

This product provides a quick overview of key facts relating to the implementation of selected arms control treaties and agreements. Included treaties are organized according to the following topics:

[Conventional Weapons](#), [Chemical and Biological Weapons](#), and [Nuclear Weapons](#).

Conventional Weapons

Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention (APLC) (Ottawa Convention)

Opened for signature: December 3, 1997

Entered into force: March 1, 1999

Expiration date: None

States Parties: 159 States Parties

Inspections/visits: Fact-finding missions are provided for in the APLC, but none have yet been requested.

Facility security concerns: Although the United States has decided not to join the APLC, U.S. facilities located on the territories of States Parties could be subject to its fact-finding provisions.

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The **United States** is currently reviewing national landmine use policy. However, the United States has not joined the APLC or CCM, preferring instead to maintain enforcement of CCW protocol II and pursue negotiation of a cluster munitions protocol to the CCW.

Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)

Opened for signature: December 3, 2008

Entered into force: August 1, 2010

Expiration date: None

States Parties/signatories: 76 States Parties; 108 signatories

Inspections/visits: None. States may submit through the United Nations Secretary-General a "Request for Clarification" to specified State Parties.

Facility Concerns: None.

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The **United Nations (UN) Conference on Disarmament (CD)** was established in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. The UN Office at Geneva (UNOG) administers the APLC, BWC, CCM, and CCW. The CD is currently hosting discussions to begin negotiating an FMCT, and was the negotiating body for the BWC, CTBT and NPT. The **UNOG** also hosts meetings on disarmament and nonproliferation, including sessions of the Preparatory Committee for NPT Review Conferences, expert panels and seminars. UN Office at Geneva website: <http://www.unog.ch/>

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Opened for signature: April 10, 1981

Entered into force: December 2, 1983 (Convention and three Protocols); December 3, 1998 (Amended Protocol II); July 30, 1998 (Protocol IV); and November 12, 2006 (Protocol V)

Expiration date: None

States Parties/signatories: 114 states are parties to the Convention; 110 states have ratified Protocol I; 98 states have ratified Amended Protocol II; 106 states have ratified Protocol III; 100 states have ratified Protocol IV; and 78 states have ratified Protocol V; the United States has ratified all Protocols.

Inspections/visits: None

Facility security concerns: The CCW contains no active verification measures.

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United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG)
Conference on Disarmament (CD)

The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** has responsibilities for implementing the CFE Treaty, Open Skies Treaty, VDOC 11, and the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI). The OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) meets weekly in Vienna to make decisions regarding military aspects of security within the OSCE area, focusing in particular on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). OSCE FSC Website: <http://www.osce.org/fsc>

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

Opened for signature: November 19, 1990

Entered into force: November 9, 1992
(July 17, 1992 provisional entry into force)

Expiration date: None

States Parties: 30 States Parties; Russia suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty on December 12, 2007

Inspections/visits: The United States regularly conducts on-site inspections and hosts inspections conducted by other States Parts at U.S. facilities located throughout Europe.

Facility Concerns: Potential concerns include the right of the inspection team to take photographs, to have access, and to conduct aerial overflights. U.S. facilities collocated with the inspectable facilities of other States Parties may also be vulnerable during inspections at these host nation facilities.

Comments: The Adapted CFE was signed on November 19, 1999 and will enter into force after all 30 States Parties ratify the adapted Treaty. The Adapted CFE replaces the treaty's bloc-to-bloc structure by setting national and territorial ceilings for treaty limited equipment (TLE).

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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in Vienna



Open Skies Treaty: Russian and U.S. Inspectors

Open Skies Treaty

Opened for signature: March 24, 1992

Entered into force: January 1, 2002

Expiration date: None

States Parties/signatories: 35 States Parties (of the original 27 signatories, all but Kyrgyzstan have ratified the treaty).

Inspections/visits: In 2012 (as of December 1), Russia had flown eight observation missions over the United States – in 2011 Russia flew six mission over the United States, and five in 2010. In 2008, Swedish representatives accompanied the Russian flight crew during one observation mission over the United States, making Sweden the only other State Party in addition to Russia to overfly the United States.

Also in 2012 (as of December 1), the United States had flown twelve observation missions over Russia and one over Ukraine. During three of the missions over Russia, the United States also overflew Belarus. In 2011, the United States flew 15 missions over Russia and one over Ukraine. Russia and other European States Parties continue to fly frequent observation missions over each others' territories.

Facility security concerns: Facilities located in the United States, as well as those located on the territories of other States Parties, may be overflown with little advance notice and no right of refusal. All States Parties have access to the data collected during observation flights.

To obtain information about receiving advance notification of observation flights, contact the Open Skies Division at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency at 1-703-767-0802.

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Russia's new **TU-214** Open Skies aircraft is equipped with digital cameras and the aircraft's range may enable Russia to increase the number of observation missions it flies over the United States each year.

Vienna Document of 2011 (VDOC11)

Opened for signature: Adopted by the participating States of the OSCE on November 16, 1999

Entered into force: Vienna Document 1999 on January 1, 2000; Vienna Document 2011 on November 30, 2011

Expiration date: None

States Parties: All 56 OSCE participating States

Inspections/visits: Since 1992, an average of four inspections and evaluation visits have been conducted each year at U.S. facilities located within the OSCE's zone of application (ZOA).

Facility security concerns: VDOC 11 allows participating States to conduct on-site inspections and evaluation visits for the purpose of confirming the accuracy of information provided in formal information exchanges.

Participating States are obligated to accept no more than three on-site inspections each year, and no more than one inspection from the same participating State. The participating State requesting the inspection may designate the area to be inspected. This "specified area" will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating State believes a notifiable military activity is taking place.

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Chemical and Biological Weapons

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

Opened for signature: April 10, 1972

Entered into force: March 26, 1975

Expiration date: None

States Parties/signatories: 166 States Parties, 12 signatories have not ratified, and 18 states have not signed or ratified

Inspections/visits: None

Facility security concerns: Foreign visitors could be allowed limited access to U.S. facilities during occasional information sharing and joint research projects. No on-site inspections or visits are conducted to verify compliance with the BWC but the United States voluntarily reports its biological activities and participates in other confidence-building measures.

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The **Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)** is the implementing body of the CWC. The OPCW is mandated to achieve the object and purpose of the CWC, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.
OPCW Website: <http://www.opcw.org/>

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Opened for signature: January 13, 1993

Entered into force: April 29, 1997

Expiration date: None

States Parties/signatories: 188 States Parties; two signatories have not ratified

Inspections/visits: Worldwide, as of August 28, 2012, the OPCW Technical Secretariat had completed 4,779 inspections at 211 chemical weapon (CW)-related and 1,298 industrial facilities located in 81 States Parties.

In the United States, as of December 7, 2012, the OPCW had conducted 188 inspections at industry facilities. The OPCW continues to inspect chemical weapon (CW) storage and former destruction facilities and will resume continuous monitoring activities at the two remaining CW destruction facilities, now under construction at Blue Grass, Kentucky and Pueblo, Colorado, when those facilities become operational. The U.S. Army's Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program (ACWA) has responsibility for construction and operation of the Blue Grass and Pueblo facilities. In January 2012, the Army's Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) marked the end of its CW disposal mission and continues its work to close the four former CW destruction facilities in Alabama, Arkansas, Utah, and Oregon.

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Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague

Nuclear Weapons



Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Opened for signature: September 24, 1996

Entered into force: Not in force

Expiration date: None

States Parties/signatories: 157 States Parties (including Russia, United Kingdom, and France), 183 signatories (including United States)

Inspections/visits: To determine whether a suspected nuclear explosion occurred (after entry into force)

Facility security concerns: Following entry into force, very large inspections could occur in the event that consultations do not adequately clarify a compliance concern. Such a concern could arise due to a mining activity, earthquake, or large subcritical test occurring near a suspected nuclear test site if it is detected by the International Monitoring System (IMS) as a possible nuclear explosion.

Comments: The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after all the 44 named states with nuclear power and/or research reactors ratify the treaty. Forty-one named states have signed the CTBT and 36 have ratified it. The U.S. Senate voted not to ratify the CTBT on October 13, 1999, but the current administration has expressed support for again seeking ratification now that new technologies are in place and the IMS stations are all nearly complete.

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The **Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)** was established in 1996 and is headquartered in Vienna. This organization is building the 337 IMS stations (272 were complete as of October 2012).
CTBTO Website: <http://www.ctbto.org/>

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

Opened for signature: Awaiting negotiation in the United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG) Conference on Disarmament (CD)

Entered into force: Not in force

Expiration date: TBD

States Parties/signatories: N/A

Inspections/visits: N/A

Facility security concerns: The draft FMCT submitted to the CD by the United States in May 2006, and the draft submitted by the International Panel on Fissile Materials in 2009, are both still awaiting negotiation.

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The United States supports the international effort to negotiate an FMCT in the structure of the **UNOG CD**. To date, the CD, which operates on a consensus basis, has been unable to agree on a Program of Work to allow these negotiations to begin.

IAEA Safeguards

Opened for signature: Safeguards Agreement, November 18, 1977; Additional Protocol (AP), June 12, 1998

Entered into force: U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, December 9, 1980; U.S.-IAEA AP, January 6, 2009

Expiration date: None

States Parties: United States, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Inspections/visits: Yes, at declared facilities

Facility security concerns: The United States allows the **IAEA** to apply safeguards on "all nuclear activities in the United States, excluding only those with direct national security significance." The primary security concern is the potential inadvertent loss of sensitive and proprietary information impacting U.S. national security or economic competitiveness. Under the U.S.-IAEA AP, the number of U.S. declared and inspectable sites increased and includes nuclear fuel-cycle related facilities and locations not involving nuclear material. Declared sites are obliged to provide detailed information about the facilities, buildings, and activities conducted on site. IAEA inspectors' rights to access and conduct inspection activities also expanded under the AP, but these rights are limited by U.S. rights to manage access and deny access to activities "with direct national security significance."

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New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)

Signed: April 8, 2010

Entered into force: February 5, 2011

Expiration date: February 5, 2021 (10 years after entry into force; one five-year extension is possible)

States Parties: United States and Russia

Inspections/exhibitions: Up to 18 per year for each Party (up to 10 Type One and up to 8 Type Two)

Facility security concerns: On-site inspection activities may include observation, photography, measurement, and the use of radiation detection equipment. The treaty's verification regime also provides for data exchanges and notifications concerning the status and location of strategic offensive arms and associated facilities. In addition, the treaty contains provisions facilitating the use of national technical means of verification and, to increase confidence and transparency, provides for the exchange of telemetric information on up to five missile flight tests per year.

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Opened for signature: July 1, 1968

Entered into force: March 5, 1970

Expiration date: Treaty duration was made unlimited at the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

States Parties/signatories: 190 States Parties; the four non-States Parties are: India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea (North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003)

Inspections/visits: The NPT obliges all States Parties (except the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to conclude safeguards agreements with to IAEA. The United States and the other nuclear weapon states have all voluntarily concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

Facility security concerns: No provisions exist under the NPT for on-site inspections. All safeguards activities are carried out by the IAEA in accordance with bilateral safeguards agreements.

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For the latest information on treaty implementation, visit the DTIRP website at:

Treaty Synopses: http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/tic_synopses.aspx

Texts & Fact Sheets: <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/factsheets.aspx>

DTIRP Products: <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/Products/Products.aspx>

Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA)

Announced: June 4, 2000; Amendment signed April 13, 2010

Entered into force: July 13, 2011 (The PMDA will be in force for the duration of plutonium disposition activities in each Party. These are planned to begin in 2018.)

Expiration date: None (The PMDA will expire when each party has destroyed a minimum of 34 metric tons of plutonium.)

States Parties/signatories: United States and Russia

Inspections/visits: The PMDA Amendment specifies the rights, obligations, principles, and measures for monitoring and inspecting each Party's disposition activities and their end products. On March 12, 2011, the U.S. and Russian Co-Chairmen of the PMDA's Joint Consultative Commission also approved a number of key measures clarifying how monitoring and inspection activities will be developed and carried out. The next steps for the PMDA include negotiating an agreement whereby the IAEA will monitor and inspect the Parties' disposition activities to verify compliance with the PMDA.

Facility security concerns: None

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Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA)

Opened for signature: September 23, 1997

Entered into force: September 23, 1997

Expiration date: None; the PPRA may be terminated one year after written notice from either Party

States Parties/signatories: United States and Russia

Inspections/visits: The United States visited shutdown Russian reactors in March 1999 and July 2000. Russia visited shutdown U.S. reactors in February and October 1998, June 1999, and May 2000. In addition, the United States continues to monitor Russian fissile material stored at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk.

Facility security concerns: There is a potential risk of disclosing sensitive data during on-site visits to shutdown U.S. plutonium production reactors, even though all 14 U.S. reactors have been shut down since 1989. Each Party has the right to designate critical information as "sensitive" for the purpose of prohibiting nonparty individuals and organizations from gaining access to such information.

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