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Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

Overview Potential Facility Impacts Current Activities

Overview

Purpose and Background

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was designed to ensure stability and security in Europe. It established equal lower levels for five categories of offensive conventional armaments: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Since 1990, States Parties have destroyed more than 70,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) under the CFE Treaty and its associated documents, and have conducted thousands of on-site inspections.

On November 19, 1999, at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Conference in Istanbul, Turkey, the 30 States Parties to the CFE Treaty signed the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Adaptation Agreement). The Adaptation Agreement amends the CFE Treaty to Europe's current security environment, as opposed to that existing during the Cold War.

Specific, noteworthy changes called for in the Adaptation Agreement include:

  • raising quotas on mandatory on-site inspections;
  • requiring States Parties to provide more information on their forces than they currently provide;
  • replacing the CFE Treaty's obsolete bloc-to-bloc (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) structure with a new structure of national and flank limits on TLE and troop levels; and
  • establishing a territorial ceiling on the total amount of equipment located on the territory of states within the CFE area of application. This will:
      - remove the requirement for new NATO allies to coordinate TLE limits with Russia and other former Warsaw Pact countries;
  - strengthen the territorial sovereignty of individual States Parties by setting limits on a state-by-state basis; and
  - preserve the special restrictions on forces, including Russian forces, in the Treaty's flank region.

The Adaptation Agreement also strengthens the requirement for host-nation consent to the presence of a foreign state's forces. This includes a provision for notifying all States Parties of such consent and addresses a fundamental security concern of several non-NATO states including Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

To facilitate routine training exercises or peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations or the OSCE, the Adaptation Agreement adds the Basic Temporary Deployments provision. This provision allows deployed forces to exceed treaty flank limits with advance notification.

The Adapted Treaty will enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties. Russia ratified the Adapted Treaty in July 2004. The United States is awaiting Russian troop withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia before submitting the Adaptation Agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

On November 9, 2004, during the biannual Joint Consultative Group (JCG) of CFE members in Vienna, Austria, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker said the United States "stands firmly by the [1990] Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and looks forward to the entry into force of the [1999] adapted CFE Treaty."

At the Third Review Conference, held from May 30 to June 2, 2006 in Vienna, Austria, no consensus could be reached on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. Ratification will not occur until Russia’s military deployments in Georgia and Moldova have been removed.

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Potential Facility Impacts

Key Verification Measures

The Treaty's verification measures include:

  • phased national reductions of TLE over 3 years (1992-1995);
  • overall numerical limits on the five categories of conventional armaments within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) Zone;
  • sublimits in geographic subzones;
  • detailed national data exchanges and notifications on force structure and equipment holdings; and
  • on-site inspections to verify compliance with numerical limits.

During the reduction period (1992-1995), on-site inspections permitted the Parties to witness the destruction of TLE, thereby promoting stability. Today, inspections continue to help CFE members verify the accuracy of each State Party's declared inventory of TLE. In addition, the extensive data exchanges among all States Parties allow the Parties to monitor each others' inventories and the movement of TLE within the ATTU Zone.

On-site inspections have been conducted under the CFE Treaty since 1992. As a result, U.S. Forces in Europe have developed an experienced and effective arms control security regime to protect sensitive information during inspections. Access provisions under the Treaty, specifically the right of access to areas beyond doors in excess of 2 meters, may give rise to security concerns. Sensitive facilities possessing such characteristics require the application of treaty-compliant protective measures.

Other potential security concerns during on-site inspection activities include the right to take photographs and, in some cases, to use video photography and to conduct aerial overflights. In addition, U.S. facilities collocated with the inspectable facilities of other States Parties may be vulnerable during inspections of host nation facilities.

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Current Activities

Recent Developments
Current levels of forces in Europe are as follows:

  • under 25,000 for battle tanks;
  • under 45,000 for armored combat vehicles;
  • under 29,000 for artillery pieces:
  • under 2,000 for attack helicopters; and
  • under 8,000 for combat aircraft.

Also 20,000 items of equipment located east of the Ural Mountains have been disposed of and personnel have decreased to less than three million troops in agreed areas.

At Russia’s request, an Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties was held in Vienna, Austria from June 12-15, 2007. Representing the United States at the Conference, Daniel Freed, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, stated on June 12, 2007, that “[i]t [was] the intention of the United States and our NATO and other European allies to defend the CFE Treaty regime and to help it remain what it has been since 1990...a major success and a cornerstone of European security.”

During the Conference, the States Parties were unable to resolve Russia’s concerns relating to the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. On July 14, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s intention to suspend participation in the CFE Treaty. This suspension entered into force December 12, 2007. As part of the suspension, Russia declared that it would no longer host CFE inspections or participate in the annual exchange of military information in December. The data exchange is used to determine the number of inspections for each Party in the upcoming year, and Russia has hosted around 50 inspections per year in the past.

According to the official statement issued by Russia's Foreign Ministry on December 12, 2007, the following issues need to be resolved in order to "restore the viability of the CFE Treaty:"

  • compensation for the additional potential acquired by NATO as a result of NATO expansion;
  • set parameters for restraining the stationing of forces on foreign territories;
  • resolve flank restrictions pertaining to Russia’s territory so as not to hinder Russia’s common struggle against terrorism;
  • ensure CFE Treaty participation by the new NATO members: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia;
  • enact the adapted version of the CFE Treaty as soon as possible, without "artificial conditions;" and
  • embark on the Treaty’s further modernization.

Although Russia did not participate in the 2007 or 2008 CFE exchange of information, Russia continued to send representatives to JCG meetings through December 18, 2007.

On May 14, 2009, Russia announced it had submitted proposals to other States Parties for negotiating the changes Russia considers necessary to the CFE treaty. According to the Russian foreign ministry, these proposals are intended to remove "discriminatory" restrictions on Russia’s deployment of military forces on its territory and to lower weapons numbers. Russia’s proposals are also intended to ensure that new NATO members observe the revised Treaty. Russian officials continue to consult with other CFE States Parties on these issues.

Inspection Status

Baseline inspections were completed November 13, 1992 and the 3-year reduction period ended in November 1995. Residual validation inspections were completed May 1996. Declared site and challenge inspections will continue for the duration of the Treaty.

The United States continues to conduct inspections and reduction inspections, and to conduct escort missions at U.S. facilities hosting inspection missions conducted by other States Parties.

Entry into Force
July 17, 1992 (provisionally)
November 9, 1992
(legally)

Signatories/Parties
Originally: 16 NATO
and 6 Warsaw Pact
States Parties

After the breakup of
the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia and the Warsaw Pact,
membership increased to 30 States Parties.

Russia's suspension of the CFE Treaty entered into force on December 12, 2007

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