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This summary provides a quick overview of key facts and facility security concerns relating to the implementation status of arms control treaties and agreements monitored by DTIRP. For more information see the Synopses
and Treaty Texts & Fact Sheets for these treaties. Pamphlets, videos and other DTIRP products are available for many of these agreements on the
Products page.
Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention (APLC) (Ottawa Convention)
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Opened for signature: December 3, 1997
Entered into force: March 1, 1999
Expiration date: None
States Parties/Signatories: 164 States Parties, 13 signatories have not ratified
Inspections/visits: Although the Convention allows fact-finding missions, none have been requested to date.
Facility security concerns: Although the United States has decided not to join the Convention, U.S. facilities located on the territories of States Parties could be subject to its fact-finding provisions.
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Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
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Opened for signature: April 10, 1972
Entered into force: March 26, 1975
Expiration date: None
States Parties/Signatories: 164 States Parties, 13 signatories have not ratified
Inspections/visits: None
Facility security concerns: No on-site inspections or visits are conducted to verify compliance with the BWC. Most States Parties, including the United States, voluntarily declare their biological activities and participate in annual data exchanges and other confidence-building measures. Foreign visitors could be allowed limited access to U.S. facilities during occasional information sharing and joint research projects.
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Biological Weapons Trilateral Statement/Agreement
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Opened for signature: September 15, 1992
Entered into force: September 15, 1992
Expiration date: TBD
States Parties/Signatories: Russia, United Kingdom and the United States
Inspections/visits All visits conducted under this Agreement were to nonmilitary biological sites and were conducted from 1993 – 1994. U.S./U.K. visits to Russian facilities in Pokrov and Berdsk occurred in October 1993, and in Omutninsk and Obolensk in January 1994. Reciprocal Russian visits to three American facilities and one British facility occurred in February and March 1994. In the United States, the visits took place at the Pfizer facilities in Terre Haute, Indiana, and Groton, Connecticut, as well as at the Department of Agriculture Plum Island facility off the coast of New York.
Facility security concerns: No future visits are foreseen. In the unlikely event that an agreement were reached allowing visits to military biological facilities, a wide range of DoD facilities, including facilities outside the continental United States, would be affected. Since the United States halted its offensive biological weapons (BW) program in 1969, any agreement allowing visits to pre-1969 BW military sites would necessarily involve a larger number of facilities.
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Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
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Opened for signature: January 13, 1993
Entered into force: April 29, 1997
Expiration date: None
States Parties/Signatories: 188 countries have either ratified or acceded to the CWC, another two are signatories
Inspections/visits: As of September 30, 2010, the OPCW Technical Secretariat had completed 4,167 inspections at 195 chemical weapon-related and 1,298 industrial sites located in 81 States Parties. In the United States, a total of 152 industry inspections have occurred as of April 2011. In addition, the OPCW technical Secretariat continues to conduct continuous monitoring activities at active U.S. CW destruction facilities.
Comments: Currently, there are five CW storage and destruction facilities in the United States. These are located in Anniston, Alabama; Pueblo, Colorado; Richmond, Kentucky, Tooele, Utah; and Hermiston, Oregon. On August 8, 2008, the CW stockpile at the Newport Chemical Depot in Newport, Indiana was successfully eliminated, and the Depot deactivation ceremony was held on June 17, 2010.CW stockpile destruction at the Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (PBCDF) in Arkansas was completed in November 2010, and the facility is currently in the process of shutting down.
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Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
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Opened for signature: September 24, 1996
Entered into force: Not in force
Expiration date: None
States Parties/Signatories: 155 States Parties (including the following three nuclear weapon states: Russia, United Kingdom and France), 182 signatories
Inspections/visits: None
Facility security concerns: The United States was the first nation to sign the Treaty, but has not yet ratified it. If the United States ratifies the CTBT and the Treaty enters into force, inspections would only be pursued in the event that consultations and clarifications do not adequately answer a compliance concern. The International Monitoring System (IMS) collects data remotely and passively to detect possible nuclear explosions. A compliance concern could potentially arise, and an inspection result, due to a mining activity, earthquake, or large subcritical test occurring near a suspected nuclear test site (e.g., in Nevada).
Comments: The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after all the 44 named states with nuclear power and/or research reactors ratify the Treaty. Forty-one of the named states have signed the CTBT (India, Pakistan and North Korea have not) and 35 have ratified it. The U.S. Senate voted not to ratify the CTBT on October 13, 1999.
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Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
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Opened for signature: April 10, 1981
Entered into force: December 2, 1983 (Convention and three Protocols); December 3, 1998 (Amended Protocol II); July 30, 1998 (Protocol IV); and November 12, 2006 (Protocol V)
Expiration date: None
States Parties/Signatories: 114 states are parties to the Convention; 112 states have ratified Protocol I; 97 states have ratified Amended Protocol II; 107 states have ratified Protocol III; 99 states have ratified Protocol IV; and 72 states have ratified Protocol V; the United States has ratified all Protocols.
Inspections/visits: None
Facility security concerns: The CCW contains no active verification measures.
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Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)
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Opened for signature: December 3, 2008
Entered into force: August 1, 2010
Expiration date: None
States Parties/Signatories: As of July 2011, 59 states have ratified and 108 states have signed the Convention.
Inspections/visits: None negotiated as of July 2011. States may submit through the U.N. Secretary-General a Request for Clarification to relevant State Parties.
Facility Concerns: None.
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Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
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Opened for signature: November 19, 1990
Entered into force: November 9, 1992 (July 17, 1992 provisional entry into force)
Expiration date: None
States Parties/Signatories: 30 States Parties; Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty entered into force December 12, 2007
Inspections/visits: The United States regularly conducts on-site inspections and hosts inspections conducted by other States Parts at U.S. facilities located throughout Europe.
Potential concerns include the right of the inspection team to take photographs, to have access, and to conduct aerial overflights. U.S. facilities collocated with the inspectable facilities of other States Parties may also be vulnerable during inspections at these host nation facilities.
Comments: The Adapted CFE was signed on November 19, 1999 and will enter into force after all 30 States Parties ratify the adapted Treaty. The Adapted CFE replaces the Treaty's bloc-to-bloc structure by setting national and territorial ceilings for treaty limited equipment (TLE).
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Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
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Opened for signature: Awaiting negotiation
Entered into force: Not in force
Expiration date: TBD
States Parties/Signatories: N/A
Inspections/visits: N/A
Facility security concerns: As of July 2011, the draft FMCT submitted by the United States on May 18, 2006, is still awaiting negotiation. Another draft was submitted by the International Panel on Fissile Materials for consideration in 2009.
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Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
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Opened for signature: December 8, 1987
Entered into force: June 1, 1988
Expiration date: None; inspections ceased on June 1, 2001, but the Treaty remains in force and is unlimited in duration
States Parties/Signatories: Original signatories include the United States and Russia (Soviet Union prior to December 25, 1991). Additional States Parties include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
Inspections/visits: As of May 31, 2001 (treaty year 12), the United States had conducted 540 inspections and Russia had conducted 311 inspections at sites in the United States and in Europe.
Facility security concerns: Continuous on-site portal monitoring was conducted under the INF treaty at Magna, Utah and Votkinsk, Russia from July 1988 to June 1, 2001. Monitoring continued at Votkinsk under START, but ended on December 5, 2009 with START’s expiration.
Comments: All INF missile systems were eliminated as of May 30, 1991.
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New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
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Signed: April 8, 2010
Entered into force: February 5, 2011
Expiration date: February 5, 2021 (10 years from EIF; one five year extension possible)
States Parties/Signatories: United States, Russia
Inspections/visits: Inspections began in April 2011. The verification regime contained in the new START treaty includes provisions for on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase confidence and transparency, the new treaty also provides for the exchange of telemetry on up to 5 missile flight tests per year.
Facility security concerns: On-site inspection activities may include observation, photography, and measurement.
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
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Opened for signature: July 1, 1968
Entered into force: March 5, 1970
Expiration date: Treaty duration was made unlimited at the 1995 NPT Review Conference.
States Parties/Signatories: 190 States Parties; with the withdrawal of North Korea on January 11, 2003, there are four non-States Parties: India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.
Inspections/visits: The NPT obliges all States Parties (except the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) to conclude safeguards agreements with to IAEA. (The United States and other nuclear weapon states have voluntarily concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.)
Facility security concerns: No provisions exist under the NPT for on-site inspections. All safeguards activities are carried out by the IAEA in accordance with bilateral safeguards agreements.
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Open Skies Treaty
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Opened for signature: March 24, 1992
Entered into force: January 1, 2002
Expiration date: None
States Parties/Signatories: 34 States Parties (of the original 27 signatories, all but Kyrgyzstan have ratified the Treaty).
Inspections/visits: In 2010, Russia flew five observation missions over the United States. From 2006 to 2009, Russia flew four observation missions per year over the United States, and two per year in 2005 and 2004. During Russia’s second overflight in 2008, Swedish representatives accompanied the Russian flight crew, making Sweden the only other country besides Russia to overfly the United States. Also during 2010, the United States flew 13 observation missions over Russia and one over Ukraine. Russia and other European States Parties continue to regularly fly observation missions over each other's territory.
Facility security concerns: Facilities located in the United States, as well as those located on the territories of other States Parties, may be overflown with little advance notice and no right of refusal. All States Parties have access to the data collected during observation flights. To obtain information about receiving advance notification of observation flights, contact the Open Skies Division at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency at 1-703-767-0802.
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Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA)
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Announced: June 4, 2000; Amendment signed April 13, 2010
Entered into force: July 13, 2011 (The PMDA will be in force for the duration of plutonium disposition activities in each party. These are planned to begin in 2018.)
Expiration date: None (The PMDA will expire when each party has destroyed a minimum of 34 metric tons of plutonium.)
States Parties/Signatories: United States and Russia
Inspections/visits: The PMDA Amendment specifies the rights, obligations, principles and measures for monitoring and inspecting each party’s disposition activities and their end products. On March 12, 2011, the U.S. and Russian Co-Chairmen of the PMDA’s Joint Consultative Commission also approved a number of key measures clarifying how monitoring and inspection activities will be developed and carried out. The next steps for the PMDA include consultations and negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency on verification measures to be implemented when the PMDA enters into force.
Facility security concerns: None
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Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA)
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Opened for signature: September 23, 1997
Entered into force: September 23, 1997
Expiration date: None; the Agreement may be terminated one year after written notice from either party
States Parties/Signatories: United States and Russia
Inspections/visits: The United States visited shutdown Russian reactors in March 1999 and July 2000. Russia visited shutdown U.S. reactors in February and October 1998, June 1999, and May 2000. In addition, the United States continues to monitor Russian fissile material stored at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk.
Facility security concerns: There is a potential risk of disclosing sensitive data during on-site visits to shutdown U.S. plutonium production reactors, even though all 14 U.S. reactors have been shut down since 1989. Either Party can designate critical information as "sensitive" to prohibit nonparty individuals and organizations from gaining access to such information.
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U.S.-IAEA Integrated Safeguards
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Opened for signature: Safeguards Agreement - November 18, 1977; Additional Protocol (AP) - June 12, 1998
Entered into force: Safeguards Agreement - December 9, 1980; AP - January 6, 2009
Expiration date: None
States Parties/Signatories: United States, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Inspections/visits:
United States, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Facility security concerns:
The United States allows the IAEA to apply safeguards on "all nuclear activities in the United States, excluding only those with direct national security significance." The primary security concern is the potential inadvertent loss of sensitive and proprietary information impacting U.S. national security or economic competitiveness. Under the U.S.-IAEA AP, the number of U.S. declared and inspectable sites increased and include nuclear fuel-cycle related facilities and locations not involving nuclear material. Declared sites are obliged to provide detailed information about the facilities, buildings, and activities conducted on site. IAEA inspectors’ rights to have access and to conduct more types of inspection activities also expanded under the AP but are limited by the rights of the United States to manage access and to deny access to activities "with direct national security significance."
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Vienna Document of 1999 (VDOC99)
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Opened for signature: Adopted by the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at Istanbul, Turkey, on November 16, 1999
Entered into force: January 1, 2000
Expiration date: None
States Parties/Signatories: All 56 OSCE participating States
Inspections/visits:
Since 1992, an average of four inspections and evaluation visits have been conducted each year at U.S. facilities located within the OSCE's zone of application (ZOA).
Facility security concerns: VDOC99 allows participating States to conduct on-site inspections and evaluation visits for the purpose of confirming the accuracy of information provided in formal information exchanges. Participating States are obligated to accept no more than three on-site inspections each year, and no more than one inspection from the same participating State. The participating State requesting the inspection may designate the area to be inspected. This "specified area" will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating State believes a notifiable military activity is taking place.
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