


# CWC Challenge Inspections: On-site Verification without Advance Preparation

Order No. 119P



September 2004



This pamphlet is part of a series about the Chemical Weapons Convention and its potential security impact on DoD facilities and chemical plants. It was prepared by the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) to increase **Readiness Through Awareness** within the U.S. Government and defense contractor community. Additional copies of this pamphlet, as well as other information about arms control treaties and the application of security countermeasures, are available through the DTIRP Outreach Program.

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# INTRODUCTION

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons (CW). To verify compliance, States Parties to the Convention are required to undergo initial and “routine” inspections at declared facilities associated with CW or certain monitored chemicals. By virtue of their declared status, these facilities will have planned and prepared in advance to host on-site inspections. However, and in sharp contrast, States Parties to the Convention are also obligated to accept challenge inspections, which are conducted to clarify non-compliance concerns raised by their treaty partners. Challenge inspections may be conducted at any site—declared or not—on the territory of, or under the control of, a State Party to the Convention. Because of the immense number of possible inspection sites and the expected rarity of such inspections, as well as the virtual impossibility of accurately predicting the location of inspection sites, advance preparation for challenge inspections by individual facilities is not practical.

For these reasons, facility personnel at a challenge inspection site will most likely be relatively unprepared to host a challenge inspection. Yet, they will be required to begin certain CWC-mandated activities within just hours after the United States is notified of an impending challenge inspection. To help facility managers understand the challenge inspection process, this pamphlet provides an overview of challenge inspection activities. It discusses the rights and obligations of the inspection team (IT) as well as those of the inspected state party (ISP), and focuses on the operational role of the assistance team. This team will help facility personnel prepare the inspection site and conduct post-notification activities. In this way, the assistance team will help to ensure that facility representatives successfully demonstrate compliance with CWC provisions, while simultaneously protecting its national security, proprietary, or other sensitive information.

# INSPECTION OVERVIEW

A challenge inspection involving a U.S. facility will begin with an allegation of non-compliance and a request from one of our treaty partners to the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the CWC's implementation body. Unless the request is disapproved by the Executive Council, the Director-General will notify the U.S. Government of the non-compliance concern and dispatch an international inspection team employed by the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

Shortly after being notified, the U.S. Government will assemble and deploy an assistance team to help facility personnel conduct inspection preparation activities, to provide advice on issues associated with the requested perimeter, and to assist with exit monitoring requirements. The IT will arrive at the point of entry (POE) in Washington, DC no earlier than 12 hours after the initial notification, and an observer from the requesting State Party will most likely join the IT to observe the inspection unless the United States formally refuses to accept the observer. A U.S. host team—formed and waiting at the POE—will meet the IT and receive the inspection mandate. The mandate is the mission statement from the Director-General to the inspection team chief. Representatives from the United States will review the inspection mandate and conduct a technical equipment inspection of the IT's equipment. These representatives will also begin to negotiate the perimeter—if necessary. At the inspection site, facility personnel are required to begin site self-monitoring within 12 hours after the IT's arrival at the POE.

When POE activities are concluded, the IT will travel to the inspection site. The IT must arrive at the site no later than 36 hours after their arrival at the POE—or, in the case of a declared facility, just 24 hours after their arrival at the POE. When the IT arrives at the perimeter of the site, facility personnel will be required to present a pre-inspection briefing (PIB). The IT will secure the perimeter and take over exit monitoring. Following the PIB, the IT will prepare and present its inspection plan, detailing how they intend to proceed with the inspection. The host team and the IT can then continue negotiating the final perimeter (if it has not yet been determined). Although the IT will seek to begin the inspection as soon as possible, perimeter

negotiations may continue for up to 72 hours. In the absence of an agreed, final perimeter, the alternative perimeter (proposed by the ISP) will be designated as the final perimeter. At this point (up to 108 hours after their arrival at the POE), the IT must be allowed access to the inspection site.

The inspection may last no more than 84 continuous hours, unless mutually agreed otherwise. During the inspection period, negotiations may continue as the IT requests access to areas, buildings, documents, and personnel. Other inspection activities subject to negotiation include the IT's requests for sampling and analysis, or photography. When inspection activities conclude, the IT has 24 hours to prepare and present their preliminary findings to U.S. representatives. Following a review of these findings and the departure of the IT, facility representatives will conduct post-inspection recovery operations and assess the inspection's overall impact



# U.S. METHODOLOGY FOR HOSTING CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS

In the United States, the lead agencies for CWC implementation are the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Commerce (DOC).<sup>1</sup> Both have developed methodologies for preparing U.S. facilities to host a CWC challenge inspection and to demonstrate compliance while simultaneously protecting sensitive information. These methodologies have two objectives. The first objective is to provide self-help information and guidance, enabling facility managers to conduct initial planning and preparation activities prior to the arrival of the assistance team. For example, this guidance helps facility managers identify which personnel will be needed to fulfill CWC inspection requirements. These initial planning and preparation activities will help maximize the assistance team's efficiency when it arrives at the site.

The second objective is to help prepare facility personnel to receive and host the IT. To provide this support, the U.S. Government quickly deploys an assistance team consisting of a group of experts who have various skills, such as treaty expertise, as well as inspection and escort experience. Individuals trained in exit monitoring, site preparation, technology transfer, counterintelligence, operations security, and the application of security countermeasures round out the assistance team. The assistance team's expertise, combined with facility personnel's knowledge of the site and its programs, represent a capable effort for ensuring that sensitive information is protected during inspection activities. Additional key support is provided by a specially-staffed challenge inspection host team tasked to interact with the IT as its official counterpart.

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<sup>1</sup> In the case of a challenge inspection, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and other U.S. Government agencies, as appropriate, may be designated as lead agencies.



# THE INSPECTION PROCESS

The challenge inspection timeline shown on the next page lists the events and activities that occur during each stage of the challenge inspection process. Beginning with “notification” and ending with “recovery,” the remaining sub-sections of this pamphlet discuss the preparation activities required before each stage, as well as other key considerations to keep in mind when hosting a challenge inspection.

## NOTIFICATION

Notification of the intent to conduct a challenge inspection activates the impacted facility’s inspection preparation process. Responsible personnel will be required to make decisions and to take action during the course of the inspection. For this purpose, facility managers need to be able to identify and quickly recall knowledgeable staff who can manage the inspection, deal with on- and off-site communications, prepare buildings (to demonstrate compliance while also protecting sensitive information), escort inspectors (both around the site boundary and on the site), and to take care of legal and safety issues. These key individuals should have a good knowledge of the facility’s operations, personnel, and security components, as well as the site’s physical characteristics and history.

Once contacted, key facility personnel should assemble at the inspection management center—an area designated to serve as the operations center during the inspection. This center should be large enough to support facility personnel, as well as members of the assistance team. It should contain work space and provide communications, document duplication, and computer capabilities. Space will also be needed for members of the U.S. host team, the IT, and the requesting State Party observer (if applicable). The IT’s work space should be located outside the perimeter, if possible. It should be far enough away from facility operations to provide privacy and must be capable of being secured by the IT and the observer. In addition, storage space that is readily accessible to the IT both before and during the inspection will need to be provided.

## Inspection Timeline

(Times are based on the IT's arrival at the POE)

Hours	Events and Activities
-12	Notification received
0	Assistance team arrives at the site* IT arrives at the POE IT presents the inspection mandate Technical equipment inspection conducted Perimeter negotiations begin
12	Facility begins site self-monitoring Negotiations continue (undeclared site) IT begins traveling to the site (declared facility)
24	Requested perimeter accepted or alternative proposed IT begins traveling to the site (undeclared facility) IT arrives at the site (declared facility) Host team, assistance team, and facility staff coordinate
36	IT arrives at the alternative or final perimeter (undeclared facility) Facility staff present the PIB IT secures the site Perimeter negotiations continue (if applicable) IT prepares and presents the initial inspection plan Inspection plan, access, and inspection activities negotiated IT continues exit and perimeter monitoring
108	Inspection begins (inside the perimeter) Inspection activities (if applicable) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Orientation tour</li><li>- Access to areas and buildings</li><li>- Document and record reviews</li><li>- Personnel interviews</li><li>- Sampling and analysis</li><li>- Non-destructive evaluation equipment used</li><li>- Photographs taken</li></ul>
192	Inspection ends IT prepares their preliminary findings
216	IT presents their preliminary findings ISP reviews the preliminary findings IT departs the site for the POE Facility staff begin recovery of normal operations

\*The exact time of the arrival of the assistance team will vary depending on the location of the inspection site.



After key facility personnel have assembled at the inspection management center, they should analyze the inspection notification to determine how facility activities might relate to a non-compliance concern. More detailed analysis—such as how facility representatives might respond, how and where inspection activities might address the non-compliance concern, what type of records could demonstrate CWC compliance, and who should brief such information—will probably have to wait until after the inspection mandate is received. If a requested perimeter diagram is part of the notification, facility personnel should conduct a perimeter assessment to determine whether there are any operational, personnel, security, or safety concerns. In the absence of a perimeter diagram, an assessment of the facility's boundaries is a good proactive step. In addition to this assessment, facility personnel should begin to consider formulating an inspection plan that could be proposed to the inspection team following the PIB. By being proactive, the United States can influence the inspection routes, the sequence of buildings being inspected, and the tempo of the inspection.

## ASSISTANCE TEAM

An assistance team will be dispatched to the inspection site shortly after notification, and should arrive just before the IT arrives at the POE. Depending on the nature of the inspection site, the assistance team will be led by personnel representing DoD, one or more of the military services, or DOC. Team members will include experts who have specific knowledge of treaty provisions, inspector and ISP rights and obligations, as well as experience in site preparation and escort training. They will act as counterparts to the facility's inspection management staff and will brief facility personnel on their capabilities as well as on the CWC challenge inspection process. Facility staff should brief the assistance team on site activities and the status of current preparations. They should also begin to integrate the team into the facility's inspection management process. Information about any chemical or sensitive operations, as well as safety and security concerns, will be required. Maps and site data should be prepared to help inspection management personnel and members of the assistance team to quickly assess requirements and divide into teams to address specific preparation tasks.

Accompanying the assistance team will be a Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) advance team. In addition to providing substantive inspection advice and assistance, the advance team will coordinate lodging, meals, and transportation issues for the host team and the IT. The DTRA team will consult with facility staff for suggestions.

## THE IT'S ARRIVAL AT THE POE

When the inspection team arrives at the POE, a sequence of events is initiated that requires communication, participation, and feedback from the inspection site. At the POE, the IT will present the inspection mandate and submit its list of equipment for technical inspection. Perimeter negotiations—if necessary—will also begin. The information contained in the inspection mandate should enable facility staff and the assistance team to identify the location where inspection activities are most likely to take place. They should also be able to identify the types of records and personnel necessary for addressing the non-compliance concern. Planning activities should specifically address the operations and locations where the use of inspection equipment could cause safety, environmental, or other operational concerns. After reviewing the list of inspection equipment and its specifications, facility staff and assistance team personnel should be able to determine whether any of the inspection equipment is of concern and allow for consultations with the host team.

The assistance team and facility staff will also review issues associated with the requested perimeter, conduct reconnaissance, and advise the host team at the POE on any relevant perimeter issues. A site diagram depicting all structures and exits will be a key tool throughout the inspection. During a challenge inspection, the IT has the right to conduct exit monitoring and other perimeter activities. These activities are conducted in an area identified as the perimeter band, which extends up to 50 meters outward from the perimeter. Many perimeter activities are not subject to the same negotiation and managed access controls that characterize inspection activities conducted within the perimeter. Therefore, any sensitive operations or activities located close to or within the perimeter band may not have the protection that negotiated managed access provides. The facility gains the protection of negotiation and managed access if the host team expands the requested perimeter to place sensitive operations within the perimeter.



Proposing an alternative perimeter, slightly larger than the requested one, may serve this purpose. However, thought must be given to the impact this could have on adjacent activities or territory not owned by the site. If the host team wishes to propose an alternative perimeter, it must do so within 24 hours of the IT's arrival at the POE.

## **SITE SELF-MONITORING**

While the IT is engaged in perimeter negotiations at the POE, the facility must begin self-monitoring activities at its air, land, and water vehicle exits located on the requested perimeter. Such monitoring must begin within 12 hours of the IT's arrival at the POE. Records, in the form of exit monitoring logs or videotapes of exit activity, are appropriate to document exiting traffic. When the IT arrives and exercises its right to secure the perimeter, it will compare the results of its monitoring activities with these records.

Exit monitoring by the site, and subsequently by the IT, has a significant impact on facility operations and resources. Therefore, a thorough assessment considering exit closing, traffic flow, monitoring-support personnel, and later, escorts for IT exit monitors, is essential. Exits seldomly used can be locked and sealed. Exits located close to sensitive activities can be closed to minimize access near these areas. The type of monitoring records chosen—traffic logs and/or videotapes—is also important. A video camera can operate unattended, whereas logs will require personnel to record activity. Videotapes, however, could gather footage of activities on the site that require further explanation and documentation. The assistance team can provide advice on the merits of exit closure and monitoring options. The team can also assist with any training that is needed.

## **DEVELOPING A PRE-INSPECTION BRIEFING**

From the time of notification, facility representatives will have approximately 48 hours to prepare a PIB. This briefing is presented to the IT upon their arrival at the perimeter. It may last no more than 3 hours and should set a cooperative tone. The PIB should contain information regarding the non-compliance concern as well as the facility's security and safety procedures, and site activities. The

assistance team's experience and knowledge of treaty requirements will help facility representatives develop an effective PIB. This briefing should always be rehearsed before it is presented to the IT. Personnel who may interface with the IT, but cannot attend the actual PIB, should at least attend a rehearsal to ensure they understand the information being presented to the inspectors.

## **SITE PREPARATION ISSUES**

The initial inspection notification will likely contain few details. For this reason, facility personnel and the assistance team must be prepared to react to the IT's inspection plan. One of the more difficult inspection preparation tasks is managing communication with affected areas and buildings—especially on a large site. Facility managers should consider—as an initial post-notification task—establishing a list or database of area and building points of contact (POCs) and their telephone numbers. Existing safety and emergency information can be helpful in this regard. Facility staff should also take steps to protect sensitive areas and buildings from exposure. By working with the appropriate program managers and POCs, facility personnel and the assistance team can identify activities of potential interest to the IT as well as site security concerns. Finally, facility managers will need to provide escorts to accompany the IT. These site escorts will be teamed with the DTRA national escorts who will arrive with the IT. The best candidates are personnel who have good knowledge of the site's layout and programs. The assistance team will be prepared to provide site escort training.

## **THE IT'S ARRIVAL IN THE VICINITY OF THE SITE**

The United States is obligated to transport IT members to the vicinity of the site (i.e., the inspection perimeter) within 36 hours after their arrival at the POE. However, experience has shown that before facility personnel begin to interact with the IT, it is prudent for key facility personnel, the assistance team, and the host team arriving with the IT to exchange information. This can be done at the receiving airport or at the hotel where the IT will be staying. The inspectors will be eager to get to the alternative or final perimeter and to secure the site, so this important information exchange must be conducted in a transparent



manner that does not visibly impede the transition to IT exit monitoring. Facility staff and members of the assistance team should plan to review the current status of site-preparation activities with the host team. Equally important, DTRA and site escorts should share information and discuss how they will integrate into a team to undertake their first operational requirement—escorting the inspectors conducting exit monitoring and other perimeter activities.

After this exchange of information, a portion of the IT should be transported to the alternative or final perimeter. The IT will seek to exercise its right to secure the perimeter immediately. However, an objective of the U.S. host team<sup>2</sup> will be to ensure the safety of the IT by requesting that IT exit monitors receive at least the safety portion of the PIB. The logs or videotapes from self-monitoring should be provided to the IT at this time. However, facility representatives and the host team must review these materials before turning them over to the IT.

As escort teams are dispatched, facility representatives will need to know who is going where, along with what and how inspection activities will be supported within the 50-meter perimeter band. A survey of this area will allow the escorts and the host team to plan their responses to IT requests for inspection activities such as photography, sampling and analysis, and the inspection of exiting vehicles. Because the CWC permits the inspection of exiting, non-personal vehicles, consideration should be given to determining who can stop traffic, where this can be done safely, and what options will be exercised to provide the IT with negotiated, managed access to a vehicle's contents.

## PRE-INSPECTION BRIEFING

In addition to mandatory safety information, this briefing should make information of mutual concern clear to all. Details, such as the exact location of the perimeter, as well as activities to be conducted by the IT within the perimeter area (supported by the host team, site personnel, and the escorts), will help all participants work under the same understanding. After the briefing, site representatives should plan to

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<sup>2</sup> In the case of a DoD host team, a senior facility representative will join the host team as a full-fledged member. In the case of a DOC host team, a facility representative will become a key advisor to the host team.

provide a site diagram—showing all structures and significant geographic features—and to advise the IT about the availability of records for review and personnel for interviews.

## INITIAL INSPECTION PLAN

Following the PIB, the IT is obligated to present its inspection plan detailing the areas, structures, and records to be inspected, as well as the personnel to be interviewed. The IT will develop this plan based on the inspection mandate, information provided by the requesting State Party observer, information provided by the facility (in the PIB and other suggestions), and information available in the public domain. The amount of detail provided in the PIB will, in large part, determine how precise the initial inspection plan will be.

The initial inspection plan may cover just the first day or the entire inspection period, and the host team and the IT can propose modifications at any time. Nevertheless, the plan is important to facility personnel because its contents prompt specific building preparation activities. Operational and security concerns will impact the sequence of inspection activities, especially since experience suggests that a prepared building cannot be maintained indefinitely. Non-inspection staff, who continue to work in an area while awaiting the arrival of the IT, can erode protective countermeasures. Thus, a rolling inspection preparation plan that works a couple of hours ahead of the IT's inspection activities provides the best use of resources. It ensures that only the buildings the IT requests to inspect are prepared. It also minimizes the chance that protective measures will erode prior to the IT's arrival. The assistance team will provide a quick overview of site preparation activities and specific training to the POCs at the buildings designated for inspection in the plan. The list (or database) of POCs and their telephone numbers becomes critical during this phase of the inspection process.

Once the IT presents its inspection plan, the host team can determine its impact on previously identified sensitive operations and activities. Access to these areas can be managed by planning the inspection



route, modifying the sequence or timing of inspection activities, and by determining the degree of access to be provided (or alternatives to access) to demonstrate compliance. The IT is obligated to consider proposals designed to protect sensitive information or require less intrusive measures. Since all inspection activities within the perimeter are subject to negotiation, this negotiation period will address the specific activities the IT plans to conduct, and will help the IT and ISP reach agreement on the activities to be conducted and supported. Modifications and renegotiation of the inspection plan by both parties can be a continuing process.

## INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

The actual inspection—beginning when the IT crosses the perimeter—must begin no later than 108 hours after the IT’s arrival at the POE. The IT may exercise its right to request an aerial overflight of the site; however, there is no obligation to provide it and an alternative activity is more likely. The U.S. host team will most likely offer a vehicular windshield tour to familiarize the IT with the site. Once the inspection begins, it will be crucial to know where the IT and its subgroups are at all times, as well as which buildings have been inspected and which buildings are prepared and ready for inspection. The assistance team will review communication and personnel requirements to effectively manage this process during the early preparation stage.

An important part of inspection preparation is to determine what kinds of information will be shared with the IT, as well as how this information will be communicated and by whom. Certain information will be so essential that it should either be addressed in the pre-inspection briefing or be communicated by the host team leader as input to the development of the inspection plan. For example, there may be technical information that is best shared in a formal setting between the host team and the IT’s leadership, rather than in a subgroup between inspectors and escorts. Other information may be shared with the IT if and when particular issues arise during the course of the inspection. The important thing is to make a conscious decision on such matters, rather than to react to events.

## ACCESS TO AREAS, BUILDINGS, DOCUMENTS, AND PERSONNEL

When site preparation activities have been successfully carried out by facility personnel and the assistance team, escorts should be able to manage the IT's access to areas, buildings, records, and personnel in ways that adequately address the facility's operational and security concerns. Protective measures will have been implemented that protect sensitive information and simultaneously allow sufficient access to demonstrate compliance. These managed access techniques will have been identified and briefed to the escorts, enabling them to support the countermeasures employed. Records that corroborate specific information provided to the IT, and support the U.S. position of strict compliance, will have been identified and reviewed. Personnel capable of addressing questions regarding site activities will also have been identified, prepared, and possibly offered to the IT for interviews. All personnel on the site should be aware of the inspection and should have received guidance from the facility inspection management staff or members of the assistance team about how to react to the inspectors. Personnel who are subject to being interviewed either as individuals, panel members, or as building POCs, should have received guidance about how to respond to the IT's requests for program information, their rights under the Constitution, and how to react to inappropriate inquiries.

## POST-INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

The inspection will end after a maximum of 84 hours, unless an extension has been negotiated. At its conclusion—up to 192 hours after the IT's arrival at the POE—the IT will prepare its preliminary findings and present them to the host team (representing the U.S. Government) for review. These findings should be factual in nature and include any photographs, as well as the results of sampling and analysis and personnel interviews. If site personnel carefully document all inspection activities, including inspectors' requests and site representatives' responses, the host team's review of these findings will be facilitated. The host team leader's signature acknowledges that the IT provided their written findings; it does not indicate U.S. Government concurrence. Finally, inspection equipment used on-site may need to be decontaminated and any stored information will be purged.



## RECOVERY

Following the departure of the IT, the site will return to normal operations. A key aspect of the recovery phase will be for facility personnel to identify the impact inspection activities had on facility operations and security. This will require facility managers to debrief DTRA and site escorts, as well as building POCs, both during and after the inspection. It will be important to note the effectiveness of the security countermeasures and managed access techniques employed, as well as other planning, preparation, or training issues. Any lessons learned should be incorporated into the facility and host team's after-action reports to benefit future site-preparation efforts. Finally, a security sweep of the inspectors' work spaces will ensure the area is restored to its original state and that nothing has been left behind by the IT.

# CONCLUSION

In the event of a CWC challenge inspection—which would result from an allegation of non-compliance against the United States—most facilities would be ill-prepared to host a challenge inspection, much less to effectively demonstrate compliance while simultaneously protecting sensitive information. Understanding the rights and obligations of the inspectors, as well as those of the inspected State Party, and understanding the inspection process, as well as the types of help available, are key to being able to effectively utilize the short preparation time a facility could expect to have available. A rapidly deploying assistance team and a specially-formed host team are essential parts of the U.S. methodology. These teams provide the information and assistance facilities need to offset this very short preparation period.

For additional information about challenge inspections and the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as other arms control treaties and the application of appropriate security countermeasures, contact the DTIRP Outreach Program Coordinator at 800-419-2899 or by email at [dtirpoutreach@dtra.mil](mailto:dtirpoutreach@dtra.mil), your local Defense Security Service (DSS) Industrial Security Representative, or your government sponsor.



# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>CW</b>	Chemical weapons
<b>CWC</b>	Chemical Weapons Convention
<b>DSS</b>	Defense Security Service
<b>DoD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DOC</b>	Department of Commerce
<b>DTIRP</b>	Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program
<b>DTRA</b>	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
<b>ISP</b>	Inspected State Party
<b>IT</b>	Inspection team
<b>OPCW</b>	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
<b>PIB</b>	Pre-inspection briefing
<b>POC</b>	Point of contact
<b>POE</b>	Point of entry/exit

# RELATED MATERIALS

***Order through the DTIRP Outreach Program Coordinator  
1-800-419-2899***

101B Challenge Inspections under the  
Chemical Weapons Convention  
**Bulletin**

102P Chemical Weapons Convention—The Impact  
**Pamphlet**

104V Chemical Weapons Convention—The Impact  
**Video**

107V Managed Access under the Chemical Weapons Convention  
**Video**

108P The CWC—Questions Facing the U.S. Defense Industry  
**Pamphlet**

112P Managed Access under the Chemical Weapons Convention  
**Pamphlet**

114P Features of Chemical Facilities  
**Pamphlet**

115P Routine Inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention  
**Pamphlet**

117P Guide for Challenge Inspections under the  
Chemical Weapons Convention  
**Pamphlet**

118P Guide for Initial and Routine Inspections under the  
Chemical Weapons Convention  
**Pamphlet**

119P CWC Challenge Inspection Planning Considerations  
**Pamphlet**



122P Guide to Managed Access under the  
Chemical Weapons Convention

**Pamphlet**

123A Development of a Chemical Weapons Convention  
Pre-Inspection Briefing

**Article**

125P CWC Inspection Preparation Guide

**Pamphlet**

127C Chemical Weapons Agreements Information

**CD-ROM**

129P Guide to Scheduled Chemicals

**Pamphlet**

132P Quick Reference Guide to Chemical Equipment

**Pamphlet**

133B Role of the Requesting State Party Observer in  
CWC Challenge Inspection

**Bulletin**

152P CWC Inspector's Privileges and Immunities

**Pamphlet**

407C Arms Control Treaties Information

**CD-ROM**

408P Arms Control Agreements Synopses

**Pamphlet**

906B Transparency During Arms Control Inspections

**Bulletin**

907P DTIRP Arms Control Outreach Catalog

**Pamphlet**

908V / 908W Facility Protection Through Shrouding  
**Video / CD-Video**

930C The Arms Control OPSEC Process  
**CD-ROM**

936V / 936W Verification Provisions—Point and Counterpoint  
**Video / CD-Video**

942C DTIRP Outreach Products on CD  
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950V / 950W The Technical Equipment Inspection (TEI) Process  
**Video / CD-Video**

951V / 951W Arms Control Site Vulnerability Assessments  
**Video / CD-Video**

952V / 952W Arms Control Security Countermeasures:  
Selection & Application  
**Video / CD-Video**

953V / 953W Arms Control Inspection: Site & Building Preparation  
**Video / CD-Video**

954T Why TEI?  
**Tri-fold Brochure**

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