Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

Overview

Potential Facility Impacts

Current Activities

Overview

Purpose and Background

A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would prohibit the production of weapons-usable fissile material or any such material not currently subject to the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Treaty would also prohibit States Parties from assisting other states with plutonium separation or with producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons use.

Disagreements over the scope and purpose of the Treaty, and over linkages to other issues, have delayed the start of negotiations at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) for almost 10 years. Nuclear weapon states, for example, oppose the inclusion of existing stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium and HEU with future stocks. However, several non-nuclear weapon states, such as Pakistan, support the inclusion of existing stockpiles. Another disagreement involves the four states not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): North Korea, India, Israel, and Pakistan. These states oppose a cutoff treaty, particularly if they were thereby obligated to accept IAEA safeguards in the same way as NPT States Parties.

Potential Facility Impacts

Key Verification Measures

Future verification measures could include routine inspections at declared facilities. Challenge inspections could be allowed at both declared and undeclared nuclear facilities to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared activities involving the production of weapons-usable fissile material. Likewise, States Parties to the FMCT might be required to declare the status of all uranium enrichment and spent reactor fuel reprocessing plants located on their territories. Actual facility vulnerabilities would be similar to those under the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

Although the United States remains committed to negotiating a legally binding treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or explosives, the United States is opposed to including a verification regime in the FMCT. In July 2004, at the UN CD, the United States expressed "serious concerns" about whether realistic and effective verification of an FMCT was achievable and intends to oppose negotiations on including inspection or verification measures in an FMCT. Ambassador Jackie Sanders, U.S. representative to the CD, explained that "the objective of an FMCT is not its verification, but the creation of an observed norm against the production of fissile material intended for weapons."

At the CD from May 17-22, 2006, the United States tabled a draft FMCT on May 18, 2006 (CD/1777). Members expressed varied opinions concerning the FMCT’s scope, preconditions for negotiations, and the possibility of including verification provisions.

Current Activities

Recent Developments

On February 8, 2007, the U.S. permanent representative to the CD, Ambassador Christina Rocca, issued a statement saying that the negotiation of a legally binding ban on fissile material “cannot be delayed any longer.” She also restated the U.S. view that prior to concluding an FMCT and prior to its entry into force, “all states should declare publicly and observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, such as the United States has maintained since 1988.”

Fissile material production for non-explosive purposes, such as for naval propulsion fuel, would not be affected by the FMCT proposed by the United States.

On March 13, 2008, Ambassador Tarui of Japan was appointed as the Coordinator for discussions on “a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

During 2008, Ambassador Tarui held three informal meetings: February 6 and 20, and July 31. The informal meetings confirmed previous CD session discussions on negotiating an FMCT, including discussions on: negotiating definitions; compliance and verification; stocks; scope; and production.

On August 14, 2008, Ambassador Rocca called (again) for the “prompt commencement of negotiations on an FMCT,” and reiterated the need for the CD to reach a consensus.

The 2009 CD session dates are:

First Part: 19 January – 27 March
Second Part: 18 May – 3 July
Third Part: 3 August – 18 September

During the first CD session of 2009, CD members expressed their support for continuing negotiations, without preconditions, on concluding the FMCT and, in so doing, to reinforce the NPT regime. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed Russia’s support for FMCT negotiations at a public plenary meeting on March 7, 2009. The Obama administration has placed topic “Control Fissile Materials” on its Homeland Security agenda, pledging to lead a global effort to negotiate a verifiable treaty ending the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

On May 11, 2009, a panel of arms control and nuclear nonproliferation experts—the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) —submitted a draft FMCT and article-by-article analysis. The draft provides definitions and addresses the verification and organization requirements recommended for treaty implementation. The panel supported a total halt to the production of fissile materials for weapons use, which would require on-site inspections at shuttered nuclear facilities, active uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing plants, and at military nuclear sites.