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Biological Weapons Convention

Overview Potential Facility Impacts Current Activities

Overview

Purpose and Background

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) [long title: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction] prohibits States Parties from developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring, or retaining biological agents or toxins: of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; and of weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. The BWC also obligates States Parties to destroy such material within nine months after entry into force, but permits biological research for defensive purposes.

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Potential Facility Impacts

Key Verification Measures

The Convention contains no compliance verification provisions, but calls for the States Parties to hold a Review Conference (RevCon) every five years to discuss Convention implementation and to draft measures for strengthening compliance with the BWC. During the Second RevCon in 1986, the States Parties agreed to establish voluntary confidence-building measures (CBMs), which included conducting annual data exchanges, sharing information, and participating in joint research projects. These CBMs were introduced in 1994, and in 1997 many States Parties began submitting (to the United Nations) voluntary declarations detailing their biological activities.

At the Third RevCon in 1991, the States Parties established a group of governmental verification experts (VEREX) to identify and analyze potential verification measures from a scientific and technical perspective. The resulting VEREX Report, produced in September 1993, identified 21 potentially effective measures for verifying compliance with the BWC. The States Parties convened a Special Conference in September 1994 to consider the VEREX Report's recommendations, and established an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to negotiate and develop a legally binding protocol to enhance confidence in treaty compliance.

At the 24th session of the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties, which met in Geneva from July 23 to August 17, 2001, Ambassador Donald Mahley, U.S. Special Negotiator for Chemical and Biological Arms Control Issues, announced that the United States had determined that the proposed Protocol was not viable and could not meet its mandated objectives. Ambassador Mahley said that new approaches were necessary and he assured the delegates that the United States would work hard to support global efforts to counter the threat posed by biological weapons.

At the Fifth RevCon, held from November 19 – December 7, 2001, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, proposed specific measures for enhancing confidence in BWC compliance. These included:

  • formulating national legislation to criminalize activities prohibited by the BWC and to enhance extradition;
  • increasing cooperation with the World Health Organization in disease outbreak surveillance and assistance;
  • enhancing domestic biodefense and counter-bioterrorism capabilities;
  • creating mechanisms to initiate investigations of alleged BW use on the basis of a determination by the United Nations Secretary-General; and
  • establishing voluntary means for resolving compliance concerns.

The United States also proposed that the AHG responsible for negotiating the BWC Protocol be disbanded and the RevCon was adjourned for one year.

When the Fifth RevCon resumed November 11-22, 2002, the States Parties agreed on a program of work to develop means for strengthening BWC compliance. The program involved meeting twice each year (one Meeting of Experts and one Meeting of States Parties) for the next three years (2003-2005) leading up to the Sixth RevCon. In 2003 and 2004, these meetings focused on developing national measures and international capabilities. In 2005, the meetings focused on developing voluntary codes of conduct for scientists.

At the Sixth RevCon, held November 20 – December 8, 2006, the States Parties agreed to continue the intersessional work program and to create an Implementation Support Unit (ISU). The purpose of the ISU is to facilitate CBM implementation and to provide administrative support to the States Parties preparing CBMs. The ISU was launched at the 2007 Meeting of Experts and since that time submits a report on its activities to the Meeting of States Parties each year.

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Current Activities

Recent Developments

Currently, there are 163 States Parties and 13 signatory states to the BWC. Nineteen countries have not signed the Convention. Of the 163 States Parties 61 submitted CBM reports in 2008.

A Meeting of States Parties was held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva from December 7-11, 2009. Participants continued the work of the Meeting of Experts held August 24-28, 2009, which focused on promoting the following objectives identified at the Sixth RevCon:

  1. developing and implementing national, regional, and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and the security of pathogens and toxins; and
  2. providing effective oversight, education, and awareness raising, and adopting codes of conduct to prevent the use of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research for purposes prohibited by the Convention.

On December 7, 2009, the U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Ellen Tauscher, addressed the meeting. In addition to announcing the newly approved U.S. national strategy for preventing biological weapons proliferation and bioterrorism, Ms. Tauscher informed the Parties that the United States “will not seek to revive negotiations on a verification protocol to the Convention.” She explained that the United States had “determined that a legally binding protocol would not achieve meaningful verification or greater security.”

Ms. Tauscher said the United States supports the development of a “rigorous, comprehensive program of cooperation, information exchange, and coordination.” This includes focusing on voluntary measures to strength confidence in BWC compliance and increasing States Parties’ participation in the current CBM regime.

The next Review Conference will be held in 2011.