ARTICLE–BY–ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF
ARTICLE IV – CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Article IV consists of 17 paragraphs. This Article sets forth the general obligations of States Parties with regard to destruction of chemical weapons, except for old or abandoned chemical weapons, which are covered separately in Part IV(B) of the Verification Annex. Specifically, it provides for the scope of the obligation, access for verification, destruction of chemical weapons, reporting of destruction activities, subsequent destruction of chemical weapons, safety and environmental standards for destruction, removal of other States' chemical weapons, cooperation, bilateral and multilateral verification arrangements between or among States Parties, costs of verification and destruction, and exemptions for certain buried and sea–dumped chemical weapons. The detailed implementation procedures for Article IV are set forth in Parts III and IV(A) of the Verification Annex.
Paragraph 1 of Article IV sets forth the scope of States Parties' obligations with regard to chemical weapons. Specifically, this paragraph states that the provisions of Article IV and the detailed procedures for its implementation, i.e., inter alia, Parts III and IV(A) of the Verification Annex, shall apply to all chemical weapons owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, except old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons to which Part IV(B) of the Verification Annex applies.
Note that this means that each State Party is responsible for destroying all chemical weapons on its territory or in, e.g., its foreign bases, regardless of their ownership.
Paragraph 2 of Article IV states that detailed procedures for the implementation of Article IV are set forth in the Verification Annex, i.e., inter alia, Parts III (general provisions for verification measures) and IV(A) (destruction of chemical weapons and its verification) of the Verification Annex.
Paragraph 3 of Article IV establishes the principle that all places at which chemical weapons are stored or destroyed are subject to verification by the Technical Secretariat. Specifically, this paragraph states that all locations at which chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 are stored or destroyed, i.e. all chemical weapons for which a State Party is responsible, shall be subject to systematic verification through on–site inspection and monitoring with on–site instruments, in accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.
Note that this paragraph establishes the principle that inspections and monitoring with instruments will be "on–site" and that such verification will be "systematic," i.e. regular or continuous.
Finally, note that while not defined in the Convention, the terms "verification," "inspection" and "monitoring" are used in a consistent, hierarchical pattern in the Convention, i.e. "inspection" and "monitoring" are separate activities, as part of "verification."
Paragraph 4 of Article IV establishes a corollary requirement that each State Party must provide access to its chemical weapons storage facilities and must not remove chemical weapons from these locations, except for destruction. Specifically, this paragraph states that each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under paragraph 1(a) of Article III has been submitted, provide access to chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 for the purpose of systematic verification of the declaration through on–site inspection. (Paragraph 1(a) of Article III requires, within 30 days after entry into force of the Convention for a State Party, declarations of chemical weapons, specification of their location, reporting of chemical weapons of other States located on its territory, declarations of past transfers and receipts, and provision of a general plan for destruction.)
This paragraph further states that thereafter, each State Party shall not remove any of these chemical weapons, except to a chemical weapons destruction facility. Note that, pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex, a State Party is allowed, however, to withdraw specified small amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals from chemical weapons stocks for permitted purposes. Finally, this paragraph states that a State Party shall provide access to such chemical weapons, for the purpose of systematic on–site verification. This means that a State Party must continue to provide access once the initial verification of the declaration has been conducted.
Paragraph 5 of Article IV establishes the requirement that each State Party must also provide access to its chemical weapons destruction facilities. Specifically, this paragraph states that each State Party shall provide access to any chemical weapons destruction facilities and their storage areas, that it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, for the purpose of systematic verification through on–site inspection and monitoring with on–site instruments.
Paragraph 6 of Article IV makes clear that each State Party must destroy all chemical weapons that it is responsible for and establishes the general schedule for such destruction. Specifically, this paragraph states that each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 pursuant to the Verification Annex, i.e., inter alia, Parts III (general provisions for verification measures) and IV(A) (destruction of chemical weapons and its verification), and in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of destruction ("order of destruction"). Note that the specific order of destruction is set forth in paragraph 17 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex.
This paragraph further states that such destruction shall begin not later than two years after the Convention enters into force for the State Party and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of the Convention. Note that while the beginning date for destruction depends on when a State Party joins the Convention, the completion date, as well as the intermediate destruction deadlines, is the same for all States Parties. The only exceptions are where a State Party joins after the ten–year destruction period, which is dealt with in paragraph 8 of Article IV, and where a State Party is granted an extension pursuant to paragraphs 24 through 28 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex. Note also that the ten–year requirement applies only to chemical munitions containing Schedule 1 chemicals. Pursuant to paragraphs 17(b) and (c) of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex, chemical munitions that contain other chemicals, or are unfilled, must be destroyed within five years after entry into force. Finally, this paragraph states that a State Party is not precluded from destroying such chemical weapons at a faster rate.
Paragraph 7 of Article IV sets forth, in three subparagraphs, the obligation of each State Party to submit detailed plans for destruction of the chemical weapons it is responsible for and certification of their destruction.
Subparagraph 7(a) states that each State Party shall submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 not later than 60 days before each annual destruction period begins, in accordance with paragraph 29 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex, i.e. the specific contents of the destruction plans. This subparagraph also states that the detailed plans shall encompass all stocks to be destroyed during the next annual destruction period.
Subparagraph 7(b) states that each State Party shall submit declarations annually regarding the implementation of its plans for destruction of chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 not later than 60 days after the end of each annual destruction period.
Subparagraph 7(c) states that each State Party shall certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that all chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 have been destroyed.
Paragraph 8 of Article IV addresses the correlative obligation of States that join the Convention after the ten–year destruction period has ended. Specifically, this paragraph states that if a State ratifies or accedes to the Convention after the ten–year period for destruction set forth in paragraph 6, it shall destroy chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 as soon as possible. This paragraph further states that the order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification for such a State Party shall be determined by the Executive Council.
Paragraph 9 of Article IV provides for States Parties that discover chemical weapons after they have made their initial declaration. Specifically, this paragraph states that any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after the initial declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, secured and destroyed in accordance with Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex.
Paragraph 10 of Article IV covers safety and environmental standards with regard to the disposal of chemical weapons. Specifically, this paragraph states that each State Party, during transportation, sampling, storage and destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. This paragraph further states that each State Party shall transport, sample, store and destroy chemical weapons in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions. Note that the specific safety and environmental standards for destruction of chemical weapons will be established by each State Party, and not by the Organization. Nonetheless, destruction of chemical weapons through dumping in any body of water, land burial or open pit burning is prohibited pursuant to paragraph 13 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex.
Paragraph 11 of Article IV provides special rules for chemical weapons of another State on the territory of a State Party. This paragraph addresses the case where, rather than abandoning chemical weapons on another State Party's territory, a State maintains a stockpile on another State Party's territory. Specifically, this paragraph states that any State Party which has on its territory chemical weapons that are owned or possessed by another State, or that are located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State, shall make the fullest efforts to ensure that these chemical weapons are removed from its territory not later than one year after the Convention enters into force for it. This paragraph further states that if the chemical weapons are not removed within one year, the State Party may request the Organization and other States Parties to provide assistance in the destruction of these chemical weapons.
The purpose of this paragraph is to take into account the possible significant legal and political difficulties a State Party may face when the chemical weapons it is required to destroy belong to another State or are the subject of disputes as to ownership. Accordingly, as a limited option, during the first year after entry into force of the Convention for a State Party, i.e. before a State Party's destruction obligation begins pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article IV, such chemical weapons may be removed from the State Party's territory rather than destroyed. Note that if the chemical weapons belong to another State that is a Party to the Convention, that State Party also bears responsibility for the weapons' destruction. In addition, the State Party on whose territory the chemical weapons are located is given a specific right to seek aid in destroying such chemical weapons if they are not removed.
Note, however, that nothing in this paragraph relieves the State Party of its ultimate obligation, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article IV, to destroy these chemical weapons if they are not removed.
Paragraph 12 of Article IV states that each State Party undertakes to cooperate with other States Parties that request information or assistance on a bilateral basis or through the Technical Secretariat regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons.
Paragraph 13 of Article IV provides for the avoidance of duplication of verification of the destruction of chemical weapons by the Technical Secretariat where State Parties are or will be verifying such destruction pursuant to bilateral or multilateral verification arrangements. Specifically, this paragraph states that in carrying out verification activities pursuant to Article IV and Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex, the Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of chemical weapons storage and their destruction among States Parties. This paragraph further states that to this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit verification to measures complementary to those undertaken pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it considers that:
(a) verification provisions of such an agreement are consistent with the verification provisions of Article IV and Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex;
(b) implementation of such an agreement provides for sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant provisions of the Convention; and
(c) parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement keep the Organization fully informed about their verification activities.
The purpose of this paragraph is to reduce the costs of verification of destruction of chemical weapons by avoiding duplication of verification activities that are planned to be conducted by States Parties, such as the United States and the Russian Federation pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non–Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, signed at Washington on June 1, 1990 ("the Bilateral Destruction Agreement").
To avoid bilateral and multilateral agreements that would be inconsistent with the standards and objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Convention requires such agreements to meet three criteria before a reduction in the multilateral regime is allowed. First, the verification provisions of such an agreement must be consistent with the verification procedures of Article IV and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex. Second, implementation of the agreement must provide for sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant provisions of the Convention. Third, parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement must keep the organization fully informed about their verification activities.
To encourage the acceptance of legitimate bilateral or multilateral regimes, reduction of duplication is required if the Executive Council finds that the proposed bilateral or multilateral verification regime meets the three criteria above.
Note that the verification provisions of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex were adopted from the draft Implementation Protocol to the Bilateral Destruction Agreement.
Paragraph 14 of Article IV states that if the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to paragraph 13, the Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement. The purpose of this paragraph is to ensure that the Technical Secretariat has the right to monitor the bilateral or multilateral verification activities. The United States understands this as the right to ensure that such verification activities are being conducted in a manner consistent with the verification provisions of the Convention, but that this does not include the right to become directly involved in such verification activities, e.g. by supervising bilateral inspectors.
Paragraph 15 of Article IV states that nothing in paragraphs 13 and 14, i.e. the reduction of Technical Secretariat verification of chemical weapons destruction, shall affect the obligation of a State Party to provide declarations pursuant to Article III, Article IV and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex. This means that all States Parties with chemical weapons must fully declare them, even if the Executive Council decides to rely on bilateral or multilateral arrangements to verify the destruction of such chemical weapons.
Paragraph 16 of Article IV provides for the costs of destruction and verification of destruction of chemical weapons. Specifically, this paragraph states that each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons it is obliged to destroy. This paragraph further states that it shall also meet the costs of verification of storage and destruction of these chemical weapons unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. Finally, this paragraph states that if the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 13, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations (UN) scale of assessment, as specified in paragraph 7 of Article VIII, i.e. the UN scale adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the UN and the Organization. This cost factoring will encourage States Parties with chemical weapons to agree to less costly bilateral or multilateral arrangements that meet the requirements of the Convention.
Paragraph 16 means that, inter alia, if the Executive Council chooses to compliment a bilateral or multilateral regime, then the costs of the Technical Secretariat's verification is borne by all States Parties. However, if the Executive Council decides that the bilateral arrangements are not necessary and subsequently activates the full–scale verification regime provided for in the Convention, the cost of such a regime must be borne by the States Party subject to such verification.
Paragraph 17 of Article IV exempts certain sea–dumped and land–buried chemical weapons from the obligations of Article IV and the Verification Annex. Specifically, this paragraph states that the provisions of Article IV and the relevant provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985. The purpose of this paragraph is to relieve States Parties of the potentially dangerous and expensive obligation to destroy chemical weapons that are not considered to pose a risk to the object and purpose of the Convention.