Part IV of the Verification Annex is divided into two parts; Part IV(A) – Chemical Weapons, and Part IV(B) – Old and Abandoned Chemical Weapons. Part IV(A) consists of 70 paragraphs, setting forth the obligations of each State Party with regard to the treatment of chemical weapons for which it is responsible. Specifically, it establishes procedures for declarations; submission of destruction plans; securing storage facilities; method and order of destruction; and verification and monitoring of declarations, storage and destruction.
Section A (paragraphs 1 through 6) of Part IV(A) contains detailed declaration requirements for chemical weapons, including chemical weapons belonging to other States, past transfers and receipts, and the general plan for destruction.
Paragraph 1 of Part IV(A) requires declaration of information on location, quantity and composition of chemical weapons, pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(ii) of Article III. Locations housing chemical weapons, regardless of type or quantity, are referred to as storage facilities.
Subparagraph 1(a) requires each State Party to declare the aggregate quantity of each chemical declared (exclusive of weapon or container weight). The purpose of this subparagraph is to obtain specific information on each of the different types of chemicals possessed by States Parties that are considered chemical weapons.
Subparagraph 1(b) requires each State Party to provide the name, geographical coordinates, and a detailed site diagram of each chemical weapon storage facility. The diagram is to include a boundary map and the location of bunkers or storage areas within the facility containing chemical weapons. The purpose of this paragraph is to obtain identifying information for each site that contains chemical weapons to facilitate verification and monitoring activities.
Subparagraph 1(c) requires the declaration of a detailed inventory for each storage facility of chemicals defined as chemical weapons; unfilled munitions, sub–munitions, devices and equipment defined as chemical weapons; and all equipment and chemicals specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions, sub–munitions, devices or equipment. The purpose of this paragraph is to obtain information on the specific contents of each declared storage facility related to chemical weapons to facilitate verification and monitoring activities.
Paragraph 2 of Part IV(A) prescribes how chemicals are to be declared.
Subparagraph 2(a) requires all chemicals to be declared in accordance with the Schedules specified in the Annex on Chemicals. The purpose of this subparagraph is to require chemicals to be listed by the item number provided in the Schedules rather than by common name or by a State Party's unique military nomenclature.
Subparagraph 2(b) provides for declaration of chemicals not listed in the Schedules. The State Party must provide additional information (toxicity of the pure compound, toxicity and identity of the principal final reaction product of precursors) so that such chemicals can be considered for possible inclusion in the Schedules in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article XV (the simplified process for changing the Annexes). The purpose of this subparagraph is to include chemicals that may not have been known to have been stored or weaponized as chemical weapons, but are included in the definition of chemical weapons and covered by the general purpose criteria.
Subparagraph 2(c) requires identification of each declared chemical by its International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) nomenclature, its structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number if the chemical is assigned such a number. For precursors of chemical weapons, the provision of the toxicity and identity of the final reaction product(s) is required. The purpose of this paragraph is to create a uniform chemical reporting procedure for all State Parties using internationally recognized chemical identification guidelines.
Subparagraph 2(d) provides rules for declaration of chemical weapons made up of more than one chemical. It requires the declaration of each chemical, and the percentage of each chemical in the mixture. The chemical weapon will be declared under the category of the most toxic chemical component. If one of the chemical components (i.e. a component of a binary or multicomponent chemical weapon) is itself a mixture of two or more chemicals, each of these chemicals must also be identified and the percentages or each reported. The purpose of this paragraph is to clarify any ambiguity that may exist in the declaration of a chemical weapon containing more than one chemical.
Subparagraph 2(e) provides rules for the declaration of binary chemical weapons for each storage facility.
Part (i) of subparagraph 2(e) requires the declaring State Party to declare binary chemical weapons by their toxic end–products within the framework of the three categories referred to in paragraph 16 (Schedule 1 chemicals, parts and components; all other chemicals, parts and components; and unfilled munitions and devices, and equipment specifically designed for use in connection with employment of chemical weapons).
Part (ii) of subparagraph 2(e) requires declaration of the chemical composition and quantity of each component. The purpose of this subparagraph is to have the declaring State Party provide the chemical name in accordance with IUPAC nomenclature, the structural formula, and the CAS registry number if assigned for the declared binary components and the aggregate quantity of each component.
Part (iii) of subparagraph 2(e) requires declaration of the weight ratio between the components as they are to be used in a munition. The purpose of this paragraph is to obtain information on quantities of each component as designed for their employment as a chemical weapon. This information is necessary for accounting for the destruction of the components, and to allow inspectors to balance declarations.
Part (iv) of subparagraph 2(e) requires the declaring State Party to identify the key component of the binary munition. The purpose of this paragraph is to obtain information from the declaring State Party on the precursor which plays the most important role in determining the toxic properties of the final product. The key component will be treated the same as its toxic end–product for the purposes of destruction accountability. ("Key component" is defined in paragraph 4 of Article II.)
Part (v) of subparagraph 2(e) requires the declaring State Party to identify the projected quantity of the toxic end–product based on the chemical reaction between the key component and non–key components of a binary chemical weapon. This quantity is calculated from the key component, assuming 100 percent yield. This subparagraph establishes that the declared amount of the key component will be considered equivalent to the amount of final toxic chemical if the reaction were completed with 100 percent yield. For example, if one kilogram of a key component were reacted with the non–key components to produce one and one–half kilograms of chemical agent, each kilogram of key component would be considered one and one–half kilograms of chemical agent when a State's destruction requirements are calculated. The purpose of this paragraph is to obtain information necessary to establish how much toxic end–product could be made from the declared quantity of key component.
Subparagraph 2(f) establishes that chemical weapons based on more than two components will be declared in a manner analogous to binary chemical weapons. The purpose of this paragraph is to establish rules for the declaration of chemical weapons that may contain two or more chemical components that are not chemical agents but when combined result in such an agent.
Subparagraph 2(g) establishes that for each chemical, the form of storage shall be declared, i.e., munitions, sub–munitions, devices, equipment, or bulk containers and other containers. The purpose of this paragraph is to obtain information on the configuration of the declared chemical weapons. This will assist the Technical Secretariat in preparing for inspections and evaluating general and specific plans for destruction.
Part (i) of subparagraph 2(g) requires the type of storage container, i.e., munitions, sub–munitions, devices, equipment, or bulk containers and other containers.
Part (ii) of subparagraph 2(g) requires the size of bulk container and other containers or the caliber of munitions, sub–munitions, or devices.
Part (iii) of subparagraph 2(g) requires the number of each type of item declared to contain chemicals.
Part (iv) of subparagraph 2(g) requires the nominal weight of the chemical contained in each item. Nominal weight is understood to be the estimated or theoretical weight of the chemical fill.
Subparagraph 2(h) requires the total weight of each chemical contained at each storage facility. The purpose of this subparagraph is to obtain information on the aggregate amount present at the storage facility of each chemical declared. This will assist the Technical Secretariat in preparing for inspections and evaluating general and specific plans for destruction.
Subparagraph 2(i) requires the percentage purity of chemicals stored in bulk containers, if the data is known. This will assist the Technical Secretariat in preparing for inspections and evaluating general and specific plans for destruction. This provision does not require analysis of bulk agent by the State Party.
Paragraph 3 of Part IV(A) requires the declaration of unfilled munitions, sub–munitions, devices or equipment (referred to in paragraph 1(c)(ii)) at each storage facility. The purpose of this paragraph is to obtain inventory information on chemical weapons that do not contain agent.
Subparagraph 3(a) requires the number of items of each type.
Subparagraph 3(b) requires the nominal fill volume per item of each type. Nominal fill is understood to be the estimated or theoretical volume.
Subparagraph 3(c) requires the intended chemical to be used to fill each type of item.
Paragraph 4 of Part IV(A) requires each State Party to declare all applicable information specified in paragraphs 1 through 3 of Part IV(A) for chemical weapons on its territory that are owned and possessed by another State and that are located in a place under another State's jurisdiction or control. This paragraph further states that it is the responsibility of the State Party on whose territory the chemical weapons are located to make appropriate arrangements with the other State to ensure that the declarations are made. If the State Party on whose territory the chemical weapons are located is not able to fulfill its obligations under this paragraph, it shall state the reasons why it is unable to do so. The purpose of this paragraph is to ensure, to the extent possible, detailed declarations of all chemical weapons located on the territory of States Parties.
Paragraph 5 of Part IV(A) requires States Parties to declare all transfers and receipts of chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 which exceeded 1 metric ton per chemical per year in bulk and/or munition form. The inventory format used in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Part IV(A) will be used for each annual declaration. The declaration must also include the supplier and recipient countries, the dates of the transfers or receipts, and, as precisely as possible, the current location of the transferred items. When not all the specified information is available for transfers or receipts of chemical weapons for the period between 1 January 1946 and 1 January 1970, the State Party shall declare whatever information is still available to it and provide an explanation as to why it cannot submit a full declaration. The purpose of this paragraph is to provide transparency to past cooperative efforts that may have contributed to an offensive chemical weapons capability. This obligation recognizes that complete records from that entire period can not be guaranteed. Records from the period 2 January 1970 to the present are assumed to be complete and available for declarations (based on the information from the U.S. and other countries), and therefore all States Parties are obligated to provide information on all transfers made during this period.
Paragraph 6 of Part IV(A) specifies that the general chemical weapons destruction plan required by States Parties pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(v) of Article III shall provide an overview of the entire national chemical weapons destruction program of the State Party and information on the efforts of the State Party to fulfill the destruction requirements contained in the Convention. The purpose of the paragraph is to provide the Technical Secretariat with information which it can use to evaluate the State Party's preparations and intentions for destruction. The data will also be used by the Technical Secretariat to begin planning its allocation of resources for on–site verification. The general plan is required to specify the following:
(a) a general schedule for destruction, giving types and approximate quantities of chemical weapons planned to be destroyed in each annual destruction period for each existing chemical weapons destruction facility and, if possible, for each planned chemical weapons destruction facility;
(b) the number of chemical weapons destruction facilities existing or planned to be operated over the destruction period;
(c) the name and location of each existing or planned chemical weapons destruction facility and the types and approximate quantities of chemical weapons, and the type (for example, nerve agent or blister agent) and approximate aggregate quantity of chemical fill to be destroyed;
(d) the plans and programs for training personnel for operation of the destruction facility;
(e) the national standards for safety and emissions that the destruction facilities must satisfy. (Note that pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V, the State Party must conduct its destruction activities in accordance with such standards and must assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment);
(f) information on the development of new methods for destruction of chemical weapons and on the improvement of existing methods;
(g) the cost estimates for destroying the chemical weapons; and
(h) any issues which could adversely affect its national destruction program.
Section B (paragraphs 7 through 11) set forth measures for securing storage facilities and preparing them for inspections.
Paragraph 7 of Part IV(A) requires a State Party to take such measures as it considers appropriate to secure its chemical weapons storage facilities not later than when it submits its declaration of chemical weapons (within 30 days after entry into force of the Convention for the State Party). Beginning not later than 30 days after entry into force, the State Party shall also prevent any movement of its chemical weapons out of the facilities, except their removal for destruction. The purpose of this provision is to facilitate accountability and verification of declared chemical weapons by keeping them in place once declared However, as provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Part VI of this Annex, movement of up to one metric ton total of chemical weapons agent per year to facilities declared under Part VI is allowed. Procedures for declaration and verification of such movement are expected to be developed by the Preparatory Commission.
Paragraph 8 of Part IV(A) requires a State Party to ensure that chemical weapons at its storage facilities are configured to allow ready access for verification in accordance with paragraphs 37 to 49 of Part IV(A) (the procedures for verification of declarations, systematic verification and inspection and visits). The purpose of this paragraph is to facilitate inspection activities and provide unimpeded access to all munitions.
Paragraph 9 of Part IV(A) permits a State Party to continue standard maintenance activities at the storage facility, including standard maintenance of chemical weapons; safety monitoring and physical security activities; and preparation of chemical weapons for destruction. The purpose of this paragraph is to allow normal activities which are required to maintain the facility and chemical weapons in a safe condition.
Paragraph 10 of Part IV(A) prohibits maintenance activities, including replacement of agent or of munition bodies, or modification of the original characteristics of munitions, or modification of parts or components thereof, except in preparation for destruction. This paragraph modifies paragraph 9 and therefore limits the activities permitted. The purpose of this paragraph is to prohibit States Parties from conducting activities which maintain or enhance a chemical weapons' capabilities. This paragraph, however, does not preclude modifications to munitions to facilitate their destruction.
Paragraph 11 of Part IV(A) establishes that all maintenance activities shall be subject to monitoring by the Technical Secretariat. The purpose of this paragraph is to give the Technical Secretariat the right to monitor all maintenance activities if it so desires.
Section C (paragraphs 12 through 16) of Part IV(A) sets forth the destruction procedures, including principles and methods, order of destruction, modification of intermediate destruction deadlines, extension of completion deadlines, detailed annual plans, and annual reports on destruction.
Paragraph 12 of Part IV(A) defines "destruction of chemical weapons" to mean a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other devices unusable as such. The purpose of this paragraph is to establish a definition of destruction which does not presuppose a specific destruction technique. The paragraph uses the term "essentially" in recognition of the near impossibility of an "irreversible" chemical reaction. The techniques to be used for destruction will be evaluated by the Technical Secretariat for compliance with the obligation to destroy chemical weapons. Note that the standard for destruction of munition bodies and other devices allows for re–use of metal contained in the munition, consistent with rendering them unusable as munitions.
Paragraph 13 of Part IV(A) permits each State Party to determine how to destroy its chemical weapons, except that the following processes may not be used: dumping in any body of water, land burial or open–pit burning. It requires each State Party to only destroy chemical weapons at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facilities. Note that this does not preclude the use of mobile facilities that otherwise meet these criteria.
Paragraph 14 of Part IV(A) requires each State Party to ensure that its chemical weapons destruction facilities are constructed and operated in a manner to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons; and that the destruction process can be verified under the provisions of the Convention.
Paragraph 15 of Part IV(A) provides the rationale for the order of destruction used in the Convention. Specifically, this paragraph states that the order of destruction of chemical weapons is based on the obligations specified in Article I (e.g. the prohibition on use, development, stockpiling, etc.) and the other Articles, including obligations regarding systematic on–site verification. The order of destruction takes into account interests of States Parties for undiminished security during the destruction period; confidence–building in the early part of the destruction stage; gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons; and applicability irrespective of the actual composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of chemical weapons. Finally, it states that the order of destruction is based on the principle of leveling out.
The principle of leveling out is understood to mean that States Parties with larger stockpiles are required to destroy at a larger annual amount than States Parties with smaller stockpiles so that all States Parties finish destruction concurrently, by the end of the tenth year after entry into force of the Convention.
Paragraph 16 divides chemical weapons into three categories for the purpose of destruction scheduling.
Category 1: chemical weapons on the basis of Schedule 1 chemicals and their parts and components;
Category 1 chemical weapons are understood to be Schedule 1 chemicals stored in bulk containers, filled munitions, devices, sub–munitions, and components of the filled munitions, devices and sub–munitions. Weaponized chemicals not on Schedule 1 at entry into force, but declared under paragraph 2(b) of Part IV(A) and subsequently placed on Schedule 1 are also included in Category 1.
Category 2: chemical weapons on the basis of all other chemicals and their parts and components. Note this includes those based on Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals as well as unscheduled chemicals.
Category 2 chemical weapons are understood to be Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals stored in bulk containers, munitions, devices, sub–munitions filled with Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals, and components of filled munitions, devices and sub–munitions. Munitions, devices, and sub–munitions filled with chemicals not listed in Schedule 2 or 3, but intended for use as chemical weapons are also included in this category until reclassified in accordance with paragraph 2(b) of Part IV(A).
Category 3: Unfilled munitions and devices, and equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with employment of chemical weapons.
Category 3 chemical weapons are understood to be unfilled munitions, devices, sub–munitions and the components of unfilled munitions, devices and sub–munitions. This category also includes equipment designed solely for use in direct connection with the employment of Category 1 or Category 2 chemical weapons, such as a filling apparatus or specially designed chemical munitions handling equipment and specific chemical weapons delivery systems.
Paragraph 17 of Part IV(A) establishes the commencement and completion of the destruction of the three categories of chemical weapons. The rationale for spreading destruction of Category 1 items over the 10 year period and requiring the destruction of Category 2 and 3 items within 5 years is that it is technically easier to destroy Category 2 and 3 items. However, paragraph 6 of Article IV states that a State Party is not precluded from destroying chemical weapons at a faster rate, therefore the goals established by the subparagraphs can be exceeded.
Subparagraph 17(a) establishes that each State Party must begin the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons not later than two years after the Convention enters into force for it, and must complete the destruction not later than ten years after the Convention enters into force. This subparagraph establishes deadlines for four phases of Category 1 destruction.
Part (i) of subparagraph 17(a) requires that a State Party must complete testing of its first destruction facility not later than two years after entry into force of the Convention. At a minimum, one per cent of a State Party's Category 1 chemicals must be destroyed by the end of the third year after the Convention enters into force. Note that the one per cent that must be destroyed must occur in the first three years after entry into force of the Convention; chemical weapons destroyed prior to entry into force do not count towards this requirement. The first three years after the entry into force of the Convention is called Phase I.
Part (ii) of subparagraph 17(a) requires a State Party to destroy, at a minimum, twenty per cent of its Category 1 chemical weapons within the first five years after entry into force of the Convention. The period including the fourth and fifth years after entry into force of the Convention is called Phase 2.
Part (iii) of subparagraph 17(a) requires a State Party to destroy, at a minimum, forty–five per cent of its Category 1 chemical weapons within the first seven years after entry into force of the Convention. The period including the sixth and seventh years after entry into force of the Convention is called Phase 3.
Part (iv) of subparagraph 17(a) requires a State Party to destroy all of its Category 1 chemical weapons by the end of the tenth year after entry into force of the Convention. The period including the seventh through the tenth year after entry into force of the Convention is called Phase 4.
Subparagraph 17(b) establishes that a State Party must begin destroying its Category 2 chemical weapons by the end of the first year after entry into force of the Convention. Category 2 chemical weapons must be destroyed in equal annual amounts. The subparagraph establishes that the method for determining quantities for annual destruction is chemical agent weight, regardless of munition or container size, type, or quantity. All Category 2 chemical weapons must be destroyed by the end of the fifth year after entry into force of the Convention.
Subparagraph 17(c) establishes that a State Party must begin destroying its Category 3 chemical weapons by the end of the first year after entry into force of the Convention. Category 3 chemical weapons must be destroyed in equal annual amounts. This subparagraph establishes that the method to determine the amount of Category 3 chemical weapons to be destroyed each year is nominal fill volume (m3) for munitions, devices, sub–munitions and containers and number of items for equipment. All Category 3 chemical weapons must be destroyed by the end of the fifth year after entry into force of the Convention.
Paragraph 18 of Part IV(A) establishes destruction accounting criteria for binary chemical weapons. The provisions contained in the subparagraphs to paragraph 18 are designed to enhance confidence building to ensure equitable destruction of chemical weapons capability by taking into account the different configuration of unitary, binary and multicomponent weapons. This is done by establishing a ratio of key to non–key components and maintaining that ratio as the quantities of both components are reduced.
Subparagraph 18(a), consistent with paragraph 2(e)(v) of Part IV(A), establishes that the quantity of the key component of a binary chemical weapon is to be equivalent to its toxic chemical end–product. (Key component is defined in paragraph 4 of Article II.)
Subparagraph 18(b) establishes that a State Party must destroy key components and non–key components in a ratio that is consistent with the actual weight ratio declared for the munitions or devices in which they would be used. For example, if a munition was to contain one liter of key component "a" and two liters of non–key component "b," then two liters of non–key component "b" must be destroyed for every liter of key component "a."
Subparagraph 18(c) requires excess non–key component be destroyed in the first two years after destruction operations begin. Thus, a State Party will need to determine the amount of non–key component needed to form complete binary chemical weapons. The requirement to destroy excess non–key component in the first two years after destruction begins means that such destruction must occur between two and four years after entry into force of the Convention for that State Party. (Destruction operations are required to begin no later than two years after entry into force for a State Party.)
Subparagraph 18(d) allows States Parties to retain the amount of non–key component that maintains a proper weight ratio with the key component at the end of each year. This quantity is to be determined annually based on the amount of key component remaining after each year's actual destruction.
Paragraph 19 of Part IV(A) establishes that chemical weapons based on more than two components will be destroyed in a manner analogous to the procedures in paragraph 18 for binary chemical weapons.
Paragraph 20 of Part IV(A) requires the Executive Council review the general plans for destruction of chemical weapons, submitted pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(v) of Article III, and in accordance with paragraph 6 of Part IV(A), inter alia, to assess their conformity with the order of destruction set forth in paragraphs 15 through 19. The Executive Council will consult with any State Party whose plan does not conform with the Convention in order to bring the plan into conformity. The purpose of this paragraph is to establish a mechanism for the review of State Party destruction plans and operations to ensure that the Party can meet the destruction timetable and requirements.
Paragraph 21 of Part IV(A) permits a State Party to propose changes in the destruction levels specified for Phase 1 (three years), Phase 2 (five years) or Phase 3 (eight years) of the order of destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons if it believes that it cannot achieve those levels. The only criterion for requesting an exception is the existence of "exceptional circumstances beyond [the State Party's] control." Such a proposal must be made not later than 120 days after the entry into force of the Convention and shall contain a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposal. The purpose of this provision is to allow a State Party, soon after entry into force, to notify the Executive Council that it foresees difficulty in achieving one or more interim destruction deadlines.
Paragraph 22 of Part IV(A) requires a State Party to take all necessary measures to ensure destruction in accordance with destruction deadlines as changed pursuant to paragraph 21. However, if it believes it will not be able to ensure the destruction of the percentage of Category 1 chemical weapons required by an intermediate destruction deadline, it may request the Executive Council to recommend to the Conference of States Parties that an extension of the obligation to meet the intermediate deadline be granted. Such a request must be made not less than 180 days before the intermediate destruction deadline and shall contain a detailed explanation of the reasons for the request and the plans of the State Party for ensuring that it will be able to fulfill its obligation to meet the next intermediate destruction deadline.
Paragraph 23 of Part IV(A) establishes that if an extension is granted pursuant to paragraph 22, the State Party shall still be under the obligation to meet the cumulative destruction requirements set forth for the next destruction deadline. This means, for example, that if a State Party is permitted to destroy less than three per cent during Phase I, it must make up the reduction by the end of Phase II, i.e. it still must destroy twenty percent by that time. This paragraph further states that extensions granted pursuant to this Section will not modify the obligation of the State Party to destroy all Category 1 chemical weapons within 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention.
Paragraph 24 of Part IV(A) establishes that if a State Party believes that it will be unable to ensure the destruction of all Category 1 chemical weapons within 10 years after entry into force of the Convention, it may submit a request to the Executive Council for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such chemical weapons. Such a request must be made not later than nine years after the entry into force of the Convention. Note that the requirements for this extension, as set forth below, are greater than for the extensions of intermediate deadlines discussed above.
Paragraph 25 of Part IV(A) establishes that the request must contain the duration of the proposed extension, a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, and a detailed plan for destruction during the remaining portion of the original 10–year period for destruction and the proposed extension period.
Paragraph 26 of Part IV(A) requires that a decision shall be taken by the Conference at its next session, on the recommendation of the Executive Council.
This paragraph further establishes that any extension of a State Party's destruction period must be the minimum time period necessary for a State Party to complete its destruction of all chemical weapons, but in no case shall the deadline be extended beyond 15 years after the entry into force of the Convention. This paragraph also requires the Executive Council to set conditions for the granting of the extension, including the specific verification measures deemed necessary, as well as specific actions to be taken by the State Party to overcome problems in its destruction program. Finally, it requires the costs of verification during the extension period be allocated in accordance with paragraph 16 of Article IV (i.e. the requesting State Party bears the cost of verification unless the Executive Council decides otherwise).
Paragraph 27 of Part IV(A) establishes that if an extension is granted, the State Party is required to take appropriate measures to meet all subsequent deadlines determined by the Executive Council. The paragraph does not elaborate on the time periods between subsequent deadlines, but these are understood to be determined by the Executive Council when forming its extension recommendation to the Conference.
Paragraph 28 of Part IV(A) requires the State Party to continue to submit detailed annual plans for destruction in accordance with paragraph 29 and annual reports on the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons in accordance with paragraph 36, until all Category 1 chemical weapons are destroyed. Additionally, it requires the State Party report to the Executive Council on its destruction activity not later than at the end of each 90 days of the extension period. This paragraph also requires the Executive Council to review progress towards completion of destruction and take the necessary measures to document this progress. Finally, all information concerning the destruction activities during the extension period shall be provided by the Executive Council to States Parties, upon request.
Paragraph 29 of Part IV(A) requires all States Parties to submit detailed plans for destruction of chemical weapons to the Technical Secretariat not less than 60 days before each annual destruction period begins. These detailed plans are established by paragraph 7(a) of Article IV. The purpose and timing of provision of this information is to assist the Technical Secretariat to evaluate the State Party's plans and to prepare for on–site verification activities. Note that the term "annual destruction period" is not defined by the Convention but is understood to mean not calendar years but 365 day periods measured from the date of the entry into force of the Convention.
Subparagraph 29(a) requires each declaration contain the quantity of each specific type of chemical weapon to be destroyed at each destruction facility and the inclusive dates when the destruction of each specific type of chemical weapon will be accomplished.
Subparagraph 29(b) requires each declaration contain a detailed site diagram for each chemical weapons destruction facility and any changes to previously submitted diagrams.
Subparagraph 29(c) requires a detailed schedule of activities for each chemical weapons destruction facility for the upcoming year, identifying time required for design, construction or modification of the facility, installation of equipment, equipment check–out and operator training, destruction operations for each specific type of chemical weapon, and scheduled periods of inactivity.
Paragraph 30 of Part IV(A) requires each State Party provide detailed information for each of its destruction facilities to assist the Technical Secretariat in developing preliminary inspection procedures for use at the facilities.
Paragraph 31 of Part IV(A) establishes the required minimum information for each destruction facility to be used by the Technical Secretariat for use in developing preliminary inspection procedures for each facility.
Subparagraph 31(a) requires the State Party to provide each facility's name, address and location.
Subparagraph 31(b) requires the State Party to provide detailed, annotated facility drawings. Annotated facility drawings are understood to include the identification of roads, rail lines, exits/entrances, buildings, and structures. This information enables the Technical Secretariat to understand the layout of the facility and the location of various parts of the destruction complex within the facility. These drawings will be supplemented by the information required in subparagraph (c) and (d).
Subparagraph 31(c) requires the State Party to provide facility design drawings, process drawings, and piping and instrumentation design drawings. This information will be used for the Technical Secretariat to determine the facility's design capacity, processes and product flow. The details will also be necessary to design customized monitoring equipment for the facility.
Subparagraph 31(d) requires the State Party to provide detailed technical descriptions, including design drawings and instrument specifications, for the equipment required for: removing the chemical fill from the munitions, devices, and containers; temporarily storing the drained chemical fill; destroying the chemical agent; and destroying the munitions, devices, and containers. This information is required for the Technical Secretariat to understand the types of equipment used and the equipment's capabilities, and to determine specific components for monitoring destruction activity.
Subparagraph 31(e) requires the State Party to provide detailed technical descriptions of the destruction process, including material flow rates, temperatures and pressures, and designed destruction efficiency. This information, added to that information provided in paragraphs (c) and (d), will be used by the Technical Secretariat to determine the rate at which the facility can process material.
Subparagraph 31(f) requires the State Party provide the destruction facility's design capacity for each specific type of chemical weapon to be destroyed there during the upcoming destruction period. This information will be used by the Technical Secretariat to evaluate the State Party's destruction program.
Subparagraph 31(g) requires the State Party to provide for each facility a detailed description of the products of destruction and the method of their ultimate disposal. This information will be used by the Technical Secretariat to determine the completeness of chemical weapons destruction and the State Party's compliance with the provisions for safe and ecologically sound destruction.
Subparagraph 31(h) requires the State Party to provide a detailed technical description of measures to facilitate inspections in accordance with this Convention. Specific measures are not defined by the Convention. This information will be used by the Technical Secretariat to evaluate the means in which it will verify the destruction process at the specific facility.
Subparagraph 31(i) requires the State Party to provide a detailed description of any temporary holding area at the destruction facility that will be used to provide chemical weapons directly to the destruction facility, including site and facility drawings and information on the storage capacity for each specific type of chemical weapon to be destroyed at the facility. This information will be used by the Technical Secretariat to plan for the accounting and security of chemical weapons stored at the destruction facility, as well as accounting for weapons removed from other storage locations to the site.
Subparagraph 31(j) requires the State Party to provide a detailed description of the safety and medical measures in force at the facility. This information will be used by the Technical Secretariat to plan for the safety and medical support of its personnel who will be assigned to conduct on–site verification at the facility.
Subparagraph 31(k) requires the State Party to provide a detailed description of the living quarters and working premises (area) for the inspectors. This information will be used by the Technical Secretariat to plan for the lodging and work of the personnel who will be assigned to conduct on–site verification at the facility.
Subparagraph 31(l) permits the State Party to provide suggested measures for international verification. This paragraph provides a mechanism for the State Party to offer verification procedures that are compatible with its destruction program. This information will assist in the development of the destruction facility's facility agreement.
Paragraph 32 of Part IV(A) requires a State Party to provide, for each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities, the plant's operations manuals, the safety and medical plans, the laboratory operations and quality assurance and control manuals, and the environmental permits that have been obtained, except that this shall not include material previously provided. This information will be used by the Technical Secretariat to gain an in–depth understanding of the operation of the destruction facility.
Paragraph 33 of Part IV(A) requires a State Party to notify the Technical Secretariat promptly of any developments that could affect inspection activities at its destruction facilities. The purpose of this provision is to provide for the early notification of the Technical Secretariat in the event that developments occur which would necessitate revision of planned verification activities.
Paragraph 34 of Part IV(A) requires the Preparatory Commission to establish deadlines for the submission of the information specified in paragraphs 30 through 32 for consideration and approval by the Conference pursuant to paragraph 21(i) of Article VIII, i.e. based on reports prepared by the Preparatory Commission.
Paragraph 35 of Part IV(A) requires the Technical Secretariat, after a review of the detailed facility information for each destruction facility, if necessary, to enter into consultation with the State Party concerned. Such consultations are to ensure that the State Party's chemical weapons destruction facilities are designed to assure the destruction of chemical weapons, to allow advanced planning on how verification measures may be applied, to ensure that the application of verification measures is consistent with proper facility operation, and that the facility operation allows appropriate and safe monitoring.
Paragraph 36 of Part IV(A) requires annual reports on destruction and information regarding the implementation of plans for destruction of chemical weapons to be submitted to the Technical Secretariat not later than 60 days after the end of each annual destruction period, as required by paragraph 7(b) of Article IV. The information will specify the actual amounts of chemical weapons which were destroyed during the previous year at each destruction facility. This paragraph also states that, if appropriate, reasons for not meeting destruction goals should be stated at that time.
Section D (paragraphs 37 through 70) of Part IV(A) sets forth the procedures for verification of storage facilities and the destruction of chemical weapons.
Paragraph 37 of Part IV(A) establishes that the purpose of the verification of chemical weapons declarations is to confirm the accuracy of the relevant declarations made pursuant to Article III through on–site inspection.
Paragraph 38 of Part IV(A) establishes that Technical Secretariat inspectors shall conduct verification of declarations promptly after a declaration is submitted. It states that the inspectors will, among other things, verify the quantity and identity of chemicals, and the types and number of munitions, devices and other equipment.
Paragraph 39 of Part IV(A) establishes that the inspectors shall, as appropriate (i.e. have the right to) employ approved seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons at each storage facility.
Paragraph 40 of Part IV(A) establishes that as the inventory progresses, inspectors shall install such agreed seals as may be necessary to clearly indicate if any stocks are removed, and to ensure the securing of the storage facility during the inventory. After completion of the inventory, the seals will be removed unless otherwise agreed.
Paragraph 41 of Part IV(A) establishes that the purpose of the systematic verification of storage facilities is to ensure that no undetected removal of chemical weapons takes place.
Paragraph 42 of Part IV(A) requires that the systematic verification be initiated as soon as possible after the declaration of chemical weapons is submitted and continue until all chemical weapons have been removed from the storage facility. It establishes that, in accordance with the facility agreement, combined on–site inspection and monitoring with on–site instruments may be used.
Paragraph 43 of Part IV(A) requires the Technical Secretariat to confirm the declaration of a State Party that all chemical weapons have been removed from the storage facility. After this confirmation, the Technical Secretariat is required to terminate the systematic verification of the storage facility and promptly remove any monitoring instruments installed by the inspectors. This means that once inspectable material is verified to no longer exist at the facility, the facility is no longer subject to systematic verification.
Paragraph 44 of Part IV(A) requires the Technical Secretariat to choose each particular storage facility for inspection in such a way as to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected.
This paragraph further states that the guidelines for determining of the frequency of systematic on–site inspections are to be elaborated by the Technical Secretariat, taking into account recommendations considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to paragraph 21(i) of Article VIII, i.e. based on reports prepared by the Preparatory Commission.
Paragraph 45 of Part IV(A) requires the Technical Secretariat to notify the inspected State Party of its decision to inspect or visit a storage facility 48 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. The paragraph also establishes that in cases of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened. "Urgent problems" could include evidence indicating the unannounced movement of chemical weapons at the facility. When providing the notification, the Technical Secretariat is required to specify the purpose of the inspection or visit. Note that paragraph 17 of Part III of this Annex also requires notification 24 hours before the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.
Paragraph 46 of Part IV(A) requires the inspected State Party to make any necessary preparations for the arrival of the inspectors and shall ensure their expeditious transportation from their point of entry to the storage facility specified for inspection. It also establishes that the facility agreement will specify administrative arrangements for inspectors. Note that, pursuant to paragraph 36 of Part II of this Annex, the inspected State Party must assist, as necessary, the inspection team in arriving at the site within 12 hours of arriving at the point of entry.
Paragraph 47 of Part IV(A) requires the inspected State Party to provide specific data to the inspection team when it arrives at the chemical weapons storage facility to be inspected. Specific information to be included is listed in subparagraphs (a) through (c).
Subparagraph 47(a) requires the State Party to provide the number of storage buildings and storage locations within the declared storage facility subject to inspection.
Subparagraph 47(b) requires the State Party to provide for each declared storage building and storage location, the type and the identification number or designation, shown on the site diagram. This means that the State Party must clearly indicate building identification markings and their relation to the site diagram.
Subparagraph 47(c) requires the State Party to provide for each storage building and storage location at the facility, the number of items of each specific type of chemical weapon, and, for containers that are not part of binary munitions, the actual quantity of chemical fill in each container.
Paragraph 48 of Part IV(A) provides inspector rights during an inspection of a chemical weapons storage facility. Specific rights for the carrying out a complete or partial inventory of declared chemical weapons are listed in subparagraphs (a) and (b).
Subparagraph 48(a) gives inspectors the right to use any of the following inspection techniques:
(i) inventory all the chemical weapons stored at the facility;
(ii) inventory all the chemical weapons stored in specific buildings or locations at the facility, as chosen by the inspectors; or
(iii) inventory all the chemical weapons of one or more specific types stored at the facility, as chosen by the inspectors.
The purpose of this provision is to provide inspectors flexibility in determining the method by which they inventory chemical weapons.
Subparagraph 48(b) gives inspectors the right to check all items inventoried against records agreed in the facility agreement. This means that inspectors may confirm that facility records accurately reflect the chemical weapons stored at the facility and are accurate representations of the declarations made to the Technical Secretariat.
Paragraph 49 of Part IV(A) provides inspectors with specific rights, in accordance with facility agreements. The rights listed below in subparagraphs (a) and (b) are intended to provide the inspector with the requisite authority to complete an inventory of chemical weapons.
Subparagraph 49(a) allows inspectors unimpeded access to all parts of the storage facilities including any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers therein. While conducting their activity, however, inspectors must comply with the safety regulations at the facility. Inspectors will select the items to be inspected.
Subparagraph 49(b) provides inspectors with the right, during the first and any subsequent inspection of each chemical weapons storage facility, to designate munitions, devices, and containers from which samples are to be taken, and to affix to a unique tag to such munitions, devices, and containers. The tag is designed so that any attempt to remove or alter the tag will be apparent. A sample may be taken from a tagged item at either a chemical weapons storage facility or at a chemical weapons destruction facility as soon as it is practically possible in accordance with the corresponding destruction programs. In any case, the sample will be taken not later than by the end of the State Party's destruction operations.
This process gives the inspected State Party the right to deny sampling of munitions at a storage facility (sampling at such locations may not be allowed under its national standards, e.g. U.S. environmental regulations), but obligates the State Party to permit any selected munition to be ultimately sampled.
Paragraph 50 of Part IV(A) establishes that the purpose of verification of destruction of chemical weapons is to confirm the identity and quantity of the chemical weapons stocks to be destroyed and to confirm that these stocks have been destroyed.
Paragraph 51 of Part IV(A) establishes "transitional verification agreements" for destruction operations underway prior to the establishment of international verification. Specifically, this paragraph states that chemical weapons destruction operations that are already underway during the first 390 days after entry into force of the Convention shall be governed by transitional verification arrangements. Such arrangements are to include a transitional facility agreement, provisions for verification through on–site inspection and monitoring with on–site instruments, and the time–frame for application of the arrangements. The transitional agreements will be agreed between the Organization and the inspected State Party and shall be approved by the Executive Council within 60 days after entry into force of the Convention.
The transitional agreement will take into account recommendations of the Technical Secretariat, which shall be based on its evaluation of the information provided by the State Party under Paragraph 31 of Part IV(A), and a visit to the facility. Guidelines for such transitional verification will be established by the Executive Council, based on recommendations considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to paragraph 21(i) of Article VIII, i.e. based on reports prepared by the Preparatory Commission. Finally, this paragraph states that the transitional verification arrangements shall be designed to verify, throughout the entire transitional period, the destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with the purposes set forth in paragraph 50 (i.e. confirm the identity, quantity and destruction of stocks), and to avoid hampering ongoing destruction operations.
This paragraph recognizes that it will take time for the Technical Secretariat to establish what will probably be a continuous presence at the destruction facility and therefore special rules may be necessary for this period. This paragraph also recognizes that there may be destruction facilities that will cease operations shortly after the Convention enters into force, such as the U.S. facility on Johnston Atoll, for which full verification measures may be neither necessary nor practical.
Paragraph 52 of Part IV(A) establishes that paragraphs 53 through 61 apply to chemical weapons destruction operations that are to begin no earlier than 390 days after the entry into force of the Convention. The rationale for the 13 month delay is that while States Parties are required to begin destruction not later than 2 years after the Convention enters into force for them, preparation time is necessary to provide full verification of destruction activities. Note that chemical weapons destruction operations that begin before the 390 day mark and continue past that point are not specifically addressed. However, read together, paragraphs 51 and 53 suggest that in such a situation destruction operations would be governed by paragraph 51 until the 390 day mark and by paragraphs 53 through 61 thereafter.
Paragraph 53 of Part IV(A) establishes that the Technical Secretariat will design draft plans for inspecting destruction facilities, and consult with the inspected State Party on the implementation of these plans. A draft plan will be provided to the State Party to be inspected not later than 270 days before a facility begins destruction operations pursuant to the Convention. These plans must be based on previous inspection experience, the destruction plans submitted by the State Party under paragraphs 6 and 29 through 34 of Part IV(A), and if applicable as agreed under paragraph 35 of Part IV(A). Any difference between the plans of the Technical Secretariat and the inspected State Party will be worked out through consultations. If differences should remain after consultations, the matter will be referred to the Executive Council for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full implementation of the Convention.
Paragraph 54 of Part IV(A) requires the Technical Secretariat to conduct an initial visit to the destruction facility to familiarize itself with the facility and assess the adequacy of its plan for verifying chemical weapons destruction. This visit must occur at least 240 days prior the beginning of destruction operations pursuant to the Convention.
Paragraph 55 of Part IV(A) relieves the State Party from the responsibility of decontaminating the facility to accommodate the presence of Technical Secretariat personnel, limits the duration of the inspection to five days, and limits the maximum number of visiting personnel to fifteen. The purpose of these provisions is to minimize the disruption on ongoing destruction operations caused by the initial visit.
Paragraph 56 of Part IV(A) establishes that the Technical Secretariat will forward the plan for destruction verification, as it is agreed between the States Party and the Technical Secretariat, to the Executive Council, with its recommendation. The Executive Council shall review the plan with a view to approving it, (i.e. it is assumed that the plan will, as a rule, be validated by the Executive Council), consistent with verification objectives and obligations under the Convention. The Executive Council should also confirm that verification schemes for destruction are consistent with verification aims (paragraph 50) and are efficient and practical.
Finally, this paragraph states that the review should be completed at least 180 days prior to the beginning of the destruction period. This is understood to mean at least 180 days prior to planned commencement of destruction operations.
Paragraph 57 of Part IV(A) establishes the right of each member of the Executive Council to independently consult with the Technical Secretariat on issues regarding the adequacy of the plan for verification. The paragraph also establishes that if there are not objections by any member of the Executive Council, the plan shall be put into operation, i.e. an objection raised by any member of the Executive Council may result in the non–approval of the destruction verification plan, depending on the consultations undertaken pursuant to paragraph 58.
Paragraph 58 of Part IV(A) establishes that if there are any difficulties, the Executive Council shall enter into consultations with the State Party with whom the destruction verification plan was agreed to reconcile them, and then, if difficulties remain, they shall be referred to the Conference.
Paragraph 59 of Part IV(A) requires the detailed facility agreements for chemical weapons destruction facilities to specify the detailed on–site inspection procedures and provisions for verification through continuous monitoring through on–site instruments and physical presence of inspectors.
Paragraph 60 of Part IV(A) requires the inspected State Party to permit Technical Secretariat inspectors access into each chemical weapons destruction facility at least 60 days prior to the commencement of destruction operations so the inspectors can supervise the installation of the inspection equipment, inspect it once it is installed, and test its operation. The inspectors may also carry out a final engineering review of the facility.
The paragraph also requires any ongoing chemical weapons destruction to stop for a maximum of 60 days for installation and operational testing of inspection equipment (i.e. destruction operations that began before the 390–day mark). The paragraph also establishes the opportunity for the Technical Secretariat and the inspected State Party to agree to additions and changes to the detailed facility agreement after the equipment is installed and tested, and after the final engineering review.
Paragraph 61 of Part IV(A) requires the State Party to notify the chief of the destruction facility inspection team of any movement of chemical weapons to the facility. This notification must be made at least four hours prior to the departure of the chemical weapons from their storage facility. The purpose of this provision is to allow the inspection team enough time to prepare for verification activities necessary to validate that the shipment has been received and remains under the observation of Technical Secretariat personnel.
The paragraph also requires the notification to specify the name of the storage facility, the estimated times of departure and arrival, the specific types and quantities of chemical weapons being transported, whether any tagged items are being moved, and the method of transportation. This provision provides the inspection team chief with information necessary to maintain accountability of the chemical weapons being transferred to the destruction facility. The tagged items referred to are understood to be the chemical weapons to be sampled, as specified in paragraph 49(b) of Part IV(A).
The paragraph permits the notification to consolidate reports if more than one shipment is being made to the same destruction facility within the same time period. The paragraph also requires the State Party to promptly notify the inspection team chief of changes to the notifications.
Paragraph 62 of Part IV(A) requires the State Party to permit the inspection team to verify the arrival of the chemical weapons shipped pursuant to the notification provided under paragraph 61 of Part IV(A). The inspectors must verify the inventory of each shipment prior to its eventual destruction, using procedures as agreed (i.e. in the detailed facility agreement) consistent with the facility's safety regulations. The paragraph establishes that allowed verification activities may include applying agreed seals, markers, or other inventory controls to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons prior to destruction.
Paragraph 63 of Part IV(A) requires chemical weapons stored at chemical weapons destruction facilities be subject to systematic verification in accordance with the facility agreements for each facility. The paragraph establishes the verification will take effect as soon as and as long as the chemical weapons remain within the facility.
Paragraph 64 of Part IV(A) requires inspectors to conduct an inventory of stored chemical weapons at the end of an active destruction phase. The end of an active destruction phase is understood to mean any break in continuous operations resulting in a halt in the destruction process for an extended period. The inspection team is to verify the accuracy of the inventory of all chemical weapons that remain, using the inventory control procedures mentioned in paragraph 62.
Paragraph 65 of Part IV(A) establishes that the inspectors will be given access to the destruction facility and the chemical weapon storage facility to conduct their activities during the entire active phase of destruction. This is understood to mean the inspectors will be given the access necessary for the conduct of their verification activities, as agreed between the Technical Secretariat and the State Party in the detailed facility agreement pursuant to paragraph 3 of Part III, and that this access will be given during the entire period that destruction operations are occurring.
Paragraph 66 of Part IV(A) establishes that inspectors have the right to verify non–diversion and complete destruction of chemical weapons through their physical on–site presence and through monitoring with on–site instruments. The information, objects and activities to which inspectors have the right to have access to verify are: the receipt of chemical weapons at the destruction facility; the temporary holding areas for chemical weapons and the specific type and quantity of chemical weapons stored in that area; the specific type and quantity of the chemical weapons being destroyed; the destruction process; the end–product of the destruction process; the mutilation of metal parts; and the integrity of the destruction process and of the facility as a whole.
This is understood by the United States to mean that the State Party must: in form the inspection team of the type and quantity of stored chemical weapons (which in turn is understood to mean that the inspection team has the right to access this area to verify the information); in form the inspection team of the types and quantity of chemical weapons being destroyed (which in turn is understood to mean that the inspection team has the right to verify the information); and provide the inspection team with sufficient access for monitoring the physical process of destruction to preclude diversion and facilitate verification of total destruction. Paragraph 66 is also understood to mean that the inspectors have the right to verify that chemical weapons are in fact rendered unusable as such, as referred to in paragraph 12 of Part IV(A), and to verify that the entire destruction process is a closed system, providing no means of diversion.
Note that, in accordance with paragraph 70, this means that the inspection team is permitted access to the entire facility to provide assurance that no chemical weapons are being diverted. It is understood that this access can be limited by the detailed facility agreement's definition of the "facility," access restrictions for safety reasons, and general restrictions placed on inspection activities by the Convention.
Paragraph 67 of Part IV(A) gives inspectors the right to tag munitions, devices, or containers located in the temporary holding areas at the chemical weapons destruction facility for sampling. Note that this is in addition to those tagged at chemical weapons storage facilities under paragraph 49(b) of Part IV(A) for sampling.
Paragraph 68 of Part IV(A) establishes that information from routine facility operations, to the extent that it meets inspection requirements, will be used for inspection purposes. The purpose of this paragraph is to permit the inspection team to draw on routine operations data, with appropriate data authentication, for inclusion in its inspection report if such information is necessary.
Paragraph 69 of Part IV(A) establishes that after each period of destruction, the Technical Secretariat will confirm the State Party's quantitative data on the destruction period. Period of destruction is understood to mean the annual period referred to in paragraph 7(b) of Article IV.
Paragraph 70 of Part IV(A) provides the inspection team with the right to access in all parts of the destruction facility and associated chemical weapons storage facilities, consistent with the provisions of the detailed facility agreement for the facility. Subparagraphs (a) through (c) further define the activities inspectors may conduct.
Subparagraph 70(a) provides the inspectors with unimpeded access to all parts of the chemical weapons destruction facility, and to the chemical weapons storage facility located at such facilities. This access includes access to any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers within these areas. Inspectors choose items to be inspected in accordance with the agreed verification plan.
Subparagraph 70(b) provides inspectors with the right to monitor the on–site analysis of samples during the destruction process. This means that the inspectors can maintain an audit trail of samples taken from the munitions, devices, or containers referred to in paragraphs 49(b) and 67 of Part IV(A).
Subparagraph 70(c) provides the inspectors with the right to receive samples, if necessary, from devices, bulk containers and other containers at the destruction facility or the storage facility located at the destruction facility. Note that this is in addition to the right to obtain samples from tagged munitions, devices and containers in accordance with paragraphs 49(b) and 67. It is understood that the inspectors' handling of these samples will be governed by the procedures contained in the detailed facility agreement for each facility.