

# New **START**

## Impact and Implementation

Product No. 237P



This pamphlet was prepared for the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) to promote **Readiness Through Awareness** throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) and defense contractor community. The pamphlet is intended to assist treaty implementers with identifying the purposes, obligations, and potential security impacts of implementing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START or NST).

For the latest information on New START Treaty implementation, see the New START Treaty Synopsis <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/synopses/start.aspx>, the New START Treaty Texts and Fact Sheets <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/treatyinfo/start.aspx>, and the Nuclear Corner <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/NC/nc.aspx> on the DTIRP website at <http://dtirp.dtra.mil>.

Additional copies of this pamphlet can be requested and downloaded from the Products page on the DTIRP website at <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/Products/Products.aspx#NewStart> and by contacting the DTIRP Outreach Program by phone at 1-800-419-2899 or by sending an email to [dtirpoutreach@dtra.mil](mailto:dtirpoutreach@dtra.mil).

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# INTRODUCTION

The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms] (New START Treaty or NST) is a bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, which entered into force on February 5, 2011. The treaty was negotiated to reduce the number of U.S. and Russian deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA) below the limits established by its predecessor treaties: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty).

Significantly, the New START Treaty contains provisions allowing U.S. and Russian inspectors to conduct on-site inspection activities at declared sites for the purpose of verifying treaty compliance and confirming the accuracy of the information declared and exchanged by the Parties relating to their SOA. The treaty's verification regime benefits the United States by enabling us to acquire direct information concerning Russia's strategic nuclear forces that will enable further reductions under future treaties. On-site inspection activities conducted by Russian inspectors do, however, create unique security challenges for impacted U.S. facilities.

This pamphlet provides a brief introduction to the New START Treaty and its potential impact on U.S. facilities. It describes the types of inspection activities allowed under the treaty and some of the countermeasures facility staff may apply to protect national security, confidential business, and other sensitive information while also demonstrating treaty compliance.

# ABOUT THE TREATY

The New START Treaty was negotiated to reduce the number of U.S. and Russian deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA) below the limits established by its two predecessor treaties: the first START treaty, which remained in force for 15 years until it expired on December 5, 2009; and SORT, which entered into force on June 1, 2003 but was superseded by the New START Treaty when this treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. The life-span of New START Treaty is ten years from entry into force, but the treaty may be extended for up to five years if both Parties agree.

Within seven years after entry into force, treaty provisions call for each Party to have reduced their strategic nuclear armaments to no more than:

- 1,550 deployed warheads;
- 800 deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; and
- 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

Achieving these levels will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s. These levels will also be well below the number of SOA existing when the first START treaty was signed in July 1991. At that time, the United States and the Soviet Union each deployed approximately 10,500 nuclear warheads.

When counting strategic nuclear warheads emplaced on ICBMs and SLBMs against the New START Treaty's limit of 1,550, the Parties count the actual number of warheads carried on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. During on-site inspections, the inspecting Party has the right to confirm the actual number of warheads on randomly selected ICBMs and SLBMs – something neither Party was able to do under START.

For each deployed heavy bomber, the Parties count one warhead against this limit. Using this attributive counting rule for heavy bombers was agreed as being preferable to counting each deployed heavy bomber as having zero warheads. This is because even though neither Party's heavy bombers carry nuclear warheads on a day-to-day basis, these aircraft are capable of carrying nuclear armaments.



The New START Treaty reduces strategic nuclear warheads to a level 74 percent lower than the limits set by START and 30 percent lower than the limits set by SORT. Limits for deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) under New START are 56 percent lower than the limits set by START. Under New START, each Party has the right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its SOA within the treaty’s overall limits.

<b>SOA Limits by Treaty</b>		
	<b>Warheads</b>	<b>Delivery Vehicles</b>
<b>START</b>	6,000 <sup>1</sup>	1,600 <sup>3</sup>
<b>SORT</b>	1,700–2,200 <sup>2</sup>	Not addressed
<b>New START</b>	1,550 <sup>1</sup>	700 <sup>1</sup> 800 <sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers (HBs) equipped for nuclear armaments  
<sup>2</sup> Strategic nuclear warheads  
<sup>3</sup> Deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles  
<sup>4</sup> Deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed HBs equipped for nuclear armaments

**Figure 1** (Current numbers for each Party’s SOA are available online at [http://dtirp.dtra.mil/pdfs/TIC\\_NST\\_Aggregate.pdf](http://dtirp.dtra.mil/pdfs/TIC_NST_Aggregate.pdf).)

To resolve questions concerning treaty compliance and implementation, the New START Treaty establishes the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). The BCC is required to meet at least twice each year unless otherwise agreed. The BCC meets in Geneva and all work conducted within the BCC remains confidential unless both Parties agree to publically release specific information. Although the BCC is not authorized to make substantive changes to the treaty text and protocols, the Parties may reach agreements on technical and procedural changes and additional measures that improve the viability and effectiveness of the treaty. Within the framework of the BCC the Parties also discuss, on an annual basis, the exchange of telemetric information (missile flight test data).

# VERIFICATION MEASURES

Although the verification provisions in the New START Treaty are based on the 1991 START treaty's verification regime, they have been tailored to effectively verify compliance with the new treaty. They have also been simplified to be less costly to implement and less disruptive to facilities subject to on-site inspections.

To verify treaty compliance, the New START Treaty contains detailed and extensive provisions for conducting on-site inspections, exhibitions, and data exchanges. New START also specifies the procedures and formats for providing notifications concerning the SOA and facilities covered by the treaty. In addition, New START contains provisions facilitating the use of national technical means (NTM) of verifying treaty compliance and, to further increase mutual confidence and transparency concerning weapon system capabilities, the treaty provides for the exchange of telemetric information on up to five missile launches each year.

## DECLARED DATA EXCHANGES

Under the New START Treaty, the United States and Russia conduct complete data exchanges two times each year – on March 1 and September 1. The initial data exchange occurred on March 22, 2011, fulfilling the treaty's requirement for the first data exchange to be completed within 45 days after entry into force.

The data includes information on each Party's SOA and facilities subject to the treaty. This information is maintained by each Party in a database that is updated continually through the treaty's notification processes and on-site inspection activities, as well as through the semi-annual data exchanges.




Figure 2



The database includes information on the number, location, and technical characteristics of each item of SOA subject to the treaty. It also includes the unique identifier (UID) number assigned to each item. UIDs are a new verification tool intended to facilitate tracking the location and status of each item of SOA. By assigning UIDs to each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber, the Parties are able to monitor individual weapon systems over the life of the treaty. Individual UIDs may also be confirmed during inspections.

In the Annex on Notifications, Sections II and III contain “formats” for updating information on SOA. Formats numbered 2-8, in Section II, are used to update the information on SOA specified in Part Two of the Protocol. Formats numbered 9-14 in Section III of the Notifications Annex are used to provide information relating to the movements of SOA specified in Part Four, Section III of the Protocol.

SOA movements include activities such as removing an ICBM or SLBM from its launcher and transferring it to a maintenance facility. In this circumstance both the missile and its launcher become non-deployed under the treaty. Notifications of such changes in status are to be provided within five days of the completion of the move. These notifications cause corresponding adjustments to be made in the New START Treaty’s database.

Through the use of UIDs and change-of-status notifications, the database maintained by each Party provides an ongoing account of all deployed and non-deployed SOA while the treaty remains in force.

## **NOTIFICATIONS**

The New START Treaty obligates the Parties to provide notifications concerning a wide-range of treaty-related activities. In addition to providing notifications pertaining to the information maintained in each Party’s database, Part Four of the Treaty Protocol specifies the obligations for providing advance notification and status updates relating to ICBM or SLBM launches, conversion or elimination activities, inspection activities, telemetric information exchanges, and BCC meetings, among other events. Formats for each type of notification are contained in the treaty’s Annex on Notifications.

Treaty Article VIII also obligates each Party to take measures to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability when it undertakes activities that could potentially create an “ambiguous situation” concerning the reduction and

limitation of its SOA. By providing advance notice and sharing information regarding these activities with the other Party, the notifying Party not only helps to avoid a possible misinterpretation of its actions, but also enhances the treaty's viability and effectiveness.

## ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

The New START Treaty contains a robust on-site inspection regime. This regime is based on the one developed and implemented for fifteen years (1994-2009) under the first START treaty. Under New START, on-site inspections began in April 2011, approximately 60 days after the treaty entered into force. These inspections allow each Party to directly observe the other Party's treaty-related arms and facilities. In addition, inspectors may request measurements or, in the case of an ambiguity or question, inspectors may request photographs to be taken, using approved inspection equipment to confirm the information provided during data exchanges or obtained using national technical means (NTM) of verification.

As stated in Article XI, the purposes for conducting on-site inspections are to confirm the accuracy of declared data on SOA and to ensure verification of compliance with the treaty's provisions. Part Five (Inspection Activities) of the Protocol and the treaty's Annex on Inspection Activities detail the procedures for conducting on-site inspections as well as the rights and obligations of the inspected and the inspecting Party.

The treaty allows the Parties to conduct two types of on-site inspections – Type One and Type Two. Each Party may conduct up to ten Type One inspections and up to eight Type Two inspections for a maximum of 18 per year (see Figure 3).

<b>New START Inspections</b> Maximum Number Allowed Each Year by Type		
Type One	Type Two	Total
10	8	18

Figure 3



Type One inspections may be conducted at declared ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed SOA subject to the treaty. During Type One inspections, the inspecting Party may also confirm the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, and may confirm the number of nuclear armaments declared to be located on deployed heavy bombers.

Type Two inspections may be conducted to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of non-deployed SOA subject to the treaty and to confirm that SOA have been converted or eliminated. The types of facilities subject to Type Two inspections include SOA loading, storage, repair, and training facilities, as well as test ranges. Items subject to inspection include non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ICBM launchers.

Type Two inspections may also be conducted at conversion and elimination sites to confirm that converted or eliminated ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and launchers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments. In addition, Type Two inspections may be conducted at formerly declared facilities to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty.

## **Rights and Obligations**

While on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspecting Party may conduct no more than one inspection at a time. The inspection team and aircrew members are also obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected Party. Further, the inspected Party is obliged to facilitate the conduct of inspection activities and to provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services. Throughout the in-country period the inspectors and aircrew members are accorded the diplomatic privileges and immunities provided in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. These privileges include recognizing the inviolability of their papers and correspondence and the inviolability of a military aircraft (commercial airlines are the usual means of conveyance) transporting the inspection team to and from the point of entry (POE).

An inspection team may include no more than ten inspectors and all inspectors and aircrew may only be selected from the approved list. This list of approved inspectors and aircrew may be amended every 45-days and the list is routinely updated and exchanged every six months coincident with the database exchanges (occurring March 1 and September 1).

## Notification and POE Arrival

When a Party intends to conduct an inspection, the inspecting Party is obligated to notify the other Party no less than 32 hours in advance of the estimated time of the inspection team's arrival at the inspected Party's POE. The treaty requires this notification to be sent only during normal working days (specified by the inspected Party) and that it list all members of the inspection team and aircrew. No later than four hours after the inspectors arrive at the POE, the inspection team leader is obliged to provide a written notification to a member of the in-country escort designating the inspection site and the type of inspection to be conducted.


## Site Designation

Within one hour after site designation, the inspected Party is obliged to implement pre-inspection restrictions (PIRs) on the SOA located at the designated inspection site. The treaty specifies PIRs for both Type One and Type Two inspections. These restrictions oblige the inspected Party not to remove SOA subject to the treaty. Restricted SOA includes heavy bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, mobile launchers, or containers and closed vehicles large enough to contain, or be, an item of inspection. PIRs remain in effect until after the inspection team has arrived at the site and the procedures for designating specific IOI are completed.

No later than two hours after site designation, and before departing the POE, the inspected Party is obliged to provide a "threshold briefing" informing the inspection team leader of the actual number of SOA located at the inspection site at that time. If, for example, for a Type One inspection, fewer than a specified percentage of SOA are present at the inspection site, the inspection team leader may choose to continue the inspection as planned or to designate another site. The inspection team leader also has the option of cancelling the inspection and departing the territory of the inspected Party.

Prior to departure for the inspection site, the inspection team's equipment will be evaluated at the POE to ensure it is both secure and safe to operate at the inspection site. Irrespective of the time required to conduct equipment evaluations and other POE activities, the inspected Party is obliged to transport the inspection team and its equipment to the inspection site within 24 hours after the inspection site is designated.

## New START Type One Inspection Timeline



**Figure 4** (Timelines for all types of inspections conducted under New START are available in the DTIRP Guide to Arms Control Inspection Timelines pamphlet (410P) available online at <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/pdfs/410p.pdf>.)

### Inspection Site

Upon the inspection team’s arrival at the inspection site, facility representatives conduct pre-inspection procedures, primarily to provide the inspectors with a safety briefing and other information relating to the facility’s SOA. The inspected Party is obliged to ensure that pre-inspection procedures are completed within one hour after the inspection team arrives at the site and that inspection activities begin immediately thereafter. The inspected Party is also obliged to ensure that a facility representative remains available to the inspectors at all times.

During inspection activities, the inspectors have the right to view and request linear measures of items of inspection. When questions or ambiguities arise, the inspectors may request clarification from the in-country escort. In the event such questions and ambiguities are not resolved, the inspectors may request that the in-country escort take a photograph of relevant objects or buildings. Although the inspectors have the right to use the equipment specified in the Annex on Inspection Activities, cameras are an exception. Cameras are provided by, and may only be used by, the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party.

Other equipment the inspectors may use includes “satellite system receivers” (global positioning system (GPS) devices) to determine geographic coordinates during certain Type One inspections. Radiation detection equipment (RDE) may only be used during Type One inspections and only for the purpose of

demonstrating that objects declared to be non-nuclear objects on the front section of deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs or on a designated heavy bomber are, in fact, non-nuclear.

The period of time allowed for inspection activities varies according to the type of inspection, the type of facility being inspected, and the items designated for inspection. These time periods also have some flexibility depending on circumstances. For example, the time limit for conducting inspection activities during a Type One inspection at an air base is 30 hours. Under the treaty this time period may be extended by up to eight hours if the in-country escort agrees.

Other time limits apply to inspection activities conducted during Type One inspections at ICBM bases and submarine bases. Inspections of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs are limited to the time necessary to achieve the purpose of the inspection. Inspections of non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and silo launchers of ICBMs are limited to no more than 24 hours after completing the inspection of reentry vehicles.

During most Type Two inspections, inspection activities are limited to no more than 24 hours. Exceptions include Type Two inspections conducted to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated, or to confirm that SLBM launchers or heavy bombers have been converted. During these Type Two inspections, inspection activities are limited to 12 hours.

## **Post-inspection Activities**

At the conclusion of the time allocated for inspection activities, post-inspection procedures are conducted. The time allowed for these procedures is mutually agreed by the Parties. During this time, the inspection team prepares the inspection activity report, which the inspection team leader is obligated to provide to the in-country escort before departing the inspection site. This report will include site diagrams and the detailed results of all inspection activities and the observed SOA.

Clarifications provided by the inspected Party in response to questions or ambiguities arising during the course of the inspection will also be included in the inspection activity report. Clarifications, questions, or ambiguities pertaining to inspection procedures or declared data may also be discussed and negotiated within the framework of the BCC.



When the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection after returning to the POE, the inspection team leader is obliged to provide such notification within four hours after the team's return to the POE. When the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection without returning to the POE, the inspection team leader is obliged to provide such notification before the completion of post-inspection procedures at the current inspection site. A sequential inspection may be conducted only at a different facility also associated with the same POE as the current inspection site.

After completing all inspection activities – initial and sequential inspections – the inspection team is obliged to depart the territory of the inspected Party within 24 hours after returning to the POE unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

## EXHIBITIONS

Exhibitions are defined as another form of inspection activity the Parties are obliged to conduct for the purposes of demonstrating distinguishing features and confirming the technical characteristics of each new type, variant or version of an ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments. In addition, upon completion of the conversion of the first item of a type of ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, the Party carrying out the conversion is obliged to conduct an exhibition to demonstrate the results of the conversion.

Each Party has the right to participate in the exhibitions conducted by the other Party. To facilitate this participation, the conducting Party is obliged to notify the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of the planned date of an exhibition. The other Party is obliged to notify the conducting Party of its intent to take part in the exhibition no less than 72 hours in advance of the planned date. The period of time allowed for inspection activities during an exhibition may not exceed the time necessary to achieve the purpose of the exhibition.

The distinguishing features and technical characteristics recorded during an exhibition are intended to be applied during subsequent inspections to enable the Parties to identify new types of SOA. Such information also enables the Parties to confirm the completion of conversion of SOA and that such items have not been reconverted.

For example, within the first year of the treaty's entry into the force, the United States was obliged to conduct a one-time exhibition of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The purpose of this exhibition was first to

demonstrate that a converted B-1B heavy bomber is incapable of employing nuclear armaments and second to demonstrate those features distinguishing a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments from a converted heavy bomber. The features demonstrated during this exhibition were recorded for use in identifying converted B-1B heavy bombers during subsequent inspections.

Similar exhibitions of converted ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers also enable the Parties to confirm that such launchers have not been reconverted and remain incapable of launching an ICBM or SLBM. If a Party is not satisfied with the distinguishing features demonstrated during an exhibition, the Party may raise the issue within the framework of the BCC.

## **NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS**

Articles VI and X provide for the use of national technical means (NTM) to ensure treaty compliance. NTM are satellites and other forms of verification and monitoring, which the Parties may use in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law.

The New START Treaty obligates the Parties not to interfere with the other's use of NTM and not to apply concealment measures which impede treaty verification through the use of NTM. The treaty specifies that these obligations apply to test ranges and obligates the Parties not to use measures concealing ICBMs, SLBMs, their launchers, and the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers, during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures does not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental shelters for SOA.

To facilitate the use of NTM to verify the conversion or elimination of SOA, the treaty calls for eliminated SOA to remain visible to NTM for 60 days after notification of the conclusion of elimination procedures. Eliminated SOA subject to this provision include solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, launch canisters for ICBMs and SLBMs, silo launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, submarines on which SLBM launchers have been eliminated, and eliminated heavy bombers. Parties also have the right to use NTM to verify the elimination of declared facilities.

In some cases, NTM may be capable of observing distinguishing external features of SOA. For example, NTM may be capable of determining which heavy bombers of the same type are equipped for nuclear armaments and which are equipped for non-nuclear armaments. There is no obligation for Parties to ensure that



external differences are observable by NTM and such features may only be visible during inspection activities.

## TELEMETRIC DATA EXCHANGE

To further increase confidence and transparency, New START Treaty provides for the Parties to exchange telemetric information (missile flight test data) on an equal number ICBM and SLBM launches each calendar year. The treaty more narrowly defines telemetric information as “the information that originates on board a missile during its initial motion and subsequent flight and that is broadcast.”

The Parties may exchange telemetric information on up to five of the launches they conducted in the past, primarily during the most recent previous calendar year. The actual number of launches for which telemetric information will be exchanged is discussed and agreed within the framework of the BCC meeting held during the first 65 days of each new calendar year. The specific launches for which telemetric information will be provided are determined by the conducting Parties.

No later than 60 days after reaching agreement in the BCC, the Parties will simultaneously exchange the telemetric information for the agreed launches. For each launch the Parties will provide the recording media (containing a recording of the telemetric information broadcast during the launch). They will also provide a summary of the recording media and interpretative data for the telemetric information. In the event that the information provided is incomplete or of insufficient quality, the receiving Party has 180 days in which to inform the providing Party of the deficiency. The providing Party is then obliged to respond within 60 days.

Whenever the Parties conduct ICBM or SLBM launches, they are obliged to send a notification to the other Party no later than 24 hours prior to the launch. Notifications for launches the conducting Party intends to consider for possible future provision of telemetric information, will specify the frequencies and modulation methods to be used for broadcasting telemetric information. The conducting Party is also obliged not to encrypt telemetric information or to take any measures to deny access to the telemetric signal broadcast of these launches.

For launches the conducting Party does not intend to consider for possible future provision of telemetric information, the notifications will not contain frequency or modulation information and the conducting Party will have the right to use any method of denying access to the telemetric information broadcast.

# FACILITY SECURITY

As we have seen, U.S. facilities declared under the New START Treaty are obliged to be prepared and ready to support a wide range of on-site inspection activities, which may be conducted on very short notice. For example, within one hour after the inspection site has been designated by the inspecting Party at the point of entry (POE), the facility will be obligated to implement pre-inspection restrictions (PIRs) on the strategic offensive arms (SOA) located at the site. While the PIRs remain in effect, many normal activities will be impacted.

No later than 24 hours after the inspection site is designated, the inspection team will arrive at the inspection site. A maximum of one hour will be allowed for pre-inspection activities and then inspection activities will begin. During these inspection activities the inspection team will have access to sensitive assets, technologies, and other information in order to fulfill the purposes of the inspection. Under normal operations, this level of access would only be allowed for a limited number of authorized personnel. Certain barriers, entry restrictions, and other security measures may not be effective for protecting critical information and assets in the arms control environment.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) provides national escorts who accompany the inspection team throughout the in-country period. At the inspection site, facility personnel, assigned as base escorts, will also become part of the escort team. DTRA escorts have detailed knowledge of the treaty and its implementation. They also have experience conducting on-site inspection activities at Russian facilities. Base escorts bring essential knowledge of the facility and its operations. Base escorts also have knowledge of, and experience implementing, the facility's inspection readiness plan. The aim is for the escort team to leverage the unique strengths of both the national escort team and base escorts to provide an effective means of meeting treaty obligations while protecting sensitive information.

## Vulnerability Assessments

A facility's inspection readiness plan details how, where, and when to apply appropriate and cost-effective security countermeasures prior to the inspection team's arrival at an area or item designated for inspection. Vulnerability assessments provide a factual and analytical basis for developing and updating a facility's inspection readiness plan.

Vulnerability assessments begin with identifying potential indicators of critical information. When identifying "critical indicators" it is important to be aware that the



inspectors will be capable of combining and exploiting different pieces of information which they will collect from multiple available sources. Such sources include the data declaration, previous on-site inspection activities, and the internet.

After identifying critical indicators, potential threats and risks need to be analyzed. This analysis involves determining the value of an asset, the likelihood of its being observed and exploited, and the expected results. This knowledge, combined with a detailed understanding of the treaty's provisions for protecting critical information, maximizes the facility staff's ability to develop and implement appropriate and cost-effective security countermeasures. The best countermeasures are transparent to the inspection team.

## **Rights and Obligations**

Some of the rights and obligations specified in the New START Treaty are specifically designed to protect critical information during on-site inspections. For example, the inspected Party may have the right to prepare an inspectable item for viewing. Depending on the circumstances, the inspected Party may move the item to a specially allocated area or apply covers – hard, soft, or a combination of both – before an item is viewed by the inspection team.

A number of obligations also apply to the inspecting Party. These include an obligation to conduct their inspection activities in the least intrusive manner possible and to avoid disrupting facility operations. In addition, the inspection team is obligated to keep all information obtained during the inspection confidential. No information may be publicly disclosed without the consent of the inspected Party.

## **DTIRP Support**

In addition to providing on-site assistance, the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) provides a broad range of arms control treaty and security-related products. These products include pamphlets, videos, reference CDs, and the DTIRP website.

Some of the products focusing on implementing the New START Treaty, conducting vulnerability assessments, and developing appropriate and cost-effective security countermeasures are listed in the Related Materials section of this pamphlet on page 20.

# CONCLUSION

This pamphlet has provided a brief introduction to the New START treaty's purpose and provisions. It has focused primarily on how the treaty's on-site inspection regime and other compliance verification provisions affect the United States and create potential security concerns for declared facilities. The pamphlet also discussed the means for protecting facility security and reducing disruptions to facility operations during on-site inspection activities.

When requested, DTIRP is ready to assist facilities with meeting arms control security challenges. In addition to on-site assistance, the DTIRP website and outreach products are always available, wherever you may be. A wide range of arms control security-related information, such as this pamphlet, is readily accessible (see "For More Information" below and the Related Materials section on page 20).

Through these means DTIRP fulfills its mission of helping facilities meet the dual goals of demonstrating treaty compliance while also protecting national security, confidential business, and other sensitive information during arms control inspections.

## For More Information

To request assistance from the DTIRP Outreach Program or to obtain more information about arms control security and treaty implementation:

- Call the DTIRP Outreach Program at 1-800-419-2899
- Send an email to [dtirpoutreach@dtra.mil](mailto:dtirpoutreach@dtra.mil)

A broad range of additional information and materials are also available on the DTIRP website <http://dtirp.dtra.mil>. The following pages are of particular interest to New START treaty implementers:

- Products on New START:  
<http://dtirp.dtra.mil/Products/Products.aspx#NewStart>
- New START Treaty Text and Fact Sheets:  
<http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/treatyinfo/start.aspx>
- New START Treaty Synopsis: <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/synopses/start.aspx>
- Nuclear Corner (current news, references, photo gallery, and links)  
<http://dtirp.dtra.mil/NC/nc.aspx>



# ABBREVIATIONS

<b>BCC</b>	Bilateral Consultative Commission
<b>DoD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DTIRP</b>	Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program
<b>DTRA</b>	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
<b>HB</b>	Heavy bomber
<b>ICBM</b>	Intercontinental ballistic missile
<b>IOI</b>	Items of inspection
<b>New START</b>	New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NST)
<b>NST</b>	New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
<b>NTM</b>	National technical means (of verification)
<b>POE</b>	Point of entry
<b>PIR</b>	Pre-inspection restrictions
<b>RDE</b>	Radiation detection equipment
<b>SLBM</b>	Submarine launched ballistic missile
<b>SNDV</b>	Strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
<b>SOA</b>	Strategic offensive arms
<b>SORT</b>	Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (also known as the Moscow Treaty)
<b>START</b>	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
<b>UID</b>	Unique identifier

# SELECTED TERMS

- In-country escort** Group of individuals designated by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members throughout the in-country period.
- In-country period** Period of time from the arrival of the inspection team or aircrew members at the inspected Party's point of entry (POE) until their departure from the country through the POE.
- Inspection site** Location at which Type One or Type Two inspections may be conducted.
- Inspection team** Group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection activity.



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Distributed by:

**DTIRP Outreach Program**

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