included to help participants develop general planning guidance and identify potential problems that need to be addressed.

Field training exercises and mock inspections are conducted to add a higher degree of realism to the overall process. Mock inspections utilize a full complement of mock inspectors, national escorts, and observers to test existing procedures. On occasion, the United States has invited foreign inspectors to participate in field training exercises and mock inspections.

Facility personnel and national escorts conduct training exercises to help refine the facility's inspection readiness and logistics plans. These exercises also help facility personnel be prepared to create and present a pre-inspection briefing and to respond to the inspection team's requests for information and access.

In addition, facility personnel and national escorts jointly rehearse the

procedures they would use to manage the inspection team's movements throughout the inspectable area. The goal is to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. Typical inspection management techniques include:

- entering each room ahead of the inspection team to allow for a final readiness check;
- guiding the inspection team along a pre-planned route;
- providing an alternative means of demonstrating compliance when the inspection team's request for access is denied; and
- ensuring that the inspection team directs all questions through the national escorts—including those questions intended for facility personnel.

Training exercises and mock inspections conducted at U.S. facilities located in a foreign country may include participants from the host country's national escort organization. Host country escorts help U.S. personnel resolve issues affecting coordination and cooperation.

The wide variety of training environments assists DoD Components, DTRA/OS personnel, and facility staff in identifying and resolving potential problems, and in refining U.S. operations and compliance plans. In particular, training exercises have helped U.S. officials develop standardized responses to difficult questions and inspection team requests for access to areas containing sensitive information. These standardized responses help national escorts negotiate alternative means for demonstrating compliance, when needed.

Teamwork
Implementing notification procedures; executing operations and compliance plans; providing logistical support; and demonstrating treaty compliance—all require teamwork.

Effective implementation of the arms control OPSEC process involves the active participation of facility staff, treaty experts, and individuals who have expertise in all aspects of the arms control inspection process. Teamwork is a key element, not only when preparing for inspection activities, but also when conducting actual on-site inspection activities.

The inspection process begins when a notification is received by the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) at the Department of State. The NRRC immediately distributes the notification information to DTRA/OS, DoD Components, and other affected agencies. When the notification is received, DTRA/OS staff initiate the actions necessary to facilitate the arrival of the inspection team and to provide all host country and logistical support throughout the entire inspection period.

As soon as the inspection site is declared, the responsible DoD Component initiates its operations and compliance plans, and notifies the appropriate site personnel. Other interested U.S. Government agencies may also initiate procedures to track the progress of the inspection's activities and may provide assistance, as required.

ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
THE LESSONS LEARNED

DTRA/OS will send an advance team to assist facility staff with site preparation activities. Together, facility staff and members of the advance team will apply the steps of the arms control OPSEC process to identify sensitive information and apply appropriate security countermeasures. When the inspection team arrives at the site, the national escort team will join the inspection preparation efforts already underway.

Good communication and teamwork will be essential for facilitating the negotiation of the inspection plan. Throughout the remainder of the inspection process, facility staff, the advance team, and the national escorts will need to work as a team and follow the steps of the arms control OPSEC process to ensure the facility is able to successfully demonstrate compliance while simultaneously protecting sensitive information.

Over the past two decades, DoD, DoD Components, and facility personnel have developed and applied the arms control OPSEC process to successfully host on-site inspections. Many lessons have been learned about the importance of advance planning, training, teamwork, and effective communications. Specifically, these lessons include the following:

- conduct treaty and inspection readiness training for appropriate personnel—this may include classroom briefings, exercises, and mock inspections;
- conduct a vulnerability assessment;
- anticipate the inspection team's requirements, requests, and capabilities;
- identify appropriate ways of accommodating the inspection team's legitimate needs;
- develop cost-effective security countermeasures;
- plan inspection routes within buildings and throughout the facility;
- prepare a written plan for all inspection-related activities;
- ensure that facility staff are aware of and ready to operationalize their responsibilities during inspection activities; and
- maintain an up-to-date communications plan to quickly contact key personnel when the facility is notified of an impending inspection.

To obtain more information about the arms control OPSEC process, treaty provisions, vulnerability assessments, and the application of appropriate security countermeasures, contact the DTIRP Outreach Program Coordinator at 1-800-419-2899 or by email at dtirpoutreach@dtra.mil, your local Defense Security Service (DSS) Industrial Security Representative, or your government sponsor. Additional DTIRP products are available on the DTIRP website at: http://dtirp.dtra.mil.

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