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CBW Corner

CBW Corner

Providing a resource for arms control treaty implementers to assist them with keeping
up-to-date on the issues and events critical to understanding and eliminating chemical and biological weapons.

Notable Quotes Archive

“The safe destruction of more than 2.2 million chemical nerve and blister agent munitions and bulk containers at seven demilitarization facilities is a remarkable accomplishment for the [Army Chemical Material Agency (CMA)] workforce at each site and systems contractors who operated each facility. It also is a tribute to the cooperative spirit of the local officials, regulators and communities. Reaching this milestone has been a team effort – a team I’m proud to be part of.”
–Heidi Shyu, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology

"It’s good to have that behind us."
–David Ostler, long-time member of the Utah Citizens Advisory Commission, on the successful completion of the destruction of chemical weapons at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility at Deseret Chemical Depot in January 2012.
[Related Story]

"So we are happy with the results [of the BWC Review Conference]. We think they are significant for not only the United States as we move ahead on advancing the President’s national strategy for countering biological threats, but that they have the same value for all of our partners around the world who share this concern about potential biological and toxic threats.”
–Thomas Countryman, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, speaking about the seventh BWC Review Conference which ended December 22, 2011

"Deseret Chemical Depot’s [DCD] Area 10 liquid incinerator (ATLIC) today began destruction operations targeting the last bulk agent stockpile - less than one dozen ton containers of Lewisite blister agent. [...] [Operations] are expected to [be] complete[d] by late January marking the end of the chemical weapons destruction mission at DCD."
–U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in her statement to the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, on December 7, 2011.

”[W]e need to bolster international confidence that all countries are living up to our obligations under the Convention. It is not possible, in our opinion, to create a verification regime that will achieve this goal. But we must take other steps. To begin with, we should revise the Convention’s annual reporting systems to ensure that each party is answering the right questions, such as what we are each all doing to guard against the misuse of biological materials.”
–U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in her statement to the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, on December 7, 2011.

"At the end of the Cold War, the United States joined together with other nations in the Chemical Weapons Convention to state in unequivocal terms that we will end our chemical weapons programs and destroy existing stockpiles, precursor chemicals, production facilities and weapons delivery systems."
–U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton

"Biological and chemical threats are often the step child, or the orphan, after nuclear and radiological [threats] and I think its a function of the human experience that when we think about really what would keep us up at night, it's a mushroom cloud. Yet, if you look at the pound for pound or ounce for ounce threat, you look at the biological or chemical side of the equation, we are probably in many ways much more threatened by threats that come from the biological or chemical world."
–UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task force chairman Assistant UN Secretary General Robert Orr, on the need for improved global cooperation in efforts to deter and address biological and chemical arms

“Today, the employees of the [Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility] UMCDF made their mark on history by completing agent destruction operations. More than 1,000 dedicated Army and contractor employees have made Oregon safer for its citizens. Additionally, their efforts successfully achieved the Chemical Weapons Convention mandate to destroy the depot’s chemical weapons by April 2012. Congratulations on jobs well done.”
–Gary Anderson, Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Site Project Manager

"We've had this danger for so many years. And people have accepted this danger, in the Hermiston area anyway. All of a sudden it's gone. . . . It's a great feeling, it's kind of exciting, but sort of a weird feeling. But we'll get over it."
–Army spokesman Jim Hackett, on the impending final destruction of chemical weapons at Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon

“This is a great day for the U.S. Army, the people of Alabama and our nation. Thanks to the steadfast dedication of the Anniston team – the United States Army, its civilian workers and contractors – the Anniston community, the state of Alabama, and our nation are all safer today. I could not be more proud of our workforce.”
–Conrad Whyne, Director, U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) and Acting Program Manager for the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program

“For the first time in 48 years, neither Anniston Chemical Activity nor Anniston Army Depot employees are storing nerve agent or mustard agent munitions. That’s huge news.”
– Lt. Col. Willie J. Flucker, Commander of the Anniston Chemical Activity, on the milestone of the last chemical agent projectile being removed from igloo storage there on September 8, 2011.

"The era of chemical munitions at Umatilla Chemical Depot is rapidly closing. The government and contractor workforce is working around the clock to safely destroy the mustard agent and we are ahead of schedule to meet the international treaty deadline.”
–Gary Anderson, Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility System Project Manager

"Jonathan [Tucker] was a rare breed in that he knew the science of the issue, which was really complicated, and also knew the policy side. He was one of really a handful of people that could talk to both of these audiences, to both chemists and diplomats.”
– Paul Carroll, program director at the Ploughshares Fund, a nonproliferation group. Biological weapons expert Jonathan B. Tucker was found dead in his home on 31 July 2011.

"I think we have to devote attention to the issue of compliance and verification, not only at the review conference but also, probably, in the intersessional process. The issue is not off the table and there are many countries who want to keep it on the table in some form or the other.”
– Paul van den Ijssel, president-designate for the BWC Seventh Review Conference to be held in Geneva this December; quoted on June 29, 2011.

"The static detonation chamber – the small facility that is handling the problematic munitions still in the stockpile – that piece of the operation is honestly going a little bit slower than we initially forecasted. . . . That’s not bad; it’s just that we were very, very optimistic early on. Now that we have operational experience behind us, our optimism has been tempered … with reality."
– Army spokesman Mike Abrams on pushing back the estimated end date for destruction of mustard munitions at the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility

"We hope we have set this aside and instead are working on practical measures without resurrecting the old divisive debate on whether it might be possible to negotiate a verification regime."
– Ambassador Laura Kennedy, U.S. permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament and U.S. special representative for BWC issues, on her experience at the April 13-14, 2011 Preparatory Committee meetings for the Seventh BWC Review Conference to be held in Geneva in December 2011.

"No one back in [1992 or 1993] really understood how complicated and expensive and contentious and dangerous the [CW] demilitarization process would really be..."
– Paul Walker, Global Green, USA

"The reason why the United States and Russia can't ... [complete CW demilitarization] by April 2012 is not bad will. Simply, the process turned out to be much more complicated, much more resource-intensive."
– Serguei Batsanov, appointed to the OPCW advisory committee on the future of the CWC; also Moscow's chief CWC negotiator in the late 1980s – early 1990s

"The OPCW represents a successful example of multilateral cooperation to promote peace and security. . . . The firm commitments of the States Parties to ensure that the norms of the convention are translated into concrete actions have yielded significant results. . . . Over the last 14 years, steady progress has been made by the organization towards the goal of a chemical-weapons-free world."
– OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü, in his opening remarks at the seminar on the OPCW’s contribution to security and nonproliferation of chemical weapons in The Hague on April 11, 2011

"The possible misapplication of technological development in the area of life sciences and the risk posed by development or use of a biological or toxin weapon by states or nonstate actors are major issues for the international community,"

– From the 10-point statement on the upcoming BWC Review Conference released March 15, 2011 by the foreign ministers at the Group of Eight [G-8] [Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States] meeting in France.

"...to manage the full spectrum of biological risks... you need a cohesive, coordinated network of activities and resources. Such a network will help to ensure that biological science and technology can be safely and securely developed for the benefit of all."

– United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon

FBI and Army scientists opening an anthrax-laden
letter sent to Senator Patrick Leahy in 2001.

"I still wonder who sent it and why they sent it."
– U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, questioning the FBI's conclusion in 2010 that a scientist working at an Army installation perpetrated the 2001 anthrax mail attacks that killed five people.

"Our position is that we need to have the [smallpox] virus collections maintained for the foreseeable future."
-unnamed U.S. official on the debate concerning the destruction of the world’s known remaining samples of smallpox virus

"A verification regime [for the BWC] is not more feasible than it was in 2001, and perhaps even less so, given the evolution of technology and industry."
–- Laura Kennedy, special representative to lead the Obama administration's delegation to the 2011 Biological Weapons Convention review conference

"In response to a biological attack, you do things other than what you need for a basic health response, but if you don't have public health response in place, [and] you don't have disease surveillance and other measures, you have a problem. You haven't taken the first step."
-Christopher Park, director of the biological policy staff in the U.S. State Department's International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau.

"We were working to squeeze every last bit of efficiency out of safe, but outdated, technology . . . It was like a car that you got tuned up but it still didn't accelerate fast enough when we needed it to."
- Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, 23 September 2010, on the government’s planned $1.9 billion revamp of the nation's medical countermeasure enterprise

"In our domestic efforts, the United States has come to appreciate that the key to effective response to a biological event – whether we are dealing with an event on our own territory or assisting others – is preparedness. It is the steps that we take before an event that determine how successful we will be in dealing with an attack, or other disease outbreak, should it take place."
- Phillip A. Foley, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Counterproliferation, Delegation of the United States, in his opening remarks to the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts, 23 August 2010

"I am extremely honored to assume the leadership of this great Organization, which in the short span of its existence has already distinguished itself as a successful example of effective multilateralism in action."
- Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü of Turkey, upon taking up office as the new Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), on July 24, 2010

"The strong commitment shown by the possessor States in fulfilling their obligations proves that complete chemical disarmament under the terms of the [Chemical Weapons] Convention is indeed an attainable goal, and has made a significant contribution to international peace and security.”
- Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, OPCW Director-General, on the milestone of surpassing 60 percent destruction of global chemical weapons stockpiles

"The Obama administration will not seek to revive negotiations on a verification protocol to the convention. We have carefully reviewed previous efforts to develop a verification protocol and have determined that a legally binding protocol would not achieve meaningful verification or greater security. . . . We believe that a protocol would not be able to keep pace with the rapidly changing nature of the biological weapons threat."
- Ellen Tauscher, U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, in her Address to the Annual Meeting of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, December 9, 2009

"The Obama administration’s new strategy for countering biological threats—both natural and man-made—rests upon the main principle of the Biological Weapons Convention: that the use of biological weapons is `repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’ . . . Our new strategy has a clear, overarching goal … to protect against the misuse of science to develop or use biological agents to cause harm.”
- Ellen Tauscher, U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, in her Address to the Annual Meeting of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, December 9, 2009

"The professional, dedicated government and contract workers at all of our locations are making great strides to safely eliminate our chemical weapons stockpile, making our nation and the world safer.”
- Conrad F. Whyne, Director of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA), 6 October 2009, on CMA’s safe destruction of its two millionth munition since entry-into-force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

"These experts' contributions will be crucial to help us review our existing disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment capacities … [which] strengthen the Convention both by enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange for peaceful purposes, and by improving capabilities for preventing and responding to illicit uses of biological agents and toxins". [Emphasis added]
- Marius Grinius, Chairman of the 2009 Meeting of Experts, States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, 24-28 August 2009

"On this Remembrance Day, let us honor the victims of chemical warfare by reaffirming our commitment to build a world where, in the words of the [Chemical Weapons] Convention, achievements in the field of chemistry are used exclusively for the benefit of mankind.”
- United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, on the Remembrance Day for All Victims of Chemical Warfare, 29 April 2009

"These [chemical] weapons have been safely stored since ’63; we don't want to store them any longer than necessary, and we can’t move them, so let’s destroy them."

- Mike Abrams, Anniston Chemical Disposal Facility public affairs official

"I congratulate the government of the Dominican Republic for its decision to ratify the Convention, which draws us closer to the goal of realizing a universal ban on chemical weapons, and we call upon those remaining States that have not yet adhered to the CWC to do so without further delay."
- Rogelio Pfirter, Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

"Iraq's accession [to the CWC] draws us closer to the Convention's goal of the universal ban on chemical weapons, and we call upon those nine states that have not yet adhered to the Convention to do so without delay."
- Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

"It’s official. The last VX-filled land mine ... stored here has been safely demilitarized."
-Timothy Garrett, Site Project Manager, Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF), AL

"We can be satisfied that we are taking the right steps to strengthen the Convention. I have been impressed by the strength of common purpose exhibited throughout our work this year and the degree of involvement of the scientific community. We have worked together in a positive and collegial atmosphere to focus on practical measures. "
-Chairman Georgi Avramchev of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, at the closing of the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, 5 December 2008

"Since our last meeting, quietly and without the public recognition it rightly deserves, a state party completed the destruction of its entire chemical weapons stockpile, becoming the second state party to do so, and before its deadline. "
-U.S. Ambassador to the OPCW Eric Javits

"There is a long way to go, but I do believe that this demonstrates that the United States doesn't have permanent enemies. "
-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on diplomatic progress with Libya

"The line we end up drawing probably leaves no one happy. Those who favor the most rigorous lab security will say it's not enough, and those who are doing their research will say it's too much. "
-Richard Besser, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, on the problem of biosurety

"It's important to make sure the treaty is upheld, that the weapons are destroyed, and we prevent them ever being developed again. "
- British professor and chemical weapons expert Alastair Hay, on the Chemical Weapons Convention

"We know we’re all working ourselves out of a job "
- Chuck Doscher, control room worker at the Anniston Army Depot, on the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile

"The Second Review Conference provides an invaluable opportunity to unequivocally affirm the ability of multilateralism to effectively advance the objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation and the value and necessity of the Chemical Weapons Convention. "
-OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter, in his opening address to the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention

"These [chemical] weapons will not make a strategic difference in the Middle East. These are just weapons of terror for civilians, "
-OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter, in a press interview, urging Israel, Egypt, and Syria to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, 4 April 2008

"In my 24 years working for CMA, I have witnessed the unfailing dedication of these individuals to safely storing and ultimately eliminating our former chemical warfare program. I look forward to upholding CMA’s remarkable safety and environmental standards."
-Conrad Whyne, new Director of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA), January 25, 2008

"We have had a very productive meeting, and have made a good start on our goal of moving from adjacency to synergy in our efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention, in the areas we have been looking at of enhancing national implementation and regional and subregional cooperation."
-Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, Chairman of the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, on the recent Meeting of States Parties, 14 December 2007.

"Our States Parties can be rightly proud of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the OPCW as examples of the success multilateralism can achieve."
-OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter, addressing the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee, 17 October 2007

"We believe that Codes [of Conduct] can become an increasingly important tool in the fight against bioweapons proliferators and the biothreat overall. Concerns about the misuse of biotechnology and a desire to preserve the free flow of scientific information have spurred discussion about the professional responsibility of the scientific community and the proper role of national governments in promoting standards."
-Ambassador Donald Mahley, U.S. Head of Delegation, Excerpt from Opening Remarks to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Annual Meeting of States Parties, 5 December 2005

"The Chemical Weapons Convention is a union of obligation and incentive. In joining the Convention, States Parties commit to meeting their implementation requirements. In return, States Parties avail themselves of certain benefits available only to States Parties. Examples include..."
-Peter Lichtenbaum, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce

"Significant progress has indeed been made in meeting Article VII obligations, particularly during the course of 2005. But we should not spend too much time congratulating each other just yet. With just 4 months of our 2-year action plan left to go, it seems clear that a number of States Parties that only recently began to take serious action will fall short of the goal of full national implementation by the 10th Conference. More troubling, it seems very likely that by the time of the Conference, there will still be a number of States Parties that have not taken even the first, most basic steps â€" though I am pleased to say that no current members of this Council fall into this latter group. We need to redouble our efforts in these last few months: those of us that can provide assistance must do so; those that have national implementation tasks yet to complete, must work assiduously to accomplish them. This is not the time to give up or to reduce our effort, but to make a renewed push."
-Ambassador Eric M. Javits, Head of the U.S. Delegation, Statement to the Forty-First Session of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 28 June 2005

"I've no doubt that our upcoming discussions will also amply demonstrate that there is no "one size fits all" approach to codes of conduct. A universal code of conduct is not, in our view, feasible. Instead, my delegation will measure the success of this meeting in the extent to which it contributes to enhancing recognition by experts and States Parties of scientists' professional responsibilities. Ethical and responsible behavior by national scientists complements States Parties' national compliance objectives as well as overall international security."
-Ambassador Donald Mahley, U.S. Head of Delegation, Opening Statement, Biological Weapons Convention Experts Meeting, 13 June 2005

"Verification, compliance assessment and compliance enforcement are the three components of a policy process wherein information about a state's actions is weighed against its obligations and commitments, and if it is determined that the state is not fulfilling its obligations and commitments, steps are identified and taken to induce or enforce compliance."
-Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State

"Our analysis has centered on a perspective that drew heavily on our understanding of the utility underlying the approach BWC States Parties have adopted in this Work Program. One of the outcomes of this process is the recognition that there is a real need to find creative new ways to improve the global response to the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, in this case specifically the biological threat. One need only look as far as the unanimous support for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to see how critical these issues are for international security."
-Ambassador Donald Mahley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Implementation, Remarks to the Annual Meeting of States Parties for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 6 December 2004

"The Bush administration is reinventing the nonproliferation regime it inherited, crafting policies to fill gaping holes, reinforcing earlier patchwork fixes, assembling allies, creating precedents and changing perceived realities and stilted legal thinking. The frontlines in our nonproliferation strategy must extend beyond the well-known rogue states to the trade routes and entities engaged in supplying proliferant countries. This can properly be described not as "nonproliferation," but as "counterproliferation." To accomplish this, we are making more robust use of existing authorities, including sanctions, interdiction and credible export controls. Most importantly, we have taken significant steps to improve coordination between sovereign states to act against proliferators."
-John Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, 7 September 2004

"Last September, I called on the United Nations Security Council to urge the cooperative action of all U.N. members against the illicit trafficking of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. I commend today's unanimous Security Council resolution, which answers that call. It now remains for all member states to act on the measures urged by this resolution. Member states should enact strict export controls, criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and secure all related materials within their borders. Today's resolution is an important achievement. We must continue to press these efforts to ensure that the world's most destructive weapons are kept from the world's most dangerous regimes and organizations."
-President George W. Bush, 28 April 2004

"We have seen some dramatic things take place within the last few days. We saw Libya decide, after many years, that it wasn't worth the game, it wasn't worth the candle, to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction. And as a result, a very, very solid diplomacy on the part of the United Kingdom and the United States working with the Libyans, you are aware of the announcements that have been made, and we are following up to make sure that we get verified removal of those weapons and programs of mass destruction, and then we will be in conversation with the Libyans as to what the nature of our relationship will be in the future. But verify first."
-Secretary of State Colin Powell, 8 January 2004

"...[T]he safe dismantlement and disposal of a CW arsenal is no easy matter. While the total costs of this undertaking in the United States are currently estimated at $24 billion, we remain steadfastly committed to the safe, environmentally sound, and verifiable destruction of our stockpile. Since entry into force, we have met every treaty milestone, and to date have destroyed over 22% of our stockpile."
-Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker, Statement at the First Review Conference of the CWC, 28 April 2003

"Gas achieved but local success, nothing decisive; it made war uncomfortable, to no purpose."
-Sir James Edmonds, History of the Great War: Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1918. Volume 5. (Macmillan, London, 1947)

"Coalition experts on fermentation and systems engineering examined the trailer found in late April and have been unable to identify any legitimate industrial use--such as water purification, mobile medical laboratory, vaccine or pharmaceutical production--that would justify the effort and expense of a mobile production capability. We have investigated what other industrial processes may require such equipment--a fermentor, refrigeration, and a gas capture system--and agree with the experts that BW agent production is the only consistent, logical purpose for these vehicles."
--Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants, Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency report, released 28 May 2003

"...Much progress has been made since the entry into force of the Convention, to which there are now 151 States Parties. However, serious concerns exist that there remain States not Party to the Convention. The States Parties reaffirm, in particular, that achieving the goals of the Convention requires ratification or accession by those States that cause serious concern. The States Parties pledge to intensify their bilateral and multilateral efforts towards universality of the Convention, and urge all States not Party to join the Convention without delay...."
--Political Declaration as approved by the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Released 12 May 2003

"...we will find weapons of mass destruction. For the last three weeks we've been fighting battles, and once this combat period is over we can then turn our attention to finding the weapons of mass destruction. And I think they will be found. That was the basis upon which we went in, and I think there is strong evidence. There's no question about the fact that there are weapons of mass destruction, and they will be looking for them.... There is, I think, a higher likelihood of there being chemical and biological weaponry. The nuclear program we also think is there, but we don't think it was as advanced as, perhaps, their chemical and biological weapons programs were."
--U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Interviewed by Sir David Frost, BBC, 12 April 2003

"On the road to Anab, many of the women and children began to die. The chemical clouds were on the ground. They were heavy. We could see them." People were dying all around, he said. When a child could not go on, the parents, becoming hysterical with fear, abandoned him. "Many children were left on the ground, by the side of the road. Old people as well. They were running, then they would stop breathing and die."
--Jeffrey Goldberg, writing in the New Yorker magazine 25 March 2003, relates the account of one survivor, Nouri Hama Ali, who led his family toward Anab, a resettlement center outside Halabja for those whose villages had been destroyed by the Iraqi Army. The gas attack occurred on 16 March 1988 in Halabja, Iraq.

"It is vital to realize that the continued use of chemical weapons in the present conflict increases the risk of their use in future conflicts. In view of this, and as individuals who witnessed first hand the terrible effects of chemical weapons, we again make a special plea to you to try to do everything in your power to stop the use of such weapons in the Iran-Iraq conflict and thus ensure that they are not used in future conflicts. ...In our view, only concerted efforts at the political level can be effective in ensuring that all the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 abide by their obligations. Otherwise, if the Protocol is irreparably weakened after 60 years of general international respect, this may lead, in the future, to the world facing the specter of the threat of biological weapons..."
--From the report of the third UN mission to investigate CW use during the Iran-Iraq war, 1987

[The Tartars], fatigued by such a plague and pestiferous disease, stupefied and amazed, observing themselves dying without hope of health ordered cadavers placed on their hurling machines and thrown into the city of Caffa, so that by means of those intolerable passengers the defenders died widely.
--Gabriel De Mussis,
on the Siege of Kaffa, 1346 CE

The effects of the successful gas attack were horrible. I am not pleased with the idea of poisoning men. Of course the entire world will rage about it first and then imitate us. All the dead lie on their backs with clenched fists; the whole field is yellow.
--Rudolf Binding, April 1915

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