Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II

Overview

Potential Facility Impacts

Current Activities

Overview

Purpose and Background

Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) [long title: Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms], the Parties agreed to reduce the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) to carry no more than 3,000-3,500 deployed warheads, thereby reducing deployed warheads to one-third of pre-START levels.

In addition to phased reductions and limitations, START II contains three new and notable provisions not found in the original START Treaty. First, Russia must eliminate all of its SS-18 missiles. This would eliminate all heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Second, START II prohibits deployment of any ICBM with multiple warheads, which would significantly reduce first-strike potential, thereby increasing stability. Third, heavy bombers would be counted based on the number of nuclear weapons they are equipped to carry. These include long-range missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, short-range missiles, or bombs.

Potential Facility Impacts

Key Verification Measures

The START II agreement builds upon the comprehensive verification regime established under the original START Treaty. The Treaty also includes some new verification measures, such as observation of SS-18 silo conversion and missile elimination procedures, exhibitions, and inspections of all heavy bombers to confirm weapon-carrying capabilities.

Other verification provisions, including on-site inspections, are generally similar to those stipulated in START. Such provisions include data exchanges, notifications, inspections, national technical means (NTM), and cooperative measures.

Potential facility impacts are generally the same as under START. All declared U.S. facilities subject to periodic inspections under START would be affected by START II. The Department of Defense (DoD) controls all declared U.S. facilities subject to periodic START inspections.

Current Activities

Recent Developments

On June 14, 2002, Russia withdrew from START II—one day after the United States formally withdrew from the ABM Treaty. Importantly, both countries also signed the new Moscow Treaty on May 24, 2002, which mandates the reduction of deployed nuclear warheads to levels between 1,700-2,200 by 2012—lower levels than those stipulated by START II (3,000-3,500).

The history of the START II Treaty's ratification process included having the U.S. Senate provide its advice and consent to ratification on January 26, 1996. However, a START II Protocol was signed in 1997 that required the Treaty to be resubmitted to the Senate.

In April 2002, Russia ratified the START II Treaty, including the 1997 Protocol. However, the Russian legislation prohibited the actual deposit of Russia's instrument of ratification until the United States also ratified the START II Protocol as well as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Demarcation Agreement. The United States and Russia had signed both the START II Protocol and the ABM Demarcation Agreement on September 26, 1997.

The purpose of these agreements was to address Russia's concerns regarding START II implementation costs and U.S. plans to deploy a National Missile Defense system. The Protocol also extended the final deadline for START II limitations and reductions to December 31, 2007, and required half of all reductions and limitations to be completed by December 31, 2004. In addition, the Demarcation Agreement delineated between strategic (banned by the ABM Treaty) and tactical (allowed by the ABM Treaty) missile defense systems.

Senate leaders decided not to consider the START II Protocol or the ABM Demarcation Agreement until after the new administration took office in January 2001. It now appears that START II, its Protocol and the ABM Demarcation Agreement have become obsolete and are not likely to enter into force.