Article V consists of 19 paragraphs. This Article sets forth the general obligations of States Parties with regard to destruction of chemical weapons production facilities. Specifically, it provides for the scope of the obligation, access for verification, immediate cessation of chemical weapons production, a prohibition on new or modified chemical weapons production facilities, closure and destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, reporting of destruction activities, subsequent destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, safety and environmental standards for destruction, conversion of chemical weapons production facilities to destruction facilities or for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, bilateral and multilateral verification arrangements between or among States Parties, and costs of verification and destruction. The detailed implementation procedures for Article V are set forth in Parts III and V of the Verification Annex.
Paragraph 1 of Article V sets forth the scope of States Parties' obligations with regard to chemical weapons production facilities. Specifically, this paragraph states that the provisions of Article V and the detailed procedures for its implementation, i.e., inter alia, Parts III and V of the Verification Annex, shall apply to all chemical weapons production facilities owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.
Note that, as with chemical weapons, this means that each State Party is responsible for destroying all chemical weapons production facilities on its territory or any other place under its jurisdiction or control (such as facilities in its foreign bases) regardless of their ownership. This includes chemical weapons production facilities that are owned or controlled by other states.
Paragraph 2 of Article V states that detailed procedures for the implementation of Article V are set forth in the Verification Annex, i.e., inter alia, Parts III (general provisions for verification measures) and V (destruction of chemical weapons production facilities and its verification) of the Verification Annex.
Paragraph 3 of Article V establishes the general principle that all chemical weapons production facilities are subject to verification by the Technical Secretariat. Specifically, this paragraph states that all chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, i.e. all chemical weapons production facilities for which a State Party is responsible, shall be subject to systematic verification through on–site inspection and monitoring with on–site instruments in accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex.
Paragraph 4 of Article V requires each State Party to cease immediately all activity at chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, except activity required for closure. The purpose of this paragraph is to require that all activities related to chemical weapons production at existing chemical weapons production facilities be stopped upon entry into force of the Convention for the State Party.
Paragraph 5 of Article V states that no State Party shall construct any new chemical weapons production facilities or modify any existing facilities for the purpose of chemical weapons production or for any other activity prohibited under the Convention, e.g., production of Schedule 1 chemicals in amounts greater than allowed. The purpose of this paragraph is to establish a corollary requirement that no new activities related to chemical weapons production are initiated after entry into force of the Convention for a State Party.
Paragraph 6 of Article V establishes a requirement that each State Party must provide access to its chemical weapons production facilities for verification of its declaration. Specifically, this paragraph states that each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under Article III, paragraph 1(c) has been submitted, provide access to chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, for the purpose of systematic verification of the declaration through on–site inspection. Paragraph 1(c) of Article III requires, within 30 days after entry into force of the Convention for a State Party, declarations of chemical weapons production facilities, specification of their location, reporting of chemical weapons production facilities of other States, declarations of past transfers and receipts of equipment for the production of chemical weapons, provision of a general plan for destruction, specification of actions for closure, and provision of a general plan for any temporary conversion to chemical weapons destruction facilities.
Paragraph 7 of Article V sets forth, in two subparagraphs, the obligation of each State Party to close and provide continuing access to the chemical weapons production facilities for which it is responsible. The United States understands that "to close" involves a series of actions to disable the facilities' production capability. Some examples of "closure" are provided in paragraph 13 of Part V of the Verification Annex.
Subparagraph 7(a) of Article V states that each State Party shall close, not later than 90 days after the Convention enters into force for it, all chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, in accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex, and give notice thereof.
Subparagraph 7(b) of Article V states that each State Party shall provide access to chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, subsequent to closure, for the purpose of systematic verification through on–site inspection and monitoring with on–site instruments in order to ensure that the facility remains closed and is subsequently destroyed. This means that a State Party must continue to provide access to its chemical weapons production facilities even after the initial verification of the declaration has been conducted.
Paragraph 8 of Article V makes clear that each State Party must destroy all chemical weapons production facilities for which it is responsible and establishes the general schedule for such destruction. Specifically, this paragraph states that each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 and related facilities and equipment, pursuant to the Verification Annex, i.e., inter alia, Parts III (general provisions for verification measures) and V (destruction of chemical weapons production facilities and its verification) and in accordance with an agreed rate and sequence of destruction ("order of destruction"). Note that the order of destruction is addressed in paragraph 30 of Part V of the Verification Annex, but unlike for chemical weapons, no specific amounts or percentages of destruction per year are specified. Note also that, unlike for chemical weapons, no special provisions are made for removal of chemical weapons production facilities on a State Party's territory that belong to another State.
This paragraph further states that such destruction shall begin not later than one year after the Convention enters into force for that State Party and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of the Convention. Note that, as with chemical weapons, while the beginning date for destruction depends on when a State Party joins the Convention, the completion date is the same for all States Parties. The only exception is where a State Party is permitted, pursuant to paragraphs 13 through 15 of Article V, to convert a chemical weapons production facility to a facility for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Finally, this paragraph states that a State Party is not precluded from destroying such chemical weapons production facilities at a faster rate.
Paragraph 9 of Article V sets forth, in three subparagraphs, the obligation of each State Party to submit detailed plans for destruction of the chemical weapons production facilities for which it is responsible and certification of their destruction.
Subparagraph 9(a) states that each State Party shall submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, not later than 180 days before the destruction of each facility begins.
Subparagraph 9(b) states that each State Party shall submit declarations annually regarding the implementation of its plans for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 not later than 90 days after the end of each annual destruction period.
Subparagraph 9(c) states that each State Party shall certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that all chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 have been destroyed.
Paragraph 10 of Article V provides for the correlative obligation of States that join the Convention after the 10–year destruction period has ended. Specifically, this paragraph states that if a State ratifies or accedes to the Convention after the 10–year period for destruction set forth in paragraph 8, it shall destroy chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 as soon as possible. This paragraph further states that the order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification for such a State Party shall be determined by the Executive Council.
Paragraph 11 of Article V addresses safety and environmental standards with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities. Specifically, this paragraph states that each State Party, during the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. This paragraph further states that each State Party shall destroy chemical weapons production facilities in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions. Note that, as with chemical weapons, the specific safety and environmental standards for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities will be established by each State Party, and not by the Organization.
Paragraph 12 of Article V allows a State Party to temporarily convert a chemical weapons production facility into a chemical weapons destruction facility. Specifically, this paragraph states that chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with paragraphs 18 to 25 of Part V of the Verification Annex. Paragraphs 18 through 25 of Part V of the Verification Annex, inter alia, require a similarly stringent verification regime for such facilities, provide for initial inspections, require notification of such conversion, provide safeguards against reconversion to a production facility, and require that conversion measures be facility–specific or in some other way unique to the facility concerned.
Paragraph 12 further requires that such a converted facility must be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons but, in any case, not later than 10 years after entry into force of the Convention, i.e. the same time period for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities in general.
Paragraph 13 of Article V allows a State Party, in limited circumstances, to convert a chemical weapons production facility to a facility for permitted purposes and to continue to use it, potentially indefinitely, for those purposes. Specifically, this paragraph states that a State Party may request, in exceptional cases of compelling need, permission to use a chemical weapons production facility specified in paragraph 1 for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. (Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II, the term "purposes not prohibited under the Convention" means: industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; protective purposes; military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; and law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.) Note, however, that paragraph 71 of Part V of the Verification Annex prohibits such converted facilities from producing, processing or consuming Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 chemicals, regardless of the purpose to which the facilities would be put, and, unless the Conference determines otherwise, prohibits the production of any highly toxic chemical. (Schedules are discussed after paragraph 2 of Article VI.)
Paragraph 13 further states that upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, the Conference shall decide whether or not to approve the request and shall establish the conditions upon which approval is contingent in accordance with Section D of Part V of the Verification Annex. Section D of Part V of the Verification Annex contains procedures for requesting conversion, actions pending a decision, conditions for conversion, decisions by the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties, detailed plans for conversion, and review of detailed plans, including specific verification provisions. Note that the Conference may act only after a positive decision by the Executive Council.
This paragraph recognizes that some States Parties may have exceptional cases of compelling need which could warrant subsequent or continued use of chemical weapons production facilities for non–chemical weapons related purposes. However, because this is a significant departure from the principle that all such facilities should be destroyed, this paragraph requires the approval of both political bodies of the Organization –– the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties.
Paragraph 14 of Article V sets forth the general standard for conversion of chemical weapons production facilities. Detailed procedures for conversion and verification will be developed by the Preparatory Commission. Specifically, this paragraph states that the chemical weapons production facility shall be converted in such a manner that the converted facility is not more capable of being reconverted into a chemical weapons production facility than any other facility used for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes not involving chemicals listed in Schedule 1. Note that the comparison facilities do not include facilities used for protective purposes, military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare, and law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.
Paragraph 15 of Article V states that all converted facilities shall be subject to systematic verification through on–site inspection and monitoring with on–site instruments in accordance with Section D of Part V of the Verification Annex. Section D of Part V of the Verification Annex, in particular paragraph 85, provides for a ten–year, post–conversion period during which inspection teams are to be given unimpeded access to the facility, including the ability to receive and analyze samples, and managed access to the plant site. After the ten–year period has run, the Executive Council shall decide on further verification measures.
Paragraph 16 of Article V provides for the avoidance of duplication of verification of the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities by the Technical Secretariat where State Parties are or will be verifying such destruction pursuant to bilateral or multilateral verification arrangements. Specifically, this paragraph states that in carrying out verification activities pursuant to Article V and Part V of the Verification Annex (destruction of chemical weapons production facilities and its verification), the Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of chemical weapons production facilities and their destruction among States Parties. This paragraph further states that, to this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit verification to measures complementary to those undertaken pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it considers that:
(a) verification provisions of such an agreement are consistent with the verification provisions of Article V and Part V of the Verification Annex;
(b) implementation of the agreement provides for sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant provisions of the Convention; and
(c) parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement keep the Organization fully informed about their verification activities.
As with chemical weapons, the purpose of this paragraph is to reduce the costs of verification of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities by avoiding duplication of verification activities that may be conducted by States Parties.
As with the destruction of chemical weapons, to avoid bilateral or multilateral agreements that would be inconsistent with the standards and objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Convention requires such agreement to meet three criteria before a reduction in the multilateral regime is allowed. First, the verification provisions of such an agreement must be consistent with the verification procedures of Article V and Part V of the Verification Annex. Second, implementation of the Agreement must provide for sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant provisions of the convention. Third, parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement must keep the Organization fully informed about their verification activities.
To encourage the acceptance of legitimate bilateral or multilateral regimes, reduction of duplication is required if the Executive Council finds that the proposed bilateral or multilateral verification regime meets the three criteria above.
Paragraph 17 of Article V states that if the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to paragraph 16, the Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement. As with chemical weapons, the purpose of this paragraph is to insure that the Technical Secretariat has the right to monitor the bilateral or multilateral verification activities but, at the same time is not permitted to directly oversee these activities.
Paragraph 18 of Article V states that nothing in paragraphs 16 and 17, i.e. the reduction of Technical Secretariat verification of chemical weapons production facilities destruction, shall affect the obligation of a State Party to provide declarations pursuant to Article III, Article V and Part V of the Verification Annex. Like its chemical weapons destruction counterpart, this provision means that all States Parties with chemical weapons production facilities must fully declare them, even if the Executive Council decides to rely on bilateral or multilateral arrangements to verify the destruction of such facilities.
Paragraph 19 of Article V allocates for the costs of destruction and verification of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities. Specifically, this paragraph states that each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities it is obliged to destroy. This paragraph further states that it shall also meet the costs of verification under Article V, unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. Finally, this paragraph states that if the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 16, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, as specified in paragraph 7 of Article VIII, i.e. adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the UN and the Organization.
This means that, as a general rule, States Parties with chemical weapons production facilities must pay all costs incurred by the destruction and verification of the destruction of these facilities. However, as with its counterpart provision relating to the destruction of chemical weapons, this also means that, inter alia, if the Executive Council chooses to complement a bilateral or multilateral regime, then the cost of the Technical Secretariat verification is borne by all States Parties using the UN scale of assessment. However, if the Executive Council decides that the bilateral arrangements are not satisfactory and subsequently activates the full–scale verification regime provided for in the Convention, the cost of such a regime must be borne by the State Party subject to such verification.