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Treaty Issues in Depth
The BWC Intersessional Work Plan

The U.S. decision to reject the BWC Protocol was based on its view that a legally-binding compliance mechanism was not viable. Specifically, Under Secretary of State, John Bolton outlined three reasons for this decision: "first, [the BWC Protocol] was based on a traditional arms control approach that will not work on biological weapons; second, it would have compromised national security and confidential business information; and third, it would have been used by proliferators to undermine other effective international export control regimes."⁴ The U.S. Government believes that traditional arms control methods cannot effectively be used to detect and prevent the development and use of biological weapons (BW) due to the dual-use nature of BW. In addition, the scope and level of effort required to verify compliance with the Convention would be immense. Also, the draft Protocol, as it was written, did not sufficiently address the potential threat posed by proliferators gaining access to sensitive technology. Further, the Protocol did not adequately address the possibility of States Parties attempting to gain technological information under the auspices of the BWC.

Although the U.S. Government rejected the Protocol, the United States still favors strengthening compliance with the Convention through alternative solutions. Referring to the BWC, Under Secretary Bolton stated that "we must first confront the failure of many states to abide by that very document. Too many states are parties to the BWC but have not lived up to their commitments."⁵ To address these concerns, the United States proposed the following nine voluntary national measures that states could implement to demonstrate compliance with the Convention:

• prohibit acquisition of biological agents or toxins by terrorist groups or organizations;
• enact national criminal legislation;
• prosecute or extradite biological weapons' offenders;
• declare the possession of biological agents to a governmental authority;
• monitor access to dangerous microorganisms;
• disclose accidental releases of pathogens;
• restrict the possession of dangerous organisms;
• oversee genetic engineering programs; and
• develop a professional code of conduct for scientists.

At the resumed Fifth RevCon in 2002, Chairman Tibor Toth proposed a new work plan which included some of the measures proposed by the United States. These measures were designed to alleviate the impasse and to facilitate continuing the RevCon's work on strengthening compliance with the Convention. The solution received a mixed response. The Western Group supported the work plan but the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States expressed their disappointment with the failure of the Protocol. Nevertheless, the new work plan was adopted by the States Parties. This program consisted of annual meetings. Each year, a Meeting of Experts would be followed by a meeting of the States Parties "to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on" issues to enhance compliance with the BWC.⁶ Specific topics were established for each set of annual meetings. In 2003, the topic was to identify national measures for implementing the prohibitions contained in the Convention and for enhancing the security of pathogens. In 2004, the focus was on responding to suspicious outbreaks of disease and on enhancing efforts to combat infectious disease. In 2005, the focus will be on developing codes of conduct for scientists. Each Meeting of Experts includes technical specialists sent from individual States Parties and from international organizations. These experts discuss the specified issues and prepare recommendations for the upcoming annual meeting of the States Parties. At their meeting, the States Parties review the work of the Meeting of Experts and continue the discussion on the topics.

At the 2003 Meeting of Experts, the group discussed a number of national measures for implementing the prohibitions of the Convention. These included: regulatory and penal legislation; international cooperation; education and training; and enforcement. National measures for securing pathogenic microorganisms and toxins included: national and international standards; risk assessment; consequence management; transport and transfer issues; and issues involving licensing, accreditation and authorization. At the 2003 meeting of States Parties, the parties agreed to: review, enact or update regulatory and penal measures to improve implementation of the BWC; to increase security on pathogens and toxins; and to provide voluntary assistance to other members in implementing national measures. The States Parties also recognized the value of biosecurity measures and methods.

The 2004 Meeting of Experts addressed measures to strengthen disease surveillance and to increase international capabilities for detecting infectious diseases as well as for responding to allegations of the use of BW or suspicious outbreaks of disease. A number of States Parties submitted outlines of their respective governments' measures addressing these topics. They also provided suggestions for further action. During the subsequent meeting of States Parties, the members agreed to continue to support and develop mechanisms for enhancing disease surveillance capabilities and for responding to suspicious outbreaks of disease. With regard to the surveillance and detection of infectious diseases, the members acknowledged that states were ultimately responsible for the "surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases."⁷ The States Parties also acknowledged that the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) were responsible, within their stated mandates, for international issues. The States Parties, however, acknowledged that they should coordinate and cooperate with these organizations, as well as with each other, to more effectively combat infectious diseases. With regard to responding to allegations of the use of biological or toxin weapons and to suspicious outbreaks of disease, the States Parties agreed that national actions added significantly to the ability of the international sphere to respond to such events. They also acknowledged that the United Nations Secretary General's investigation mechanism was an application that could investigate cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.

In his remarks on the 2004 BWC work plan, U.S. Ambassador Donald Mahley expressed his belief that the intersessional meetings were encouraging participation, discussion and information sharing among its members and that these efforts would prove to be useful.⁸ Following the 2005 meetings, the States Parties will meet for the Sixth RevCon in 2006. At this meeting, the States Parties will review the work of the intersessional meetings and will determine the future direction of the BWC.