Treaty Information Center

This summary provides a quick overview of key facts and facility security concerns relating to the implementation status of arms control treaties and agreements monitored by DTIRP. For more information see the Synopses and Treaty Texts & Fact Sheets for these treaties. Pamphlets, videos and other DTIRP products are available for many of these agreements on the Products page.

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

Opened for signature: April 10, 1972

EIF: March 26, 1975

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: 163 States Parties, 13 signatories have not ratified

Inspections/visits: None

Facility security concerns: No on-site inspections or visits are conducted to verify compliance with the BWC. Most States Parties, including the United States, voluntarily declare their biological activities and participate in annual data exchanges and other confidence-building measures. Foreign visitors could be allowed limited access to U.S. facilities during occasional information sharing and joint research projects.

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Biological Weapons Trilateral Statement/Agreement

Opened for signature: September 15, 1992

EIF: September 15, 1992

Expiration date: TBD

States Parties/Signatories: Russia, United Kingdom and the United States

Inspections/visits All visits conducted under this Agreement were to nonmilitary biological sites and were conducted from 1993 – 1994. U.S./U.K. visits to Russian facilities in Pokrov and Berdsk occurred in October 1993, and in Omutninsk and Obolensk in January 1994. Reciprocal Russian visits to three American facilities and one British facility occurred in February and March 1994. In the United States, the visits took place at the Pfizer facilities in Terre Haute, Indiana, and Groton, Connecticut, as well as at the Department of Agriculture Plum Island facility off the coast of New York.

Facility security concerns: No future visits are foreseen. In the unlikely event that an agreement were reached allowing visits to military biological facilities, a wide range of DoD facilities, including facilities outside the continental United States, would be affected. Since the United States halted its offensive biological weapons (BW) program in 1969, any agreement allowing visits to pre-1969 BW military sites would necessarily involve a larger number of facilities.

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Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Opened for signature: January 13, 1993

EIF: April 29, 1997

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: 188 countries have either ratified or acceded to the CWC, another two are signatories

Inspections/visits: As of June 30, 2009, the OPCW Technical Secretariat had completed 3,757 inspections at 195 chemical weapon-related and 1,103 industrial sites on the territory of 81 States Parties. In the United States, a total of 115 industry inspections have occurred as of August 1, 2009. In addition, the OPCW technical Secretariat continues to conduct continuous monitoring activities at active U.S. CW destruction facilities.

Comments: Currently, there are six CW storage and destruction facilities in the United States. These are located in Anniston, Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, Colorado; Richmond, Kentucky, Tooele, Utah; and Hermiston, Oregon. On August 8, 2008, the CW stockpile at the Newport Chemical Depot in Newport, Indiana was successfully eliminated. The Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility is currently undergoing closure operations.

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Opened for signature: September 24, 1996

EIF: Not in force

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: 148 States Parties (including the following three nuclear weapon states: Russia, United Kingdom and France), 181 signatories

Inspections/visits: None

Facility security concerns: The United States was the first nation to sign the Treaty, but has not yet ratified it. If the United States ratifies the CTBT and the Treaty enters into force, inspections would only be pursued in the event that consultations and clarifications do not adequately answer a compliance concern. The International Monitoring System (IMS) collects data remotely and passively to detect possible nuclear explosions. A compliance concern could potentially arise, and an inspection result, due to a mining activity, earthquake, or large subcritical test occurring near a suspected nuclear test site (e.g., in Nevada).

Comments: The CTBT would enter into force 180 days after all the 44 named states with nuclear power and/or research reactors ratify the Treaty. Forty-one of the named states have signed the CTBT (India, Pakistan and North Korea have not) and 35 have ratified it. The U.S. Senate voted not to ratify the CTBT on October 13, 1999.

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Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)

Opened for signature: December 3, 2008

EIF: Not in force

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: As of August 2009, 14 states have ratified and 98 states have signed the Convention

Inspections/visits: None negotiated as of August 2009. States may submit through the U.N. Secretary-General a Request for Clarification to relevant State Parties.

Facility Concerns: None.

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Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Opened for signature: April 10, 1981

EIF: December 2, 1983 (Convention and three Protocols); December 3, 1998 (Amended Protocol II); July 30, 1998 (Protocol IV); and November 12, 2006 (Protocol V)

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: 110 states are parties to the Convention; 108 states have ratified Protocol I; 93 states have ratified Amended Protocol II; 104 states have ratified Protocol III; 95 states have ratified Protocol IV; and 59 states have ratified Protocol V; the United States has ratified all Protocols.

Inspections/visits: None

Facility security concerns: The CCW contains no active verification measures.

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Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

Opened for signature: Awaiting negotiation

EIF: Not in force

Expiration date: TBD

States Parties/Signatories: N/A

Inspections/visits: N/A

Facility security concerns: As of August 2009, the draft FMCT submitted by the United States on May 18, 2006, is still awaiting negotiation, and another draft was submitted by the international Panel on Fissile Materials for consideration. The United States does not believe an effective verification regime for an FMCT is achievable, and continues to oppose negotiations regarding the development of an FMCT inspection and verification regime.

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Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

Opened for signature: December 8, 1987

EIF: June 1, 1988

Expiration date: None; inspections ceased on June 1, 2001, but the Treaty remains in force and is unlimited in duration

States Parties/Signatories: Original signatories include the United States and Russia (Soviet Union prior to December 25, 1991). Additional States Parties include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Inspections/visits: As of May 31, 2001 (treaty year 12), the United States had conducted 540 inspections and Russia had conducted 311 inspections at sites in the United States and in Europe.

Facility security concerns: Continuous on-site portal monitoring was conducted under the INF treaty at Magna, Utah and Votkinsk, Russia from July 1988 to June 1, 2001. Monitoring continues at Votkinsk under START.

Comments: All INF missile systems were eliminated as of May 30, 1991.

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Opened for signature: July 1, 1968

EIF: March 5, 1970

Expiration date: Treaty duration was made unlimited at the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

States Parties/Signatories:190 States Parties; with the withdrawal of North Korea on January 11, 2003, there are four non-States Parties: India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.

Inspections/visits:The NPT obliges all States Parties (except the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) to conclude Safeguards agreements with to IAEA. (The United States and other nuclear weapon states have voluntarily concluded a Safeguards agreement with the IAEA.)

Facility security concerns: No provisions exist under the NPT for on-site inspections. All safeguards activities are carried out by the IAEA in accordance with bilateral safeguards agreements.

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Ottawa Convention

Opened for signature: December 3, 1997

EIF: March 1, 1999

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: 156 States Parties; non-signatories include China, Russia, South Korea and the United States.

Inspections/visits: Although the Convention allows fact-finding missions, none have been requested to date.

Facility security concerns: Although the United States has decided not to join the Convention, U.S. facilities located on the territories of States Parties could be subject to its fact-finding provisions.

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Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA)

Opened for signature: September 23, 1997

EIF: September 23, 1997

Expiration date: None; the Agreement may be terminated one year after written notice from either party

States Parties/Signatories: United States and Russia

Inspections/visits: The United States visited shutdown Russian reactors in March 1999 and July 2000. Russia visited shutdown U.S. reactors in February and October 1998, June 1999, and May 2000. In addition, the United States continues to monitor Russian fissile material stored at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, and expects the remaining reactor at Zheleznogorsk to be shutdown by 2010.

Facility security concerns: There is a potential risk of disclosing sensitive data during on-site visits to shutdown U.S. plutonium production reactors, even though all 14 U.S. reactors have been shut down since 1989. Critical information can be designated as "sensitive" by either Party to prohibit nonparty individuals and organizations from gaining access to such information.

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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

Opened for signature: July 31, 1991

EIF: December 5, 1994

Expiration date: December 5, 2009 (15 years, plus successive 5-year extensions thereafter, as determined by the States Parties)

States Parties/Signatories: United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine

Inspections/visits: As of August 15, 2009, the United States had conducted 647 inspections and Russia had conducted 470. The Treaty also provides for visits with special right of access to address urgent compliance concerns, but none have been requested and none are expected to occur. The Treaty will expire on December 5, 2009, unless a successive 5-year extension is agreed.

Facility security concerns: Inspection procedures are directed at items of inspection and allow close observation, photography, and measurement. Protective measures, such as shrouding, route planning, and limiting access, should provide adequate protection for other critical information and activities at inspection sites.

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Strategic Offensive Arms Reductions Treaty (SORT) (Moscow Treaty)

Opened for signature: May 24, 2002

EIF: June 1, 2003

Expiration date: December 31, 2012

States Parties/Signatories: United States and Russia

Inspections/visits: The Treaty does not stipulate a verification regime but relies on the START verification regime and ongoing threat reduction programs to verify compliance. In preparation for entry into force, the United States conducted 10 site vulnerability assessments during 2002.

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Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

Opened for signature: November 19, 1990

EIF: November 9, 1992 (July 17, 1992 provisional entry into force)

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: 30 States Parties; Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty entered into force December 12, 2007

Inspections/visits: The United States regularly conducts on-site inspections and hosts inspections conducted by other States Parts at U.S. facilities located throughout Europe.

Potential concerns include the right of the inspection team to take photographs, to have access, and to conduct aerial overflights. U.S. facilities collocated with the inspectable facilities of other States Parties may also be vulnerable during inspections at these host nation facilities.

Comments: The Adapted CFE was signed on November 19, 1999 and will enter into force after all 30 States Parties ratify the adapted Treaty. The Adapted CFE replaces the Treaty's bloc-to-bloc structure by setting national and territorial ceilings for treaty limited equipment (TLE).

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Treaty on Open Skies

Opened for signature: March 24, 1992

EIF: January 1, 2002

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: 34 States Parties (of the original 27 signatories, all but Kyrgyzstan have ratified the Treaty).

Inspections/visits: Russia flew four observation missions per year over the United States in 2007 and 2006, and two per year in 2005 and 2004. In 2008, Russia flew four observation missions over the United States. During the second flight, Swedish representatives accompanied the Russian flight crew, making Sweden the only other country besides Russia to overfly the United States. Also during 2008, the United States flew 12 observation missions over Russia and one over Ukraine. Russia and other European States Parties continue to regularly fly observation missions over each other's territory.

Facility security concerns: Facilities located in the United States, as well as those located on the territories of other States Parties, may be overflown with little advance notice and no right of refusal. All States Parties have access to the data collected during observation flights. To obtain information about receiving advance notification of observation flights, contact the DTIRP Coordinator by e-mail at: dtirpoutreach@dtra.mil or call 1-800-419-2899.

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U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement

Opened for signature: November 18, 1977

EIF: December 9, 1980

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: United States, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Inspections/visits: IAEA inspectors visit one DOE declared site monthly. None of the other 240 eligible sites are currently being inspected.

Facility security concerns: The United States allows the IAEA to apply safeguards on "all nuclear activities in the United States, excluding only those with direct national security significance." The primary security concern is the potential inadvertent loss of sensitive and proprietary information impacting U.S. national security or economic competitiveness.

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U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol (AP)

Signed: June 12, 1998

EIF: January 6, 2009

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: United States, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Inspections/visits: Visits at selected declared sites

Facility security concerns: Under the U.S.-IAEA AP, the number of U.S. declared and inspectable sites greatly increased to include nuclear fuel-cycle related facilities and locations not involving nuclear material. Declared sites are obliged to provide detailed information about the facilities, buildings, and activities conducted on site. IAEA inspectors’ rights to have access and to conduct inspection activities are limited by the rights of the United States to manage access and to deny access to activities "with direct national security significance."

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Vienna Document of 1999 (VDOC99)

Opened for signature: Adopted by the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at Istanbul, Turkey, on November 16, 1999

EIF: January 1, 2000

Expiration date: None

States Parties/Signatories: All 56 OSCE participating States

Inspections/visits: Since 1992, an average of four inspections and evaluation visits have been conducted each year at U.S. facilities located within the OSCE's zone of application (ZOA).

Facility security concerns:VDOC99 allows participating States to conduct on-site inspections and evaluation visits for the purpose of confirming the accuracy of information provided in formal information exchanges. Participating States are obligated to accept no more than three on-site inspections each year, and no more than one inspection from the same participating State. The participating State requesting the inspection may designate the area to be inspected. This "specified area" will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating State believes a notifiable military activity is taking place.